Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004838
FTT No: PA/00034/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2nd March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LEWIS

Between

MM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The Appellant appeared as a litigant in person.
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at the Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 26 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties are entitled to apply on notice to vary this direction.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is our decision which was delivered at the hearing on an ex tempore basis. Whilst it is the Secretary of State who brings this appeal, to ease following our decision, we shall continue to refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.
2. We had been provided with a bundle of documents from the Respondent comprising 124 pages. The Appellant confirmed that he had that bundle. He did not inform us he had additional documents which he had sought to rely on until after Mr Tan’s submissions to us. We shall return to those documents.
Background and Permission to Appeal
3. The Appellant is a national of Iran. By way of a decision dated 15 August 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Jepson (“the Judge”) had allowed the Appellant’s appeal based on humanitarian protection grounds.
4. The Respondent had sought permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision. Permission to appeal had been granted to the Respondent by First-tier Tribunal Judge Horton by way of a decision dated 13 October 2025. When granting permission on a single ground, it was stated:
“Ground 2 has some merit given that the asylum claim was dismissed (including regarding being an atheist) but it was allowed under humanitarian protection (due to being an atheist). There are significant adverse findings on the core claim throughout the determination but then the appeal is allowed. It is at least arguable that there are not adequate reasons given for reaching a contradictory finding on the material matter of atheism.”
Grounds of Appeal
5. The Respondent’s grounds of appeal are not focused and somewhat lengthy. The Respondent is aware that grounds need to properly particularised. We remind the Respondent to draft the grounds in accordance with the overriding objective and to ensure that the grounds are set out correctly.
6. In any event, ground 2 states:
“Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters and or Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter –
Findings on Humanitarian Protection at [76-82] of the decision.
The Respondent submits the FTJ has made significant adverse findings on the appellant’s core claim throughout the determination. Most significantly, the FTJ finds in this NABA 2022 appeal a well-founded fear of return is not established to the balance of probabilities at [18-73].
Considering the key matter of whether the appellant has established a fear of persecution for a convention reason, the FTJ finds the appellant’s claimed prior period in custody does not create (or increase) risk on return [23], the appellant remained in Iran for eight more years without any adverse interest.
Indeed, the FTJ accepts the appellant and his family remained living openly as atheists in Iran without issues at [49-50 & 78]:
“49. The picture painted, whereby the Appellant could quite openly possess atheist belief without apparent concern, is at odds with the country policy cited above. It appears quite a lot of people were aware. They did not seemingly face problems either, despite as set out reference by the Appellant to that often being an issue in Iran. Quite how there was no danger from the nearby cleric – who made checks – is a mystery.”
“50. The Appellant did talk therein about the neighbouring cleric, other neighbours being aware (question 13) though as discussed above he did not face any problems in Iran from that. The subject at least in one sense is not therefore something which was raised at a particularly late stage. The Appellant also said in the SCR he is an atheist. He did not, however, put belief forward at that stage as a specific risk. Whilst there can be no expectation a detailed account be given in the first round of questions, given belief forms an important part of the narrative one it is odd no direct mention was made of it – at least as a source of danger – at that point.”
“78. ….It remains very odd the Appellant would have seemingly lived in quite an open fashion, despite the danger that would represent. The concern created is amplified by inconsistency with M's account. That also applies to contrasting depictions of the son being able to live freely as an atheist due to connections as against M’s claim he pretends to be a Muslim.”
Continuing, the FTJ finds the appellant’s claimed fear of persecution from the Ministry of Information is not made out and there was no barrier to the appellant leaving Iran sooner than he did [24]. It is noted the appellant did not leave Iran illegally as it is accepted he entered on a work visa [25, 27] and he is not Kurdish. It is therefore submitted no risk factors, including reference to “pinch points”, identified in HB (Kurds) are applicable in this appeal.
Most significantly damaging to the appellant’s claim is the fact the FTJ has categorically found the appellant is not on any blacklist due to his time spent outside Iran at [66] “Aside from those issues, I do not believe on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant is on a blacklist or that he has been told as such by his son” and [68] “I therefore reject claims the Appellant is on a blacklist or that he has been told as much.” 16. Turning to the appellant’s claimed atheism, the FTJ once more categorically finds contradictions in the evidence of the appellant and his daughter fatal to his claim at [74] “Taking those factors together, I cannot be satisfied on the balance of probabilities the Appellant is or ever has been an atheist. His account is simply not plausible.”
The Respondent does not seek to rehearse the FTJ findings comprehensively dismissing both key aspects of the appellant’s claim from [18-74] and does not challenge any of these conclusions. It is clear the FTJ does not accept either aspect of the appellant’s claim and the appeal is summarily dismissed under the Refugee Convention at [74-75]. None of these findings are disputed – the FTJ has agreed the appellant’s protection claim is not made out.
The Respondent therefore submits the FTJ has then reached a completely contradictory finding on the matter of atheism. The asylum claim is rejected as not credible or plausible at [73] “Taking those factors together, I cannot be satisfied on the balance of probabilities the Appellant is or ever has been an atheist. His account is simply not plausible.” 19. However, the FTJ then goes on to find the opposite for the purposes of Humanitarian Protection at [81].
The findings are starkly contradictory and are clearly not open to the FTJ on the same evidence which was found not supportive of the appellant’s claim. 20. Given the FTJ has not identified any convention reason, has not accepted the appellant is on a blacklist and categorically not accepted he is or ever has been an atheist, the Respondent submits they have failed to identify any reasons why the appeal succeeds under Humanitarian Protection provisions. While Article 8 was not considered, it cannot be disputed the appellant is an educated, successful businessman fully conversant with Iranian culture and with relatives to assist him on return.
While previous detention is accepted, the FTJ finds “the fact the Appellant had been in custody some years ago would not lead to any additional scrutiny of note on return. Nor can it in my view create a risk of persecution on return” at [64] and “Nothing on the evidence before me suggests that having been in the UK for a long period of time would increase the risk faced. I do not know, for example, how long the people on the list the Appellant present had been away from Iran (if indeed they have been detained at all.) The accepted fact the Appellant was in custody twenty-five years ago does not change my conclusions on this point.” [65].
Summing up their findings the FTJ states (emphasis added):
“79. What just about tips things in the Appellant’s favour is his consistent claim to have been an atheist. Even when not putting that element forward as a basis for risk (via the SCR) the Appellant gave atheism as his religion (so to speak.) Given at that stage he was not claiming to be in peril due to faith-based problems, there would be no reason to claim atheism if it were untrue. Although perhaps a slightly clumsy analogy, it would be similar to giving a date of birth that made the Appellant a year younger; nothing would be gained. Had the Appellant claimed at that stage his atheism put him in peril, the position may have been different. Although a less persuasive factor, he and M were consistent in court about the Appellant’s beliefs. 81. As such, though not without considerable hesitation I am about persuaded to the standard of reasonable likelihood a substantial risk of serious harm awaits the Appellant on return by virtue of his being an atheist.”,
The Respondent seeks to rely on Budhathoki (reasons for decision) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC) which clarifies: “…We are not for a moment suggesting that judgments have to set out the entire interstices of the evidence presented or analyse every nuance between the parties. Far from it. Indeed, we should make it clear that it is generally unnecessary, unhelpful and unhealthy for First tier Tribunal judgments to seek to rehearse every detail or issue raised in the case. This leads to judgments becoming overly long and confused. Further, it is not a proportionate approach to deciding cases. It is, however, necessary for First-tier Tribunal judges to identify and resolve the key conflicts in the evidence and explain in clear and brief terms their reasons for preferring one case to the other so that the parties can understand why they have won or lost…” 24. With respect, the FTJ findings, particularly at [79] are muddled and unclear such that the Respondent cannot determine why the appeal succeeds. The FTJ adverse findings throughout the decision provide clear reasons why the claim is dismissed on all key matters.
It is considered wholly contradictory for the FTJ to find on one hand the appellant has not demonstrated to the balance of probabilities he has established a fear of return due to being an atheist and that he is not and never has been an atheist; but on the other hand to find he would be at risk under Humanitarian Protection provisions.
The FTJ has not referred to any CPIN, established country guidance case law or submissions to corroborate their findings on Humanitarian Protection. Consequently, it is respectfully submitted the FTJ has failed to provide adequate reasons and / or made a material misdirection of law on key material matters.”
The Hearing Before Us
7. In his submissions before us Mr Tan relied on the grounds of appeal and said that the challenge to the Judge’s decision could be distilled into a few sentences. He said that the Judge noted at paragraphs 72 and 73 that the Appellant’s account was not same as his daughter’s account. Mr Tan said that what fatally undermined the Judge’s decision was that the Appellant’s description of events in Iran. He said that there had been inconsistency in the narrative. For example, the Appellant had claimed in the hearing that he had been afraid of the cleric neighbour yet in his Home Office interview, the Appellant was seemingly unconcerned about the checks he made. Mr Tan said that another oddity was the wide circle of people who seemed to have been aware that the Appellant had moved away from Islam. Mr Tan referred to the Judge’s decision whether the Appellant had broken away from Islam 26 years ago, it might be said he was remarkably lucky not to have faced adverse attention given the quite relaxed attitude taken.
8. Mr Tan referred to the Judge’s decision at paragraphs 78 and 79 when he had said,
“78. As to claimed atheism, my finding is somewhat different, however. I acknowledge entirely the concerns set out in a previous section of the judgment are significant to say the least. They raise some doubt about the Appellant’s account. It remains very odd the Appellant would have seemingly lived in quite an open fashion, despite the danger that would represent. The concern created is amplified by inconsistency with M's account. That also applies to contrasting depictions of the son being able to live freely as an atheist due to connections as against M’s claim he pretends to be a Muslim.
79. What just about tips things in the Appellant’s favour is his consistent claim to have been an atheist. Even when not putting that element forward as a basis for risk (via the SCR) the Appellant gave atheism as his religion (so to speak.) Given at that stage he was not claiming to be in peril due to faith-based problems, there would be no reason to claim atheism if it were untrue. Although perhaps a slightly clumsy analogy, it would be similar to giving a date of birth that made the Appellant a year younger ; nothing would be gained. Had the Appellant claimed at that stage his atheism put him in peril, the position may have been different. Although a less persuasive factor, he and M were consistent in court about the Appellant’s beliefs.”
9. Mr Tan said that the Judge’s decision was not rational. He invited us to set it aside.
10. We then heard from the Appellant in response. He told us at this stage that in fact he did have documents that he had sought to rely on, in addition to the 124 paged Respondent’s bundle. He said that one set of his documents comprised 22 pages and another set comprised 10 pages. It turned out that when in the correct font, the documents fitted on to fewer pages. We had not seen those documents previously and nor had Mr Tan. The documents were a witness statement from the Appellant’s daughter, comprising 6 pages and also a document setting out why the Respondent was wrong to reject his application for a visa in the first place. It became clear that these documents had not been available to the Judge.
11. Noting that the Appellant was a litigant in person and being as fair in the circumstances that we could, we permitted the Appellant to refer to these documents and Mr Tan was given time to read them.
12. We invited the Appellant to say all that he wished to in respect of his response to the Respondent’s appeal against the Judge’s decision.
13. The Appellant provided a detailed response relating to various matters. These included (i) his daughter’s witness statement, (ii) what occurred 26 years ago (iii) that matters in Iran will have likely changed since then and (iv) he referred to the screening interview he attended with the Respondent.
14. The Appellant also told us at length about recent events in Iran. Such as that 3 weeks ago in Iran that access to telephones and internet had been switched off and that “they started to kill people in the streets and offices and in 36 hours they killed 35000 people.”
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
15. We remind ourselves that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. In particular we note the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
16. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
Consideration and Analysis
17. We agree with Mr Tan that the Judge’s findings are inconsistent and contradictory. Whilst on the one hand the Judge when considering the asylum issues concluded that the Appellant’s version of events could not be accepted, the Judge then made contradictory findings when assessing the humanitarian protection aspect of the Appellant’s claim by accepting those very matters. We have been unable to reconcile the Judge’s findings at paragraph 79 with the rest of his decision, particularly with those earlier parts of the decision in which he did not find the Appellant’s account to have been made out.
18. Whilst we appreciate that the Judge was perhaps seeking to consider matters separately in terms of section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 which have differing standards of proof for different parts of the claim, the contradictory findings reveal contradictions and irrational findings.
19. We conclude that the Judge’s decision contains a material error of law. In the circumstances, the fairest approach is that the whole of the Judge’s decision be set aside on all issues because of the contradictory findings.
20. For completeness, as we explained to the Appellant during the hearing, we are unable to take into account the recent events that he had referred to Iran when assessing whether or not the Judge had made a material error of law in his decision in August 2025. Nor are we able to now take into account the new evidence of the Appellant’s daughter or other documents because they were not before the Judge.
21. We have considered whether or not this is a matter which ought to remain for further consideration here at the Upper Tribunal or whether it should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. We apply AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). We consider whether to retain the matter for remaking here at the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. We take into account the history of this case, the nature and extent of findings to be made as well as the nature of the errors in this case. We further consider it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process. We conclude that the appropriate decision in this case is that we remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal with no retained findings.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had allowed the appeal is set aside.
The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a complete rehearing on all issues and all matters.
None of the current findings shall stand.
The anonymity direction shall continue because the matter raises international protection issues.

Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 January 2026