Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004863, UI-2025-004862 UI-2025-004860, UI-2025-004855
UI-2025-004856, UI-2025-004858

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/52584/2024
HU/52587/2024
HU/52583/2024
HU/52572/2024
HU/52575/2024
HU/52579/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST

Between

NAW
AAH
OAH
WAH
OAH
AAH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Islam, instructed by Qualified Legal Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr Pugh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellants are Syrian nationals. They appeal against the Respondent’s decision dated 19 February 2024 refusing them entry clearance to join the sponsor, who has refugee status in the UK. The Appellants’ appeals were originally allowed by the First-tier Tribunal on 9 September 2025. In a decision promulgated on 1 April 2026 the Upper Tribunal found that there was an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and set it aside.
2. For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that in the particular circumstances of the Appellants’ case, paragraph FRP 7.1 of the Immigration Rules was met and the appeals should therefore be allowed.
Background
3. The Appellants are Syrian nationals and are the mother and younger siblings of the sponsor, an adult with refugee status in the UK. The First Appellant’s husband (the father of the sponsor and the other Appellants) went missing in 2016 and the Appellants have no information as to whether he is alive.
4. The Appellants applied for entry clearance on 19 May 2022. Their applications were refused by the Secretary of State on 19 February 2024 on the basis that they did not meet the eligibility requirements of the Immigration Rules, did not share Article 8 family life with the sponsor, and that there were no compassionate factors sufficient to justify granting them entry outside the Immigration Rules.
5. The Appellants appealed the refusal of entry clearance to the First-tier Tribunal, which on 9 September 2025 allowed their appeal. The First-tier Tribunal found that paragraph FRP 7.1 of the Immigration Rules was met, in that there were exceptional circumstances which made the refusal of the entry clearance applications a breach of Article 8 ECHR. When considering whether Article 8 was engaged by family life between the Appellants and the sponsor, the First-tier Tribunal applied what was then understood to be the correct test, namely whether the sponsor had provided “real, effective or committed support” to the Appellants.
6. The Secretary of State appealed and permission was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 17 October 2025.
7. On 26 November 2025, prior to the error of law hearing in the Upper Tribunal, the Court of Appeal gave judgment in IA & Ors v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, [2025] WLR(D) 595 (‘IA’). The judgment clarified both that (i) the test to be applied when determining whether there was family life between adult siblings, or parents and adult children, was whether there were “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”, and (ii) that test was more demanding than the “real, effective or committed support” test (see §10 of the judgment).
8. The appeal came before me on 15 December 2025. In light of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in IA, I found that the First-tier Tribunal had misdirected itself as to the threshold to be applied when determining whether Article 8 family life existed between the Appellants and the sponsor. I set aside the decision and directed that the appeal be reheard in the Upper Tribunal with findings preserved.
9. The hearing on 5 June 2026 proceeded by way of submissions only. I reserved my decision, which is given with reasons below.
Discussion and decision
Legal framework
10. The Appellants made their entry clearance applications on 19 May 2022, prior to the suspension of refugee family reunion applications on 4 September 2025. By the time of the decisions on the Appellants’ entry clearance applications, Appendix FRP of the Immigration Rules applied.
11. The relevant paragraph of the Rules is FRP 7.1, which at the date of the decisions (19 February 2024) provided:
“FRP 7.1. Where an applicant does not meet the requirements for a partner under FRP.4.1. or for a child under FRP.5.1. to FRP 6.2., the decision maker must consider, on the basis of the information provided by the applicant, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would make a refusal of the application a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR, because such refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family member, whose Article 8 rights it is evident from the information provided would be affected by a decision to refuse the application.” [emphasis added]
12. If the Appellants satisfy paragraph FRP 7.1 of the Immigration Rules, then that is positively determinative of their appeal: TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1109 at §34. The Upper Tribunal must therefore consider whether paragraph FRP 7.1 is satisfied before going on if necessary to consider Article 8 outside the Rules.
13. At the hearing before me an issue arose as to whether, when considering whether the Appellants met the requirements of paragraph FRP 7.1, the Tribunal should consider the position as it was at the time of the entry clearance applications, at the time of the decisions refusing entry clearance, or as at the time of the hearing.
14. Before me, the parties were in agreement that the application of paragraph FRP 7.1 should be considered as at the date of the entry clearance applications. However, on reflection I consider that the correct date is the date of the decisions refusing entry clearance (19 February 2024). That is because (i) FRP 7.1, which the parties agree is the applicable Immigration Rule in these appeals, did not exist at the date of the Appellants’ applications; and (ii) there is nothing in FRP 7.1 which indicates that the decision-maker should proceed on the basis of matters as they were at the time of the entry clearance application. I have therefore proceeded on the basis that the application of FRP 7.1 should be determined as at 19 February 2024. I have also borne in mind that s85(4) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 permits the Tribunal to consider any matter which it thinks relevant to the substance of the decision, including matters arising after the date of the decision. ‘Matter’ in this context means “the factual substance of a claim” (Celik (EU exit; marriage; human rights) [2022] UKUT 00220 (IAC) at §93) and ‘the substance of the decision’ means the decision to refuse the Appellants’ human rights claim.
15. If the Appellants do not satisfy paragraph FRP 7.1 of the Immigration Rules, then I must consider Article 8 outside the Rules as at the date of the hearing.
16. In both cases it is for the Appellants to show that there is family life engaging Article 8(1), applying the test set out by the Court of Appeal in IA & Ors v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, [2025] WLR(D) 595 (‘IA’), namely whether there are “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”. Although the requirement for additional elements of dependence imposes a higher threshold than “real, committed or effective support”, exclusive or complete dependency is not required (IA at §120-121). Financial dependency plays a role, but is not sufficient on its own. The assessment is a fact-based one which involves considering all the relevant circumstances of the case: Kumari v The Netherlands (Application 44051/20, 19 November 2024) at §43. Kumari outlines some factors which have previously been considered in a migration context, including the fact that the person with whom ties were claimed was the only surviving relation, or conversely the existence in the country of origin of other family members who could provide care and support (§42).
17. When considering Article 8 outside the Rules, if Article 8(1) is engaged, it is for the Respondent to show that the refusal of entry clearance is in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and proportionate to that legitimate aim. In assessing whether the refusal of entry clearance breaches Article 8 ECHR, the Tribunal must have regard to the statutory considerations in s117B Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Article 8 under the Immigration Rules: Paragraph FRP 7.1
18. In determining whether paragraph FRP 7.1 is met, I must determine the following issues as at the date of the entry clearance refusals:
a. Is there family life engaging Article 8(1) between the sponsor and the Appellants?
b. If so, would the refusal of entry clearance result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellants and/or the sponsor?
Does family life exist between the Appellants and sponsor?
19. It is not in dispute that the Appellants are related to the sponsor as claimed. As I am considering the relationship between the adult sponsor and his mother and siblings (one of whom was also an adult at the time of the entry clearance decision), the test to be applied in determining whether family life exists is that set out by the Court of Appeal at §116-120 of IA.
20. The starting point is the preserved findings of fact made by the First-tier Tribunal at §28-33 of its decision. Although the First-tier Tribunal’s determination was promulgated on 9 September 2025, the Tribunal’s findings of fact were based on witness and expert evidence all dating back to August 2024. There was no suggestion either before the First-tier Tribunal or before me that the Appellants’ situation had changed materially between the refusal of entry clearance in February 2024 and the date of the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal.
21. The First-tier Tribunal found that the First Appellant’s husband went missing in 2016; the Appellants were homeless and living in a tent, sometimes taking shelter in the ruins of bombed-out buildings; the Appellants had unreliable access to food and their water supply was 40 minutes’ walk away; the First Appellant suffers from osteoporosis, pain in the knee and back and had been diagnosed with severe depression, anxiety and panic attacks; and the Second Appellant suffers from epilepsy. The First-tier Tribunal found that the First Appellant received emotional support from the sponsor and in particular that she would talk to him about her health and her worries, including about the other children. The Tribunal also found that the sponsor provided the First Appellant with financial support. The Tribunal noted that the departure of the sponsor and his half-brothers for the UK may have led to the family being perceived as opponents of the Assad regime then in power.
22. The sponsor’s evidence in his witness statement dated 5 August 2024, which was not challenged by the Respondent before the First-tier Tribunal and which formed the basis for the First-tier Tribunal’s findings, was that he had since 2022 been providing financial support to the Appellants of approximately £100 every month, although he would sometimes send more depending on their needs. After his departure from Syria, because his father was missing there was no adult man left in the family to take care of and protect the Appellants, and the Appellants were the subject of verbal abuse and threats from people coming to their home accusing them of disloyalty to the Assad regime as a result of the sponsor’s departure for the UK. As a result, the First Appellant’s mental health had deteriorated. The sponsor tried to speak to the Appellants daily, but it was not always possible due to weak internet connections and the fact that they had to move location due to threats.
23. The First Appellant’s witness statement, dated 26 August 2024, was to similar effect. She confirmed that the money sent by the sponsor was used by the Appellants for subsistence.
24. Considering both the preserved findings of fact and the underlying evidence, and applying the IA test, I am satisfied that family life engaging Article 8 exists between the Appellants and the sponsor. First, the sponsor had at the relevant time been for two years providing financial support to the Appellants. There was no evidence that the Appellants had any other source of income, and the First Appellant’s evidence was that the Appellants were dependent on the sponsor to meet their subsistence needs. That was illustrated by the First Appellant’s evidence that collecting the money sent by the sponsor required her to undertake a dangerous two-hour return journey involving hitchhiking on the motorway. I find that the Appellants were financially dependent on the sponsor to meet their subsistence needs. Whilst financial dependency is not by itself sufficient to meet the Article 8 family life threshold, it is an important factor.
25. Second, I find that the Appellants, and in particular the First Appellant, were heavily dependent on the sponsor for emotional support. The sponsor was living as part of the family unit prior to his departure from Syria (then aged 15) in 2018. It is clear from the witness evidence that the disappearance of the father of the family in 2016, and the lack of any other adult man in the family, meant that the sponsor has to a great extent taken on the role of head of the family, and that the Appellants rely upon him to provide not only financial support but emotional support and reassurance to the rest of the family which goes significantly beyond what would normally be expected of a young man in his early 20s. In reaching this conclusion I take into account the unchallenged expert evidence detailing the particular vulnerability in Syria of a female-headed household without adult male relatives, which is reflected in the First Appellant’s evidence about the pervasive sense of insecurity and lack of safety which the Appellants face. The Appellants’ emotional dependence on the sponsor has also been increased by the severity and insecurity of their living conditions. The sponsor’s evidence, which I accept, was that he tried to call his family daily although he was not always able to make contact due to insecure and unstable connections; the frequency of his contact with his family is a further factor which indicates a much greater level of emotional dependency than would normally be the case. There was no evidence that there were any other adult relatives in Syria who were providing support of any kind to the Appellants. In the circumstances, the contact and emotional support provided by the sponsor was considerably more significant, and was relied on more heavily by the Appellants, than would normally be the case.
26. I therefore find that the Appellants’ relationship with the sponsor involved additional elements of dependency going beyond the normal emotional ties which would be expected between a young adult and his family members. There was at the relevant time family life between the Appellants and the sponsor engaging Article 8 ECHR.
27. For the avoidance of doubt, although I have considered the position as it was at the time of the decisions refusing entry clearance, the evidence before me does not demonstrate that the position was materially different at the time of the Appellants’ applications for entry clearance in 2022. I would therefore have found that Article 8 family life existed at that time.
Were there exceptional circumstances meaning that the refusal of entry clearance would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences?
28. On the basis of the evidence before me, I am satisfied that at the relevant time there were exceptional circumstances rendering the refusal of entry clearance a breach of the Appellants’ rights, and the rights of the sponsor, under Article 8 ECHR.
29. At the time of the entry clearance refusals, I find that:
a. The Second Appellant (d.o.b. 20/1/2006) had just turned 18. The other child Appellants were aged between 12 and 17;
b. The Appellants were homeless and living in a tent, which was not weatherproof and required them to take shelter at times in the ruins of derelict and bomb-damaged buildings;
c. The Appellants did not have security of accommodation and had been evicted on two occasions, increasing the sense of insecurity and lack of safety. There were no housing facilities available due to the destruction caused by the war and no government assistance;
d. The Appellants did not have access to toilet or washing facilities and the nearest well was a 40 minute walk away. Because the First Appellant was not able to carry heavy loads, the children had to carry buckets of water for the family. The lack of clean water had led to health issues including stomach problems and dehydration;
e. The Appellants did not have access to cooking facilities and on most days were eating one meal a day;
f. The children were not able to attend school as there were no schools in the vicinity;
g. The adverse living conditions, and prolonged lack of security and safety, had affected the Appellants’ mental and physical health;
h. The First Appellant had been diagnosed with severe depression, anxiety and panic attacks, and also suffered from osteoporosis and joint pain. The Second Appellant suffered from epilepsy.
30. On the basis of the unchallenged expert report, I find that the Appellants were particularly vulnerable to violence and exploitation as a family without an adult male head, and that the risk to the children was particularly acute. There was an ongoing risk of malnutrition and an extremely low likelihood of the Appellants being able to find safe or suitable housing.
31. The living conditions of the child Appellants, and their inability to meet their basic living needs or to access education, were clearly contrary to their best interests and inimical to their wellbeing. The refusal of entry clearance meant that the extreme and severe conditions faced by the Appellants would continue, with no foreseeable prospect of improvement.
32. I find that the exceptional severity of the conditions in which the Appellants were living, and the lack of any foreseeable prospect of improving their situation, meant that the refusal of entry clearance had unjustifiably harsh consequences. I therefore find that the requirements of paragraph FRP 7.1 were met in the particular circumstances of the Appellants’ case.
33. The fact that the Appellants satisfy the Immigration Rules is positively determinative of the appeal, and I therefore do not need to consider the appeal outside the Rules.

Notice of Decision
The Appellants’ appeals are allowed on human rights grounds.

L Hirst

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 August 2026