Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No.: UI-2025-004827
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02481/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

1st June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MONSON

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

SKA (IRAQ)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Sadeghi, Counsel instructed by Simman Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Scott-Baker promulgated on 21 July 2025 (“the Decision”). By the Decision, Judge Scott-Baker dismissed the appellant’s asylum appeal in which he maintained that he had a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm upon return to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (also known by the acronyms “KRI” or “IKR”) as a victim of a blood feud and/or because of his sur place activities in the UK.
Relevant Background
2. The appellant is a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity, whose date of birth is 1 July 2005. The appellant entered the UK by small boat on 14 April 2022, and he claimed asylum on 22 April 2022. The appellant made a detailed witness statement which he signed on 18 January 2023, and he was given a substantive asylum interview on 10 May 2024.
3. The appellant’s claim was that he had been born and brought up in Sangasar, near the town of Ranya in Sulaymaniyah Governate, and that he was a member of the Marga Tribe. On 9 September 2021 his sister married a local man called Shaho who was from the Mangor Tribe. Shortly after the marriage, his family discovered that Shaho was in a blood feud with another family in the same tribe (“the Mangor family”) as he had killed one of them in a land dispute prior to the marriage.
4. The appellant’s family learnt of the blood feud 10 days after the marriage, when Shaho brought his sister back from the Shaho family home 10 mins away as the Mangor family had launched an attack on the Shaho family home, and there had been shooting. So, he was bringing her back as she was scared. After two days she went back. Four or five days later she returned, as there had been another shooting incident at the Shaho family home. She went back again a few days later.
5. The appellant’s parents were not happy that they had agreed to marry their daughter to someone who, without their knowledge, was involved in a blood feud, and they made it known to the Shaho family that they wanted to discuss a possible separation. The Shaho family invited them all to lunch in early October 2021 to discuss this. After the meal, and as Shaho was about to drive them all home, two men arrived in a car and started shooting. Shaho, who was inside the car, was shot in his shoulder, and had to go to hospital. The appellant’s father took Shaho’s gun and fired back, injuring one of the assailants. The appellant did not see this, as he was still inside the house, but he heard about it later.
6. Three days later his mother told him that the man from the Mangor family whom his father had shot had died. A day after that, his father came home and said he had been sacked from his job and there was a warrant out for his arrest.
7. Either on the same day or the next day, they all left Sangasar and went to Qala Tukan, about two hours’ drive away. His sister, Ajhin, was already there with Shaho, and they all stayed in Qala Tukan with some of Shaho’s relatives.
8. While they were there, the Mangor family asked the Shaho family for a meeting to negotiate a tribal settlement. The Shaho family sent a relative to this meeting, but the Mangor family killed him in his car before he got there.
9. After hearing this news, the appellant’s father obtained Iraqi passports for all of them, but he left the country on his own before the appellant. With the assistance of the Shaho family, the appellant obtained a one-year business visa to Turkey, which was stamped on his passport, and on 3 or 4 December 2021 he legally entered Turkey by car with an agent and other travellers.
10. One month after he arrived in the UK, he heard from his mother via his younger sister’s Facebook Messenger account that another person in Shaho’s family had been killed. So, they were all now planning to leave Iraq, including Shaho and his family.
11. In the Refusal Letter (RL) dated 17 May 2024, the respondent did not accept that the appellant’s claim was credible. Among other things, it ran contrary to the background evidence (a) that he would have become the target of a blood feud, as he was a child at the time; and (b) that the Mangor family would get elders and the wider tribe involved to settle the feud, only to ambush and kill a member of the Shaho family, as this would contradict the goal of mediation.
12. The appellant’s appeal came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Scott-Baker sitting at Taylor House on 28 May 2025. Both parties were legally represented, with Mr Sadeghi of Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant.
13. In the Decision, the Judge’s findings began at para [35]. With regard to the claimed blood feud, the Judge stated at [37] that it was confirmed at the hearing that the issue of tribal membership was irrelevant as the claim was of warring between two families.
14. At para [40] the Judge observed that the background material in the CPIN suggested that some tribal disputes may be resolved by peaceful means and may not result in a blood feud. The appellant suggested that the blood feud had already started, and the chronology suggested that an attempt was made in around October 2021 to settle the conflict. At 3.1.9 the CPIN provided that if it could not be resolved peacefully, they could escalate into blood feuds. The Judge continued:
“The timing of the dispute does not sit easily within the background material, i.e that the feud had been ongoing before a resolution was sought.”
15. At para [41] the Judge observed that in the CPIN at 9.3.9 there was a table showing that in the Sulaymaniyah Governate between December 2019 and December 2023 there had been one fatality from inter-tribal violence, and three inter-tribal violence events.
16. At para [43] the Judge referred to the appellant’s evidence that, after discovering the existence of the blood feud, his family had gone to Shaho’s family to discuss his sister getting a divorce, and that while they were there, the other family had attacked and his father had fired back, killing one of the assailants. The appellant further said that they had left their home area after they were told that an arrest warrant was issued for their father, and that they went to stay with Shaho’s family. The Judge held:
“It is implausible that they would return to the family where the danger was centred and where the relationship was strained as they had been discussing divorce.”
17. At para [45] the Judge referred to the appellant’s evidence that the authorities would not get involved as the police saw blood feuds as family matters. Yet, he said that the Asayish security forces had attended after the shooting, and that there was an arrest warrant for his father. The Judge held that this evidence was internally inconsistent
18. At para [46] the Judge referred to the appellant’s evidence that the other family was influential and powerful, yet he said at interview that he had no idea of the level and power held by the Mangor tribe. The Judge held that this was internally inconsistent. The Judge continued:
47. The appellant’s description of his fear was convoluted, as he had said in his witness statement that he feared that he would be killed by the Mangor family, but at interview said that he feared being killed by the whole tribe. He described the conflict more as a vendetta. He knew that Shaho had to carry a gun each day for protection but claimed that his family did not know of the conflict, although they lived in the same area.
48. The appellant on his evidence, assuming that his family was at risk as his father had killed a member of the Mangor tribe, had shown that he was able to relocate. They had lived in that area for two months before he left Iraq and suffered no problems at that time.
19. The Judge concluded at [49] that the appellant was not credible in his claim that he and his father were at risk as his father had killed a man. She therefore did not find that upon return the appellant was at risk of a revenge killing.
20. The Judge then turned to address the sur place claim. At para [50] the Judge held that the appellant had attended four demonstrations in the UK and had posted on Facebook, and had joined Dakok. She found that the appellant had created his Facebook account and had joined Dakok after he had received the RL and that there were a limited number of posts - a significant number having been copied from others.
21. At para [51] the Judge found that at the highest the appellant was only a low-level demonstrator in the UK. He did not attempt to express any political opinion until the service of the RL, which suggested that his interest was to boost his asylum claim. He confirmed at the hearing that he had not written any posts himself, and that he had copied others.
22. At para [52] the Judge held that the evidence suggested that there had been very limited attendance at demonstrations, and he had not been involved in any organisation of these or spoken at them; and again, attendance at these was after the service of the RL.
23. At para [53] the Judge reiterated that the appellant had joined Dakok after the issue of the RL. It was accepted that he had done some work with Dakok at these demonstrations, but this was limited to distributing posters. There was no evidence from any co-demonstrator before her. The appellant claimed that the Iraqi authorities had taken photos at demonstrations, but there was no evidence before her to suggest that, even if photos were taken (which had not been established), the appellant would be identifiable by the Iraqi authorities.
24. At para [54] she said that she did not consider that the Iraqi authorities would have any interest in the appellant upon return due to his activities in the UK, and that he had not come to their adverse attention in the past.
The Grounds of Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
25. Mr Sadeghi settled the grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Ground 1 was that the Judge had conducted an irrational and/or inadequately reasoned assessment with respect to the risk to the appellant upon return to Iraq, having regard to the appellant’s attendance at multiple demonstrations and his Facebook activity, which was blatantly not limited.
26. Ground 2 was that the Judge failed to adequately assess and/or determine the risk upon return arising from the appellant’s political opinions, having regard to the principle that an individual cannot reasonably be expected to lie about their political opinions in order to avoid persecution.
27. Ground 3 was that the Judge had made mistaken and/or irrational findings with respect to the appellant’s credibility at paras [47] and [48] of the Decision.
28. Ground 4 was that the Judge had made an irrational and/or inadequately reasoned assessment with respect to the appellant’s ability to successfully redocument himself in Iraq.
The Reasons for the Grant of Permission to Appeal
29. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal on the basis that the grounds were no more than an expression of disagreement with findings that were reasonably open to the Judge. But following a renewed application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, on 14 November 2025 Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins granted permission for the following reasons:
“I am particularly concerned that the Judge may have erred in the consideration of sur place activities for the reasons given in the grounds and the Judge’s adverse credibility findings may have been based on a misunderstanding of the evidence for the reasons summarised at paragraph [22] of the grounds.”
The Hearing in the Upper Tribunal
30. At the hearing before me to determine whether an error of law was made out, Mr Sadeghi developed the case that he had put forward in the grounds of appeal. On behalf of the respondent, Ms Everett submitted that the error of law challenge was a sophisticated expression of disagreement with findings that were reasonably open to the Judge, and no error of law was made out. After hearing from Mr Sadeghi in reply, I reserved my decision.
Discussion and Conclusions
31. I bear in mind the observations of Lord Brown in South Bucks County Council -v- Porter [2004] UKHL 33; 2004 1 WLR 1953 at para [36]. His guidance is cited with approval by the Presidential Panel in TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC). Lord Brown’s observations were as follows:
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…”
32. I also take into account the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Volpi and another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at para [2]:
“i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for the judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
33. Mr Sadeghi’s central argument under Ground 1 is that the Judge erred in law in her assessment of the risk engendered by the appellant’s sur place activities, applying the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) [2025] EWCA Civ 688. Mr Sadeghi acknowledges that this decision was published on 9 June 2025 and hence it was not relied on at the hearing before the Judge. But he relies on the principle that the law always speaks. He submits that the evidence before the Judge was of sufficient cogency that it was perverse of the Judge not to accept that it was reasonably likely that the appellant’s sur place activities had come to the adverse attention of the KRI authorities, or that her refusal to draw this inference was inadequately reasoned.
34. In MH, the principal issue raised by Ground 1 of the appeal was whether the FTT had erred in law in its treatment of the evidence of surveillance and monitoring by the then Bangladeshi government of the appellant’s sur place activities. After reviewing the relevant authorities on this topic, including YB (Eritrea), Arnold LJ (giving the leading judgment of the Court with which the other Judges agreed) said at [37] that the FTT (and the Upper Tribunal if remaking an FTT decision) must not impose an unrealistic evidential burden upon asylum applicants who rely upon sur place activities:
“It is inherently unlikely that an applicant for asylum will be able to adduce direct evidence of covert surveillance and monitoring by a foreign state. Accordingly, tribunals are not merely entitled, but are required, to use their common sense.”
35. However, Arnold LJ went on to observe at [38] and [39] that there are limits to this. Firstly, beyond the fact that it is generally understood that targeted monitoring is technically easier, but more resource-intensive, than bulk monitoring, the technical capabilities of methods of monitoring is a matter that requires expert evidence, not least because: (i) states differ in their capabilities, and (ii) such capabilities change over time.
36. Secondly, the question of the capacity of the foreign state to carry out surveillance and monitoring cannot realistically be divorced from the questions of whether the person in question is already of interest to the regime and, if not, whether the activities relied on are likely to make the person of interest to the regime:
“To take a single example, if there is a large demonstration outside the Bangladesh High Commission in London, then there is a considerable difference between a person who stands at the front waving a placard bearing a slogan hostile to the government and the person who stands at the back with no placard. It is inherently more likely that the former will thereby get themselves noticed by government agents, photographed and targeted for further surveillance and monitoring than the latter.”
37. I do not consider that the Judge failed to use common sense, or that she otherwise misdirected herself. Earlier in her Decision, she referenced the respondent’s reliance on XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC), and I consider that her approach was in line with the guidance given by the Tribunal in XX. As I explored with Mr Sadiqi in oral argument, since Iran is objectively a more authoritarian and oppressive regime than that which prevails in the KRI, it cannot be said that applying the guidance in XX to a political asylum case involving the prospective return of an Iraqi national of Kurdish ethnicity to the KRI imposes an unrealistic evidential burden.
38. In summary, the Tribunal in XX identified two potential pinch-points on return when the risk to the returnee is elevated (the first being the application for an ETD, and the second being arrival at Tehran airport, where the returnee will be questioned). Prior to the first pinch-point, the crucial question is whether the returnee has by his real world sur place activities raised his social profile to a point where there is a real risk of him being already the subject of targeted surveillance and monitoring by the Iranian authorities, so that it is too late for him to delete his incriminating social media account, even if he were minded to do so.
39. It was clearly open to the Judge to find that there was not a real risk to the appellant having become a person of adverse interest to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) as a result of his low-level participation in real world sur place activities, such as attending demonstrations against the KRG outside the Iraqi Embassy.
40. It was also clearly open to the Judge to find that the appellant’s online activities were very unlikely to have come to the attention of the KRG. In support of the contrary contention, Mr Sadeghi relies upon passages in the CPIN on Iraq: Opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Version 3.0, July 2023 to the effect that ordinary citizens within the KRI have been prosecuted by the authorities for online criticism of the government. But it does not follow that such prosecutions flow from bulk monitoring, rather than from targeted monitoring arising from an elevated social profile within the KRI, and in any event the fact that there is evidence of the KRG monitoring online activity within the KRI does not give rise to an inference that the KRG has either the capability or the inclination to carry out bulk monitoring of online activity carried out in the diaspora.
41. Ground 2 relates to the alternative scenario postulated by Mr Sadeghi, which is the appellant being identified as an anti-government activist when being screened at the airport in Sulaymaniyah following his enforced return there.
42. Firstly, Mr Sadeghi submits that the Judge erred in law in failing to make an express finding with respect to the principle stated in RT (Zimbabwe) [2012] UKSC 38 at [25] that an individual cannot reasonably be expected to lie about their political opinions in order to avoid persecution. He submits that it was incumbent upon the Judge either to make an express finding that the appellant’s political activity was contrived, or to address how the appellant could be expected to return to Iraq in safety without withholding his genuinely-held political opinion.
43. I accept that the Judge could have been more emphatic, but it is tolerably clear from her findings that in her view the appellant had not discharged the burden of proving to the lower standard of proof that he was a genuine anti-government activist, as opposed to him embarking on his sur place activities after the refusal letter for the purpose of bolstering his asylum claim.
44. RT (Zimbabwe) was not cited in the appeal skeleton argument (ASA) that was before the Judge. In addition, the principle stated in RT (Zimbabwe) was not engaged on the facts of this appeal for the reason given by the Court of Appeal in S -v- SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482, at [56]:
“In contrast, as was pointed out in XX at [99], the Iranian authorities do not persecute individuals because of their political neutrality. Moreover, in the present case, and in light of both the retained findings and those made by Judge Kebede as to the unlikelihood of the appellant having already come to the attention of the authorities and his lack of genuine political belief in the PJAK, the appellant was not in a position where he would have to prove his political loyalty, rather it would be one in which (as Judge Kabede found) the appellant would not be required to volunteer information about his activities in the UK.”
45. Similarly, the appellant in this case was not going to be required to volunteer information about his activities in the UK as part of his screening at the return airport in Sulaymaniyah.
46. Secondly, Mr Sadeghi submits that the Judge failed to have regard to the fact that the appellant’s involvement with Dakok would become apparent during the appellant’s screening (if it was not known already). He relies on paras [30] and [31] of the Headnote to SMO (2) in support of this submission. These paragraphs provide as follows:
30. Once at the IKR border (land or air) P would normally be granted entry to the territory. Subject to security screening, and registering presence with the local mukhtar, P will be permitted to enter and reside in the IKR with no further legal impediments or requirements. There are no sponsorship requirements for entry or residence in any of the three IKR Governates for Kurds.
31. Whether P would be at particular risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Additional factors that may increase risk include: (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL; (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL; and (iii) being a single male of fighting age. P is likely to be able to evidence the fact of recent arrival from the UK, which would dispel any suggestion of having arrived directly from ISIL territory.
47. The Judge correctly directed herself that the import of these paras was that the only additional factor which might increase risk for the appellant during the screening process was him being a single male of fighting age. The Judge did not misdirect herself in assuming that there would be no inquiry as to the appellant’s activities in the UK, either in the form of him being asked questions about what he had been doing in the UK or through an open internet search being carried out to see if anything of interest in relation to the appellant showed up, such as the appellant’s involvement in Dakok.
48. Thirdly, Mr Sadeghi relies upon para [5] of the Headnote in SMO (2) for the submission that the appellant’s political activity in the UK places the appellant in an enhanced risk group. But this submission overlooks the fact that the personal characteristics identified in para [5] as being relevant to a sliding scale analysis only apply where P is being returned to a place of internal armed conflict within Iraq, whereas it was not the appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal that Sulaymaniyah governate is a place of internal armed conflict, and nor is such a proposition supported by the relevant country guidance.
49. Under Ground 3, it is submitted that the Judge’s findings at paras [47] and [48] are mistaken and/or irrational.
50. The background to the impugned finding in para [47] is that, whereas in his witness statement the appellant described a blood feud between two families – and only expressed a fear of the Mangor family - in interview the appellant claimed that, because his father was from a different tribe, it had become an inter-tribal feud, and so he feared the entire Mangor tribe. However, on his own account, it had not played out as an inter-tribal dispute as the only people who had been targeted were Shaho and his extended family members. Notwithstanding the appellant’s attempt to reconcile the two positions in his oral evidence, it was clearly open to the Judge to find that the two positions were inconsistent.
51. While some of the extracts from the background evidence cited in the ASA were supportive of the proposition that blood feuds between families could escalate into an inter-tribal conflict, the Judge was not bound to treat such evidence as establishing that such an escalation was inevitable.
52. In short, the impugned finding at para [47] is rationally supportable, and it does not arise from a misapprehension of the relevant evidence.
53. The background to the impugned finding in para [48] is that when asked in interview if he had any problems or threats from the Mangor family/tribe whilst in his new location with the Shaho family in Qala Tukan, the appellant answered that nothing had happened to him or his family (AIR 120-122). The respondent’s case in the refusal letter was that his and his family’s ability to remain in this new location - not too far from his home area - was internally inconsistent with his claim that the Mangor family/tribe were intent on killing him or that they had the power and influence to find him anywhere. If the family/tribe possessed the power and influence he claimed them to have, then they would have located him and his family in this new location had they had the motive to do so.
54. It was clearly open to the Judge to hold that the ability of the appellant and his family to relocate internally without being traced or threatened was inconsistent with his claim the Mangor family/tribe had the power and influence to find him anywhere.
55. The finding made by the Judge at para [48] of the Decision is not irrational, and nor is it based on a mistaken view of the evidence.
Ground 4
56. Under Ground 4, Mr Sadeghi impugns two findings made by the Judge on the issue of whether the appellant’s enforced return to the KRI was feasible. Firstly, he submits that the Judge failed to take into account that a friend of a friend was only able to provide the appellant with a copy of his CSID, and that the appellant had made it clear that the friend did not have access to his actual CSID. On this basis, he submits that it was not open to the Judge to find at para [63] that the appellant could contact his friends in his home area so that his actual CSID could be brought to the airport. However, given the Judge’s adverse credibility findings in respect of the blood feud claim, it was clearly open to the Judge to find that the appellant’s actual CSID could be retrieved and brought to the airport.
57. In any event, there is no error of law challenge to the Judge’s parallel findings that the appellant would be able to obtain at the airport a temporary admission visa that was valid for 30 days, and that with this he would be able to travel back safely to his home in Sulaymaniyah without having to produce a CSID (as he would not be crossing a border); that the appellant would be afforded an opportunity to provide within a reasonable time a relative, friend or local mukhtar or two other witnesses to confirm his identity; and that he would also be able to travel to his local CSA office to redocument himself without having to produce a CSID.
58. Secondly, Mr Sadeghi submits that the Judge did not give adequate reasons for holding that the appellant could be returned directly to Sulaymaniyah Governate, rather than having to be returned to Federal Iraq, with the consequence that he would face a real risk of serious harm if he tried to cross a checkpoint without a valid CSID. In support of the case that the appellant could not be returned directly to the KRI, Mr Sadeghi relied on SA (Iraq) [2022] UKUT 37, to which the Judge makes reference, and he says he also relied on the information in the CPIN that, between 30 September 2020 and 5 October 2022, the Home Office had only successfully enforced the removal of 8 Iraqi nationals to Erbil and 9 Iraqi nationals to Sulaymaniyah, and that the CPIN of October 2023 did not give any statistics for the number of enforced removals to the KRI after 2022.
59. I consider that it was clearly open to the Judge to find that the appellant was removable to the KRI for the reasons that she gave and on the basis of the information given in the October 2023 CPIN. The Judge reasonably distinguished SA (Iraq) on the ground that, at the time that case was decided, enforced returns were only to Baghdad, whereas, according to the October 2023 CPIN, failed asylum seekers could now be returned to any airport in Federal Iraq or the KRI.
60. The Judge was not obliged to address every material consideration, especially when it had not been raised in the ASA and especially when it was inherently tendentious. The fact that there had been a negligible number of returns previously, and the fact that there were no statistics for the number of returns to the KRI since the new policy had been announced, was not reasonably capable of refuting the existence and operation of the new returns policy, but only of casting doubt on the extent of its implementation. Even so, this did not change the fact that prima facie the appellant’s direct enforced return to Sulaymaniyah Governate was feasible, and the Judge was not clearly wrong to find that it was.
Summary
61. In summary, for the reasons I have given above, none of the grounds discloses an error of law.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not contain an error of law, and accordingly the decision stands. This appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
Anonymity
The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in favour of the appellant, and I consider that it is appropriate that the appellant continues to be protected by anonymity for the purposes of these proceedings in the Upper Tribunal.

Andrew Monson
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
13 May 2026