Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004830

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/04626/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29th December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between

AY
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person and unrepresented
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge Emmerson (the judge) sent out on 4 August 2025. By that decision the judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims.

2. The Appellant is a citizen of Turkey born in 1996. He is of Kurdish ethnicity. After arriving in the United Kingdom his protection and human rights claims were made in August 2024 and therefore the provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 applied.

3. The Appellant’s case was based on his claimed support for the HDP party in Turkey. He said that many people in that country associated the HDP with the PKK. The Appellant claimed that the following events took place whilst he was living in Istanbul. Three former work colleagues accused him of being a “terrorist” because they associated support for the HDP with that for the PKK. This resulted in a fight at the beginning of August 2024. A few days later three unidentified men in a car, believed to be associates of the three work colleagues, assaulted the Appellant. The Appellant believed that one of the three colleagues had connections with the Turkish authorities. He claimed that he would be at risk on return to Turkey as a result of these past events. The Respondent rejected the main parts of the Appellant’s claim in a detailed reasons for refusal letter dated 7 November 2024. The Appellant then appealed to the First-tier Tribunal.

The judge’s decision
4. The Appellant was not represented (and this remains the case) and he appeared before the judge in person. The judge considered this matter and was satisfied that the hearing could fairly proceed. The Appellant was asked questions and the judge did not give his decision at the end of the hearing.

5. Before stating his written reasons, the judge confirmed that he had taken all of the evidence into account. The judge found that the main parts of the Appellant’s evidence were not reliable. I now set out the most important parts of the judge’s decision:

“39. I attach some weight to the Appellant’s claims as set out in paragraphs 32 and 33 above regarding him being called a terrorist supporter by the Three Colleagues and that this resulted in a fight but attach more weight to the Appellant’s response that, prior to the 4th August 2024 incident, he did not take it seriously.

Three Men in a Car

40. On his return to work on 4th August 2024, the Appellant claims that he was forced into the back seat of a car and punched in the face by three men who were not the Three Colleagues ….

…

43. I find the Appellant’s oral testimony about the 4th August incident, the uncle MP, the Three Colleagues’ nephew being at police academy and the subsequent threats that allegedly followed to both him and his brother as vague and attach weight to this.

44. I attach weight to Miss Butt’s submission that the Appellant did not go to the police, that he has not identified who the Three Men in the Car were and that he has been inconsistent on certain key dates ….

45. I attach significant weight to the Reasons For Refusal Letter ….

46. I attach no weight to the Appellant’s claims as set out in paragraphs 40 and 41 above regarding his been called a terrorist by the Three Men in a Car and being punched and threatened.

Non- State Actors

47. I attach significant weight to the Reasons for Refusal Letter … about the lack of information about the MP’s identity and the Appellant’s admission in his oral testimony that he was unable to match the surname of the nephew (who was one of the Three Colleagues) with any MP. I also attach [significant] weight to the lack of detail and evidence about this nephew’s attendance at a police academy.

48. I attach significant weight to the Reasons for Refusal Letter (paragraph 11(b): “The group you claim to fear are non-state and you have failed to demonstrate that it is reasonably likely they have sufficient power or influence over the authorities in Turkey.”

49. I attach significant weight to Miss Butt’s submissions about both the Three Colleagues and the Three Men in a Car being non-state actors with no affiliation to the Turkish authorities. Kurdish ethnicity.

…

58. The Appellant identified his Three Former Colleagues and the Three Men in a Car as the people who he specifically fears. I find that this fear is, on the balance of probabilities, not genuine in relation to the Three Colleagues and not genuine in relation to the Three Men in a Car. I also find his fear from being a supporter of the HDP and his fear from being of Kurdish ethnicity are each, on the balance of probabilities, not genuine.

59. Based on my findings above, on the balance of probabilities, the fear of persecution that the Appellant claims in relation to the Three Colleagues, the Three Men in a Car, being a supporter of HDP and being of Kurdish ethnicity is not genuinely held for the claimed Convention reasons of being a victim of race and/or political opinion.

…

62. Based on my findings above, it is reasonably likely that the Appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason on return to Turkey.

64. Based on my findings above, it is reasonably likely that sufficient protection would be available to the Appellant on return to Turkey.

Internal relocation

65. I attach significant weight to the Reasons for Refusal Letter (paragraphs 12 and 13).

66. Based on my findings above, it is reasonably likely that the Appellant would be able to internally relocate to Turkey.”

6. As a result of these conclusions, the judge found that the Appellant’s appeal should be dismissed.

The grounds of appeal
7. The Appellant put forward six grounds of appeal. These related to the fairness of proceedings, the interpreter, the assessment of the Appellant’s claim and whether there was a risk on return. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal, but only on ground 3. Ground 3 reads as follows:

“The Tribunal assessed my support for the HDP as ‘minimal.’ However, the Home Office’s Country Policy and Information Note acknowledges that the Turkish authorities often conflate the HDP with the PKK, and HDP supporters are at risk of being associated with terrorism. Therefore, individuals like me face a genuine risk of persecution from both state and state-affiliated actors. The finding that my support for the HDP was ‘not genuine’ is therefore incorrect.”

8. There was no renewed application in relation to the other grounds of appeal. Therefore, the only ground of appeal with which I am concerned is ground 3.

The hearing
9. The Appellant appeared in person and had the assistance of an interpreter. I was satisfied that they understood one another in the Turkish language. I took time to explain all relevant matters to the Appellant at the outset. These included my role, Mr Ojo’s role, what the judge had found, what the Appellant’s grounds of appeal were, and the fact that he was only able to rely on the third ground of appeal at the hearing. The Appellant confirmed that he understood all of this.

10. I then heard from the Appellant. He told me that initially he had had evidence on his mobile telephone but this had been taken off him and lost whilst he was in France. He had apparently obtained a new document, which had been sent in to the Upper Tribunal recently. At this point I explained to him that I was only able to consider evidence which had been in front of the judge (there were no circumstances in which new evidence could have been relevant to ground 3 at the error of law stage). He explained that he had been reluctant to go to the police in Turkey because his own father had been an HDP member and had been tortured in the past. He was told that if he had gone to the police nothing would have changed in any event. He believed that the police might have information about him and that he could be charged with terrorist offences at any time.

11. When I asked about why he thought he could not move to another part of Turkey the Appellant told me that everything would be the same wherever he went.

12. Mr Ojo referred me to relevant passages in the judge’s decision (most of these have already been set out in my decision). He submitted that the judge had looked at all the evidence properly and reached sustainable conclusions.

13. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.

Reasons
14. The judge’s decision is detailed. The judge did not have to set out every single part of the evidence which he had considered, nor did he have to give detailed reasons for each part of his assessment.

15. For the following reasons I have decided that the judge did not make any legal mistakes when dismissing the Appellant’s appeal.

16. The judge clearly looked at all of the evidence which was before him. The judge was entitled to find that the Appellant’s evidence had not been straightforward or reliable. Even taking into account the fact that the Appellant did not have legal representation, the judge was entitled to find that there were differences in the evidence about important parts of the Appellant’s case.

17. I focus on the Appellant’s claims about the three work colleagues and the three men in a car because that is the part of his case to which ground 3 relates.

18. The judge accepted that the three work colleagues might have called the Appellant a “terrorist” because they saw a link between support for HDP with support for the PKK. However, the judge was entitled to find that the Appellant did not in fact take that allegation seriously and he then returned to work. The judge was in effect saying that if the Appellant had been in fear at that stage he would not have gone back to work.

19. The judge was entitled to find that the Appellant’s evidence about the three men in a car was vague. The judge was entitled to find that the Appellant was not called a “terrorist” by those men and that he was not in fact assaulted.

20. The judge was entitled to find that there was no reliable evidence to connect any of the six individuals with the Turkish authorities or any politician. That was an important finding because it had an effect on the question of whether the Appellant could get protection from the authorities, or whether he could go and live elsewhere in Turkey.

21. The judge went on to find that the Appellant was not in fact afraid of the six individuals or because of his support for the HDP. That is because there was no genuine support for that particular party.

22. Reading the judge’s decision sensibly and as a whole, all of his findings pointed in one direction only: there was no risk to the Appellant on return. Even if some of the wording used in his decision could have been better expressed, the conclusions were both clear and supported by findings and reasons.

23. Following from the above, the judge was entitled to find that even if there might be problems from the six individuals, the Appellant could get protection from the Turkish authorities in his home area of Istanbul. Alternatively the judge was clearly entitled to conclude that the Appellant could go and live in another part of Turkey.

Summary
24. There are no errors in the judge’s decision. His findings were all open to him. Even if there might possibly be a risk from the six individuals within a district of Istanbul, the judge was plainly entitled to find that the Appellant could simply go and live in another city or town in Turkey. On the judge’s findings, none of the individuals had any relevant connections with the Turkish authorities and the Appellant himself had not had adverse interactions with the authorities. There was no reasonable likelihood of him being on any database or that any adverse matters would be detected if he moved somewhere else in that large country.

Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal Judge did not make any errors of law in his decision and that decision stands.

The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

H Norton-Taylor

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 16 December 2025