Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004826

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51918/2023
LP/13094/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 31st December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI

Between

MP
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Badar, Counsel instructed by SMA Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) dated 9 September 2025 in which the FTT dismissed his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claim.

2. The appeal arises in the context of the appellant being a foreign criminal subject to a deportation order made on 6 August 2013. Having been deported back to Albania on 21 February 2014, he re-entered in breach of the deportation order in 2022 since when he has been living with his brother and his brother’s wife and children. He is estranged from his own children and has not seen them for many years. On 5 May 2022 he made further submissions to the respondent on human rights and protection grounds. The respondent refused those submissions on 2 May 2023. It was his appeal against that decision which was dismissed by the FTT in the decision now under challenge.

3. In summary the FTT dismissed the appellant’s humanitarian protection claim as she found the appellant to lack credibility so rejected his claim that he was at risk from money lenders in Albania and found, in the alternative, that there was a safe and reasonable internal relocation alternative for him there. Secondly, the FTT dismissed the appellant’s Article 3 claim on medical grounds, largely because there is adequate treatment for his mental health conditions in Albania. Finally, having considered the Article 8 claim under the framework contained within section 1117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”), the FTT did not find either of the Exceptions to deportation to apply to the appellant and nor did the FTT find there to be very compelling circumstances over and above those Exceptions which outweighed the requirement otherwise to deport him as a foreign criminal.

The Grounds of Appeal

4. The appellant challenges the FTT’s decision on three grounds, summarised as follows:

Ground 1: the judge failed to give adequate weight to the expert psychiatric report;
Ground 2: the FTT failed to take into account the best interests of the appellant’s brother’s children as a primary consideration;
Ground 3: the FTT made irrational findings by confusing transportation of drugs with selling drugs.

5. Permission was granted on all grounds but it was clear from the grant decision that it was only ground 2 which the judge considered to have arguable merit. As I noted at the hearing, the grant of permission was not restricted so it was open to the appellant to argue all three grounds before me should he choose to do so. Mr Badar made submissions in relation to all three. There was no Rule 24 notice, but Ms Khan confirmed the appeal was opposed on all grounds.

6. At the hearing, I had the benefit of a 244 page error of law bundle. I heard submissions on behalf of both parties, and at the end of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now give with my reasons for it.

The Legal Framework

7. The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal arose in the context of the appellant as a foreign criminal. Due to the length of the appellant's sentence, he is liable to deportation pursuant to section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971 and section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007.

8. There is no right of appeal against the deportation decision, but the refusal of the appellant’s protection and human rights claims carried a right of appeal pursuant to section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”).

9. Insofar as any assessment was required under Article 8, the FTT was obliged to decide to the appeal with reference to the framework contained within section 117A-D of the 2002 Act, but in particular section 117C which deals with human rights appeals for foreign criminals. Section 117 C says as follows:

“Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals

(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.

(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.

(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.

(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.

(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2…..”

10. The task of the Upper Tribunal is to decide if the FTT made an error on a point of law (section 12(1) Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“the 2007 Act”)). If there is no error of law, then the decision of the FTT stands in full. If there is an error of law, then I have to decide whether to set the decision aside pursuant to section 12(2)(a) of the 2007 Act. In reality, that will only be justified if the error is a material one (in other words that it would make a material difference to the outcome of the decision). An immaterial error does not matter.

Discussion

Ground 1

11. Although the FTT largely dealt with the expert psychiatric report of Dr Hameed under the Article 3 heading, Mr Badar confirmed that the challenge to the report is under the limb of Article 8 and the FTT’s findings under Article 3 are not disputed. Furthermore, although there is an addendum report dated 18 September 2025 in the bundle, Mr Badar accepted it post-dates the FTT’s hearing and is not relied on at this stage of the appeal.

12. Mr Badar accepted that it is clear from [32] of the decision that the judge was aware of the expert’s primary findings including the impact upon the appellant of separation from him family as the expert noted at 8.2.26. However, he argued that the FTT should have placed more weight on this part of the report.

13. Furthermore he argued the FTT irrationally reduced the weight to attach to the report arising from what the FTT said at [57].

14. Having set out the substance of the expert’s findings at [32] the FTT evaluated the report at [56]-[58] as follows:

“56. The reports of Dr Hameed contains a number of significant errors. In particular, Dr Hameed considers that the withdrawal or disruption of the current care and treatment provided to the Appellant will have a detrimental impact on his mental health. The Appellant is not, however, receiving any care or treatment currently. Further, Dr Hameed notes that whilst the Appellant experiences suicidal thoughts, he denies any suicidal plans at present, citing his son as the protective factor. It is not in dispute, however, that the Appellant does not have a son. These errors, on fundamental issues in the expert evidence, undermine the reliability of the report.

57. Further, Dr Hameed concludes that the Appellant’s current condition were partly caused by the trauma he experienced in Albania, the account of which I have rejected.

58. In any event, the report does not go as far to suggest that, if returned, there is a real and immediate risk of suicide. The Appellant is not yet on medication and there is no evidence before me to suggest that his condition could not be properly managed with such medication and other interventions. To the contrary, Dr Hameed’s opinion is that there is a ‘strong likelihood’ that the Appellant’s condition could improve with appropriate management (antidepressant medication and psychological therapy).”

15. Ms Khan submitted that the FTT thoroughly considered the expert report and at [56] outlined errors in the report which reduced the weight to attach. She submitted that the FTT did not just consider the report but also the provision of psychiatric care and treatment in Albania [59]-[64]. She submitted that weight is a matter for the judge applying paragraph 2(iv) of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464.

16. At [2] of Volpi v Volpi Lewison LJ said:

“the following principles are well-settled:

i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.

ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.

iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.

iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.

v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.

vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”

17. Mr Badar did not challenge the FTT’s findings that there were factual errors in the report. On that basis I am satisfied that it was rationally open to the FTT at [56] to find those errors to undermine the reliability of the report for the reasons the FTT gave which were sufficient and rationally open to the FTT. It is clear from reading the psychiatric report that the errors pervade the expert’s reasoning (see for example 8.4, 8.10, 8.11, 8.15, 9.5).

18. As for [57] Mr Badar submitted that when the report is looked at in the round, it is clear that there are several life events which have contributed to the onset of the appellant’s mental health conditions, not just the events in Albania so it was irrational for the FTT to have found the report undermined in line with the rejection of the protection claim.

19. This submission overlooks the fact that it is plain from the use of the word “partly” in [57] that the FTT was aware that the events in Albania were only one of the factors contributing to the appellant’s mental health problems. Others include a violent attack upon him in 2023. However, as events in Albania were one of the factors contributing to the condition, I am satisfied it was rationally open to the judge to find the rejection of the protection claim to impact the weight to attach to that part of the report.

20. Mr Badar further submitted that when read as a whole the expert report should have attracted weight which should then have been applied within the ‘very compelling circumstances’ analysis under Article 8.

21. As part of that analysis, the FTT correctly identified that an assessment was required of the extent to which, if at all, the appellant was able to meet the Exceptions at section 117C(4) and (5). Within that analysis the judge acknowledged at [73] the appellant’s mental health and alcohol difficulties and that they would make integration in Albania harder for him but that the country evidence shows support is in place there for him to assist with that.

22. That is then brought forward into the proportionality balancing act within section 117C(6) at [81(c)] as a factor on the appellant’s side of the balance sheet. At [81(c)] the FTT said:

“(c) I give some weight to the difficulties the Appellant will face in reintegrating in Albania, given his mental health and the impact of being separated from his brother and his family, which I have given detailed findings on above;”

23. The grounds argue that in light of what the expert said at 8.2.6 of his report “upon a rational assessment, it is clear that this aspect clearly deserves far more weight”.

24. Paragraph 8.2.6 of the psychiatric report said:

“the separation of Mr. Prenci from his family has the potential to induce significant negative emotional consequences. Such separation can exacerbate his existing depression and contribute to increased levels of anxiety. These powerful negative emotions have the potential to disrupt his day-to-day functioning, making it difficult for his to cope effectively with adversity. Given the circumstances, it is vital to recognize the importance of social and emotional support in Mr. Prenci 's life, particularly from his family. This support plays a crucial role in his mental health recovery. “

25. At paragraph 6.9 the expert noted the appellant’s brother has “his primary source of emotional and practical support” and at 6.11 that the appellant feels a “deep sense of connection and belonging to the UK” “strong emotional ties to his children” (my emphasis) and that “everything meaningful to him – his children, community and a sense of stability – is rooted in the UK”. I was not directed toward any other part of the expert report which discussed the appellant’s family and nor can I find any. In any event, it is clear that the expert referenced the appellant’s relationship with his brother and his feelings about his own children, the latter of which was not sufficient to amount to family life given the lack of contact between the appellant and his children (a factor not in dispute - see [16] and [75] of the FTT decision).

26. Given that weight is a matter for the judge, and given that the judge attached some weight to the impact upon the appellant of leaving the life he has here and having to adjust to life in Albania, the appellant has failed to satisfy me that the FTT fell into error here. The FTT was rationally entitled to assess that “some weight” attached to these factors on the appellant’s side of the balance sheet.

Ground 2

27. As seen above, the FTT recognised the appellant’s relationship with his brother and the children as it relied on it to make a finding that the appellant’s Article 8 rights were engaged [72]. The FTT did so having recognised the relatively low threshold to find such rights engaged and also noting the overall length of his residence in the UK.

28. It is not in dispute that the FTT did not set out in terms what was in the best interests of the appellant’s brother’s children.

29. Ms Khan submitted that the judge was not obliged to as it is clear from CAO v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] UKSC 32 at [54] that the responsibly to consider a child’s best interests pursuant to section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 is the respondent’s, whereas the Tribunal has to consider the children’s best interests as a primary consideration under the umbrella of Article 8. She submitted this is what the FTT did at [72] and then at [81(c)] when the FTT referred to the impact of separation of the appellant from his brother and the brother’s family on the appellant’s side of the balance sheet (see [22] above).

30. At [54] of CAO the Supreme Court said:

“where the FTT determines an appeal it becomes the relevant decision-maker, superseding the Secretary of State, and if the FTT does not refer to or seek to apply section 55 in its own decision-making, it has not failed to act in accordance with the law so far as its own decision is concerned. Its legal duty is to comply with article 8, including by having regard to the best interests of the child as a primary consideration. If the FTT has done that and, as in the present case, has not committed any other error of law, then its decision (which becomes the relevant determinative decision affecting an appellant's Convention rights) is "in accordance with the law" within the meaning of article 8(2) and cannot be impugned on the basis that it is not.”

31. At [63] the Supreme Court confirmed that the obligation upon the FTT is to “treat the best interests of a child who is affected by its decision as a primary consideration”.

32. I do not find the FTT to have considered expressly what was in the best interests of the children as a primary consideration under Article 8. Given that the FTT was satisfied that the relationship the appellant had with the brother and the children supported a finding about the engagement of Article 8 [72], I am satisfied that the children were ones who are “affected” by the respondent’s decision, thereby engaging the need to consider their best interests under Article 8.

33. The FTT was therefore in error in failing to expressly reference their best interests. In my judgment, neither [72] nor [81(c)] of the FTT’s decision are capable of being read as a statement of what is in those children’s best interests or that they have been treated as a primary consideration.

34. However, I am not satisfied that this error was material for the reasons given below.

35. At the hearing I invited Mr Badar to take me to evidence before the FTT about the brother’s children, or the impact upon them of the appellant’s deportation. He was not able to do so. Having looked at the evidence carefully, I note there is no reference in either the appellant’s or his brother’s witness statements to the children. Neither is there any evidence from the children directly. There is no express reference to the brother’s children in the psychiatric report. The appellant’s skeleton argument only mentions the appellant’s brother and even then, gives no detail about their relationship. The skeleton argument relies more heavily on the appellant’s relationship with his own children which appeared to assume less importance by the time of the hearing before the FTT (see [25] above).

36. In this context, it does not appear that the appellant was placing any real reliance on the impact of his deportation upon his brother’s children. There is very little evidence on which the FTT could have made an assessment of what was in the children’s best interests, save perhaps that they should remain in the care of their parents. I have not been directed to any evidence as to the role the appellant plays (if any) in their lives. In those circumstances, I am not persuaded that the failure to identify their best interests was material as there was simply no evidence before the FTT which could have resulted in that assessment leading to a finding that was likely or even possibly rationally capable of changing the overall outcome of the assessment under section 117C of the 2002 Act. For these reasons Ground 2 is not made out.

Ground 3

37. This is a rationality challenge to the finding the FTT made at [50]. The context is that the appellant claimed to have borrowed money from an organised crime gang in Albania in exchange for which he was to work for the organised crime gang (“OCG”) which he did for a week before he fled.

38. At [50] the FTT said:

“Further, and more importantly, in his interview the Appellant explained his role in drugs trafficking, but at the hearing before me he said that he had never sold drugs in Albania and that whilst he agreed to work for the OCG, he did not realise he would be required to deal drugs. He said that, once he realised that was the expectation, he ran away. His account in this key respect is not consistent. I do not accept that the Appellant’s reliance on alcohol explains such a fundamental inconsistency and no other good explanation has been given for it. The Appellant’s credibility is significantly undermined as a result.”

39. The FTT did not specify which part of the interview was in question, but Mr Badar directed me to question 17 which was asked and answered as follows:

“Q In what way were you involved in drugs and trafficking?
A. In what way? I sold them? I made the transportation”

40. The grounds say that his account has consistently been that he transported drugs and he has not admitted selling them.

41. At 18-19 the interview continued:

“18 Q. Where did you transport them from or to?
A. You are asking about Albania? Drugs in Albania?

19 Q. Im asking where you generally took drugs from and to?
A. They gave it to me and I delivered to the places where they told me. They have closed us up in house and there were 2 guys there to guard us.

20 Q. Did you ever transport drugs over the border?
A. No, no, no.”

42. At question 28 he said “I have been delivering drugs, transporting drugs to persons, to different people you know”. At question [105] he again said he had never “trafficked drugs” other than in Albania.

43. At [48] the FTT set out the basis of the appellant’s protection claim as contained within the screening and substantive interviews. The FTT noted at [48] that the appellant had claimed to have “sold drugs and ‘made the transportation’. He explained that the drugs were given to him, and he delivered them to wherever he was told to go”. It is not clear whether reference to selling drugs was in the screening or substantive interview but in any event, I am unable to see reference to the appellant ‘selling’ drugs (as opposed to transporting them) in either.

44. To that extent, I am satisfied the judge erred in saying that the appellant had previously admitted “selling” drugs but here I agree with the FTT judge who granted permission, namely that there is a degree of semantics about this. It may be that the judge was using the word ‘selling’ to cover a spectrum of behaviour connected with the supply of drugs.

45. I asked Mr Badar at the hearing what he says turns on this potential inconsistency. He submitted that FTT was in error in finding the appellant inconsistent on this point and that infects the credibility findings in the protection claim.

46. When the FTT granted permission, the judge who granted permission noted “the judges credibility findings turn on more than just a question of semantics (ie. whether transportation of drugs for sale amounts to being involved in the sale of drugs).”

47. I agree that there were other reasons the FTT found the appellant inconsistent. The reasons the FTT gave at [49] were not expressly challenged. Therein the FTT made adverse credibility findings about the appellant’s account to have borrowed money from the OCG.

48. At [51] the FTT noted that the appellant’s account was not supported by his brother who could not give first-hand evidence but in any event whose evidence was inconsistent with the appellant’s account.

49. It is right to note however that the FTT’s findings at [50] assumed greater significance to the judge than those at [49] as is made clear by the opening words at [50] and also the last sentence.

50. However, for the reasons I give below, I do not find the FTT to have erred at [50] and even if I did, I do not find that material because of the alternative findings the judge made at [52].

51. As to the first point, it is clear from [50] that the judge’s findings were based upon what the appellant said at the hearing namely “at the hearing before me he said …”.

52. The appellant does not challenge what the FTT said here about his evidence at the hearing. He has not applied to admit the notes of evidence from the hearing.

53. Notwithstanding the reference in [50] to selling drugs, when [50] is read as a whole, I am satisfied that it was the whole of the account the appellant gave at the hearing which the FTT took issue with including the part where he said “whilst he agreed to work for the OCG, he did not realise he would be required to deal drugs. He said that, once he realised that was the expectation he ran away. His account in this key respect is not consistent.”

54. It is clear from the answers the appellant gave at interview that he did not run away once he learned of what he was expected to do as he admitted transporting drugs on more than one occasion. The judge noted that account at [48].

55. For this reason, even if the FTT’s use of the word ‘selling’ was deliberate and potentially reveals an error of fact I am not satisfied it infects the credibility assessment. Firstly, there were other matters on which the FTT based its adverse credibility findings. Secondly, I am satisfied that, taken as whole, the FTT was of the view that the appellant’s evidence at the hearing was inconsistent with the thrust of the account the appellant gave in interview about knowingly participating in the OCG’s drug operation and that this was a conclusion the judge was rationally entitled to draw.

56. In any event, as indicated above, even if the judge was in error, I do not find the error to be material. At [52] the judge said:

“Even if I am wrong about the risk faced by the Appellant, I consider there to be a safe and reasonable internal relocation alternative. The Appellant says that when he escaped from the OCG in July 2021, he stayed with his Uncle in Diber and remained there until March 2022. That is a period of approximately ten months in which he was able to live within Albania without coming to the attention of the OCG. In oral evidence, the Appellant suggested for the first time that the OCG were also able to find him there and that he escaped before they could get to him. That is inconsistent with his asylum interview, and I do not accept it as credible. The Appellant confirmed in interview that he had not had any contact (directly or indirectly via his family) from the OCG since he left Albania. The OCG have not, so far as the Appellant knows, tried to place pressure on him to return by threatening his parents. There is no evidence to suggest that the OCG are actively looking for the Appellant.”.

57. The opening sentence makes it clear that this is an alternative finding and on the basis that the appellant’s account was made out.

58. Whilst I accept there are credibility findings within [52], they go to a different point about the ability of the gang to locate him in Albania which the judge found to have been raised for the first time and not mentioned in the interview. I was not directed to the appellant’s answers in the interview which contradict this finding and having read the interview carefully I am satisfied this was a finding rationally open to the FTT to make. In any event, there was no suggestion there has been any contact from the gang with him or his parents since he left, as the judge noted at [52]. This is not challenged in the grounds.

59. Accordingly, given the judge found there to be a safe and reasonable internal relocation option open to the appellant, his claim to humanitarian protection could not succeed in any event. I am not satisfied that Ground 3 identifies an error on a point of law capable of making a material difference to the outcome of the protection appeal.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error on a point of law so the decision stands.

SJ Rastogi
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 December 2025