Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Case No: UI-2025-004844

(First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60528/2024)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FROOM

Between

G A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M M Hossain, Counsel, instructed by M K Adams, Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard on 19 February 2026 at Field House

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with the permission of the First-tier Tribunal against a decision, signed on 14 August 2025, of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal sitting remotely in the Virtual Region (“the judge”) dismissing his appeal against a decision of the Respondent refusing his protection and human rights claims, dated 9 April 2024.
2. The First-tier Tribunal did not make an anonymity order even though this appeal centres on a protection claim. I have decided to make an order because the risk of harm outweighs the usual requirement for open justice. As such I am satisfied, having had regard to the guidance in the Presidential Guidance Note No 1 of 2013: Anonymity Orders, that it would be appropriate to make an order in accordance with Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 in the following terms:
“Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, or the Appellant’s protection claim is finally determined, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him, any of his witnesses or any member of his family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellant and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.”
The factual background and First-tier Tribunal decision
3. The Appellant left Bangladesh and entered the United Kingdom on 8 October 2022. He entered with leave to enter as a student, but his leave was cancelled on 9 June 2023 to expire on 8 August 2023. I have not been told the reasons for that. The Appellant claimed asylum on 7 August 2023. He was interviewed on 2 April 2024 and he gave an account of fearing persecution as a result of his activities as a supporter of the BNP. He did not receive any threats while he was in Bangladesh but he had whilst in the United Kingdom. He had attended meetings in the United Kingdom and posted on social media. A false case was filed against him in Bangladesh on 4 January 2024.
4. The Respondent refused the claim on 9 April 2024. The Respondent accepted the Appellant’s claim fell within a Refugee Convention reason: political opinion. However, the Respondent did not accept the Appellant was a high level member of the BNP or that he had come to the adverse attention of the Awami League.
5. The Appellant claimed to have a partner in the United Kingdom, Ms Begum, who had entered on the same date as the Appellant with leave to enter as his dependant. She did not claim asylum as his dependant but, on 27 March 2025, she was granted leave to remain on the family route until 27 September 2027. This was on the basis of her being a parent. A child, T, entered the United Kingdom on 19 July 2024. She is a British citizen. Her birth certificate records that her mother is Ms Begum, but the Appellant is not her father. A marriage certificate was produced showing the Appellant and Ms Begum married in Bangladesh shortly before the Appellant and Ms Begum left. The date of marriage was 9 August 2022.
6. In the notice of decision, the Respondent simply noted the Appellant’s partner was not a British citizen or settled in the United Kingdom. The Appellant had not mentioned the child at that point.
7. In the proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal, the Respondent gave consent for the Appellant’s claimed relationship with the child, T, to be considered as a ‘new matter’. The judge heard oral evidence from the Appellant and Ms Begum. He did not permit the child, T, to give evidence. He made adverse credibility findings and he gave reasons for finding the Appellant’s account not credible. His reasons and findings included the following:
(1) It was not credible that the Appellant had not received any threats in Bangladesh or come to the adverse attention of the authorities if he had been politically active for eight years and held a position of some seniority within the BNP, as he claimed;
(2) The Appellant did not receive a threat until he had been in the United Kingdom for eight months;
(3) The threat was not made to the Appellant directly but to his brother;
(4) The Appellant had not claimed to have held any specific role at demonstrations in the United Kingdom and he only attended as a supporter;
(5) The Appellant’s evidence of social media activity could not be given weight because it was incomplete, it mostly consisted of re-posts of content written by other people, it covered a limited time period and it attracted relatively few likes; and
(6) The Appellant had been inconsistent at his interview in disclosing that a case had been filed against him and the Appellant had not asked anyone in Bangladesh to check the status of the case against him.
8. In sum, the Judge concluded the Appellant was not a reliable witness and he rejected his account of political activity in Bangladesh and the United Kingdom, and of a false case being brought against him. He also noted the background evidence which showed the political situation in Bangladesh had changed fundamentally since the Appellant had left and the Awami League, whom the Appellant feared, was no longer in power.
9. On Article 8, the judge made the following findings:
(1) The Appellant’s claim that he had been living with Ms Begum since they both arrived in the United Kingdom was rejected because the Appellant had given three different addresses within a one-year period (April 2024 to April 2025);
(2) The Appellant had lived with Ms Begum at her address in Poundbury, Dorset, since no earlier than April 2025, which was only four months before the hearing;
(3) As such, the appellant did not have a genuine and subsisting relationship with the child, T;
(4) It was in the best interests of the child, T, to remain living with her mother, Ms Begum, who has leave to remain;
(5) However, there was no reason Ms Begum and the child, T, could not return to Bangladesh with the Appellant, if they wished to.
10. The Appellant appealed on the following grounds:
(1) The judge erred by failing to undertake a rounded assessment and had not assessed the documentary evidence of the false case against the Appellant or the documentary evidence of the Appellant’s sur place activities;
(2) The judge erred by failing to engage adequately with the background evidence;
(3) The judge erred by failing to make a credibility finding on the evidence of Ms Begum, which supported the Appellant’s claim to have a genuine and subsisting relationship with the child, T;
(4) The judge erred by failing to make findings on crucial documents supporting the claimed relationship; and
(5) The judge’s conclusion on the relationship was not adequately explained and the judge had not engaged with section 117B(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
11. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal to argue all grounds, save for Ground 2.
12. The Respondent has not filed a Rule 24 response, but Ms McKenzie confirmed the Respondent opposed the appeal.
Rule 15(2A) application
13. The composite bundle contains evidence which was not before the First-tier Tribunal, all of which relates to the Appellant’s claimed relationships with Ms Begum and T (pages 21 to 30 PDF). The skeleton argument filed in advance of this hearing seeks permission to adduce further evidence as it is relevant to the credibility findings. Since his appeal was dismissed, the Appellant’s circumstances had changed materially and his partner was pregnant with a child expected in June.
14. I considered Rule 15(2A) of the Procedure Rules. Clearly, the reason the evidence had not been submitted to the First-tier Tribunal is that it did not exist at that time. All the documents are dated after the hearing and the promulgation of the decision. Ms Begum could not have been pregnant at that time. In any event, none of this new material is relevant to the issue whether the First-tier Tribunal made an error of law. I exercised my discretion to refuse to admit this evidence.
The submissions
15. Mr Hossain relied on the grounds of appeal and his skeleton argument. The latter largely reiterates the points made in the grounds. I asked Mr Hossain to address me on whether any error of law in the protection part of the decision could be material in light of the BNP’s victory in the elections in Bangladesh last week. He reminded me that the Appellant also fears ill-treatment by virtue of the false case brought against him. On the protection element of the appeal, Mr Hossain’s point was essentially that the judge failed to consider all the evidence in the round: Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367, QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 00033 (IAC). On the Article 8 element of the case, his point was essentially that the judge failed to take into account significant documentary evidence showing the relationship between the Appellant and T, based on cohabitation going back to when T entered the United Kingdom. In both cases the judge had not given adequate reasons: MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC).
16. Mr Hossain also argued the judge erred by failing to make findings on the best interests of the child and under section 117B(6) of the 2002 Act, although I pointed out that the judge’s primary finding was that he did not accept there was a genuine and subsisting parental relationship between the Appellant and T, so he did not need to consider the section.
17. Ms McKenzie defended the decision and said there was no error. She began by highlighting the change of government in Bangladesh since the Appellant had claimed asylum. She argued the decision did not contain any error of the kind described in Mibanga. Even if the judge had erred in failing to assess the documents concerning the false case, any error could not be material because those documents were not complete and did not name the accuser. Ms McKenzie argued there was no error in the judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s sur place activities and she relied on MH (Bangladesh) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 688.
18. Turning to Article 8, Ms McKenzie argued the judge had been right not to allow T to give evidence and she agreed with me that the Appellant’s real complaint about this was that, having reasoned that Ms Begum could give evidence instead of T, he had failed to make a finding on her evidence. She argued the judge had done enough to show he had taken all the documents into account and he was entitled to reach the conclusion he reached. As to the meaning of ‘subsisting’, she reminded me of he decision in GA (“Subsisting” marriage) Ghana * [2006] UKAIT 00046.
19. In reply, Mr Hossain again made the argument that the Mibanga principle applied. The judge had decided the Appellant was not credible before looking at the documents. He also maintained the judge had erred by it considering the best interests of T.
Decision on error of law
20. I have reminded myself that I must exercise caution when determining whether the First-tier Tribunal has erred in law. I summarise the applicable principles from AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49, [2008] 1 AC 678 at [30], MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49, [2011] 2 All ER 65 at [45], AA (Nigeria) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1296, [2020] 4 WLR 145 at [34], KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693, [2021] 5 WLUK 93 at [77], and Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48 at [2] – [5], as follows:
1. The First-tier Tribunal is an expert tribunal, and an appellate court should not rush to find a misdirection an error of law merely because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently;
2. The Upper Tribunal should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that they were plainly wrong;
3. The Upper Tribunal should be astute not to characterise as an error of law what, in truth, is no more than a disagreement with its own assessment of the facts;
4. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the First-tier Tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account;
5. The Upper Tribunal is an appellate court, and it is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the First-tier Tribunal has taken the whole of the evidence into consideration. The mere fact that the First-tier Tribunal does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that it overlooked it;
6. Experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically;
7. Reasons for a judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appellate court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it were a piece of legislation or a contract;
8. Decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that the First-tier Tribunal has misdirected itself in law; and
9. The focus should be on the way the First-tier Tribunal performed the essence of the task required.
21. With those principles firmly in mind, I dismiss the Appellant’s appeal because there is no material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal decision. I shall divide my consideration into two parts: protection and Article 8.
Protection claim
22. Even without the question mark which the election results raise in terms of the materiality of any error of law, I would not have found that any errors in the decision were sufficient to vitiate the overall conclusion reached that the Appellant’s claims were not credible.
23. The judge’s reasoning might reasonably be described as sparse. However, he was not required to give separate treatment to each and every piece of evidence. If the decision is read as a whole, it is sufficiently clear that the judge was aware of all the evidence submitted on behalf of the Appellant and that he reached his conclusions in that context. In particular, it is clear he understood the Appellant’s case in detail as regards his political activities in Bangladesh because he expressly refers to the length of his political activity in Bangladesh (8 years) and his seniority. Indeed he wove that into one of his main reasons for finding the Appellant not credible in that he found it not credible the Appellant could have avoided adverse attention in Bangladesh for so long if he had genuinely held such a profile.
24. The argument based on Mibanga is also misconceived. The principle relied on from that case was explained in the headnote of QC as follows:
“(3) What the case law reveals is that the judicial fact-finder has a duty to make his or her decision by reference to all the relevant evidence and needs to show in their decision that they have done so. The actual way in which the fact-finder goes about this task is a matter for them. As has been pointed out, one has to start somewhere. At the end of the day, what matters is whether the decision contains legally adequate reasons for the outcome. The greater the apparent cogency and relevance of a particular piece of evidence, the greater is the need for the judicial fact-finder to show that they have had due regard to that evidence; and, if the fact-finder’s overall conclusion is contrary to the apparent thrust of that evidence, the greater is the need to explain why that evidence has not brought about a different outcome. “
25. In this case, it is true that the judge made no analysis of the documents adduced, such as the newspaper clipping, the FIR, charge sheet and arrest warrant. I did not follow Ms McKenzie’s argument because these documents do appear to me to name the complainant. Mr Hossain’s argument, building on the grounds of appeal, was that the judge had already made up his mind that the Appellant was not credible before looking at the documents and he therefore failed to look at everything in the round, as he was required to do.
26. However, that is not what the decision shows the judge did. He set out his analysis of parts of the evidence over two pages from [20] to [28] and then stated his conclusion at [29] that he did not find the Appellant credible either to his political activities in Bangladesh or the United Kingdom. At [30] he concluded the Appellant was not at risk on return. So, it cannot be right to say the judge rejected the Appellant’s credibility before looking at the documents and then rejected the documents because the Appellant was not credible, which would be circular and erroneous. Rather, he gave reasons for disbelieving the Appellant’s account of his activities in Bangladesh and, on the subject of the documents, he rejected them because (1) the Appellant had been inconsistent at his interview about the existence of the case, and (2) the Appellant had not followed up on the case with people in Bangladesh (see [28]). Those are adequate reasons for finding the Appellant’s claim to be the subject of a false claim unreliable. He did not need to analyse the documents to do that.
27. As for the evidence of the Appellant’s sur place activities, the judge set out adequate reasons for concluding his profile would not place him at risk on return at [24] and [25]. Indeed, he relied on the Appellant’s own evidence that he was merely a supporter of the BNP in the United Kingdom and had not had any role at demonstrations other than being an attendee. He did not then need to analyse the photographs. He did analyse the social media posts and gave cogent reasons for finding these showed the Appellant was at most a low-level supporter of the BNP [25].
28. The grounds suggest the judge should have considered the risk of his presence being monitored. However, although not apparently cited to the judge, the judgment in MH (Bangladesh) shows there was no error of law in the judge’s approach. Each case is fact-sensitive. The judge did not place an unrealistic evidential burden on the Appellant because mere presence at a demonstration opposing the Awami League and supporting the BNP would not by itself create a real risk. There was no evidence before the judge showing the government of Bangladesh had the technical means to identify the Appellant through any surveillance and there was no reason to believe the authorities would be concerned by his presence at demonstrations given his limited profile.
29. The decision is adequately reasoned and complies with MK. There is no merit in Ground 1.
Article 8
30. Grounds 3, 4 and 5 can be dealt with together. Much of Mr Hossein’s oral arguments appeared to me to be attempts to reargue the appeal in an attempt to reach a different outcome. As I endeavoured to explain to him, there could be no material error in the judge’s failure to consider the reasonableness of expecting T to leave the United Kingdom unless it were first established that the Appellant had, at the date of hearing, a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with T. Furthermore, Mr Hossein’s arguments about T’s best interests failed to engage with the fact the judge did reach an entirely sound conclusion that T’s best interests were safeguarded by the fact she could remain living in the United Kingdom with her mother, Ms Begum, who would not be required to leave as a result of the Respondent’s decision to refuse the Appellant’s applications [35]. That was in line with his primary finding that the Appellant had failed to show he had lived with Ms Begum for a sufficient time to have taken on a genuine and subsisting parental role with respect to T [34].
31. I do not understand Ground 3 to take issue with the judge’s decision to refuse to allow T to give evidence but, if that were the intended meaning, I would reject it. There is no minimum age threshold but it would be very rare that an 11-year old child would be permitted to give oral evidence in a court or tribunal, given the obvious welfare concerns, and there was simply no need for T to do so in this case given that the evidence she could give could be provided by Ms Begum. The judge directed himself at [5] in terms of the relevant guidance. His decision was sound.
32. I understood the complaint in Ground 3 to be that, having refused to allow T to give evidence because Ms Begum could do so, the judge then erred by failing to make a finding about whether be believed Ms Begum’s evidence and, if he rejected it, to give reasons for doing so: MK. I note Ms Begum’s witness statement maintained that she and the Appellant had cohabited since arrival. Other than recording that Ms Begum adopted her statement and gave evidence through an interpreter [10], the judge does not refer to her evidence at all.
33. At first sight, this ground appears to have some merit. However, on closer examination, Ms Begum’s statement is extremely brief and the grounds do not set out any oral evidence she gave beyond her statement which the judge ought to have had regard to. Her evidence simply echoed that of the Appellant. It is a fair assessment to say the circumstances of T prior to her arrival in the United Kingdom are not explained and the Appellant did not refer to her at all in his asylum claim, either in the screening or substantive interviews. This was noted in the Respondent’s Review.
34. In that context, I consider the judge’s reasons, which focus exclusively on the Appellant’s evidence, as sufficient. It is clear from [33] in particular, that the Appellant was pressed to explain the various addresses he had given during a 12-month period, which covered T’s entire period of residence in the United Kingdom, and the judge explained why he did not believe him. The Appellant did not provide an explanation to satisfy the judge why he had provided documents showing his address as being in London or Newport. This undermined the claim that the Appellant and Ms Begum had resided together in Dorchester since 2022. The judge has done enough to explain why he rejected the claim the couple had lived tougher since 2022 and, by extension, the Appellant had lived with T since her arrival in July 2024. It was appropriate to infer from the short period of cohabitation that a genuine and subsisting parental relationship had not yet been established.
35. Although not raised as an issue by the judge, I also note the Appellant was admitted to the United Kingdom in order to study in Leicester.
36. Ground 4 follows on from the judge’s failure to consider Ms Begum’s evidence by his failure to consider documents said to support the claimed length of cohabitation. However, the bulk of these are dated July 2025, so they in fact support the finding of the judge that cohabitation commenced no earlier than April. The photographs are numerous and clearly taken on separate occasions, but they are undated. A few emails from the school received in the Appellant’s email account are dated from March or April 2025, but no earlier. There is a bank transfer from January. In short, I do not consider that the failure of the judge to examine these documents in greater detail than he did could conceivably have altered his finding that he was not satisfied there was sufficient evidence to show a parental relationship between the Appellant and T. This finding was not, as stated in Ground 5, inconsistent with the evidence.
37. As said, given this primary finding was sound, there was no error in failing to assess section 117B(6) of the 2002 Act.
38. There is no merit in Grounds 3, 4 or 5.
39. Finally, I would record that, whilst there was no material error in the judge’s conclusion on the evidence before him at the date the appeal was decided that a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with T had not been formed after only four months of cohabitation, or, for that matter, his stated “reservations” about the Appellant’s relationship with Ms Begum, should mean the Appellant might not be able to establish these relationships in due course.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal did not contain an error of law and is upheld.

Signed

N Froom

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Date 20 February 2026