Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No.: UI-2025-004877

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/04021/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MONSON

Between

CQ (COLOMBIA)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Thoree, Partner, Thoree & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal out of time against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Symes promulgated on 18 June 2025 (“the Decision”). By the Decision, Judge Symes dismissed the appellant’s protection appeal, concluding that the appellant did not face a real risk of persecution at the hands of a FARC dissident group that he feared upon return to Colombia, and that his own evidence did not suggest that he would not be able to access sufficient protection from the group.
Relevant Background
2. The appellant is a national of Colombia, whose date of birth is 22 February 1988. The appellant arrived in the UK from France on 28 October 2023, travelling on a passport that was stamped with a 6-month visit visa. After he had been taken into detention by the UK police, for reasons which are unclear, the appellant claimed asylum on 16 January 2024. He was given a screening interview on 25 January 2024; he made a witness statement in support of his claim on 10 September 2024; and he was given a substantive asylum interview on 14 September 2024. After his substantive interview, the appellant provided a series of amendments to his screening interview in a document received by the Home Office on 23 September 2024.
3. In his witness statement, he said that his troubles began on 22 June 2020, when he was working as an administrator in Cali for a beverage business. He received a phone call from a man who introduced himself as “AV”, and who claimed to be a leader of a FARC dissident group. AV demanded a contribution of 5 million pesos for their supplies. He explained to AV that he was not the owner of the business, and therefore he could not provide any money. AV insisted that, as the administrator, it was his responsibility to make the contribution, and he warned him of severe consequences if he did not comply.
4. The appellant informed the owner of what had happened, but she did not take it seriously and did nothing in response. On 12 July 2020 he received another phone call from AV, demanding that he provide the 5 million pesos in 3 days. AV repeated his threat of there being consequences if there was non-compliance, and then he hung up. He informed the owner once again, but she refused to file a police report, as she was afraid.
5. On 18 July 2020, when he was standing near the cashier with a colleague reviewing some documents, he heard a loud noise. It turned out to be a grenade that had been thrown. Fortunately, no one at his workplace was injured, but a lot of property around the area was destroyed. Shortly afterwards, the police arrived. They advised him to close the business, and they took him to the police station to file a report.
6. Fearing for his safety after the incident, he left for Medellin on 1 August 2020 to stay with his uncle. During his time in Medellin, he worked as a waiter in a restaurant for 3 years until it was shut down. At the end of August 2023, he found employment at a bakery as an administrator. When he took up the job, he did not know that the business was being blackmailed by FARC dissidents. One week into his new job, 2 individuals approached him at the bakery and demanded he pay them a sum of 500 million pasos. They identified themselves as FARC dissidents. When he refused, they asked him what his full name was. The owner of the business approached the counter and gave the individuals his full name, and said that he was a new administrator who would now be responsible for making their monthly payments.
7. On 27 September 2023, he received a phone call from AV stating that they had found him again, and he should not under-estimate them as they had contacts everywhere. He had not forgotten about the 5 million pesos he owed him. The grenade had just been a warning, and that next time he would be buried 6 feet down. AV told him that he had 3 weeks to come up with the money, and he warned him that if he reported anything, he would burn down both the bakery and his uncle’s house where he was staying. The appellant decided that the only way out was by leaving the country. He explained to his uncle his situation, and his uncle advised him to move out as they might come after him. On 27 October 2023, he took a direct flight from Bogota to France.
8. In his asylum interview, the appellant said that his mother and brother were still living in Cali, and they had not received any threats from FARC. He was asked why he thought that this was the case. The appellant answered that he was targeted because he was working at a business that made money (AIR 60-61).
9. It was put to the appellant that FARC used to have influence predominantly in the southern half of Colombia, and he was asked why he could not relocate to a northern city like Barranquilla? He replied that he did not know anybody there (AIR 67).
10. In the reasons for refusal letter (RFRL) dated 23 September 2024, the respondent did not accept any of the material elements of the appellant’s claim. This was because he had provided inconsistent evidence without reasonable explanation, as well as a lack of detail. There were some elements of his account which were implausible and inconsistent with external information.
11. Alternatively, it was considered that there would be sufficient protection from persecution in his country of origin because, according to the 2023 US State Department report on Human Rights Practices: Colombia, the police in Colombia were generally willing and able to provide protection in similar circumstances to him. The people he claimed to fear were non-state actors, and he failed to demonstrate that it was reasonably likely that they had sufficient power or influence over the authorities in Colombia.
12. By his own admission, he did not enquire about the progress of the police investigation after making the report to the police in Cali before fleeing to Medellin. He also failed to report to the police the visit made by the gang to the bakery in 2023.
13. Alternatively, it was considered that he could relocate to Barranquilla within his country of origin. He stated that FARC was a large organisation across Colombia, with access to a government database. Despite this, he was able to reside in Medellin for 3 years after the initial extortion attempt, and he was only discovered by chance when giving his name to FARC members himself. This did not support his claim that FARC could easily locate him. At the time of the Peace Deal, FARC’s area of influence was predominantly in the south of Colombia. A substantial number of FARC members had since engaged with a reincorporation process, meaning that dissident members had been limited to rural areas. After changing his mobile phone number, he had not received any threats from FARC, and his mother and brother had been able to continue residing in Cali.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
14. The appellant elected for his appeal to be decided without a hearing. Accordingly, his appeal was listed as a Paper Case at Taylor House on 23 May 2025, and assigned to Judge Symes.
15. At paragraphs [4] and [5] of the Decision, Judge Symes summarised the appellant’s case, and at paragraphs [6] to [8] of the Decision, the Judge summarised the respondent’s case.
16. At paragraph [11] of the Decision, the Judge found on the balance of probabilities that the appellant was credible in his evidence that he truly feared persecution, as per the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA 2022”). In his grounds of appeal, the appellant had satisfactorily explained the matters raised by the respondent. The Judge accepted that the screening interview was not read back to the appellant. His failure to claim asylum in France was explained by his fears of racism there. The issue was not the objective reality of these fears, but his state of mind. Albeit that FARC activists were now largely confined to rural areas, they had been a powerful organisation in relatively recent times. It was unsurprising that some of their members had turned to crime.
17. At paragraph [12] of the Decision, the Judge turned to address the question of whether the appellant faced a real risk of persecution. The Judge answered this question in the negative. There was no reason to think that FARC would wish to harm the appellant upon return to Colombia. He had come to their attention only incidentally, due to his work for 2 businesses that had received extortion threats. He did not have to return to the same occupations in the future. The US State Department report for 2023 cited in the refusal letter raised extortion as a problem for internally displaced people from rural areas who often lived in poverty and unhygienic conditions and with limited access to healthcare, education, shelter and employment. This suggested that extortion by FARC was not generally prevalent in urban areas, even to the real risk standard. The Judge continued:
“I cannot accept that there is a real risk of any business in Colombia being so threatened.”
18. At paragraph [13], the Judge said that even if the appellant was to have the misfortune to again find himself in a role where he would risk being the point of contact for threats, there was no evidence that he would not be able to access effective protection. He was confined to the country evidence adduced before him, and there was nothing there to suggest that the police and the courts would not act appropriately if the appellant returned to Colombia. Furthermore, he could relocate to another part of the country. He had said at interview that he would not know anyone there, but he was a healthy young man who had migrated to the UK, so there was no evidence to suggest that he would be unable to establish a reasonable life for himself in locations in Colombia other than those where he had previously resided.
The Application for Permission to Appeal
19. The appellant’s application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was settled by Mr Thoree. Ground 1 was that the Judge had misapplied the real risk test. Ground 2 was that the Judge failed to assess the cumulative nature of the risk. Ground 3 was that the Judge’s engagement with the US State Department report of 2023 had been selective and inadequate. Ground 4 was that the Judge had made flawed findings on sufficiency of protection. Ground 5 was that the Judge had misapplied the internal relocation test. Ground 6 was that there was an inconsistency between the Judge’s positive credibility findings and the Judge’s risk assessment. Having accepted the appellant’s account of persecution (including threats, extortion and explosives), it was inconsistent and legally perverse for the Judge to then conclude that the appellant faced no risk on return, as acceptance of past persecution was a strong indicator of future risk. Ground 7 was that the Judge had failed properly to consider Article 3 ECHR in terms of the psychological impact of return in the light of the appellant’s accepted experiences of past threats and violence.
The Reasons for the Grant of Permission to Appeal
20. In a decision dated 26 November 2025, UTJ Ruddick noted that the appellant’s application for permission to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal was significantly out-of-time, and that the application had thereby not been admitted by the First-tier Tribunal. She nonetheless admitted the application, because she considered that it was in the interests of Justice to do so. The Judge went on to give reasons for this finding.
21. The Judge then went on to give reasons for giving the appellant permission to appeal on Grounds 1-6, but not on Ground 7.
22. The Judge was satisfied that Grounds 1, 2, 5 and 6 were arguable. As to Grounds 3 and 4, she considered that they were unlikely to be arguable, as it was not clear that the evidence relied upon was placed before the First-tier Tribunal. It was for the appellant to show at the error of law hearing that there was evidence that was overlooked. As this was an off-line appeal, it was not entirely clear what evidence was before the Tribunal.
Parallel and Subsequent Developments
23. While the appellant’s permission application to the Upper Tribunal was pending, the appellant was taken into Immigration Detention. On 14 November 2025 the appellant was sent a Notice of Intention to remove him to Colombia, and on the same day he was given a Notice of Departure detailing the intention to remove him to Cali, Colombia.
24. Although permission to appeal on Grounds 1-6 was granted by UTJ Ruddick on 26 November 2025, the Order was not sealed until 4 December 2025, so the parties to the Order were not aware of it until that date. In the meantime, on 30 November 2025, the appellant was removed to Colombia.
25. On 16 December 2025 the Secretary of State responded to the Grounds of Appeal under Rule 24 of the Upper Tribunal Procedural Rules. Her response did not refer to the fact that the appellant had been removed to Colombia because the Presenting Officer drafting the document was not aware of this at the time of drafting.
26. The hearing to determine whether an error of law was made out was listed before DUTJ Daykin on 3 February 2026. Both parties were legally represented, with Mr Thoree appearing on behalf of the appellant. After hearing from the representatives, DUTJ Daykin adjourned the error of law appeal to be re-listed on the first available date after 23 March 2026, and she gave detailed directions as to the further conduct of the appeal.
27. At paragraph (12) of the Directions, DUTJ Daykin said that she did not have enough clear information to conclude whether the appellant was forcibly removed from the UK or if he had left voluntarily. The consequences for the appellant were of the utmost importance, because it could result in his appeal being treated as abandoned, if he had left voluntarily.
28. Although DUTJ Daykin’s Directions of 3 February 2026 were not formally issued until 12 June 2026, Counsel instructed by the Home Office settled a detailed response to them in a document dated 13 April 2026, in which he set out the above chain of events and confirmed, as DUTJ Daykin had surmised, that the appellant had been forcibly removed.
The Error of Law Hearing
29. At the hearing before me, the representatives were in agreement that the appellant had been forcibly removed, and therefore he should not be treated as having abandoned his appeal, following SR (Algeria) [2015] EWCA Civ 1375 per Sales LJ at [14]-[15].
30. The representatives were also in agreement that I should proceed to determine whether an error of law was made out. Mr Thoree had filed a composite bundle which only contained the respondent’s bundle for the appeal in the First-tier Tribunal (pages 34 to 91). Mr Thoree explained that this was all that he had been able to obtain. The respondent’s bundle did not incorporate the 2023 report that was referenced in the RFRL by means of a hyperlink.
31. Mr Thoree proceeded to develop the case put forward in the Grounds of Appeal, save that, in respect of Grounds 3 and 4. Mr Thoree said he could not demonstrate that the Judge’s engagement with the county background evidence was inadequate, as he did not have this evidence. However, he sought to support the appellant’s error of law challenge by reference to the CPIN on Armed Groups and Criminal Gangs, Colombia, dated March 2026.
32. On behalf of the respondent, Mr Parvar submitted that the Judge had correctly directed himself by reference to the country report that was before him - namely the 2023 report referenced in the RFRL - and he submitted that the 2026 CPIN could not be relied upon to undermine the soundness of the Judge’s approach to the question of sufficiency of protection. Mr Parvar went through each of the Grounds for which the appellant had been granted permission, and he adhered to the Rule 24 Response on each Ground, which was that the impugned finding was reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence for the reasons which he gave, and that no error of law was made out.
Discussion and Conclusions
33. I bear in mind the observations of Lord Brown in South Bucks County Council -v- Porter [2004] UKHL 33; 2004 1 WLR 1953. His guidance is cited with approval by the Presidential Panel in TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC). Lord Brown’s observations were as follows:
“36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…”
34. I also take into account the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Volpi and another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at para [2]:
“i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for the judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
35. I consider that Grounds 1, 2 and 6 can be taken together, as they all have a common theme. Mr Thoree submits that it was not reasonably open to the Judge to find that there was no real risk of persecution upon return, in light of his acceptance of the appellant’s account of past persecution; and, in particular, his implicit acceptance that ultimately the appellant had not been successful in relocating from Cali to Medellin, as the same leader of the FARC dissident group who tried to extort money from him in Cali had tracked him down to a new business that he had started working for in Medellin, and he was holding the appellant personally responsible for paying the sum of money which he had demanded from the previous business in Cali 3 years previously. I address the various specific criticisms of the Judge’s approach in turn.
36. I do not consider that the Judge misdirected himself as to the correct burden and standard of proof. The Judge clearly followed the required approach laid down in NABA 2022, which was to assess whether the appellant had a genuine fear of persecution on the balance of probabilities, and to then apply the lower standard of proof to the issues of real risk of persecution, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.
37. There was nothing inherently perverse in the Judge accepting that the appellant had a genuine fear of persecution on the basis of his past experiences, but finding that objectively there was no real risk of such persecution being repeated, having regard to the country background evidence that was before him in the form of the 2023 report cited in the RFRL that the Judge could access by clicking on the hyperlink.
38. Applying Volpi v Volpi, the Judge was not clearly wrong to characterise the threats experienced by the appellant as being incidental to the two businesses for which he had worked as an administrator. On his own case, the extortion demand in respect of the first business was directed at the first business. If the appellant had not been working as an administrator for the beverage business in Cali, he would not have received the extortion demand. On his own case, the consequence of the extortion demand not being complied with was that the business premises were targeted by a grenade being thrown in their direction, not that he personally was targeted.
39. On his own case, the appellant was not pursued by the FARC dissident group to Medellin. He was left in peace until after he had the misfortune of taking up employment as an administrator in a bakery business where (unknown to him) the business was already paying a monthly fee to the same dissident FARC group which he had encountered in Cali 3 years previously. Thus, when the business owner disclosed his full name to members of the group, AV was alerted to his role as the administrator of the bakery business, and demanded that he pay the sum demanded from the previous business as well as the monthly fee which the business owner was already paying. As the appellant has since severed his connection with the bakery business, it was reasonably open to the Judge to find that there would not be a continuing risk from AV on return to Colombia, as the appellant would not be working as an administrator in a business from which he could siphon off money to pay AV. It was reasonably open to the Judge to find that the appellant did not have to return to the same occupations in the future as had given rise in the past to him having to deal with extortion demands from a dissident FARC group.
40. Although, the Judge did not expressly direct himself in accordance with paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules, there is no reason to suppose that Judge did not have that guidance in mind. In any event, I consider that the Judge did supply good reasons as to why the past persecution would not be repeated.
41. Firstly, as I have already canvassed, it was open to the Judge to find that the extortion threat was inextricably linked to the appellant working as an administrator in two businesses of sufficient profitability that they could afford to comply with extortion demands. Thus, as was held by the Judge, upon return the appellant did not have to return to the same occupations in the future whereby he would be potentially exposed to the same risk.
42. The second and third good reasons given by the Judge as to why past persecution was unlikely to be repeated were the availability of sufficient protection and the viability of relocating internally to the north of the country.
43. Grounds 3 and 4 relate to sufficiency of protection, and the appellant has failed to show that the Judge misdirected himself on the issue of sufficiency of protection by not taking adequate account of the background material that was before him by virtue of the hyperlink to the 2023 report that was provided in the RFRL. His reasoning on the issue of sufficiency of protection was entirely sound, and no error of law is made out. The Judge was not clearly wrong to find that there was not a real risk per se in an urban area of a business being targeted for extortion, and the Judge was also not clearly wrong to find that the appellant would be able to access sufficient protection in the event of another encounter with a dissident FARC gang.
44. Although the CPIN on Armed Groups and Criminal Gangs, Colombia, March 2026, is prima facie inadmissible, as it post-dates the hearing before Judge Symes - and the earlier CPIN of November 2024 was also not before Judge Symes – I nonetheless ask myself whether, as Mr Thoree, submits, it retrospectively supports the case that the Judge’s line of reasoning on sufficiency of protection was perverse or inadequately reasoned. The executive summary provides inter alia as follows:
“Two dominant armed groups in Colombia, the AGC and the ELN, operate alongside and against more than 30 dissident armed groups of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and a similar number of criminal gangs.
Armed groups and criminal gangs exert control and influence mainly in rural areas close to Colombia’s international borders and coastlines. Criminal gangs also operate in urban centres.
In general, a person living in an area occupied by an armed group or criminal gang is likely to face persecution or serious harm in that area, only when: (a) (i) they are considered by the group or gang to be a military objective or target and/or (ii) they are otherwise perceived by the group to seriously oppose or hinder the group’s activities or interests, and (b) the precise size and/or presence of the group or gang is such that it has a significant control and influence over the area, rather than merely operating within it.
Persons who may become military objectors of an armed group or criminal gang include human rights defenders, environmental activists, witnesses and informants and former gang members.
The state is willing but unable to provide protection against the most powerful of the armed groups, such as the AGC and the ELN.
However, the state is willing and able to provide effective protection against smaller gangs and armed groups with limited influence and control over one or more areas.
Internal relocation is likely to be viable depending on the facts of the case.”
45. Mr Thoree drew my attention to section 9.2 of the CPIN, which states at 9.2.3 that the FARC splinter groups are fragmented and lack a central demand structure. A report published in September 2021 by the Institute for Peace and Development Studies, a Colombian research Group, estimates that the splinter groups have around 5,000 members. Most are new recruits, although there are also hundreds of former FARC fighters in their ranks. Currently, 25 FARC dissident groups operate throughout the country, according to a survey by Conflict Responses, a Colombian think-tank (9.2.4).
46. At 5.1.4, it is stated that Colombia is around 4.7 times the size of the UK. The majority of its almost 50 million population live in the resource-rich north and west of the country, while 60% of Colombia, the south and the east, is sparsely populated. Sources indicate that FARC dissident groups have a presence in 119 municipalities (almost 11%). International Crisis Group’s February 2023 report states than fewer than 15% of Colombia’s population live in areas under the sway of at least 1 armed group.
47. In summary, while Mr Thoree relies on this CPIN to fortify the case that the Judge’s findings on sufficiency of protection and the viability of internal relocation are perverse in light of his acceptance of the appellant’s past experiences, I consider that a fair reading of the CPIN demonstrates the opposite. Additionally, the CPIN fortifies the soundness of the Judge’s finding on the viability of internal relocation. Although the appellant was ultimately unsuccessful in his attempt to relocate from Cali to Medellin, he was only relocating from an area in the south of the country to a city in the middle of the country. In the circumstances, the Judge was not clearly wrong to find that the appellant could safely and reasonably relocate to a northern city in Colombia, such as Barranquilla.
48. For the reasons given above, I find that no error of law is made out.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not contain a material error of law, and accordingly the decision stands. This appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
Anonymity
The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in favour of the appellant, and I consider that it is appropriate that the appellant continues to be protected by anonymity for the purposes of these proceedings in the Upper Tribunal.

Andrew Monson
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
10 August 2026