UI-2025-004864 & Ors.

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 29 Apr 2026
• Promulgation date: 19 May 2026
• Publication date: 03 Jun 2026
• Last updated on: 03 Jun 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004864
UI-2025-004865; UI-2025-004866
UI-2025-004867; UI-2025-004868
UI-2025-004869; UI-2025-004870
UI-2025-004871; UI-2025-004872
UI-2025-004873; UI-2025-004874
UI-2025-004875; UI-2025-004876

First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/50361/2025; HU/55618/2025
HU/55616/2025; HU/55615/2025
HU/55614/2025; HU/55613/2025
HU/55608/2025; HU/50360/2025
HU/55619/2025; HU/55620/2025
HU/55622/2025; HU/55625/2025
HU/55627/2025
LH/01938/2025; LH/01942/2025
LH/01943/2025; LH/01944/2025
LH/01945/2025; LH/01946/2025
LH/01947/2025; LH/01948/2025
LH/01949/2025; LH/01950/2025
LH/01938/2025; LH/01939/2025
LH/01940/2025


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 19th of May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8, A9, A10, A11, A12, A13
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms K Reid, Counsel instructed by the Government Legal Department
For the Respondent: Ms M Knorr, Counsel instructed by Birnberg Pierce Ltd


Heard at Field House on 29 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants and their family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants and their family in the United Kingdom. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

(1) Introduction
1. On 23 February 2026, my decision (the error of law decision) allowing the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s (SSHD) appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Lawrence (FTTJ) in respect of A1- A13 was promulgated. Having set aside the FTTJ’s decision I decided to retain the matter in the Upper Tribunal. I preserved some of the findings made by the FTTJ and directed that there would be a further hearing after which I would remake the decision in respect of A1 – A13’s appeals against the SSHD’s decisions to refuse them entry clearance to the United Kingdom. Having conducted the further hearing on 29 April 2026, this is my decision in respect of the appeals brought by A1 -A13 (the re-making decision).
2. Although it was the SSHD who appealed to the Upper Tribunal, in this remaking decision I will refer to A1 – A13 as “the appellants” because it is their appeals against the SSHD’s decisions that I am now considering. This remaking decision should be read in conjunction with my error of law decision which sets out the Legal Framework for considering these appeals including the judgment of the Master of the Rolls in IA and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 (IA and Others). For ease of reference, the error of law decision is attached as an Appendix to this decision.
3. The thirteen appeals have been heard together in a single hearing because they raise common issues. I have however considered each of the appellant’s cases individually and at the end of this document, having explained my reasons, provide a separate decision in respect of each of A1 -A13.
4. Throughout the life of these appeals there has been an anonymity order in place to protect the identities of the children involved. I maintain that order as no good reason in the interests of justice has been advanced for identifying the children.
(2) Background
5. The appellants are two core families living in Gaza. A1 and A2 are married and A3, A4, A5, A6 and A7 are their children. A8 and A9 are married and A10, A11, A12 and A13 are their children1.
6. A1 and A8 are brother and sister aged 38 and 35 respectively. They also have three other siblings: a sister “W” who is 40 years old, a brother “M” who is 32 years old, and another brother R who is 30 years old. The siblings lived with their mother “S” and their father in Algeria until 1995 when they moved to Gaza where they lived together in a large four storey family house in Gaza City (“the Sheikh Ejleen house”).
7. In April 2000 the siblings’ father sadly died, leaving S to raise the five siblings in the Sheikh Ejleen house.
8. In 2005 W married “K” who was studying in the United Kingdom. The couple did not live together until February 2008 when W moved from the Sheikh Ejleen house to live with K in London. The couple have two sons who were born in 2008 and 2012. In 2013 W naturalised as a British citizen. W, K and their two sons continue to live in West London.
9. In November 2008 A8 married A9 and moved out of the Sheikh Ejleen house to live with A9, his mother and his two sisters in a property a short walk away. The couple’s son A10 was born in 2009, another son A11 was born in 2013 and twin daughters A12 and A13 were born in 2016.
10. In August 2009 A1 married A2 who moved into the Sheikh Ejleen house. The couple’s daughter A3 was born in 2010, another daughter A4 was born in 2012, a son A5 was born in 2014, a third daughter A6 was born in 2018 and a second son A7 was born in 2021.
11. At some time R married “I” who moved in to the Sheikh Ejleen house. The couple had two daughters who were born in 2017 and 2020.
12. In November 2018 M was granted a visa to enter the United Kingdom to study and in December 2018 M moved to London. Having completed a postgraduate degree in Machine Intelligence, in March 2021 M was recognised to be a refugee with a well-founded fear of persecution in Palestine by Hamas, and he was granted asylum in the United Kingdom. Since then he has been living and working in Essex.
13. In October 2023 therefore, when war began in Gaza, S was living in the Sheikh Ejleen house with A1 - A7 and with R and I and their two daughters. A9 – A13 were living nearby with A10’s mother. W and K and their sons were living in West London and M was living in Essex.
14. Following the outbreak of the war S, A2 – A7, R and I and their two daughters were forced to leave the Sheikh Ejleen house and A9-A13 and A10’s mother were forced to leave their house, as Gaza City was under rocket attack. Other extended family members were also required to leave their homes in Gaza City including “N” a cousin of the siblings who lived in the area of the Sheikh Ejleen house. They all sought refuge in the Yabna refugee camp in Rafah at the south of the Gaza strip, where they stayed in a makeshift construction on the roof of a building. After they left, the Sheikh Ejleen house and much of the area of Gaza City in which they had been living was destroyed.
15. In January 2024, S, together with R and I and their two children, paid a fee which enabled them to exit Gaza through the Rafah crossing into Egypt. W visited them in Egypt in February 2024 and M visited them there in March 2024. When M visited Egypt, he married N who had also managed to cross into Egypt with her mother. In December 2024, N moved to the United Kingdom to join M in Essex having been granted a spousal visa.
16. In March 2024, S made an application to the SSHD for entry clearance to come to the United Kingdom in which she raised a human rights claim on the basis of the family life she shared with W, K and their sons, and with M. Her application was refused in May 2024 but her appeal against that decision was allowed by the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) in March 2025 and that decision of the FTT was upheld by this Tribunal in January 2026. S was accordingly granted entry clearance to come to the United Kingdom, and on 3 April 2026 she arrived in London and moved in with W, K and their sons.
17. In October 2024, R and I and their daughters left Egypt and travelled to Saudi Arabia and then to Oman where they are now living.
18. Between May and June 2024 the thirteen appellants made their applications for entry clearance for the purpose of family reunion that have led to this appeal hearing. At the time they made their applications they were required to leave the Yabna refugee camp following an evacuation order. They have subsequently moved between various different locations in Gaza, living in makeshift tent structures. Since October 2025 they have been living in a tent in the ruins of the Sheikh Eijeen house.
19. The appellants’ applications for entry clearance were refused by the respondent on 17 December 2024 and the appellants brought human rights appeals against those refusals to the First-tier Tribunal. While their appeals were still outstanding the appellants advanced as a “new matter” alternative applications that A3-A7 be granted entry clearance to come to the United Kingdom and reside with M and N and that A10-A13 be granted entry clearance to come to the United Kingdom and reside with W and K and their sons. The respondent agreed to consider these alternative applications even though validity requirements for such applications had not been met but refused to grant the applications. The respondent consented to the “new matter” of these alternative applications being considered by the First-tier Tribunal.
(3) The appellants case
20. In my error of law decision I discussed the two alternative arguments that were advanced by the appellants before the First-tier Tribunal and why, since they raised separate claims that different rights were being infringed by the SSHD’s decisions, it was an error to conflate those arguments. As I explained in that decision those two alternative arguments involved separate claims that different rights under Article 8 of the Convention were being infringed.
21. In the appellant’s primary case the right being claimed is the right under Article 8(1) of the Convention to respect for the unitary family life the siblings say they share with one another and with their mother. The argument advanced is that the SSHD has a positive obligation to grant entry clearance to the relatives in Gaza to prevent a disproportionate interference with that unitary family life.
22. In the appellant’s alternative case the right being claimed by A3 – A7 is the right under Article 8(1) of the Convention to respect for the family life they share as nieces and with their uncle M and aunt N in the United Kingdom. The argument advanced is that the SSHD has a positive obligation to grant them entry clearance to join M and N to prevent a disproportionate interference with that family life.
23. Likewise in the appellant’s alternative case, the right being claimed by A10 – A13 is the right under Article 8(1) of the Convention to respect for the family life they share as nieces and nephews with their aunt W and uncle K and their two cousins in the United Kingdom. The argument being advanced is that the SSHD has a positive obligation to grant them entry clearance to join W and K to prevent a disproportionate interference with that family life.
24. In her written and oral submissions Ms Knorr maintained that if I (1) found against the appellants on their primary case and (2) found in favour of A3- A7 and A10 -A13 on their alternative case, it would be necessary to (3) determine the proportionality of separating A3-A7 and A10 – A13 from their parents. Ms Reid by contrast submitted that this approach amounted to the appellants seeking to “have their cake and eat it” and that having chosen to advance an alternative case that the children should be allowed to separate from their parents to ensure their needs are met, the adult appellants cannot then be “pulled in” despite not meeting the requirements of the Immigration Rules for being granted entry clearance.
25. I am not persuaded by Ms Knorr argument that a third stage of decision making is required. In my judgment the suggestion that were the child appellants to succeed with their alternative case it would be necessary to go on to consider whether it is disproportionate to refuse entry to their parents, loses sight of the rights being considered. As I have stated already, the alternative case involves an assertion that the Article 8(1) rights of the sponsors in the United Kingdom to develop their family life with the child appellant’s is being disproportionately interfered with. The adult appellants are not part of that family life and so the proportionality of interference with the family life they share with their children is not a relevant consideration.
26. As the Master of the Rolls made clear at [143] of IA and Others :
… As we have explained at [100] above, the UK as an ECHR state is not under a positive obligation to admit every member of the wider family of the person within the territory of the UK. The positive obligation could only extend, even if such family life existed, to those who have family life (for the purposes of article 8(1)) with that person, in this case the brother (or, as the family argued, the family). Moreover, the person who has “the right to respect for his … family life” under article 8(1) is the sponsor, who is within the jurisdiction of article 8,…
27. An alternative way of making the same point is this: The child appellants share a family life with their parents that does not involve their aunts and uncles in the United Kingdom. The appellants chose in their alternative case to propose that A3 – A7 and A10 – A13 separate from their parents and live instead with their aunts and uncles. In these circumstances it is not the decision of the SSHD that is causing the separation of the children from their parents but the decision of the appellants (albeit a decision forced on them by the extreme circumstances in which they find themselves). It cannot be said therefore, on the alternative case, that the SSHD has infringed the rights of the child appellants to live with their parents. There is therefore no requirement to consider the proportionality of that separation because it is not the actions of the SSHD that is causing the separation.
28. I will therefore proceed to first determine the appellants’ primary case and second determine the appellants' alternative case in order to remake the decisions in respect of the appellants appeals.
(4) Consideration of the appellants primary case
29. As identified at [66] of my error of law decision, to remake the decision in respect of the appellant’s primary case it is necessary to decide:
a) Whether there are additional elements of dependency involving more than the normal emotional ties such that there is a family life between the appellants and the two core families in the United Kingdom such that Article 8(1) of the Convention is engaged?
And if so
b) Whether interference with that family life is justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention i.e. in the interests of the economic well-being of the country or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others?
30. It is necessary therefore to consider first whether the additional elements of dependency test is met such that there is a family life between the appellants and their sponsors in the United Kingdom that engages Article 8 (1) of the Convention. When doing so, it is necessary to have regard to the fact that S is now living in the United Kingdom
31. There can be no sensible doubt that the extended family of S her five children, their spouses and their children is a close and a loving one. S, W and M are compelling witnesses who gave comprehensive evidence with clarity and candour. The appellants have adduced an extensive body of detailed evidence which shows their commitment to maintaining regular contact with one another and with their other relatives in the United Kingdom through visits, video calls and messages. They have adduced extensive evidence of their involvement in one another’s lives. It is apparent from that evidence that they have supported one another through challenging circumstances. Examples include the fact that W was present for the birth of A10 during a three month visit to Gaza in late 2009, also that she breastfed A11 during another such visit in 2013. Another example is the support that S gave to W and K and their sons when she came to live with them during W’s cancer treatment in 2019. Most recently they have supported each other in the very trying circumstances of the war in Gaza, the consequent destruction of the Sheikh Ejleen house and the dreadful circumstances in which the appellants have found themselves.
32. It is clear from the evidence that S and the five siblings share a deep affection for one another. The evidence of psychologist Catrin Lewis is that W is suffering from a severe Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and severe Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) as a direct result of concerns relating to the appellants in Gaza, which have had a significant impact on her well-being. Likewise Ms Lewis diagnoses M as suffering from a moderately severe MDD and severe GAD, which is directly linked to the impact of events in Gaza on his family members. I accept that these diagnoses are indicative of the deep affection and concern W and M have for the appellants. Social workers Nikki Austin and Jane Bartlett have also separately referred in reports to the emotional attachment the siblings share especially having lost their father when they were children and as a result of visits made to Gaza by W, K and their sons prior to the war. The two social workers also make clear that seeing their siblings family suffer is causing W and M distress.
33. It is further apparent that W and K and M and N provide financial support to their siblings and their siblings families in Gaza. Bank statements from M’s account show cash transfers being made both before and after the start of the war. The witnesses descriptions of sending money via friends and bank transfers to the family in Gaza as well as giving the money in the past during visits was not challenged and is credible.
34. This all reflects the “central and oversized role” that Country expert Professor Diana Allan says “family solidarities and support structures” play in Gazan society. Professor Allan describes an extended family structure called the hamouleh which translates as the “clan” or “tribe” that operates in Gazan society and which incorporates grandparents, aunts, uncles, in-laws and even distant relations. Professor Allan explains that members of the hamouleh are considered to owe to the collective rather than rights of the individual. She details how family relations are strengthened through the practice of endogamy and living within a shared household and neighbourhood.
35. Professor Allan’s description of the hamouleh is consistent with the evidence of how S and the five siblings view one another. It is also consistent of the evidence of W and M’s relationships with cousins and other extended family in the United Kingdom. The evidence is that although they live in different areas of South East England the extended family gather to celebrate religious festivals and other occasions together. It is equally consistent with the support W and K have provided to K’s mother and sisters, both before the war when they would spend time with K’s family during visits to Gaza and after the start of the war when W visited K’s mother and sister in Egypt to try to arrange support for them. Equally it is consistent with the support N has provided to her parents. The evidence is very clear that the appellants, W, M and S all take their obligations to the hamouleh very seriously.
36. The concept of the hamouleh however is different to what amounts to a family life that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention such that the SSHD is required to justify interference with that family life. As was made clear in IA and Others the additional elements of dependency test for establishing a family life between adults that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention is an exacting one which requires there to be elements of dependency in addition to the love and support that might be shared between adult siblings, before a family life engaging Article 8(1) is established. This is because the jurisprudence demonstrates that such a family life is usually seen in the context of “cohabiting dependents”.
37. Here whilst, as noted, the evidence demonstrates a deep affection, care and support between the siblings and their individual core families, it does not in my judgment establish additional elements of dependency. In fact there are a number of indicators of the siblings’ independence and that rather than dependency on their siblings they have established their own dependent family units with their spouses. These indicators include:
a) The fact that W left the Sheikh Eijeen house to come to the United Kingdom when she was only 21 years old and while three of her siblings were still children. This is particularly significant given the evidence of Professor Allan that it is common and culturally expected for the oldest daughter to be responsible for the childcare of younger siblings and to assume the role of the maternal caregiver. By defying that cultural expectation and moving country, becoming a British citizen, and setting up home with her husband and later two children in the United Kingdom, W demonstrated a level of independence from her siblings and mother, and instead a dependence on her core family of her husband and children.
b) The fact that A9 left the Sheikh Ejleen house and cohabited instead with the family of A10 following their marriage, reflecting the cultural expectation described by Professor Allan that family bonds are maintained along patrilineal and patrilocal lines with daughters expected to live with their husband’s extended family. Whilst their house was close to the remaining family, the separation is indicative of a level of independence from the other siblings rather than inter-dependence.
c) Likewise the fact that M came to the United Kingdom to continue his post graduate studies seven years ago is a powerful indicator of his independence from his mother and siblings (notwithstanding his commitment to them).
d) Further, the fact that having initially stayed with W and K on his arrival in the United Kingdom, M did not settle in the area of West London where W was living, but moved to Essex which is where he and N have set up home together. This is a powerful indicator of M’s independence from his sibling (despite his love and affection for her) and by contrast his co-dependence with his spouse with whom he co-habits.
e) The length of time since the siblings cohabited. They have never all done so as adults and it is 18 years since W left the Sheikh Ejleen house to set up home with K, seventeen years since A9 left the Sheikh Ejleen house to set up home with A10, seven years since M left the Sheikh Ejleen house to study in the United Kingdom.
f) The evidence from W and M that prior to the outbreak of the war the siblings had no intention of co-habiting together. W answered questions in cross examination saying that there had been no need for them to do so and that they were happy with her being able to visit. M agreed with this in his answer to the question in cross examination. This description is not consistent with the type of elements of dependence that are consistent with cohabiting dependants but instead indicate that they are loving, committed siblings who are nonetheless living independent lives with their own core families.
g) The fact that R has moved with his wife and children to Oman is further evidence of the siblings independence notwithstanding their commitment and support for one another. Although it is not suggested that R and his core family form part of a unitary family life with the appellants and W and M, his circumstances are relevant.
h) A1, whilst being autistic, is described as being able to work, being given a plot of land for which he was responsible and as providing for his family. It was evidently of importance that he, like his siblings, be able to establish and support his own core family.
38. None of these indicators of independence weaken the care and affection felt between the siblings. They do not undermine the obvious commitment they have to one another and desire for one another’s best interests. They do not suggest anything other than a commitment to the hamouleh described by Professor Allan. Rather they demonstrate why the Master of the Rolls said at [125] of IA and Others that “it is harder for adults to demonstrate the necessary dependency because family life is normally limited to the core cohabiting family”
39. This fact is well illustrated by a comparison with the position of S who was found to share an Article 8(1) family life with W, K and their children. Unlike any of the siblings S was living alone in Egypt where she had no legal status and was not only dependant on money that W and M were able to get to her to survive, but also, because she was suffering from severe PTSD, required regular and frequent visits in Egypt from her children because as she was neglecting herself between those visits without their support. In these circumstances there were clear additional elements of dependency between S and her daughter W, that are not present in the relationships between the siblings.
40. The reality in the case of the siblings is that, in contrast to the situation S faced, each sibling in this close and supportive family has established an independent life with their own core family, R in Oman, W and M in different parts of the United Kingdom and A1 and A8 in Gaza. The siblings remain close, they want the best for each other and are committed to each other, but there are not additional elements of dependency which mean that they share a family life that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention. The dreadful circumstances the siblings in Gaza have faced since the start of the war have meant that the siblings are no longer happy with this arrangement and some of them would like to now cohabit in the United Kingdom. As was pointed out in IA and Others however, wanting to cohabit is not the same thing as having the additional elements of dependency that amount to a family life that engages Article 8(1). This is the case notwithstanding the fact that the war has caused the siblings to grow closer, and it is clearly their very strong desire that all the family are able to get to a place of safety where they can once again thrive.
41. Overall therefore, I find that additional elements of dependency have not been established and that the appellants do not share a unitary family life with their relatives in the United Kingdom which engages Article 8(1) of the convention. For this reason the appellant’s primary case must fail and it is not necessary to consider the proportionality of interference with a unitary family life.
(5) Consideration of the appellant’s alternative case
42. As previously discussed, the appellants alternative case involved first the assertion that A3 – A7 have a family life with M and N that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention and that the SSHD has a positive obligation to grant them entry clearance to join M and N to prevent a disproportionate interference with that family life, and second the assertion that A10 – A13 share a family life with W, K and their sons that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention and that the SSHD has a positive obligation to grant them entry clearance to join W and K to prevent a disproportionate interference with that family life.
43. A3 – A7’s assertion that refusing them entry clearance amounts to a disproportionate interference with their family life is predicated on the claim that they meet the requirements of Appendix CRP to the Immigration Rules for being granted such entry clearance. A10 – A13’s assertion that refusing them entry clearance amounts to a disproportionate interference with their family life is predicated on the claim that they meet the requirements of paragraph 297 of the Immigration Rules for being granted such entry clearance. I considered the application of the Immigration Rules to A3 – A7’s claim at [71] – [86] of my error of law decision and the application of the Immigration Rules to A10 -A13’s claim at [87] – [96] of the error of law decision.
44. Having preserved some of the findings made by the FTTJ I identified the remaining issues to be resolved at [97] of my error of law decision as follows:
a. Whether A3-A7 share a family life with M that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention?
If so:
b. Whether the requirements of CRP6.1 are met because refusal of A3-A7’s applications will breach Article 8 of the Convention because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for A3-A7
c. Whether A10-A13 share a family life with W that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention?
If so:
d. Interference with that family life will not be justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention because of the preserved finding that A10-A13 meet the requirements of paragraph 297 of the Immigration Rules.
45. Taking issues (a) and (c) together, I turn first to consider whether there is a family that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention between the child appellants and their respective aunt and uncle in the United Kingdom.
Is there a family life that engages Article 8(1)?
46. The appellants rely on what Ms Knorr submits is a consistent line of domestic and Strasbourg authorities including R (Singh) v ECO [2005] QB 608; Boyle v UK [1995] 19 EHRR, TS and JJ v Norway (App no 15633/15) and Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330 that says a family life engaging Article 8(1) of the Convention will exist between a child and its near relatives such as aunts and uncles, where there is real existence of close personal ties between them and those relatives play an active role in their lives.
47. I am satisfied that the authorities relied upon by Ms Knorr do establish that, dependant on the facts, a family life engaging Article 8(1) of the Convention may exist between a child and its aunt and uncle. I am further satisfied that the authorities identify that the test for the existence of such a family life differs from the “additional elements of dependency” test I have already discussed and which applies in respect of a claim by adult siblings that they (and their core families) share a unitary family life.
48. An Article 8(1) family life between and a child and a close family member was described at [23] of TS and JJs v Norway as one involving “sufficiently close family ties between them”. At [25] of R (Singh) v ECO Dyson LJ said that the question of what will constitute family life “will always be one of fact and degree” but that there “must be evidence of real close personal ties”. At [38] Dyson LJ added that the potential for development of family life is relevant in determining whether family life already exists. In his judgment in the same case Munby LJ stated that in many cases cohabitation will be a relevant consideration, but that cohabitation is likely to play a much less significant role in assessing whether there is family life between an uncle and nephew in contrast to non-marital relationships between adults, recognising that nephews tend not to live under the same roof as their uncle (see [74] – [76]). Quoting from a decision of the Strasbourg Court in Lebbink v The Netherlands Munby LJ described the test for family life in these circumstances at [79]:
“Typically the question will be…whether there is a ‘close personal relationship’, a relationship which ‘has sufficient constancy and substance to create de facto ‘family ties’“
49. There is nothing surprising or inconsistent about the different tests that apply when assessing the existence of a family life between a child and its close adult relatives and the test that applies when assessing the existence of family life between adult family members. As Munby LJ said at [60] of his judgment in R (Singh) v ECO the Strasbourg court has never sought to define what is meant by family life since the considerations that bear upon the question of whether there is family life between two adults are not the same as those that bear upon the question of whether there is family life between an uncle and his nephew. The application of different tests for assessing the existence of family life in different circumstances serves as a further reminder of the importance of identifying with clarity at the outset of the assessment what is the nature of the family life right being claimed.
50. Applying this test to the present case, I conclude that the evidence establishes that there is a close personal relationship between A3 – A7 and their uncle M and Aunt N which has sufficient constancy and substance to create a family life that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention.
51. The finding of the FTTJ that these appellants have a genuine family relationship with M was not challenged and as per [71] of my error of law decision is preserved. Further, it is significant that for the first eight, six and four years of their lives respectively A3, A4 and A5 lived with M in the Sheikh Ejleen house in Gaza. There is substantial evidence from M, A1, S and W of M’s active role in the lives of A3 – A5 during that time, particularly in the context of A1’s autism and the strains that this has on occasion placed on his relationship with his children. There is equally evidence of M’s ongoing relationship with each of A3 – A7 following his departure from Gaza in 2018. That evidence includes notes sent to him from the children and evidence of contact via WhatsApp. Despite the fact that his well-founded fear of persecution has prevented M from returning with the consequence he is yet to meet A6 or A7 in person, it is apparent that M has continued to have a relationship of substance with A3- A7 since leaving the Sheikh Ejleen house. It is equally significant that the evidence demonstrates that N has had a constant and substantive relationship with the children and as recently as 2024 she was living with A3 – A7 in a refugee camp in Rafah.
52. I further conclude that the evidence establishes that there is a close personal relationship between A10 – A13 and their aunt W and uncle K and between A10 – A13 and their cousins which has sufficient constancy and substance to create a family life that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention.
53. Although A10 – A13 were all born after W left Gaza and so they have never previously cohabited with her or K there is powerful evidence that W in particular has maintained a constant and substantive relationship with them through regular extended visits and that they share close personal relationships with one another. As already noted, W was present for the birth of A10 during one such visit in 2009 describing him as being “born into my hands. It was a great moment in my life”. Also, as again already noted, W breastfed A11 during another such visit in 2013. That was particularly significant because Professor Allan describes that within Palestinian culture “ties with ‘milk-kin’ are understood to be strong (especially when they occur within families) and symbolically important” with A10 and W’s second son whom she was also breast feeding at that time being “seen like siblings” as a result. There was another extended visit in 2022 after A12 and A13 had been born and photographs show the two families enjoying time together during that visit.
54. Further evidence of the substance of the relationship between A10 – A13 and W, K and their sons is provided in the reports from the two social workers. Ms Bartlett describes A10 – A13 speaking to their cousins via video calls and records A8’s account to her of the very very close relationship between her children and the children of her sister W. Likewise Ms Austin, who spoke to W’s sons, records their description of their close relationships with their cousins and the times they spent together in Gaza.
55. Ms Reid submits that the respondent has not interfered with any family life that is found to exist between A3-A7 and M or between A10 – A13 and W. She submits that rather than protecting a right to family life already in existence the child appellants are attempting to create a right. MS Reid argues that W and M have maintained a remote relationship with the child appellants and that such a remote relationship can continue unaffected by the respondent’s decision to refuse entry clearance.
56. I do not find this submission persuasive. As both Dyson LJ and Munby LJ acknowledged at [38] and [77] of the judgment in R (Singh) v ECO), the potential relationship which may develop in the future between a child and their close relative is relevant to the existence of a family life that engages Article 8(1) and whether there is interference with that family life, so long as some degree of family life is already established. It was therefore no answer in that case to say that the adoptive parents in the United Kingdom could maintain their existing remote relationship with their adopted child in India. Here, as I have found, there is already in existence a family life that involves A3 – A7 and M, and a family life involving A10 – 13 and W. There is a desire to develop that already existing family life further by the children moving to live with their aunts and uncles. The decision of the SSHD interferes with that desire and therefore interferes with the family life which I have found to exist.
57. The question to be answered therefore is whether the SSHD’s interference with that family life is necessary in the interest of the economic well-being of the country and the protection of rights and freedoms of others. As was made clear in IA and Others it is the responsibility of the SSHD and Government to make policy decisions as to what is necessary to protect the economic well-being of the United Kingdom and the rights of its citizens, and the courts and tribunals must respect those policy decisions and not seek to get around them save in very exceptional or compelling circumstances. It is necessary therefore to consider next whether A3 – A7 and A10 – A13 meet the requirements of the SSHD’s Immigration Rules for being granted the entry clearance they seek.
Application of the Immigration Rules
58. At [87] – [96] of my error of law decision I preserved the finding of the FTTJ that A10 – A13 meet the requirements of paragraph 297 of the Immigration Rules for being granted entry clearance to the United Kingdom to join their close relative W. That being the case Ms Reid accepted that if family life engaging Article 8(1) of the Convention were found to exist between W and A10 – A13 then it would be disproportionate to interfere with that family life by refusing the children entry clearance. That concession was well made for the very reason relied upon by the SSHD in IA and Others namely, the fact that it is the SSHD and Government’s primary responsibility to make policy decisions as to what is necessary to protect the rights of citizens in the United Kingdom.
59. In this case, reflecting Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and giving primary importance to the best interests of the child, the relevant policy decision reflection in paragraph 297, recognises that when the applicants are children, and where the children will be adequately accommodated and maintained in the United Kingdom without recourse to public funds, and where there are no suitability issues, there will, on occasion, be serious and compelling reasons why they should be granted settlement. The serious and compelling requirement sets a high threshold, but for reasons that were clearly explained in the FTTJ’s decision that high threshold was met in respect of A10 – A13.
60. The children having met the requirements set by the SSHD for being granted settlement it would be disproportionate and therefore unlawful by virtue of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, to interfere with the family life I have found W shares with A10 – A13. Accordingly the appeals of A10 – A13 succeed on human rights grounds.
61. I considered the FTTJ’s findings about whether A3 – A7 met the relevant requirements of the Appendix CRP to the Immigration Rules at [71] – [86] of my error of law decision. I set aside the Judge’s finding that A3 – A7 met the requirements of paragraph CRP 3.2 of the Appendix because they are currently being cared for by their parents and it cannot be said that they have no family who could reasonably be expected to support or care for them. As I stated at [81] however that is not the end of the matter because the Appendix includes the “mop up” requirements of CRP 6.1:
Where the applicant does not meet all the suitability or eligibility requirements (subject to CRP 6.2), the decision maker must be satisfied that refusal of the application would not breach Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family.
62. The existence of paragraph CRP 6.1 reflects the SSHD and Government’s recognition that the public interest in immigration control for the protection of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom and the rights of its citizens can be outweighed in the case of children in serious and compelling circumstances. This reflects the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children, which is established domestically by section 55 of the Borders Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 and internationally by Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The background note to the Home Office Policy on the Appendix identifies that this means: “Appendix CRP allows for a close relative with protection status in the UK to sponsor a child to stay with or join them where there are serious and compelling circumstances”. I agree with Ms Knorr that this reference to “serious and compelling circumstances” aligns the test for admission to the one under paragraph 297(f) of the Rules which was met by A10 – A13.
63. As I stated at [83] of my error of law decision, determining whether A3 – A7 meet the requirements of CRP 6.1 involves a proportionality assessment to decide whether the refusal of A3 – A7’s applications for entry clearance will result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for them. I turn to that assessment now.
64. On the one side of the scales is the protection of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom and the rights of its citizens. The fact that the children will be adequately maintained and accommodated with M and N in the house of M’s cousin is relevant when assessing the weight to be attached to this factor. Whilst I agree with Ms Reid that the presence of the children will not be neutral to the United Kingdom economy (the children will need to be educated and will use the NHS) this is not a case where public funds are required to support them and thoughtful arrangements have been made to minimise the impact on the economy and on other citizens.
65. Also on the scales in favour of refusal is the well-reasoned policy aim that first and foremost children should remain with their parents in their home country. The opinion of social worker Ms Bartlett is however relevant to this policy aim. Having spoken to the children and the adults concerned, viewed the accommodation in which A3 – A7 will live in the United Kingdom and assessed the relationships that A3 -A7 have with M and N, she concludes that while it will be very difficult for the children to leave their parents, the family in the United Kingdom will be able to meet the children’s needs even in those difficult circumstances whereas the children’s needs are not currently being met in Gaza. The fact that more than one social worker has concluded that there are no safeguarding concerns about the children living with their family in the United Kingdom is also highly relevant. Finally, the willingness of A1 and A2 to pass the care of the children to M and N and the willingness of M and N to assume care is highly relevant. This is an arrangement contemplated though necessity, but it is one that has been made willingly with the sole intention of promoting the best interests of the children. In these circumstances, the weight to be attached to the aim of keeping children with their parents in their home country is reduced.
66. Weighing heavily on the other side of the scales is the extreme adverse effect that living in a conflict zone for more than two years has had on A3 – A7. The children are currently living in a tent in the ruins of their old home. A consequence has been that each of A3 – A7 have contracted Hepatitis C during this time with A4 suffering particularly dire symptoms. A5 has a testicular hernia which needs surgery but that has not been possible as a result of the war. A6 and A7 are epileptic and have been unable to consistently access the medication that they need with the consequence that they have frequent seizures. On one occasion A6 required hospital treatment following a seizure when she saw her aunt wounded by shrapnel. As with A10 – A13 the evidence adduced by the appellants about the suffering faced by A3 – A7 is substantial and compelling. The circumstances in which the children are living are extreme, the environment is unsafe and the risk to their livelihoods remains significant. In my judgment the evidence establishes beyond doubt that requiring A3 – A7 to remain in Gaza will have extremely harsh consequences for them.
67. Balancing these two sides of the scales, I am satisfied that the extremely harsh consequences that refusal will have on A3 – A7 cannot be justified by the public interest in maintaining the economic well being of the country and the rights of its citizens. As identified, the effect on the United Kingdom’s economic well-being, whilst not insignificant has been reduced by the measures M and N have in place to accommodate and support the children. Meanwhile the SSHD and Government’s assessment of what is necessary to protect the rights of the citizens of the United Kingdom specifically makes allowance for the admission of children in serious and compelling circumstances. The policy of the SSHD includes the fact that the absence of security in another country is a relevant consideration and that in some circumstances requiring family members to continue living there may give rise to very serious hardship that renders refusal unjustifiably harsh. Here, the circumstances are undoubtedly serious and compelling and requiring A3 – A7 to stay in Gaza would involve them facing very serious hardship.
68. The final factor in the balancing exercise is the closeness of the relationship between A3 – A7 and M and N. This is not a situation like the one presented to the Court of Appeal in IA and Others where the children did not know their family in the United Kingdom. Until December 2024 N was living with the children in the makeshift shelters in Gaza. The children have maintained a close relationship with M despite his leaving Gaza in 2018 and they would also be able to benefit from the wider support of the family including their grandmother who has had a substantial involvement in their lives, if they settled in the United Kingdom.
69. Overall therefore, I am satisfied that A3 – A7 meet the requirements of paragraph CRP6.1 of Appendix CRP to the Immigration Rules. Refusal of their applications would breach Article 8 of the Convention because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for these applicants. In those circumstances the decision to refuse their applications is disproportionate and unlawful under the Human Rights Act 1998.
(6) Conclusions
70. The appellants do not share a unitary family life with their sponsors in the United Kingdom which engages Article 8(1) of the Convention. Although this is a close and supportive extended family there are not the additional elements of dependency required to establish such a family life between adults which is usually reserved for co-habiting dependents. The decision of the SSHD to refuse the appellants primary case did not therefore interfere with a Convention right and was lawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
71. A3, A4, A5, A6 and A7 do share a family life with M and his wife N that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention. They have a close family relationship with the substance and constancy to establish family ties. The decision of the SSHD to refuse A3 -A7’s alternative case involves an interference with that family life because it prevents its development as intended by the family. The interference is not necessary or proportionate because, in their serious and compelling circumstances, A3 – A7 meet the requirements set by the SSHD in Appendix CRP for being admitted to the United Kingdom to join their close relative with protection status. In those circumstances the decision of the SSHD to refuse A3, A4, A5, A6 and A7’s alternative applications for entry clearance was unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
72. A10, A11, A12 and A13 do share a family life with W and her husband K and their two sons that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention. They have a close family relationship with the substance and constancy to establish family ties. The decision of the SSHD to refuse A10 -A13’s alternative case involves an interference with that family life because it prevents its development as intended by the family. The interference is not necessary or proportionate because, in their serious and compelling circumstances, A10 – A13 meet the requirements set by the SSHD in paragraph 297 of the Immigration Rules for being admitted to the United Kingdom to join their close relative who is settled in the country. In those circumstances the decision of the SSHD to refuse A10, A11, A12 and A13’s alternative applications for entry clearance was unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Notice of Decision
A1’s human rights appeal is DISMISSED on human rights grounds
A2’s human rights appeal is DISMISSED on human rights grounds
A3’s human rights appeal is ALLOWED on human rights grounds
A4’s human rights appeal is ALLOWED on human rights grounds
A5’s human rights appeal is ALLOWED on human rights grounds
A6’s human rights appeal is ALLOWED on human rights grounds
A7’s human rights appeal is ALLOWED on human rights grounds
A8’s human rights appeal is DISMISSED on human rights grounds
A9’s human rights appeal is DISMISSED on human rights grounds
A10’s human rights appeal is ALLOWED on human rights grounds
A11’s human rights appeal is ALLOWED on human rights grounds
A12’s human rights appeal is ALLOWED on human rights grounds
A13’s human rights appeal is ALLOWED on human rights grounds


Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 May 2026




IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No:
UI-2025-004864; UI-2025-004865
UI-2025-004866; UI-2025-004867
UI-2025-004868; UI-2025-004869
UI-2025-004870; UI-2025-004871
UI-2025-004872; UI-2025-004873
UI-2025-004874; UI-2025-004875
UI-2025-004876

First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/50361/2025; HU/55618/2025
HU/55616/2025; HU/55615/2025
HU/55614/2025; HU/55613/2025
HU/55608/2025; HU/50360/2025
HU/55619/2025; HU/55620/2025
HU/55622/2025; HU/55625/2025
HU/55627/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8, A9, A10, A11, A12, A13
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms K Reid, Counsel instructed by the Government Legal Department
For the Respondent: Ms M Knorr and Ms A Patyna, Counsel instructed by Birnberg Peirce Ltd


Heard at Field House on 22 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants and their family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants and their family in the United Kingdom. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The respondents are two core families living in Gaza. A1 and A2 are married and A3, A4, A5, A6 and A7 are their children who are aged 15, 13, 11, 7 and 4 years old respectively. A7 and A8 are married and they have three children A11 who is 12 years old, plus twins A12 and A13 who are 9 years old.
2. A1 and A8 are siblings aged 38 and 35 respectively. They also have three other siblings:
• “W” who is 40 years old. W married K in 2005 and came to live in the United Kingdom in February 2008. W and K have two children who are aged 17 and 13 years old. They live in West London and all are now British citizens.
• “M” who is 35 years old. M came to the United Kingdom in December 2018 initially to study, before being granted asylum because he had a well-founded fear of persecution by Hamas if he returned to Gaza. In April 2024 M married N and they live together in Essex.
• “R” who is 30 years old. R is married to I and they have two children aged 8 and 5. They are currently living in Oman having fled from Gaza via Egypt.
3. The father of A1, A8, W, M and R died in 2000. Their mother S is currently living alone in Egypt. She made an application for entry clearance to join W and M in the United Kingdom. Her application was refused by the appellant but an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against that decision was successful and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal has recently been upheld by the Upper Tribunal.
The applications for entry clearance
4. On 25 June 2024 the thirteen respondents all applied for entry clearance to settle in the United Kingdom. To avoid confusion hereafter I will refer to them as the “applicants”. In the representations submitted with their applications the applicants made clear that their applications were made outside the Immigration Rules (the Rules) and in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) which is the right to respect for one’s private and family life. They argued that they shared a family life with W and M which engaged Article 8(1) of the Convention and which it would be disproportionate to
5. The appellant (hereafter the SSHD) refused the respondents’ applications in a series of decisions issued on 17 December 2024. In those decisions the SSHD concluded that the applicants do not share a family life with W and M that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention and that if they did share such a family life then interference with that family life would be proportionate under Article 8(2) of the Convention for the legitimate aim of protecting immigration controls.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (FTT)
6. The applicants appealed against the SSHD’s decisions to the FTT where their appeals were consolidated to be considered together. Before their appeals were heard, on 9 July 2025 they raised through correspondence a “new matter” which they wanted the FTT to consider. The new matter was an alternative to the primary submission in the original applications and the request was that the new matter be additionally considered on an alternative basis to that put forward in those original applications.
7. That alternative basis was that A1 and A2 plus A8 and A9 had decided that they would wish for their children to come to the United Kingdom without them if necessary, and that the children met the requirements of the Rules for being granted entry clearance to the United Kingdom. It was argued that A3, A4, A5, A6 and A7 intend to live with M and N and that they met the requirements of Appendix Child Relative (Sponsors with Protection) (Appendix CRP) for being granted entry clearance to join M. It was further argued that A10, A11, A12 and A13 intend to live with W and K and that they met the requirements of paragraph 297 of the Rules for being granted entry clearance as the child of a relative (W) who is settled in the United Kingdom. If they were found to meet the requirements of the Rules, it was argued their appeals should be allowed, provided Article 8(1) of the Convention is engaged.
8. The SSHD consented to the FTT considering the new matter and on 15 August 2025 issued supplementary decision letters maintaining the decisions to refuse entry clearance to A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A10, A11, A12 and A13. In the supplementary decision letter concerning A3, A4, A5, A6 and A7 the SSHD agreed exceptionally to consider whether the respondents met the suitability and eligibility requirements of Appendix CRP even though they did not meet the validity requirements under the Rules. The SSHD concluded however that the A3, A4, A5, A6 and A7 did not meet the eligibility requirements contained in paragraphs CRP 3.2 and CRP 4.1 of Appendix CRP. Likewise the appellant agreed to consider whether A10, A11, A12 and A13 met the requirements of paragraph n297 of the Rules notwithstanding they had not made a valid application, but concluded that they did not meet the requirements of paragraph 297(i)(f), paragraph 297(iv) and paragraph 297(v) for being granted the entry clearance they sought.
9. The applicants’ appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Lawrence (the Judge) on 26 August 2025. W and M gave oral evidence along with two of their first cousins and a second cousin. Catrin Ann Lewis an HCPC Registered Practitioner Psychologist also gave evidence. The Judge heard submissions from Ms Reid and Ms Knorr who had each submitted skeleton arguments in advance of the hearing.
The Judge’s Decision
10. At [10] of his decision the Judge identified four issues to be resolved: (1) whether there was family life between the applicants and M and W which engaged Article 8(1) of the Convention?, (2) whether the private life of W and M engaged Article 8(1) of the Convention?, (3) If Article 8(1) of the Convention is engaged, whether the SSHD’s decisions resulted in any sufficiently grave interference with the private and family life found?, and (4) whether any such interference was proportionate to the aim pursued by the SSHD? These were the issues identified by the applicants in their first skeleton argument submitted prior to the new matter being raised (although the skeleton argument combined the first two issues in a single question).
11. Between [11] and [28] the Judge considered the first of those issues and the question of whether the applicants share a family with W and M. The Judge expressed his conclusion on that question at [28] as follows:
Considering the evidence in the round, I find it established that the relationships between W and M and the Appellants involve effective, real and committed support and close personal ties that exceed normal emotional ties between such relatives. I therefore find that there is family life between the Appellants and Sponsors such that Article 8 is engaged.
12. At [29] and [30] the Judge considered the second issue he had identified and concluded that the private life rights of M and W were engaged by the SSHD’s decisions “owing to the detrimental impact on [M and W’s] mental health and personal relationships in the United Kingdom owing to their plainly well-founded fears for the [respondents] lives and mental and physical health.” At [31] and [32] the Judge found, on the third issue that had been identified, that the SSHD’s decisions resulted in a sufficiently grave interference with the private and family life that he had found to exist to engage Article 8(1) of the Convention.
13. From [33] onwards the Judge considered the proportionality of interference with the family life he had found M and W shared with the applicants. The Judge did this by considering first whether A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A10, A11, A12 and A13 met the requirements of the Rules as they had argued in the “new matter”, and in particular by considering those eligibility requirements that the SSHD had concluded the applicants did not meet, in her supplementary decision. At [38] the Judge found that A3, A4, A5, A6 and A7 met the requirements of paragraph CRP4.1 of Appendix CRP and at [40] the Judge found that they also met the requirements of paragraph CRP 3.2 of Appendix CRP. At [41] the Judge found that A10, A11, A12 and A13 met the requirements of paragraph 297(i)(f) of the Rules and at [42] and [43] the Judge concluded that they also met the maintenance and accommodation requirements of paragraph 297(iv) and (v) of the Rules. Having made these findings the Judge concluded at [44] that A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A10, A11, A12 and A13 met the requirements of the Rules for being granted entry clearance to the United Kingdom and in those circumstances that interference with their family life could not be justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention.
14. Turning to A1 and A2 and to A8 and A9, the Judge recognised at [45] that they did not meet the requirements of the Rules for being granted entry clearance and considered whether theirs was an “unusual case” where “ineligibility” under the Rules may be outweighed. When undertaking that assessment, the Judge had regard to those factors identified as relevant in s117B of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (at [46] and [47]), to the predicament faced by the respondents in Gaza (at [48]), to the best interests of the children involved (at [54]).
15. The Judge considered at [49] – [53] competing arguments about whether it was the rights of W and M or the applicants that needed to be considered in the proportionality assessment. He rejected Ms Reid’s submission that it was the rights of W and M and W’s children that are protected, and accepted Ms Knorr alternative proposition that the consideration needed to be all of the family’s rights including those of the applicants, notwithstanding the fact they were outside of the United Kingdom. At [55] the Judge said that he doubted that the duration of the existence of family life was material to the assessment, rejecting Ms Reid’s submission that any family life that existed would be very recent and tenuous. At [56] the Judge rejected Ms Reid’s submission that the public interest in effective immigration would be undermined by reasoning which extends Article 8(2) of the Convention to a large number of people affected by humanitarian crisis.
16. Having repeated his conclusion that the fact the children met the requirements of the Rules was determinative of the proportionality assessment for them, the Judge then concluded at [58] in relation to A1 & A2 and A8 & A9 that:
Considering the evidence and submissions the round, I find that the adult Appellants have established that the identified interferences with private or family life are not proportionate to the aim pursued.
17. Accordingly the Judge allowed the applicants appeals finding that the refusal of their applications for entry clearance was unlawful under the Human Rights Act 1998.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
18. I granted the SSHD permission to appeal against the decision of the Judge on three grounds on 21 November 2025. The first ground challenged the judge’s finding that A3-A7, met the requirements of paragraph CRP3.2 of Appendix CRP to the Rules. The second ground challenged the Judge’s finding that A10-A13 met the requirements of paragraph 297(i)(f) of the Rules. The third ground challenged the Judge’s proportionality assessment under Article 8(2) of the Convention. When granting permission I noted that the Court of Appeal had recently considered similar issues to those raised in this appeal and that judgment in that case was awaited.
19. On 26 November 2025, the Master of the Rolls handed down judgment in the case of IA and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516. On 5 December 2025, relying on the Court’s judgment in IA and Others, the SSHD sought permission to amend her grounds of appeal to include a fourth ground challenging the Judge’s finding that the applicants share a family life with W and M that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention. Permission to amend the grounds was granted by Judge Hirst and I on 17 December 2025 and we maintained that decision on 19 December 2025.
20. Ms Reid submitted a skeleton argument addressing the four grounds of appeal on behalf of the SSHD and Ms Knorr and Ms Patyna submitted a skeleton argument doing the same on behalf of the applicants. I am very grateful to all involved for these written submissions. At the hearing I heard further oral submissions about whether the Judge erred in law from Ms Reid and Ms Knorr. Again I am grateful for those careful submissions. Having heard from the parties I reserved my decision about whether the Judge had erred in law indicating that were an error found I would hear from the parties again separately about the appropriate disposal of the appeal.
The Legal Framework
21. The applicants’ appeals are human rights appeals as defined in section 82(1)(b) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act). The sole permitted ground by virtue of section 84(2) of the 2002 Act is that the SSHD’s decision was unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 which prohibits public authorities from acting in a way incompatible with a Convention right. The relevant Convention right in this case was Article 8 of the Convention which provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
22. Section 117A of the 2002 Act states that a court or tribunal considering whether interference with a person’s right to respect for private and family life is justified under Article 8(2) must have regard to the considerations listed in s.117B of the 2002 Act. Those considerations include that: the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest (s.117B(1)); it is in the public interest that those seeking to enter the United Kingdom speak English (s.117B(2); and it is in the public interest that those seeking to enter the United Kingdom are financially independent.
23. The Secretary of State for the Home Department seeks to maintain effective immigration controls through the Immigration Rules (the Rules) which reflect the responsible Minister’s assessment, at a general level, of the relative weight of the competing factors when striking a fair balance under Article 8. As the Secretary of State for the Home Department has constitutional responsibility for policy in this area, courts and tribunals must attach considerable weight to the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s policy at a general level as well as considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular case - see [47] of Lord Reed’s judgment in R (Agyarko) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 11.
24. Accordingly, the Senior President of Tribunals found at [34] of TZ (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1109 that the tribunal should undertake an evaluation of whether an applicant meets the relevant requirements of the Rules to determine the strength of the public policy ‘in the case before it.’ Where a person satisfies those requirements of the Rules this will be positively determinative of their article 8 appeal, provided their case engages article 8(1), for the very reason that refusal of their application would then be disproportionate.
25. In this case the parts of the Rules which the parties agree are relevant are Appendix CRP and paragraph 297. In respect of A3-A7 the dispute was about whether they met the following two requirements of Appendix CRP:
CRP 3.2 “The decision maker must be satisfied that the applicant has no family other than the close relative in the UK that could reasonably be expected to support or care for them”.
CRP 4.1 The decision maker must be satisfied that the applicant has an existing, genuine family relationship with their close relative in the UK
26. In respect of A10-A13 the dispute was about whether they satisfied the following requirements of paragraph 297:
(i) [they are] seeking leave to enter to accompany or join a parent, parents or a relative in one of the following circumstances…
(f) one parent or a relative is present and settled in the United Kingdom or being admitted on the same occasion for settlement and there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make exclusion of the child undesirable and suitable arrangements have been made for the child’s care …
(iv) can, and will, be accommodated adequately by the parent, parents or relative the child is seeking to join without recourse to public funds in accommodation which the parent, parents or relative the child is seeking to join, own or occupy exclusively; and
(v) can, and will, be maintained adequately by the parent, parents, or relative the child is seeking to join, without recourse to public funds;…
IA and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department
27. IA and Others concerned a core family six people in Gaza (mother, father and their four children) who in early 2024 sought entry clearance to join the father’s younger brother who had been living and working in the United Kingdom since 2007. Their applications were refused by the Entry Clearance Officer and they appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (FTT). The FTT found that family life withing the meaning of Article 8(1) existed between the brother in the United Kingdom and the core family in Gaza following the start of the Gaza conflict in late 2023, but concluded that interference with that family life was proportionate and therefore justified under Article 8(2). On appeal the Upper Tribunal (UT) upheld the FTT conclusion about the existence of family life engaged Article 8(1) but held that the FTT had made material errors when applying Article 8(2) of the Convention. The UT proceeded to remake the decision concluding that interference with the 8(1) family life was not proportionate and therefore could not be justified under Article 8(2).
28. Following the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s appeal the Court of Appeal reviewed European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and domestic authorities relevant to (a) the existence of article 8(1) family life between adult siblings (at [38] – [85] of the judgment; (b) how the rights of persons outside the jurisdiction of the ECHR are to be treated in weighing the proportionality balance under Article 8(2) (at [86] – [100] of the judgment ; and (c) weighing the proportionality balance under Article 8(2) (at [101] – [112] of the judgment).
29. The Court then addressed three questions: (i) were the tribunals right about the existence of family life?; (ii) was the UT right to accord weight to the article 8 rights of the core family in addition to those of the brother in the United Kingdom ?; and (iii) was the UT right to hold that the decision to refuse the core family entry to the United Kingdom was an interference with their family life infringing Article 8? The Court briefly summarised it’s conclusions on those three questions at [10] – [12] of its decision:
10 First, the consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) has been that “family life for the purpose of Article 8 … is normally limited to the core family and that there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”” (see Kumari v. The Netherlands 44051/20, 10 December 2024 (Kumari) at [35], and Beoku-Betts v. SSHD [2008] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 AC 115 (Beoku-Betts) at [39]). The FTT did not apply that test, but instead asked itself whether the sponsor had provided “real, effective or committed support” to his brother and the family (see [18] and [25] of the FTT decision). The real, effective or committed support test is lower than the additional elements of dependence test. Applying the proper test, neither the brother nor his family had shown that they had family life with the sponsor for the purposes of article 8(1).
11. Secondly, if there had been family life between the sponsor and his family (as found by the FTT), it would have been appropriate to have regard to the unitary nature of that family life (see Beoku-Betts at [4], [20] and [41]-[43]). We accept, however, that, in undertaking the proportionality balance under article 8(2), the court is looking primarily at the article 8 rights of those persons within the jurisdiction of article 1 of the ECtHR (in this case, the sponsor).
12. Thirdly, we have concluded that the UT made several errors in undertaking the proportionality balance under article 8(2). Even if, contrary to what we have decided, family life had existed between the sponsor and the family, the balance should not have been determined in favour of granting the family entry clearance. Very exceptional or compelling circumstances had not been shown. The UT was wrong to pay so little regard to the immigration control policies of the SSHD and the UK Government, as reflected in the Rules, as expressing what was necessary in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK and for the protection of the rights of the citizens of the UK. The UT wrongly over-stated the importance of the family’s short-lived family life with the sponsor (had it existed at all), the best interests of the children of the family and the admittedly serious risks faced by the family in Gaza.
Analysis
The Correct Approach
30. The applicants appeal to the FTT was a human rights appeal. It is easy to lose sight in all the arguments advanced and the evidence submitted of the fact that as such the ultimate question for the Judge was whether the SSHD’s decisions were incompatible with an Article 8 Convention right to respect for private and family life. It is necessary therefore to keep the focus on the Convention right which it is claimed is being infringed, and the assessment of a human rights appeal should therefore begin with the identification of what is the precise Convention right it is said the decision of the SSHD is incompatible with.
31. The applicants in this case advanced two alternative arguments which related to different rights which, it was claimed, existed under Article 8 of the Convention. The primary submission made in their initial applications for entry clearance and in the first skeleton argument was that they shared a unitary family life involving all the applicants plus the two core families living in the United Kingdom, which engaged Article 8(1) of the Convention, and that interference with that family life would be disproportionate under Article 8(2) of the Convention.
32. The alternative case made in the “new matter” correspondence and in the second skeleton argument was that A3-A7 share a distinct family life with M which engages Article 8(1) of the Convention and that interference with that family life would be disproportionate under Article 8(2) of the Convention. Likewise the alternative case was that A10-A13 share a family life with W which engaged Article 8(1) of the Convention, and that interference with that family life would be disproportionate Under Article 8(2) of the Convention.
33. The fact that these were alternative arguments was made clear in the new matter correspondence and the skeleton arguments submitted to the FTT. Before me Ms Reid and Ms Knorr (who both appeared at the FTT hearing) confirmed that the two arguments were advanced as alternatives to the Judge who was asked to consider them both as alternative propositions.
34. That was unquestionably the correct approach to take because as explained in the preceding paragraphs the alternative arguments involved different types of family life requiring separate consideration. As the Court of Appeal made clear at [143] of IA and Others the United Kingdom, as an ECHR state, is not under a positive obligation to admit every member of the wider family of the person within the territory of the United Kingdom: “The positive obligation could only extend, even if such family life existed, to those who have family life (for the purposes of article 8(1) with that person” emphasis added. Accordingly, if the applicants alternative case were successful and the child applicants were found to share a family life with their aunt and uncle in the United Kingdom with which it would be disproportionate to interfere that would not extend a positive obligation to admit the adult applicants who are not part of that family life.
35. It was necessary therefore for the Judge to deal first with the applicants primary case and make a decision about whether there is a unitary family life, involving all the applicants and the families in the United Kingdom, which engaged Article 8(1) of the Convention; and second to make a decision about whether interference with that family life was justified under Article 8 (2) of the Convention.
36. When dealing with the alternative case advanced, it was separately necessary for the Judge to make distinct decisions about (a) whether there was a family life that engaged Article 8(1) involving A3- A7 and M, and if so whether interference with that family life was justified under Article 8(2) and (b) whether there was a family life that engaged Article 8(1) involving A10-A13 and W, and if so whether interference with that family life was justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention.
37. It is unfortunate in this case that that was not the approach adopted by the Judge and the applicants alternative cases became conflated in his deliberations. This may have been because the Judge was persuaded to rely on this Tribunal’s decision in Al Hassan and Others (Article 8; enry clearance; KF (Syria) [2024] UKUT 00234 (IAC) which was part of a series of authorities that the Court in IA and Others described in this context as “unhelpful.” Whatever the explanation the result was the Judge lost sight of what was the nature of the family life and the Convention right relied upon by the applicants in their alternative cases.
38. In this analysis I address first the applicants primary case about a unitary family life involving all the applicants plus the families in the United Kingdom which it was claimed engaged Article 8(1) of the Convention. I then address separately the applicants’ alternative case that the child applicants share a family life with their aunt and uncle in the United Kingdom which engaged Article 8(1) of the Convention.
The Applicants’ Primary Case for Family Reunion
39. The Judge began his decision with an analysis of the applicants primary case and their assertion of a unitary family life that included all the applicants plus the two core families in the United Kingdom. The SSHD argues that the Judge erred in his assessment of both whether there was such a family life that engaged Article 8(1) of the Convention (ground four) and whether interference with such a family life was justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention (ground three).
Did the Judge err when finding family life engaging Article 8(1) between W and M in the UK and the applicants in Gaza? (ground four)
40. On behalf of the SSHD, Ms Reid submits that the Judge erred in his assessment of whether there is a family life that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention. Ms Reid submitted that IA and Others makes clear that the test to be applied for determining this question where, as here, the claimed family life is not limited to the core family, is whether the applicants could demonstrate “additional elements of dependence involving more than the normal emotional ties.” On behalf of the applicants, Ms Knorr submits that while the test identified in IA and Others applies in respect of relationships between adult relatives, a different test applies for considering family life between children and their relatives outside the core family and therefore that the Judge was not required to apply the test identified in IA and Others when considering the child applicants.
41. Ms Knorr’s submission conflates the two alternative arguments being pursued by the applicants. It is plain from the Judge’s decision that he was considering here the applicants primary case that there is a single shared family life between the members of the core families in Gaza and the members of the core families in the United Kingdom. The Judge was not considering the applicants alternative case that separately and distinctly there is a family life between the child applicants and their aunts and uncles in the United Kingdom which engages Article 8(1) of the Convention. That alternative case involved a different test to determine whether there existed a different type of family life. It was not however what the Judge was considering.
42. There can be no sensible doubt that when assessing whether there was a unitary family life involving the applicants and the families in the United Kingdom , the Judge was required to apply the test identified in IA and Others, that test being whether “additional elements of dependence involving more than the normal emotional ties” had been demonstrated. This is evident from the fact that in IA and Others the Court identified this to be the test to be applied to determine the same argument pursued by the family, namely that there was a shared family life between the brother in the United Kingdom and all the core family in Gaza including the children. The Court of Appeal in other words did not make the distinction between the child and adult applicants in that case which Ms Knorr submits should be made now. Just as was the case with the family in IA and Others, the applicants’ primary argument that they all shared a unitary family life with W and M in the United Kingdom which engaged Article 8(1), fell to be determined in accordance with the “additional elements of dependency test” identified in IA and Others.
43. That being the case the remaining question is whether the Judge applied the “additional elements of dependence test”? Ms Reid acknowledges that the Judge made reference to the correct test when quoting the decision of the ECtHR in Kumari at [13] of his decision. She argues however that having done so, the Judge failed to recognise that dependency is a higher threshold than support, involving a more significant level of relationship. Ms Reid submits that it is apparent from his conclusion at [28] and that the Judge, like the FTT and UT in IA and Others, in substance applied a lower “real, effective or committed support” test. Ms Knorr by contrast submits that having identified the correct test by reference to Kumari the Judge then remained focused on the need for dependency despite his reference to the “real committed or effective support provided”.
44. It bears pointing out that at the time the Judge made his decision he did not have the clear elicitation of the correct test to be applied that was given by the Master of the Rolls in IA and Others. Further, as the review of authorities in IA and Others identifies, some of the domestic authorities that were referred to the Judge in the applicants’ skeleton arguments (e.g. Rai v ECO [2017] EWCA Civ 320) had “lost sight” of the relevant ECtHR authorities on the issue when referring to a real committed or effective support test. That “real committed or effective support test” was the test which the applicants advanced at [23] of their skeleton argument as the correct one to be applied. It is in this context where the clear declaration of the appropriate test was yet to be given by the Master of the Rolls, and where the real committed or effective test was positively advanced before the Judge that the Judge’s decision falls to be considered.
45. In all the circumstances and having carefully considered the Judge’s decision I am satisfied that the Judge did apply the wrong test and decided that there was a family life that engaged Article 8(1) on the basis that there was real committed or effective support rather than on the basis of finding there to be additional elements of dependency involving more than the normal emotional ties. That the Judge was looking for real committed or effective support is most starkly apparent from [28] of his decision where those are the words he uses to explain his final conclusion about the existence of family life. In my judgment that paragraph involved an unambiguous indication that the Judge’s finding was made applying the real committed or effective support test. That he did so is however also additionally apparent from other passages of the decision in which the Judge sought to explain his conclusion about a unitary family life.
46. At [16] the Judge refers to “especially close relationships between the siblings through the support for each other that is described” without identifying how such close relationships and support amounted to additional elements of dependency. At [17] the Judge refers to care M gave to A1, A2 and their children before he left Gaza in 2018, again without identifying how that past care establishes that the current relationship involves additional elements of dependency. At [18] the Judge appears to equate support with dependency when he refers to “support and corresponding dependency” having developed. At [19] the Judge refers to a close bond and strong relationship without identifying that the threshold of dependency is reached. At the end of [20] when expressing his conclusion, the Judge refers to the circumstances described resulting in an increased need for “reassurance and support” without identifying additional elements of dependency. All of these provide the strong indication that something less than the exacting test of additional elements of dependency was being applied.
47. Further, at [26], when still considering the question of whether there is family life that engages Article 8(1), and addressing submissions made by Ms Reid about the existence of family life, the Judge again explicitly indicates that he is applying the real committed or effective support test when he says, without reference to additional elements of dependency: “I am not persuaded that it would be material to the question of whether or not this is a case of ‘effective, real or committed support’ or whether there is ‘the real existence in practice of close personal ties’ that any such support or ties would be expected normally to have developed between comparable family members through the exposure to similar events and circumstances as the subject family has been exposed” (emphasis added).
48. As was made clear at [123] of IA and Others the difference between support and dependency is not a question of semantics but is demonstrative of different thresholds. Real committed or effective support requires a lower threshold than the one the ECtHR decisions indicate is required, that is the need for additional elements of dependency. As the Court explained at [123] - [125] of IA and Others, dependence is more than support, even if that support is qualified by the adjectives real, committed or effective. The starting point for the use of the word “dependence” by the ECtHR was the context of cohabiting dependents and it is harder to demonstrate the necessary dependency in other relationships because Article 8 family life is normally limited to the core cohabiting family. The word “dependency” in this context denotes a more significant relationship than one involving support.
49. Without the clear guidance of the judgment in IA and Others and having had the real committed and effective support test specifically advanced before him, it is apparent from his decision that the Judge applied the wrong test and reached his conclusion that there was family life that engaged Article 8(1) of the Convention on the basis of the real, committed or effective support test. Instead, as IA and Others clearly identifies, the test that should have been applied was more demanding, requiring a finding of a significant relationship with additional elements of dependency involving more than the usual emotional ties. On this basis the Judge’s finding of a family life engaging Article 8(1) of the Convention involved an error of law.
50. That error of law was unquestionably material to the Judge’s decision. As the legal framework set out above establishes the finding of a family life that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention is the first step towards a decision in an Article 8 appeal. For the reasons I have given the Judge’s finding of a unitary family life engaging Article 8(1) cannot stand and it will be necessary to remake the decision on whether the applicants share a unitary family life with the families in the United Kingdom that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention, applying the correct “additional elements of dependency” test.
Did the Judge err when finding that interference with the unitary family life would be disproportionate? (ground three)
51. Having set aside the Judge’s finding of family life, it is not strictly necessary to address the remaining ground about his consequent assessment of the proportionality of interference with that family life. I have however considered that proportionality assessment and the grounds of appeal that relate to it because it is necessary to determine the scope of the remaking which must now occur and whether any of the Judge’s findings can be preserved.
52. In respect of the child applicants, the Judge resolved the public interest question on the basis that they met the requirements of the Rules and therefore it would be disproportionate to interfere with their Article 8(1) family life. Ms Knorr submitted, relying on TZ (Pakistan) that this was the correct approach and that a finding that the child applicants met the requirements of the Rules was dispositive of the proportionality assessment for those children. I consider the Judge’s finding that the child applicants met the requirements of the Rules and whether than finding involved an error of law later. More fundamentally however it is clear in my judgment that this approach to the proportionality assessment was flawed as it lost sight of nature of the family life that the proportionality assessment was considering and erroneously conflated the two distinct and alternative arguments that were being pursued by the applicants.
53. Having found (applying the wrong test) that there was a unitary family life involving all the applicants and the families, the question the Judge was now deciding was whether interference with that family life was justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention. The applicants submission was that theirs was a compelling case where interference with that unitary family life would be disproportionate notwithstanding the fact they did not meet the requirements of the Rules for being granted entry clearance on the basis of that family life. This was evident from the representations that were submitted with their application and also the first skeleton argument that was prepared (see [38(8)] of that argument in particular).
54. It was only in the context of the alternative “new matter” argument that the applicants made the assertion that the child applicants met relevant requirements of the Rules. As previously discussed, that alternative argument was made on the distinct basis of a different type of family life, one which was shared between the children in Gaza and their aunts and uncles in the United Kingdom but which expressly did not include the children’s parents. That is not the family life the Judge was considering at this point. Instead, he was considering whether interference with the unitary family life he found (applying the wrong test) to exist was justified.
55. The extent to which the child applicants met the requirements of Appendix CRP and paragraph 297 of the Rules was not relevant to this consideration of the proportionality of interference with the unitary family life involving all the members of the core families. That is because while Appendix CRP and paragraph 297 represent the responsible minister’s assessment at a general level of the relative weight of the competing factors when undertaking an assessment of the proportionality of interference with the family life shared between a refugee and his child relative or a settled migrant and their child relative, those Rules do not represent the responsible ministers assessment at a general level of the relative weight of the competing factors when undertaking an assessment of the proportionality of interference with a unitary family life shared by four core families of adult siblings. The extent to which the children met the requirements of Appendix CRP and paragraph 297 would not therefore enable the tribunal to “formulate the strength of the public policy in immigration control ‘in the case before it’” in the way described at [34] TZ (Pakistan).
56. As previously explained, the correct approach was to approach the applicants cases in the way that they were advanced – as two alternative propositions involving two alternative types of family life. The result of the Judge not doing so but instead conflating the alternative arguments was that factors relevant to the proportionality of interference with one type of family life (that potentially shared by a refugee / settled adult and their child relative) was introduced into the proportionality assessment of another type of family life (that potentially shared by adult siblings and their families).
57. Consequently the Judge erred when finding that because he concluded that the child applicants met the requirements of Appendix CRP and paragraph 297, it would be disproportionate to interfere with the unitary family life he had found the adult siblings and their families to share. The assessment of the proportionality of interference with the article 8(1) family life the Judge found (applying the wrong test) was shared by all the applicants and the families in the United Kingdom, fell to be considered outside of the Rules, which was in fact the way the applicants put their case.
58. The Judge did undertake such an assessment of the proportionality of interference with that family life but only in respect of the adult applicants. Ms Reid argues in ground three that that proportionality assessment was flawed because the Judge attached too much weight to the best interests of the children and the circumstances they were facing in Gaza and failed to attach weight to the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control and the SSHD’s policies as reflected in the Rules. On behalf of the applicants Ms Knorr submits that the proportionality assessment is the paradigm of the situation where appellate courts should not rush to find mis-directions in decision making. Ms Knorr argues that the Judge gave appropriate weight to both the best interest of the children and the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control and adequately explained why on the particular facts of this case the family life outweighed the public interest.
59. Despite giving due deference to the considered assessment that was undertaken by the expert Judge, I am satisfied that the Judge did err in his assessment of the proportionality of interference with the family life he found to exist, in the ways asserted by the SSHD.
60. The Judge’s conclusion at [54] of his decision was that it would be in the best interests of the child applicants that both they and their parents are admitted to the United Kingdom. The Judge explains that conclusion by reference to his earlier finding at [41] that the children are living in an unacceptable social and economic environment, where they are at serious risk and their basic needs are not being met. In IA and Others the Court of Appeal accepted at [157] the SSHD’s submission that a similar best interests finding made in that case based on the basis of the dire circumstances faced by children in Gaza “distorted the balance that had to be undertaken under article 8(2) and was the wrong approach”. It is clear in my judgment that the Judge’s assessment in this case, made without the benefit of the Court of Appeals guidance in IA and Others likewise involved an error of law because it distorted the balance to be struck with the public interest in circumstances where the Government had decided not to have a resettlement policy.
61. In IA and Others at [168] the Court found that the quite natural reaction to the evidence of what the family were enduring in Gaza should not prevent the tribunal from giving effect to the Government’s immigration policies including the fact that those policies did not include a resettlement policy concerning Gaza. The Court went on at [169] to state that “It is the responsibility of the SSHD and Government to make policy decisions as to what is necessary to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens in the UK. The courts and tribunals must respect those policy decisions and not seek to get around them save in very exceptional or compelling circumstances”.
62. Whilst he refers in general terms to the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control, the Judge does not refer at all in his proportionality assessment to the policy decision of the Government not to have a resettlement policy concerning Gaza. Neither does the Judge refer to the steps the Government and the SSHD, as the responsible people, consider in these circumstances to be necessary to protect the economic well-being of the United Kingdom and the rights of its citizens. The closest the Judge comes to considering these issues is at [56] of his decision but in that paragraph the Judge considers these issues by reference to the potential of many others in Gaza or other humanitarian crises succeeding in human rights claims and concludes that he is not persuaded that is a relevant consideration. As the Court of Appeal made clear at [159], [167] and [173] of IA and Others however, that misses the point. It is not a question of floodgates or numbers likely to apply from war zones across the world, it is a question of respect for the UK’s laws and democratic process. That is not a matter the Judge weighed in his proportionality assessment and the failure to attribute weight to those policy considerations was an error of law. It is worth repeating that the Judge did not at the time of his decision have the benefit of the guidance of the Court of Appeal in IA and Others.
63. It is apparent from the decision in IA and Others that the Judge also erred when undertaking his proportionality assessment at [55] of his decision. In that paragraph the Judge addresses an argument by Ms Reid that the recent nature of the family life is relevant to the proportionality assessment and said that “I doubt that it is material to consider the duration of [the family life]” In the same paragraph he rejected Ms Reid’s argument that the tenuous nature of the family life is relevant and said that the assessment of proportionality must focus on the present. At [151] of IA and Others however, dealing with similar arguments, the Court of Appeal said the following:
Had such family life existed, the tribunals would have been entitled to consider, in determining how much weight to accord to it in the article 8(2) balance, the circumstances in which it had come into existence, the type of family life that was concerned, the length of time it had existed and its likely future development. It was relevant that the sponsor and the family had not cohabited after the Gaza conflict began and that the core family would continue to live together even if entry clearance were refused. It was also relevant that the relationship had been rekindled in the knowledge that the family had no right to enter the UK, and that if their applications failed, the sponsor would not be joining them in Gaza (see [103] and [106] above). This is the approach of the ECtHR; the strength of family ties is relevant to proportionality: see [32] of AW Khan (at [44]-[45] above).
64. It is evident from this passage that contrary to the Judge’s view, issues such as the duration of the family life found to exist, the circumstances in which it came to exist and the likely future development of the family life are all relevant to and should be factored into the proportionality assessment.
65. The Judge’s decision that the applicants share a family life with the two core families in the United Kingdom with which it would be disproportionate to interfere, involved errors of law and must be set aside.
Remaking the decision in respect of the applicant’s primary case
66. To remake the decision on the applicants primary case it will be necessary to decide:
a) Whether there are additional elements of dependency involving more than the normal emotional ties such that there is a family life between the applicants and the two core families in the United Kingdom such that Article 8(1) of the Convention is engaged?
And if so
b) Whether interference with that family life is justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention i.e. in the interests of the economic well-being of the country or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others?
At the end of this decision I issue directions for the purpose of a further hearing at which I will decide these two outstanding issues.
The “alternative case” in respect of the child applicants
67. The Convention right which the applicants claim in their “alternative case” was infringed by the SSHD decisions is (i) the right to respect for the family life shared by A3-A7 and M and (ii) the right to respect for the family life shared by A10-A13 with W. As already identified the Judge did not separately consider the applicants alternative case and determine whether there is a family life between M and A3-A7 which engages Article 8(1) of the Convention and did not determine whether there is a family life between W and A10-A13 that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention. Those questions will need to be determined in order to remake the decision in respect of the applicants appeals.
68. I agree with Ms Knorr that the “additional elements of dependency test” identified in IA and Others is not the relevant test when considering the family life between nieces and nephews and their aunts and uncles. As the Master of the Rolls made clear at [38] the issue argued before the Court of Appeal in IA and Others was the proper approach to determining whether family life exists between adult siblings. The ECtHR case law considered in the judgment all related to relationships between adults (adult siblings or adults and their parents). The Court did not consider the line of authorities including R (Singh) v ECO [2005] QB 608; Boyle v UK [1995] 19 EHRR, TS and JJ v Norway (App no 15633/15) which considered whether family life engaging Article 8(1) exists between children and adult family members outside of the core family.
69. Those authorities are relied upon by Ms Knorr to support her submission that A3-A7 share a family life that engages Article 8(1) with M and that A10-A13 share a family life that engages Article 8(1) with W. Although Ms Reid addressed them to limited extent in her oral submissions that was only in the context of the Judge’s decision which did not address this claimed family life at all, as it only considered the claimed unitary family life involving all the applicants. There has not therefore yet been full argument about the existence or otherwise of a family life which engages Article 8(1) between A3-A7 and M and A10-A13 and W and there has not been a judicial decision about the existence of such family life. This will be necessary in order to make a decision concerning the applicants alternative case.
70. As previously identified, the applicants’ alternative case is that interference with any family life engaging Article 8(1) is found to exist between A3-A7 and M would be disproportionate because they meet the requirements of Appendix CRP of the Rules and that interference with any family life engaging Article 8(1) found to exist between A10-A13 and W would be disproportionate because they meet the requirements of paragraph 297 of the Rules. The extent to which those applicants meet the requirements of the Rules was something the Judge did consider. The Judge found that they did meet the requirements of the Rules. The SSHD argues in grounds one and two that the Judge’s consideration of whether these applicants met the requirements of the Rules involved errors of law, while the applicants argue that the Judge’s findings are free from error. It is necessary to resolve this dispute in order to decide whether the findings made by the Judge can be preserved and applied in the future re-making of a decision in this appeal.
Did the Judge err when finding that A3, A4, A5, A6 and A7 met the requirements in Appendix CRP for being granted permission to join a close relative (ground one)
71. Although it was disputed in the SSHD’s decision letters, the SSHD does not challenge the Judge’s finding that A3-A7 met the requirements of CRP4.1 of Appendix CRP namely that they have an existing genuine family relationship with M, their close relative in the United Kingdom. That finding should therefore be preserved.
72. The challenge in ground one is to the Judge’s finding that the requirements of paragraph CRP 3.2, namely that the applicants have no family other than the close relative in the United Kingdom that could reasonably be expected to support or care for them, were met. The Judge explained that finding at [40] of his decision as follows:
I find that A3-A7 have no family other than M in the UK who can reasonably be expected to support and care for them in the circumstances of the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in Gaza, due to the consequent risk to the Appellants’ lives, the destruction of their homes, and the physical and mental health matters that I have found to be established on the evidence. I find it established in the evidence that A3-A7’s family members in Gaza are not in a position to provide adequate care for them, because they are unable to protect them from the risks of death due to airstrikes and ground attacks, starvation, and other risks associated with their lack of access to medical attention and poor living conditions. No safeguarding concerns are apparent on the evidence.
73. The SSHD asserts that the Judge erred by failing to have regard to the relevant fact that A3 -A7 are in the care of their parents. Pointing to the SSHD’s guidance for decision makers Appendix Child Relative (Sponsors with Protection) Ms Reid submitted that the purpose of Appendix CRP is as a route to remove children from a situation where there is no-one taking on a parental role in their life, and argues that the Appendix is not intended to be used to remove children from their parents when they are in a war-zone or area of humanitarian crisis and there is someone who can provide better care for them. Mr Reid submitted that using the Rule in this way treats it as giving rise to a protection claim and the policy guidance explicitly states that this route is not a protection route. Ms Reid argued that the policy aim explicitly recognises the accepted principle that a child should first and foremost be cared for by their parent(s). Ms Reid submitted that in reality, instead of looking at whether there is no family member who can reasonably be expected to care for the applicants, the Judge has erroneously considered whether there is a family member who can provide better care than the parents can provide.
74. Ms Knorr submits that the Judge was right to consider the risks to A3-A7 in Gaza and to conclude that their parents cannot reasonably be expected to support and care for them in those circumstances. Mr Knorr also relied upon the SSHD’s policy guidance, placing particular reliance on an example in the guidance that the paragraph’s requirements will be met where “there are safeguarding concerns in relation to the child remaining in their own country.” Ms Knorr argues that this example demonstrates that the rule can be met even when the child is with its parents. Ms Knorr submitted that the stated policy aim of the rule is to comply with the duty to promote the child’s best interests. Ms Knorr also pointed to guidance in the policy document that “consideration should also be given as to whether the applicant is in a conflict zone or dangerous situation.” Mr Knorr submitted that the Judge correctly considered the question of whether the parents of A3-A7 can reasonably be expected to support or care for them and reached a conclusion on the evidence that was open to him and which should not be interfered with on appeal.
75. I agree with the SSHD’s assertion that the Judge failed to have regard for the fact that the parents of A3-A7 are currently providing them with support and care and I conclude in the circumstances that the Judge failed to give the Rule its ordinary and natural meaning.
76. The fact that their parents are currently providing A3-A7 with care and support was self-evidently relevant to the question of whether A3-A7 have family that could reasonably be expected to support or care for them. If there were any doubt about that however the policy guidance makes it clear stating “The fact that a person or organisation has been providing care for a period may suggest that they can continue to do so”. The unequivocal evidence was that A3-A7 are currently in, and have always been in, the care of their parents, A1 and A2. The Judge’s finding was that A1 and A2 cannot reasonably be expected to care for their children was made in the face of that evidence and without an acknowledgement of the fact that caring for and supporting their children is exactly what A1 and A2 are doing.
77. Rather than considering whether A1 and A2 parents could reasonably to expected to provide A3-A7 with support and care, it is apparent from the decision that the Judge applied a different test by looking at the adequacy of the care they can provide. That is evident from the Judge’s addition of the word “adequate” at [40] of his decision: “I find it established on the evidence that A3-A7’s family members in Gaza are not in a position to provide adequate care for them….” The Rule does not however require the care or support provided by an applicant’s family member to reach a certain level of adequacy. Instead it asks whether the parent could reasonably be expected to support or care for their child. By considering the adequacy of the care the parents are providing the Judge was failing to address the specific requirements of CRP3.2. In my judgment this involved an error of law. It introduced a requirement of adequacy that is simply not in the rule. I agree with the respondent’s submission that it is indicative of the Judge looking at the comparative care available for the children rather than addressing the plain terms of the Rule. The question to be answered was is it reasonable to expect A1 and A2 to care for or support their children?
78. It is common ground that the Rules are not to be construed with all the strictness applicable to the construction of a statute or a statutory instrument but, instead, sensibly according to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used, recognising that they are statements of the Secretary of State's administrative policy (see [10] of the Supreme Court decision in Mahad v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] UKSC 16). The requirement in the Rule that there be no other family member that could reasonably be expected to support or care for the children, reflects the policy aim for CRP3.2 which is identified in the guidance: “this requirement and policy aim is consistent with the internationally accepted principle, and in line with Section 55 that a child should first and foremost be cared for by their parent or, if this is not possible, by their natural relatives in the country in which the child lives.” In that context, it is only where it is unreasonable to expect the parent to care for or support their child that the requirement of the Rule will be met.
79. The safeguarding example in the policy relied upon by Ms Knorr must likewise be considered in the context of that policy aim. It recognises that there might be instances where concerns about the parents mean it would be unsafe and therefore unreasonable to expect the parents to care for the applicant. It relates to the parents rather than the country circumstances. In this case there was no suggestion that A1 and A2 are unsafe carers for their children.
80. Once the fact that the parents of A3-A7 are currently caring for them and remain committed to caring for and supporting them, is factored into the consideration, it is impossible to see how the conclusion can properly be reached that there is no family other than M in the United Kingdom who could reasonably be expected to support or care for them.
81. As Ms Knorr identified however that is not the end of the matter when considering whether A3-A7 meet the eligibility requirements of Appendix CRP, because those requirements include what Ms Knorr described as a “mop up” requirement at CRP6.1:
CRP 6.1. Where the applicant does not meet all the suitability or eligibility requirements (subject to CRP 6.2), the decision maker must be satisfied that refusal of the application would not breach Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family.
82. In the decision letter the respondent found that A3-A7 did not meet the requirements of this paragraph because “whilst there may be a familial relationship between your clients and their sponsor, it is not accepted there is a genuine and existing family relationship with him.” This rather ambiguous approach however can no longer be followed because, as already identified, the Judge’s made the contrary finding that A3-A7 do have a genuine and subsisting family relationship with M and that finding has not been challenged.
83. What remains to be completed therefore to comply with CRP6.1 of Appendix CRP is a proportionality assessment to determine whether the result of refusal of A3-A7’s application would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for them. That proportionality assessment must balance on the one hand the public interest including the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control in circumstances where the eligibility requirements have not been met and the express policy aim is that first and foremost children remain with their parents in their home country. On the other side of the scales is the strength of any family life found to exist between A3-A7 and M and the consequences of refusal on A3-A7.
84. It is in the context of that proportionality assessment that the extracts from the policy guidance both parties relied on and arguments made by both parties about the circumstances in which A3-A7 are living are relevant. The policy guidance says that when considering whether there will be unjustifiably harsh consequences, consideration should be given to whether the applicant is in a conflict zone or a dangerous situation, whilst recognising that this is not a protection route. It is also under the heading of “Unjustifiably Harsh Consequences” that the guidance makes reference to the “relevant factors” section of the “Family Policy Family life (as a partner or parent) and exceptional circumstances” guidance. As Ms Knorr identifies those relevant factors include the absence of governance or security in another country and that in some circumstances requiring family members to continue living there may give rise to very serious hardship that renders refusal unjustifiably harsh.
85. In summary, the dire circumstances in which the children are living are not relevant to the specific question asked in CRP3.2. That is a discrete question asked for the purpose of promoting the policy principle that a child should first and foremost be cared for by their parent(s). The policy guidance makes clear however that the circumstances in which the children are living is highly relevant to the question posed by CRP6.1 and whether interference with the family life between the child and family member in the United Kingdom would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the child. That is because the Rules and guidance are also intended to promote the welfare of children, give effect to Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and give primary importance to the best interests of the child. Whether those best interests lie with staying with the parents who are currently caring for and supporting the children in very difficult circumstances or with M in the United Kingdom will form part of the required proportionality assessment.
86. Accordingly I do not preserve the Judge’s finding that A3-A7 meet the requirements of paragraph CRP3.2 of Appendix CRP because in my judgment the Judge erred in his application of that paragraph. When remaking the decision in respect of this appeal, it will be necessary to consider paragraph CRP6.1 of Appendix CRP and determine the, to date unresolved, question of whether refusal of the application made by A3-A7 to join M in the United Kingdom would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for them. Answering that question will require a proportionality assessment that includes an assessment of whether the best interests of the children lie in them remaining with their parents in Gaza or living with their uncle in the UK.
Did the Judge err when finding that A10, A11, A12 and A13 met the requirements of paragraph 297 for being granted leave to enter as the child of relative settled in the United Kingdom?
87. At [42] and [43] of his decision, the Judge found, despite the SSHD’s contrary arguments, that A10-A13 met the maintenance and accommodation requirements set out in paragraph 297(iv) and (v) respectively. Those findings have not been challenged by the SSHD and are therefore preserved.
88. The remaining dispute is about whether A10-A13 meet the requirement in paragraph 297(i)(f) and in particular the requirement that “there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make exclusion of the child undesirable”. The Judge found at [41] of his decision that the applicants did meet that requirement. In that paragraph the Judge identified by reference to the decision of this Tribunal in Mundeba (s.55 and para 297(i)(f) [2013] UKUT 00088 (IAC) that an assessment of paragraph 297(i)(f): “has regard to what the child’s welfare and best interests require, including their emotional needs, whether the child is living in an unacceptable social and economic environment, whether there is evidence of neglect or abuse, or unmet needs and stable arrangements for the child’s care.”
89. The Judge then continued to make the following finding:
… Ms Reid also submitted that it was likely that separating the child Appellants from their parents in the event that only the children were eligible for entry clearance would be traumatic. I do not doubt that that would be highly traumatic for the child Appellants t, (sic) and I find that it would be in their best interests to be accompanied by their parents in escaping the dire situation they are in in Gaza. However, I find that it would be better for the child Appellants to be removed from that, leaving their parents behind, than it would be for them to remain in that situation with their parents who, I find, are unable to provide the children with adequate support and care to meet their needs due to the environmental factors that I have already described I am not persuaded that a comparison with other children is relevant and I find it established on the evidence that the children’s welfare and best interests require that they leave Gaza as soon as possible because they are living in an unacceptable social and economic environment, where they are at serious risk and their basic needs are not being met, and there are suitable arrangements for their care in the UK.
90. The SSHD challenges that finding, arguing that the Judge erred in finding that a comparison with other children living in Gaza is not relevant. Ms Reid submits that the relevant policy: Annex FM 3.2 children guidance states that for this requirement to be met, where the sponsor is not a parent, the circumstances in which the child is living should be exceptional in comparison with the ordinary circumstances of other children in his home country. Ms Reid argues that by declining to compare these applicants situation to the ordinary circumstances of children in Gaza the Judge applied a lower threshold than the “high threshold” that paragraph 297(i)(f) involves.
91. Ms Knorr submits that the wording of paragraph 297(i)(f) does not involve a requirement that an applicant’s circumstances are exceptional compared to the ordinary circumstances of other children in his home country and that such a requirement for exceptionality would be unlawful. Ms Knorr further argues that the purpose of the relevant paragraph of the policy guidance is to reflect the point that a child cannot meet the serious and compelling threshold simply because they are better off with the relative in the United Kingdom. Ms Knorr submits that a comparison with other children would be irrelevant in the light of the Judge’s finding about A10-A13’s best interests.
92. I am satisfied that there was no requirement on the Judge to conduct a comparison between the circumstances of A10-A13 and other children in Gaza and agree with Ms Knorr that to do so would at least potentially be inconsistent with the duty to have regard to the best interests of the child in question. That was a point made by the Supreme Court at [37] of HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 when addressing a similar argument made by the SSHD about the use of a “notional comparator child” in an assessment of what would be unduly harsh for a child effected by deportation:
“a test involving a notional comparator child is potentially inconsistent with the duty to have regard to the “best interests” of the child in question as a primary consideration in accordance with section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. This requires having “a clear idea of a child’s circumstances and of what is in a child's best interests” and carrying out “a careful examination of all relevant factors when the interests of a child are involved” - see Zoumbas at para 10. The focus needs to be on the individual child…”
93. The circumstances of A10-A13 provide a good example of where a decision based on a comparison with the ordinary circumstances of other children would be incompatible with the best interests duty. The Judge found on the basis of a considerable body of evidence that the applicants’ needs are not being met in Gaza. To refuse their application in those circumstances on the basis that ordinary circumstances of children in Gaza involve them also not having their needs met, would not be consistent with the need to focus on the individual needs of the applicant and to act in a way that promotes that child’s welfare.
94. I agree with Ms Knorr’s submission that read as a whole the relevant paragraph in the policy guidance indicates that its purpose is to preclude applications made on the basis that the child will simply be better off in the United Kingdom than in their home country. I am satisfied that it is not the purpose of the paragraph that children who are not having their needs met should remain where they are simply because that is the common experience for children in that country. That is evident from the example given in the paragraph itself: “These circumstances should be exceptional in comparison with the ordinary circumstances of other children in his home country. It would not, for instance, be sufficient to show he would be better off here by being able to attend a state school”. (emphasis added)
95. I can see nothing in the decision in Mundeba (s.55 and para 297(i)(f) that suggests that a comparison with ordinary children in the home country is a requirement to determine whether there are “serious and compelling family or other circumstances which make exclusion of the child undesirable”. Paragraph [45] of the Tribunal’s decision, relied upon by the SSHD, is an assessment of the facts of that case. It does not establish as a matter of principle that a comparison with ordinary children in the home country is required. Paragraphs [34]-[38] of the Tribunal’s decision by contrast gives detailed guidance on the test to be applied when considering paragraph 297(i)(f) of the Rules from which the following principles emerge: (i) the “serious and compelling” requirements set a high threshold which will be met only by considerations that are powerful and persuasive; (ii) that high threshold will not be met by the parties desire to obtain a particular state of affairs, however natural that wish might be; (iii) whether the threshold is met requires an analysis of degree and kind; (iv) that analysis will involve an assessment of the child’s best interests; (v) the analysis will also involve an assessment of the child’s current circumstances including whether there is evidence of neglect, abuse, unmet needs and stable arrangements in place for the child’s care; (vi) the starting point will be that the best interests of the child are usually best served by being with both or at least one of their parents; (vii) continuity of residence will also be a factor. Conspicuously absent from the list of relevant factors identified in those paragraphs of the decision is Mundeba (s.55 and para 297(i)(f) is any reference to a comparison to other children.
96. I am satisfied that the Judge correctly applied these principles when making his finding that there are serious and compelling considerations which make exclusion of A10-A13 undesirable and that this finding is, as described by Ms Knorr, unimpeachable. The Judge reached that conclusion by reference to his earlier findings of fact that A11 has suffered severe weight loss, an inguinal hernia and Hepatitis C, A10 has an infection causing dwelling in his genitals and lymph nodes and A13 is suffering headaches which require investigation that has not been possible (see [20] of the decision). The Judge then demonstrably assessed whether the circumstances are serious and compelling by reference to those facts and the circumstances the child applicants are currently experiencing, by reference to the best interests of the children and having regard to the primary position that a child should first and foremost be cared for by his natural parents. The Judge then gave sustainable reasons for why in the extreme circumstances faced by the applicants the high threshold was passed and the circumstances were sufficiently compelling to mean that the balance fell in favour of the children living with their aunt in the United Kingdom. Accordingly I preserve the Judge’s finding that A10-A13 meet the requirements of paragraph 297 of the Rules.
Making the decision in respect of the alternative case for the child applicants
97. To make a decision in respect of the child applicants alternative case which was raised in the new matter correspondence and which was not distinctly considered by the Judge it is necessary to decide:
a. Whether A3-A7 share a family life with M that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention?
If so:
b. Whether the requirements of CRP6.1 are met because refusal of A3-A7’s applications will breach Article 8 of the Convention because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for A3-A7
c. Whether A10-A13 share a family life with W that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention?
If so:
d. Interference with that family life will not be justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention because of the preserved finding that A10-A13 meet the requirements of paragraph 297 of the Immigration Rules.
Directions for Remaking Hearing
98. The appeal is to be listed before me at the earliest opportunity convenient to counsel so enable me to resolve the outstanding issues identified at [66] and [97] above. The time estimate for that hearing will be one day.
99. The applicants are to file and serve any updating evidence and submissions relevant to the identified issues no later than 10 days before that hearing.
100. The SSHD is to file and serve any submissions relevant to the identified issues in reply no later than 3 days before that hearing.

Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Lawrence involved errors of law and is set – aside.
The appeals will be listed for remaking on the first available date.


Luke Bulpitt
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 February 2026