Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004779

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/65984/2023
LP/10928/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PERKINS

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

HAROON AQSAD
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr M Iqbal, Counsel, instructed by Briton Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 9 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal allowing the appeal of the respondent, hereinafter “the claimant”, against a decision of the Secretary of State refusing him leave to remain on human rights grounds. The appeal was allowed solely on human rights grounds with reference to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. There had an appeal against a decision to refuse him international protection but that was not pursued before the First-tier Tribunal.
2. It was a feature of the case that by the time the appeal was heard by the First-tier Tribunal the claimant and his partner had a child. The judge found, uncontroversially, that the claimant and his partner were not “partners” within the meaning of Appendix FM because they were neither legally married nor had they had two years or more cohabitation. The judge reminded himself of the provisions of Section 117B(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 which says that in a case of a person not liable to deportation the public interest does not require that person’s removal where there was a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child and it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the United Kingdom.
3. At paragraph 7 in the Decision and Reasons the judge said that it was:
“… clearly in the best interests of this child to grow up with all the benefits of living in the UK. Here he has a supportive family in steady employment, housing and the advantages of education and health services. In Pakistan, he would face a much more limited existence in all of these matters. The test of whether it would be reasonable for him to live in Pakistan must be viewed through that lens. Whilst criminal deportation is a separate category, on these facts the respondent did not point to any pressing public policy reason to support the de facto exclusion of the child through the removal of his father. The relocation of the family to Pakistan would bring enormous detriment to the child’s future prospects. The father is a long-term overstayer, who has made repeated failed applications but he does not present any risk to the public. He is educated, speaks English and I find he would work and be self-sufficient. It would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the UK. The appeal is therefore allowed on Article 8 ECHR grounds”.
4. At paragraph 3 of the Decision and Reasons the First-tier Tribunal Judge said:
“At the hearing, both the [claimant] and his wife relied upon witness statements and were cross-examined. It was not put to them they were lying about any issue. I found them both to be highly credible because they gave consistent, nuanced and comprehensive evidence that matched the documentary material”.
5. Mr Iqbal said that this was a very important finding that illuminated the rest of the decision.
6. The Secretary of State relies on all the grounds of appeal and I have considered all of them but the following points from the grounds seem to me to be particularly important.
7. It was said that the judge failed to give lawful reasons for finding that it would be disproportionate to require the child, who it is accepted is a British citizen, to leave the United Kingdom to live in Pakistan. The grounds contend at paragraph (c) that the claimant’s partner has clear ties with Pakistan.
8. Further, the judge’s very clear finding that the child would face a “much more limited existence” in Pakistan and that living in Pakistan will bring “enormous detriment to the child’s future prospects” were said to be unsustainable because they were not supported by reference to the evidence, particularly not the background evidence or country guidance. It was for the appellant to show why it would not be reasonable for the child to remove to Pakistan and there was no evidence before the judge to support that conclusion.
9. Additionally, under paragraph (d), the judge had failed to explain why it is unobjectionable to expect the appellant, with or without his family, to live temporarily in Pakistan before applying to return to the United Kingdom.
10. The grounds also contend that the judge unlawfully underestimated the public interest in the claimant’s removal. He is not a foreign criminal but he does have a history of overstaying.
11. I remind myself that the claimant and his now wife were believed and I consider, as Mr Iqbal urged, the witness statements.
12. The claimant’s statement was concerned largely with his protection claim which was not pursued. He said at paragraph 23 how he received a telephone call from his uncle that was very threatening and his father and brother also contacted him and made similar threats. He said that “No one is willing to accept me as a family member in Pakistan”. His father had disowned him and indicated that by placing a newspaper advertisement which was produced.
13. The claimant’s wife described how they had built their life together and were enjoying being parents. The claimant was very much involved in the life of his young son. Their child missed his father. She said at paragraph 3.8:
“I will be unable to fulfil my parental responsibilities towards our son in the absence of [the claimant]. I would not imagine doing it singlehandedly and it will badly affect the care of our son needs. I believe [the claimant’s] absence from the company of our son will devastate lives of all family members”.
14. She then expressed the view that the claimant’s absence would be harmful and significant. She insisted that she could not relocate to Pakistan. She described herself as a British citizen with strong ties to the United Kingdom where she enjoyed a stable and well-paying job and removal would also impact “severely” on her ability to earn money to provide for the family.
15. I have to reflect carefully on the findings here. I find it significant that there is no challenge to the very favourable credibility findings. It would have been more helpful if the First-tier Tribunal Judge had given fuller reasons for reaching the decision but the evidence of the witnesses was believed and that evidence shows deep concern for the effect on the child of separation from the father and the need of the father’s presence in the United Kingdom to enable the mother to continue working and earning at a high level.
16. I am not sure how much it helps either party but any suggestion that it would be a seamless step to leave the United Kingdom and then come back again based on the wife’s income is not sustainable on the findings that have been made.
17. The main reasons in the grounds of appeal, or at least what appeared to me to be the main reasons when I first read this case, are made out. The simple assertion that it would, almost “obviously” be so much better for the child to remain in the United Kingdom is not explained and possibly not supported but that is not the end of the matter. There was clear accepted evidence of the bad effect on the child and the mother of the claimant’s removal, and that the claimant’s wife would not leave the United Kingdom. Whilst it may not be that every judge would necessarily have decided the case the same way on the facts as found, despite Ms Clewley’s measured but determined efforts, I am not satisfied that the Tribunal erred in law and I dismiss the Secretary of State’s appeal.
Notice of Decision
18. The Secretary of State’s appeal is dismissed.
Jonathan Perkins
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
12 February 2026