Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004788

First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/00425/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

MN
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No representation
For the Respondent: Ms. L. Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify her. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Namibia who has sought asylum in the UK. The First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) made an anonymity order in her appeal, and I consider that it is appropriate for that order to continue. The appellant claims to have been a victim of sexual violence and therefore anonymity is required under Section 1 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992.
2. The appellant claimed asylum on the grounds that she is at real risk of gender-based violence from her uncle and her husband, who is also her cousin. She has a son who was born in the UK in August 2022 and who is a dependant on her claim. The respondent refused her asylum claim and the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) dismissed her appeal against that refusal in a decision promulgated on 26 June 2025. She has been granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the ground that it is arguable that the FTT overlooked the evidence and written submissions she had submitted prior to the appeal hearing.

Background
3. The appellant arrived in the UK on 2 April 2022 and claimed asylum. The respondent interviewed her about her claim in November 2023 and on 10 January 2025, she refused it. The respondent rejected the appellant’s account of having been a victim of forced marriage and gender-based violence as inconsistent with the country evidence in her CPIN, Namibia: Women fearing gender-based violence (September 2021) and implausible. The appellant had submitted a document purporting to be a police report of her complaint that she had been raped by her husband in January 2016, but the respondent put little weight on it due to a handwritten amendment to a date stamp and because the appellant had not explained how she obtained it. A letter of support from a friend in Namibia was also rejected for lack of evidence of its provenance. Newspaper articles describing large protests in Namibia against the lack of police action against femicide and gender-based violence were rejected – somewhat surprisingly – as not relevant to the claim.
4. The appellant appealed, and on 11 March 2025, she submitted a number of documents. These included a document entitled “Appellant’s Skeleton Arguments”. This was unsigned and written in the third person. The appellant confirmed at the hearing before me that she had drafted the document with the assistance of a friend, whom she had not paid. The document contains a summary of the appellant’s case, a list of issues in dispute, and a detailed response to the reasons for refusal letter. It thus combines submissions about the conclusions that should be drawn from the evidence, such as would typically be found in a skeleton argument, with assertions of fact about the appellant’s personal experience, such as would normally be set out in a witness statement. The appellant has called this document her “statement”, and it was agreed at the hearing that we would continue to use this term for the sake of simplicity. It is clear, however, that the document did not comply with the necessary formalities for witness statements before the FTT.
5. I set out here only the submissions made in this statement that I consider material to my decision:
(i) Although there was some machinery of state protection in place, the police would not take action against the appellant’s husband because they viewed domestic violence as a family issue and because of his power and influence as a traditional headman;
(ii) When assessing the credibility of the appellant’s account of her conduct during her marriage, her claim to have been a victim of “slavery” who had been “groomed and under constant manipulations” needed to be taken into account;
(iii) The news articles she had submitted to the respondent in support of her asylum claim showed that gender-based violence was prevalent in Namibia;
(iv) The appellant had PTSD, as indicated by the medication she had been prescribed: Omeprazole, Sertraline and Naproxen; evidence of the prescriptions was attached; and
(v) Her son was “unable to speak” and was currently undergoing an autism assessment. Resources were lacking in Namibia “as you will find out from external sources.”
6. The statement concluded with a list of documents that were said to be attached:
“a) UN article archived in 2023 bringing attention to elements of forced marriages in Namibia
“b) A screenshot showing how a witness statement was received
“c) Proof of the of the Appellant’s medication
“d) Correspondence letters from the GP confirming the continued examination of his [sic] little boy’s health condition
“e) The bundle”
7. The appellant explained at the hearing before me that (a) was submitted in the form of a hyperlink. We were unable to locate item (b) in the bundle prepared by the Upper Tribunal, so for the purposes of this decision I find that the appellant has not established that this was before the FTT. Finally, the appellant clarified that (e) referred to the documents that followed the statement in the bundle prepared by the UT, namely her asylum interview record, a letter from her friend in Namibia dated 20 November 2023, two NHS documents concerning her son, and photographs of her prescription medication.
8. Subject to these clarifications, Ms Clewley accepted that the statement and supporting documents had been filed with the FTT in time and prior to the hearing.
The challenged decision
9. The FTT’s decision began by setting out at [2]:
“The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation provided. The appellant provided a number of documents individually (including some documentation at the hearing which has been considered). The respondent provided a bundle of 88 pages.”
For the sake of completeness, I note that the appellant has not complained that any documents she provided on the day of the hearing were overlooked.
10. At [3], the FTT identified the appellant’s claim as based on a fear of gender-based violence from her husband and her uncle. Under the heading of “Preliminary issues,” the FTT stated at [4]:
“Given that the appellant was unrepresented and had not provided a witness statement, I explained carefully and slowly to her the process that would be followed at the hearing. The appellant confirmed to me that she had understood the process to be followed. The appellant spoke in the English language and was able to understand and answer questions without any problems and express herself clearly throughout the hearing.”
11. At [5], the issues were identified as: (a) whether the appellant would be at risk on return; (b) whether there was sufficiency of protection in Namibia; and (c) whether internal relocation was a “viable option.” At [6] and [7], the FTT confirmed that it had heard evidence from the appellant and submissions from the appellant and the respondent’s representative, but provided no further details. The “legal framework” was set out at [8]. This consisted of a summary of the refugee definition and an identification of the burden and standard of proof in refugee claims.
12. The next section of the determination is entitled “Findings.” This begins with:
(i) a chronology of the appellant’s claim and the birth of her son: [9];
(ii) a statement that the respondent did not accept that the appellant was forced into marriage with her cousin or that the police would not assist her: [10];
(iii) a self-direction to the case of Tanveer Ahmed in the following terms: “it is for the claimant to show that a document on which he seeks to rely can be relied upon. The decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round.”: [11]
(iv) The appellant’s claim to have three other children. The children’s names and dates of birth were given, and the appellant’s claim that the children were being looked after by a friend in Namibia who had provided a letter to that effect was noted: [12]; and
(v) The appellant’s account of the parentage of her four children.
13. The FTT’s consideration of the appellant’s account of events in Namibia follows at [14]-[18]. At [14], the FTT expressed its agreement with the respondent’s submission that it was not plausible that the appellant would have been able to carry on an extra-marital affair as she claimed if her husband was a traditional headman with influence over the local police. This damaged the overall credibility of her account. At [15], the FTT described the police report and at [16] it recorded and then agreed with the respondent’s concerns that the date stamp appeared to have been altered and that there was a “lack of information as to how the document was obtained”. The FTT accepted that the report did not indicate that the police were “taking any active steps in relation to the matter”. On the other hand, it did “at the very least show that the police recorded the matter”, and this did not support the appellant’s claim that the police “were not prepared to get involved with the matter at all on the basis that it was a family issue.”
14. At [17], the FTT recorded, without comment, the appellant’s claim to gave been raped by her husband repeatedly. At [18], it rejected as implausible the appellant’s explanation of why she did not go to the hospital when she was injured by her husband:
“Given that the appellant’s husband wielded significant power locally and had influence over the local police due to his position as a traditional headman, I find it difficult to understand why the appellant’s husband objected as claimed to the appellant going to the hospital and why he would threaten to beat her, to kill her and to strangle her to death were she to go to the hospital for treatment for her injuries. I do not find that aspect of the appellant’s account to be credible.”
15. At [19], the FTT referred to the reasons it had already given and rejected the appellant’s account of being a victim of forced marriage and gender-based violence and found that sufficient protection would be available.
16. At [20], the FTT turned to the question of internal relocation. It stated that the respondent had referred it to a conclusion set out in the assessment section of its CPIN, Namibia: Women fearing gender-based violence:
“In general, there are parts of the country, such as (but not limited to) Windhoek, where a woman, including a single woman or one with children to support, would not face persecution or serious harm and could reasonably relocate to”.
It stated that it had been referred to other sections of the CPIN as well, but it did not say which, or what they contained.
17. At [20], the FTT acknowledged that the appellant had stated that she had tried to relocate twice but her husband and uncle had found her. It stated, “I did not find the evidence of the appellant to be credible in that respect” but gave no reason for this finding.
18. The FTT’s consideration of the article 8 aspects of the claim are contained at [22]. I set it out in full:
“The appellant has been in the UK for a little over three years. Her son has been in the UK since he was born. I must, therefore, take into account the best interests of the appellant’s son as well. The appellant has no partner nor family in the UK. Her three other children are living in Namibia. The starting point and overall framework for an assessment of Article 8 of the ECHR outside the Immigration Rules is the case of R (Razgar) v SSHD [2004] UKHL in which the House of Lords set out 5 steps. Taking account of all of the circumstances of this case, I do not accept that the facts of the case support a finding of any exceptional circumstances that would render refusal a disproportionate breach of the rights of the Appellant under Article 8 of the ECHR. Having taken into account the best interests of the child in this case, I see no reason why the appellant cannot return to Namibia with her son and continue their lives there.”
19. The FTT dismissed the appeal.
The grounds of appeal
20. The appellant appealed on the sole ground that the FTT had not taken into account the “statement” she had submitted in support of her appeal. As evidence of this, she points to the FTT’s statement at [4] that “the appellant had not provided a witness statement.”
21. On 25 September 2025, a different judge of the FTT granted permission to appeal on the ground that the skeleton argument and the other documents submitted in support of the appeal – including evidence relating the health of the appellant and her son – may not have been taken into account as there was no reference to them in the decision.
22. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response. The respondent relied primarily on Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 for the principle that “it is not necessary for a judge to reference every document at their disposal when making their decision.” The respondent then argued that the FTT had addressed one of the submissions that had been made in the skeleton argument. This was that the appellant might have misunderstood the process or that misunderstandings might have arisen “due to language”. The respondent pointed to the FTT’s careful consideration of whether the appellant was able to understand and participate in the hearing. The respondent further asserted that the appellant had “not specified any challenge to the adverse credibility findings in the grounds”. Finally, with regard to the article 8 aspects of the appellant’s claim and the best interests of her child, the respondent accepted that there was no reference to the medical evidence in the decision, but submitted that the conclusion that there were no exceptional circumstances was clearly open to the FTT on the evidence. She repeated that it was “not incumbent on a judge to refer to every argument pursued by the parties in order to produce a sustainable decision.”
The hearing
23. The appellant was unrepresented at the hearing before me, as she has been throughout her appeal. She made her submissions with the assistance of a Herero interpreter, and I was satisfied that they understood each other. A volunteer from Refugees Welcome Hounslow asked to sit next to the appellant in order to provide moral and practical support. She had provided a signed statement explaining her role with the charity and setting out that she knew the appellant and had assisted her in obtaining speech and language support for her son. She confirmed in court that she had not given the appellant any legal advice and understood that she was not authorised to do so. She further confirmed that she understood that she could not address the court and that her only role was to provide the appellant with moral and practical support. Ms Clewley had sight of her written statement and agreed to her presence. Her participation in the hearing was at all times appropriate and was limited to such practical matters as handing the appellant a document that had been referred to or reminding her to pause in her submissions to enable the interpreter to translate. I am grateful to her for her assistance in furthering the overriding objective of enabling the appellant to participate fully in the proceedings.
24. At the beginning of the hearing, the appellant confirmed that she had received the bundle that the Tribunal had prepared. However, she did not have access to it in court, as she had no laptop. The only document she had in hardcopy was the respondent’s bundle from the FTT hearing, which was section D of the UT bundle. I considered that the appellant would not be able to participate in the hearing if she did not have sight of the documents, and I therefore rose so that the Tribunal could print out the rest of the bundle.
25. I then heard submissions first from the appellant and then from Ms Clewley. I am grateful to Ms Clewley for furthering the overriding objective by consistently making her submissions in language that the appellant was able to understand. I do not set out the parties’ submissions in full here, but I have taken them into account and refer to them where relevant in my discussion.
26. At the end of the hearing, I informed the parties that I was allowing the appeal and gave a brief summary of my reasons. I now set those reasons out in more detail below.
Legal framework
27. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I have reminded myself of the principles of judicial restraint set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] and of the danger of “island-hopping”, rather than looking at the evidence, and the reasoning, as a whole. See Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114].
28. The respondent relied in particular here on the principle that an appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that they overlooked it, and appeal courts should be slow to infer that they have: Volpi at [2(iii)]; Yalcin at [50].
29. This principle does not, however, displace the FTT’s duty to give reasons. The scope of the duty to give reasons was set out MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) and reiterated in Joseph (permission to appeal requirements) [2022] UKUT 00218 (IAC) at [43]:
“[The duty to give reasons] does not mean that every factor which weighed with the Judge in his appraisal of the evidence has to be identified and explained. But the issues the resolution of which were vital to the Judge’s conclusion should be identified and the manner in which he resolved them explained. […] It need not involve a lengthy judgment. It does require the Judge to identify and record those matters which were critical to his decision.” (citing English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd. (Practice Note) [2002] EWCA Civ 605)
Discussion
30. Having looked carefully at the decision with Ms Clewley’s assistance and taking into account that first instance judges are not required to refer to every piece of evidence that is in front of them, I am persuaded that the FTT failed to take into account the documents that the appellant submitted prior to the appeal hearing and that this was a material error.
31. It is not in dispute that the FTT’s decision contains no reference to a number of submissions made in the appellant’s appeal “statement” or to the supporting evidence filed at the same time. The most striking oversight is with regard to the evidence regarding the best interests of the child. As emphasised by the Supreme Court in CAO v SSHD [2024] UKSC 32, the First-tier Tribunal was required by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act to decide for itself whether removing the appellant from the UK would be inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under article 8, and a proper assessment of the impact of removal on the appellant’s child was a necessary part of that decision. It reiterated what Lord Hodge said in Zoumbas v SSHD [2013] UKSC 74 at [10]:
“(1) The best interests of a child are an integral part of the proportionality assessment under article 8 of the Convention; (2) in making that assessment, the best interests of a child must be a primary consideration, although not always the only primary consideration; and the child’s best interests do not of themselves have the status of the paramount consideration; (3) although the best interests of a child can be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other considerations, no other consideration can be treated as inherently more significant; (4) while different judges might approach the question of the best interests of a child in different ways, it is important to ask oneself the right questions in an orderly manner in order to avoid the risk that the best interests of a child might be undervalued when other important considerations were in play; (5) it is important to have a clear idea of a child’s circumstances and of what is in a child’s best interests before one asks oneself whether those interests are outweighed by the force of other considerations; (6) to that end there is no substitute for a careful examination of all relevant factors when the interests of a child are involved in an article 8 assessment [….]”
32. In the challenged decision in this appeal, there is no indication that the FTT had a clear idea of the child’s circumstances beyond the fact of his birth in the UK and his length of residence. There is simply no reference to his additional needs. These are described briefly in two NHS letters from early 2025 that confirm that at the age of 28 months, had had no hearing difficulties but suffered from delayed speech and language development. His mother had reported that he made “grunting sounds” and used the words “ma ma, no and bye sporadically”. During the NHS hearing assessment, he “did not respond to conventional stimuli”. As there were no hearing difficulties that could explain his speech and language delay, he had been referred for an initial assessment by a Specialist Speech and Language Therapy Team.
33. It might have been open to the FTT to find on the basis of this evidence that the child’s additional needs were not significant enough to require a grant of leave. It might also have been open to the FTT to point to the lack of evidence that his special needs could not be addressed in Namibia (although CAO does establish that the FTT has a duty of enquiry). But the FTT did neither of these things. It either overlooked this evidence entirely or failed to give reasons for considering it irrelevant to the assessment of the child’s best interests. Ms Clewley accepted that there was no indication that this evidence had been considered but urged me to find that the error was not material because the decision would inevitably have been the same. Given the importance that the higher courts have placed on conducting an individualised, fully informed assessment of a child’s best interests, I reject this submission.
34. Nor is there any reference in the decision to the appellant’s diagnosis of anxiety, depression and low mood and the prescription medication that the evidence showed she was taking for this. Ms Clewley submitted that a number of the FTT’s credibility findings were based on the implausibility of the appellant’s account, such that her mental health was not directly relevant (as it would have been, by contrast, if the FTT had faulted the appellant for gaps in her memory). However, I consider that the appellant’s mental health was potentially relevant to the FTT’s finding that it was not plausible that the appellant would have been afraid to seek medical assistance in Namibia. As this was one of only a few adverse credibility findings for which a reason was given, I cannot say that this error was not material. The appellant’s mental ill health was also potentially relevant to the FTT’s finding, in the alternative, that if the appellant were at risk from her husband, internal relocation would be reasonable.
35. It is equally significant that the FTT failed to mention the appellant’s evidence of the unwillingness of the Namibian police to act against gender-based violence, as contained in various news reports and a statement from the International Commission of Jurists. In her refusal decision, the respondent (inexplicably) described this evidence as irrelevant, and the appellant then explained in her pre-appeal statement why it was in fact relevant. Yet here, too, the FTT was silent about the appellant’s evidence. This omission was also material, because the FTT treated the question of whether the police would have taken action against the appellant’s husband as relevant both to the credibility of the appellant’s account and, in the alternative, to the issue of sufficiency of protection.
36. The presumption that the FTT will have taken into account the evidence before it only takes the respondent so far, because the FTT is also presumed to know and be seeking to apply the law. This includes the duty to give reasons for why it resolved material disputes in the evidence in the way that it did. The appellant’s credibility was a key issue in the appeal, as was the attitude of the police towards gender-based violence. The FTT was also under a clear legal duty to properly inform itself about the appellant’s son’s particular circumstances and best interests. Either the FTT never saw the appellant’s evidence on these issues, or it dismissed that evidence but failed to explain why it had done so. In either case, this was a material error of law.
37. I note that this was an offline appeal. Documents in such appeals can be misfiled or difficult for a judge to locate. Nonetheless, wherever the error originated, the appellant was entitled to have her appeal decided by a judge who had considered all of her evidence. For that reason the decision must be set aside.
38. Taking into account the guidance set out in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, as well as the Practice Statement of 11 June 2018, and I consider that remittal to the FTT is appropriate given the extensive fact-finding required.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 26 June 2025 is set aside in its entirety and is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing on all issues before any other judge.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 January 2026