Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004879

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59000/2024
LP/05879/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SINGER

Between

EL (ALBANIA)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Collins, instructed by Sentinel Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Kaerthy, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. EL is a national of Albania, aged 29, who appeals with permission granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“the FTJ”) dated 1 July 2025 (“the decision”) to dismiss her appeal against the decision of the Respondent on 13 March 2024 to refuse her protection claim (“the refusal letter”).
2. EL had given birth to her third child by caesarean section two days before the substantive hearing and had been discharged from hospital the day before.
3. EL says, inter alia, that she fears persecution and serious harm in Albania because she is a victim of trafficking, and domestic and sexual abuse. She asserts that she fears serious harm from her ex-boyfriend, (“K”), and men who previously exploited her for sex and she says she also fears being re-trafficked. It was her case that her family in Albania would not support her and she is estranged from them.
4. It is common ground that (i) on 11 December 2020 the Respondent decided that there were reasonable grounds to accept that EL might be a victim of modern slavery, and (ii) on 19 January 2023 the Respondent decided that there were conclusive grounds to accept that EL was a victim of modern slavery on the grounds of sexual exploitation (“the CG decision”).
5. At the First‑tier Tribunal (“FTT”) the Respondent accepted EL’s identity and nationality and accepted that EL is a victim of trafficking (positive NRM conclusive grounds), but did not accept her account of a relationship with K or any links/influence he allegedly had with the Albanian authorities. The Respondent’s case was that EL could return to Albania, rely on family support and the authorities, with sufficiency of protection available, and that internal relocation and reintegration were feasible; and that Article 8 was not made out.
The decision
6. At paragraphs 8-9 of the decision the FTJ stated:
“8. The appellant had given birth by caesarean section the day before the hearing. I asked her directly whether she felt she was fit enough to give evidence so soon after her procedure. She insisted she was. Her representative confirmed that she was determined that the hearing go ahead.
9. Throughout the hearing the appellant gave evidence confidently and did not show any signs of distress or discomfort due to the recent birth. I made it clear to her that she could ask for a break at any time during her evidence should she wish and she said she understood this. She did not ask for a break and the only break she took was the one I ordered about 50 minutes into the hearing when I insisted she take a 15 minute break although she said she did not need it.”
7. At paragraph 14 the FTJ stated that she had had regard to the face of the recent birth and the medical evidence which was taken into account when considering the weight to be given to inconsistencies in SL’s evidence. At paragraphs 15-17 the FTJ set out what were considered to be shortcomings in SL’s evidence regarding complaining to the police about her former partner, (“K”), , and found (inter alia) that even allowing for SL’s vulnerabilities she considered that SL was evasive in the way she gave her evidence. At paragraphs 18-19 the FTJ highlighted what were considered to be credibility problems with SL’s evidence regarding her escape from captivity in Birmingham, and travelling to Hounslow and Croydon, and who she spoke to about her journey. At paragraphs 20-21 the FTJ rejected SL’s evidence about her estrangement from her parents having found there to be inconsistencies. SL’s general credibility was rejected. The FTJ did not accept SL was in a relationship with K, or that he had any connection to the authorities as claimed. The FTJ did not accept SL’s account of her escape from captivity in Birmingham, or that she had no ongoing relationship with her parents.
8. At paragraph 23 the FTJ said:
“23. I have considered that the NRM have made a positive conclusive grounds finding that the appellant has been trafficked. No further detail was provided to me as to which facts this finding was based on. The appellant says she spent three months in Germany where she says she was trafficked into prostitution by two men neither of which was her former partner. She says she was then brought to the United Kingdom and forced into prostitution. I do not know whether the NRM finding was based on events in Albania, Germany or one of the other European countries (Slovakia and Hungary) the appellant says she passed through en route to the United Kingdom. I therefore afford the NRM's findings no weight in considering the appellant’s account of events in Albania.”
9. At paragraphs 24-33, the FTJ made findings on risk on return and treatment for mental health issues, and found that there would be sufficiency of protection for SL and she would not be at risk of persecution. At paragraphs 35-36 the FTJ found that there would not be very significant obstacles to reintegration or that removal would otherwise breach Article 8 ECHR.
Grounds of appeal and submissions
10. The grounds argue, firstly, that the FTJ materially erred by proceeding with the substantive hearing and oral evidence two days post‑caesarean without a meaningful capacity enquiry; and that, given EL’s PTSD and vulnerability, the hearing should have been adjourned of the FTJ’s own motion. Secondly it is argued that the FTJ failed to properly engage with the mental health evidence and only paid “lip service” to SL’s mental health issues, without grappling with how these conditions could explain memory or recall issues and inconsistencies. Thirdly it is argued that the FTJ erred in giving no weight to the positive CG decision, and if this was unclear, the FTJ should have sought clarification (e.g., requesting the underlying minute) rather than rejecting its relevance to credibility. Fourthly, it is argued that relevant country guidance was not adequately followed, with insufficient analysis of area of origin, the presence of illegitimate children, and the risk of re‑trafficking. Fifthly it is argued that the FTJ erred by failing to consider the ramifications of being perceived as “kurva” (in respect of EL’s previous sexual exploitation and/or the presence of illegitimate children) for EL and her children. Sixthly it is argued that the FTJ made a flawed analysis of very significant obstacles, including EL’s claimed subjective fear and the impact of her trafficking experiences on the potential for her to reintegrate.
11. The Respondent argues in her Rule 24 response, in summary, that there was no suggestion before the FTJ of lack of capacity in respect of EL who was represented and chose to proceed. The Respondent argues that the presumption of capacity was not rebutted, because there was no clear medical evidence of incapacity, and if it were evident, EL’s counsel would have sought adjournment. The Respondent contends that the FTJ considered the relevant medical evidence throughout the decision (referencing it at paras 14, and 27–30), including PTSD, anxiety and depression and the extent to which there was treatment in Albania. The Respondent argues that the grounds do not identify medical evidence that explains the “widely inconsistent” evidence. with regard to the CG decision the Respondent contends that weight was a matter for the FTJ and the burden of proof was on EL. With regard to arguments about failure to follow country guidance authorities the Respondent asserts that the FTJ did not need to detail every piece of evidence in a “tick box exercise” and could be presumed to be aware of the relevant jurisprudence and applied it, even if she did not cite chapter and verse from the authorities. The Respondent argues that the FTJ was entitled to make the findings she did regarding the availability of family support, sufficiency of protection, and that the FTJ adequately addressed stigma in accordance with the guidance given in the jurisprudence.
12. At the error of law hearing before me both parties relied upon and amplified their respective arguments, and I have considered their submissions with care, along with all of the material before me.
Legal principles
13. I remind myself of what was said by Lady Hale at paragraph 30 of SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49. What was said there about the restraint which must be exercised on appeal has been repeated in other cases, including HA(Iraq) and others v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 at [72]. The approach I adopt to the First-tier Tribunal’s findings reflects what was said by Lewison LJ at [2] of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the FTJ failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the FTJ's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
14. At paragraph 55 of QY (Vietnam) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 607, Dingemans LJ said:
“It was also common ground that appeal courts should not interfere with judgments by trial judges just because the appellate court takes a different view of the facts. Findings of fact made by primary fact finders should not be set aside by the appellate court, unless the appellate court is bound to act. The trial judge should "give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties, and if need be [the appellate court] the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision", see Fage at paragraph 115. There is no duty to refer to every argument of counsel, and the mere fact that a judge does not mention a piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it, see Volpi at paragraph 57. These principles apply to the FTT and Upper Tribunal, see generally Terzaghi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2017; [2020] Imm AR 461, particularly given that rights of appeal from the FTT to the Upper Tribunal are limited to errors of law. Findings of fact made by FTT judges should not readily be set aside.”
Analysis
Ground 1
15. In my judgment, while the FTJ was faced with an unusual set of circumstances, there was no material error in respect of the case management decision to proceed substantively with the appeal and hear oral evidence from the Appellant.
16. There is a presumption of capacity (see s.1(2) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005), unless it is established that the person in question lacks capacity. There was in my judgment insufficient medical evidence before the FTJ to point to SL lacking legal capacity to take part in proceedings; nor is there any before me now. A person may suffer from a mental health condition or conditions, and/ or be suffering physically, but it does not automatically follow that they do not have capacity to understand, and participate in, legal proceedings.
17. I fully accept that SL had mental health issues which had been diagnosed, and the fact of her having given birth and being operated upon, would have meant that she was almost certainly in pain and discomfort, and very anxious about her two day old baby (and her other children) who was not with her. For my part I take judicial notice that upon giving birth hormone levels can vary enormously and fluctuations in hormone levels can affect mental acuity.
18. It is relevant that the Equal Treatment Bench Book, whose most recent edition was published in July 2024, with an update in May 2025, states, inter alia, at Chapter 6 (with emphasis added):
“27. A woman who is heavily pregnant or has just given birth should not be expected to attend a court or tribunal unless she feels able to do so. Although every woman is different, this is likely to apply at least to the month before the birth and at least two months after the birth. This period would be longer if there were complications at birth. Even a video or telephone hearing may be too difficult if the woman is looking after the baby on her own. This may mean that a hearing has to be adjourned. The Court of Appeal in F (A Child: Adjournment) added these points, with a reminder that the touchstone for case management is justice:
▪ A mother should not have to put forward medical reasons to justify her request to avoid such dates.
▪ It is not a solution to suggest a mother attends by remote video from her own home. She is entitled to attend in person if she wants to and, in any event, even remote participation can be stressful and would need her full attention.
▪ A general intention to allow breaks does not remedy the position if the hearing should not be taking place at all.
▪ A “try it and see” approach is not appropriate in this type of situation.
▪ Account needs to be given to a mother’s anxiety at the prospect of having to participate.”
19. As observed in F (A Child : Adjournment) [2021] EWCA Civ 469, by Jackson LJ, and Carr LJ (as she then was), the Equal Treatment Bench Book “…is the product of serious thought about fairness in the conduct of legal proceedings. It is written by judges for judges. Its guidance should be taken into account wherever it is applicable.”
20. But all of this was something which the Tribunal could (and should) take into account when assessing the Appellant’s evidence, and it did not mean when considered holistically that SL lacked capacity in law, as pleaded in Ground 1. The FTJ was faced with SL herself who firmly said she wanted to proceed, and SL was represented by counsel of some thirty years call. There is no witness statement before me from SL detailing how she was feeling on the day of the hearing and how the hearing progressed. No complaint is made in the grounds that her barrister at the hearing was negligent, nor has any witness statement been taken from counsel. There is no reason to believe that her barrister would not have canvassed with her prior to the hearing whether she felt physically and mentally capable of sitting through a hearing, understanding proceedings, and answering questions, some which were likely to cover issues which could cause her distress. Nor is there any reason to believe that the barrister himself would not have turned his own mind, independently, to whether his lay client was in a fit state to give evidence notwithstanding what she was saying. In my judgment, from an analysis of paragraphs 8-9 of the FTJ’s decision, the FTJ was more than live to the question of whether or not it was fair to proceed with the substantive hearing even though the Appellant had only been discharged the day before from hospital having given birth two days before the hearing.
21. It is right that a Judge has the power, of their own motion, to decide to adjourn, even against the express wishes of the parties, if the FTJ considers that fairness and the interests of justice require the matter not to proceed there and then. Had the FTJ decided to adjourn, that decision would not have been unreasonable or unlawful and it would have been a rational case management decision on these facts. But the decision to proceed, was, in my judgment, also within the range of reasonable case management decisions open to the FTJ on the facts and evidence before her, and not, in and of itself, an error of law. Because of this, I find that Ground 1 is not made out.
22. However, for reasons which follow, I find that the other grounds are made out.
Ground 2
23. Ground 2 argues that the FTJ failed to properly engage with the mental health evidence.
24. While the decision to proceed with the appeal was one which was lawfully open to the FTJ, the circumstances and history of SL meant that particular care and sensitivity needed to be taken, not simply with regard to offering breaks and the management of the hearing, but also in relation to how SL’s evidence was assessed.
25. At paragraph 14 of her determination the FTJ said she had borne in mind the medical evidence in the bundle of which she said the most recent was a report from Talking Therapies at Merton NHS dated 16 May 2025. The FTJ characterised that report as follows at paragraph 14:
“This confirmed that the appellant suffered with symptoms of PTSD and had presented initially with symptoms of moderate depression and anxiety. After treatment her scores for depression and anxiety had improved slightly but her PTSD seemed to have deteriorated.”
26. The 16 May 2025 report from Talking Therapies stated:
“Outcome: Your score on the PHQ-9 depression scale reduced marginally from 12 to 11, and your score on the GAD-7 anxiety scale reduced from 14 to 9, indicating a modest improvement in anxiety symptoms. Most critically, your symptoms of PTSD have significantly worsened during the treatment period, with your final score on the PCL-5 increasing substantially from 39 to 54. This marked deterioration in trauma symptoms is of significant clinical concern and strongly indicates your ongoing psychological vulnerability directly related to your trafficking experiences. The worsening of your PTSD symptoms, despite engagement in trauma-focused therapy, suggests that the psychological impact of your trafficking experiences has created profound and enduring alterations to your psychological functioning.
I have advised you to continue practising the skills you have learned in treatment.
Risk issues: During our sessions, you disclosed ongoing concerns about potential re-trafficking should you be returned to Albania. Based on comprehensive clinical assessment and the observed deterioration in your mental health, your psychological vulnerabilities directly related to your trafficking experiences place you at severe and substantial risk of re-trafficking and further exploitation due to:
Psychological vulnerability: Your trauma history has created entrenched patterns of fear, compliance with perceived authority figures, and significantly impaired ability to recognise potentially dangerous situations, particularly with male authority figures—the exact psychological vulnerabilities that were exploited during your initial trafficking experience. These psychological patterns have worsened rather than improved during our treatment period, as evidenced by the increase in your PCL-5 score from 39 to 54.
Impaired decision-making under stress: When experiencing heightened anxiety or perceived threat—situations that would be inevitable if returned to Albania—your decision-making becomes severely compromised, dramatically increasing vulnerability to exploitation and manipulation. Your trafficking experiences have created trauma-bonding patterns that make it extremely difficult for you to recognise and resist coercive control tactics employed by traffickers.
Lack of protective support network: Your social isolation and profound difficulty forming trusting relationships, direct consequences of your trafficking experiences, have eliminated crucial protective factors against re-trafficking. The frequent accommodation moves have prevented the establishment of community connections that might otherwise provide some protection against exploitation. I understand that due to the circumstances, your parents have chosen to create distance in your relationship further limiting your family/social support.
Debilitating fear responses: Your hyper-vigilance and intense fear responses, especially toward men who remind you of your traffickers, severely impair your ability to distinguish between genuine and perceived threats, making you highly susceptible to coercion and control.
The psychological impact of your trafficking experiences has created profound alterations in your psychological functioning that make you particularly vulnerable to re-exploitation. This clinical assessment is supported by the objective evidence of the deterioration in your PCL-5 scores despite consistent engagement with treatment. It is important to note that these vulnerabilities are not temporary reactions but represent enduring psychological alterations resulting from severe interpersonal trauma during trafficking. …”
27. I do recognise that, in a number of paragraphs where the FTJ made adverse credibility findings, phrases such as “even allowing for the vulnerabilities of the Appellant” were used, but there is no reference in the FTJ’s decision to the principles in the Joint Presidential Guidance note no.2 of 2010 (“the Guidance Note”), and the FTJ did not in my judgement adequately detail why the vulnerabilities could not have been responsible for at least some of the shortcomings in SL’s evidence. The Guidance Note reminds Judges at 10.3 to be aware that:
“… ii. Some forms of disability cause or result in impaired memory;
iii. The order and manner in which evidence is given may be affected by mental, psychological or emotional trauma or disability;
iv. Comprehension of questioning may have been impaired.”
28. The Guidance Note also states:
“13. The weight to be placed upon factors of vulnerability may differ depending on the matter under appeal, the burden and standard of proof and whether the individual is a witness or an appellant.
14. Consider the evidence, allowing for possible different degrees of understanding by witnesses and appellant compared to those are not vulnerable, in the context of evidence from others associated with the appellant and the background evidence before you. Where there were clear discrepancies in the oral evidence, consider the extent to which the age, vulnerability or sensitivity of the witness was an element of that discrepancy or lack of clarity.
15. The decision should record whether the Tribunal has concluded the appellant (or a witness) is a child, vulnerable or sensitive, the effect the Tribunal considered the identified vulnerability had in assessing the evidence before it and thus whether the Tribunal was satisfied whether the appellant had established his or her case to the relevant standard of proof. In asylum appeals, weight should be given to objective indications of risk rather than necessarily to a state of mind”.
29. The Guidance Note was explicitly endorsed by the Court of Appeal in AM (Afghanistan) [2017] EWCA Civ 1123, where the Court of Appeal agreed at paragraphs 21-22 that “expert medical evidence can be critical in providing explanation for difficulties in giving a coherent and consistent account of past events and for identifying any relevant safeguards required to meet vulnerabilities that can lead to disadvantage in the determination process, for example, in the ability to give oral testimony and under what conditions”. Similarly in SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana [2019] UKUT 00398 (IAC) it was stated at paragraphs 61-62:
“61. By applying the Joint Presidential Guidance Note, No 2 of 2010, two aims are achieved. First, the judicial fact-finder will ensure the best practicable conditions for the person concerned to give their evidence. Secondly, the vulnerability will also be taken into account when assessing the credibility of that evidence.
62. So far as the second aim is concerned, the Guidance makes it plain that it is for the judicial fact-finder to determine the relationship between the vulnerability and the evidence that is adduced:
"3. The consequences of such vulnerability differ according to the degree to which an individual is affected. It is a matter for you to determine the extent of an identified vulnerability, the effect on the quality of the evidence and the weight to be placed on such vulnerability in assessing the evidence before you, taking into account the evidence as a whole".”
30. The FTJ critiqued SL for saying she could not remember things on three occasions in paragraph 16 of the determination, three times in paragraph 18, and again criticizing at paragraph 19 when the FTJ summed up some of her conclusions. Even leaving aside that recently giving birth and the associated hormonal changes can affect mental acuity (as can lack of sleep due to looking after a newborn), there was material before the FTJ (contrary to what the Respondent argues) that SL’s mental health issues and trauma related vulnerabilities were capable of being consistent with her having some problems with remembering things, yet the FTJ gave this evidence no weight. The report from the Centre for Trauma Healing and Growth dated 3 September 2024, (the assessment took place on 3 May 2024), contained a Psychotraumatologist’s report on the Appellant, which on the second and third pages (CB286 and 287) expressly referenced the impact SL’s mental health conditions could potentially have on her recall and memory. At paragraph 28 of the determination the FTJ decided that she was not going to give any weight to this report because of its age and because other material post-dated it. In my judgment it was not reasonable (and an error of law) to give this report no weight at all regardless of whether other material postdated it. In addition to setting out how PTSD and other mental health problems can affect memory, the report set out:
• SL’s presenting history and treatment history at that time;
• the background that SL had given the professionals she was interacting with (relevant to the assessment of credibility, especially internal consistency, as to the extent to which SL (i) had a family support network open to her on return and (ii) had been the victim of domestic abuse and exploitation in Albania and elsewhere);
• the commitment that SL had shown to the trauma sessions (which was capable of being relevant to her wider reliability as to her attitude to and insight towards her mental health needs).
31. The Equal Treatment Bench Book at paragraph 59 of Chapter 4 reminds Judges that a witness with a mental disability may have difficulty reconstructing events in chronological order. It is right that SL saying she could not remember was also capable of being consistent with her not being truthful about key aspects of her case, but the FTJ nonetheless needed to grapple in more detail with whether SL’s complex PTSD, other mental health issues (severe anxiety and severe depression) and past trauma could have resulted from innocent and genuine lapses in memory and accounted for the apparent shortcomings in her evidence; and, if not, explaining why not. In my judgement this error infects and consequently renders unsafe the adverse credibility findings.
Ground 3
32. The Psychotraumatologist’s report was not the only piece of evidence to which the FTJ said she gave no weight.
33. Ground 3 argues that the FTJ also said she gave no weight to the findings of the Competent Authority in the Conclusive grounds decision that the Appellant was a victim of modern slavery. The determination reads at paragraph 23:
“23. I have considered that the NRM have made a positive conclusive grounds finding that the appellant has been trafficked. No further detail was provided to me as to which facts this finding was based on. The appellant says she spent three months in Germany where she says she was trafficked into prostitution by two men neither of which was her former partner. She says she was then brought to the United Kingdom and forced into prostitution. I do not know whether the NRM finding was based on events in Albania, Germany or one of the other European countries (Slovakia and Hungary) the appellant says she passed through en route to the United Kingdom. I therefore afford the NRM's findings no weight in considering the appellant’s account of events in Albania.” [emphasis added]
34. It may have been one thing to say that limited weight was attached to the NRM decision because of the absence of the underlying reasoning behind it, but to give it no weight in my judgement was not reasonably open to the FTJ. While it is correct that evidence gathering by the competent authority is not the same as evidence forensically tested in cross-examination at a hearing, there was still evidence before the FTJ that the Appellant had been deemed sufficiently credible on the balance of probabilities about at least some of her account, which ought to have been considered in the round when assessing her wider credibility, rather than not being given any weight at all.
Grounds 4 and 5:
35. I am not satisfied that the FTJ adequately had regard to relevant country guidance relating to trafficked women from Albania. The headnote to TD and AD (Trafficked women) [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC) reads:
“Much of the guidance given in AM & BM (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] UKUT 00080 (IAC) is maintained. Where that guidance has been amended or supplemented by this decision it has been highlighted in bold:
"a) It is not possible to set out a typical profile of trafficked women from Albania: trafficked women come from all areas of the country and from varied social backgrounds.
b) Much of Albanian society is governed by a strict code of honour which not only means that trafficked women would have very considerable difficulty in reintegrating into their home areas on return but also will affect their ability to relocate internally. Those who have children outside marriage are particularly vulnerable. In extreme cases the close relatives of the trafficked woman may refuse to have the trafficked woman's child return with her and could force her to abandon the child.
c) Some women are lured to leave Albania with false promises of relationships or work. Others may seek out traffickers in order to facilitate their departure from Albania and their establishment in prostitution abroad. Although such women cannot be said to have left Albania against their will, where they have fallen under the control of traffickers for the purpose of exploitation there is likely to be considerable violence within the relationships and a lack of freedom: such women are victims of trafficking.
d) In the past few years the Albanian government has made significant efforts to improve its response to trafficking. This includes widening the scope of legislation, publishing the Standard Operating Procedures, implementing an effective National Referral Mechanism, appointing a new Anti-trafficking Co-ordinator, and providing training to law enforcement officials. There is in general a Horvath-standard sufficiency of protection, but it will not be effective in every case. When considering whether or not there is a sufficiency of protection for a victim of trafficking her particular circumstances must be considered.
e) There is now in place a reception and reintegration programme for victims of trafficking. Returning victims of trafficking are able to stay in a shelter on arrival, and in 'heavy cases' may be able to stay there for up to 2 years. During this initial period after return victims of trafficking are supported and protected. Unless the individual has particular vulnerabilities such as physical or mental health issues, this option cannot generally be said to be unreasonable; whether it is must be determined on a case by case basis.
f) Once asked to leave the shelter a victim of trafficking can live on her own. In doing so she will face significant challenges including, but not limited to, stigma, isolation, financial hardship and uncertainty, a sense of physical insecurity and the subjective fear of being found either by their families or former traffickers. Some women will have the capacity to negotiate these challenges without undue hardship. There will however be victims of trafficking with characteristics, such as mental illness or psychological scarring, for whom living alone in these circumstances would not be reasonable. Whether a particular appellant falls into that category will call for a careful assessment of all the circumstances.
g) Re-trafficking is a reality. Whether that risk exists for an individual claimant will turn in part on the factors that led to the initial trafficking, and on her personal circumstances, including her background, age, and her willingness and ability to seek help from the authorities. For a proportion of victims of trafficking, their situations may mean that they are especially vulnerable to re-trafficking, or being forced into other exploitative situations.
h) Trafficked women from Albania may well be members of a particular social group on that account alone. Whether they are at risk of persecution on account of such membership and whether they will be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend upon their individual circumstances including but not limited to the following:
1) The social status and economic standing of her family
2) The level of education of the victim of trafficking or her family
3) The victim of trafficking's state of health, particularly her mental health
4) The presence of an illegitimate child
5) The area of origin
6) Age
7) What support network will be available.”
36. The FTJ did reference this case but made no reference in her decision to the area of origin of the Appellant (Puke, in the north of Albania), which was a relevant consideration given the influence of kanun law and the traditional attitudes that prevail there, and which went amongst other things to the plausibility of her claim to have been disowned by her family.
37. Another relevant risk factor set out in the country guidance authority was the fact that the Appellant would be returning with three illegitimate children. At paragraph 27 the FTJ said:
“27. I accept that appellant’s evidence that she now has three small children. They were all born in the United Kingdom. She told me they each have different fathers. It was noted in one of the mental health reports that the appellant says her first child was born as a result of sexual exploitation. She said that the second and third child were not conceived as a result of sexual exploitation and indeed in the GP notes contained in the bundle, it was noted that the second child was conceived with her then-partner with whom she was living in Hounslow. The children's birth dates are 1 August 2021, 27 September 2023 and 25 June 2025. I specifically asked her representative whether the appellant was advancing any evidence about the children’s fathers that I need to consider and he told me that his instructions were that the appellant is not in a relationship and is a lone parent. She told me she lives with a female friend in a house share. I assume therefore that were she to return to Albania she would take her three children with her. I have also considered Mr Morris’s submission that among the general population in Albania it is inevitable that there will have been relationship breakdowns and therefore there are people raising children alone there.”
38. In my judgment while the FTJ referenced the Appellant being a lone woman and having three children at this part of her decision, the children’s illegitimacy and the cultural and social attitudes to that were not adequately considered in accordance with the relevant country guidance. The children’s illegitimacy was only indirectly touched upon with a somewhat brief reference to it during the later assessment of Article 8 ECHR: “She may find some stigma attached to her status as an unmarried woman with three children, but I do not find this reaches to the level of an obstacle so significant it would prevent her integrating into Albania with the support of her family.” In my judgment the FTJ also did not overtly grapple with whether or not there was a risk of re-trafficking in the Appellant’s home area or elsewhere in Albania, given that she was in fact a recognised victim of trafficking according to the Respondent. SL’s past trafficking was referenced in the decision as set out above, but there is no explicit or considered reference to whether the Appellant faced a risk of re-trafficking in Albania, notwithstanding what is set out headnote G of TD and AD, beyond the general remarks about SL not being at risk of persecutio,n and sufficiency of protection.
39. It is relevant that in AM & BM (Trafficked women) Albania [2010] UKUT 80 (IAC) it was stated at paragraph 59:
“59. Dr. Schwandner-Sievers set out the social mores within the rigid patriarchal culture of much of Albania particularly the rural areas and among the rural areas particularly in the north. She referred to the strict code of honour embodied in the Kanun of Leke Dukagjinit (Dr. Schwandner-Sievers’ spelling is used throughout this determination), the code of conduct accepted in the north of Albania which focuses on the concept of family “honour”. She emphasised that the definition of honour within particularly rural, Albanian society was reflected in the concept of ““kurva””, which Ms Schwandner-Sievers translated as meaning “a whore”, which effectively referred not only to someone who had committed adultery or was a prostitute but also someone who had been raped or was considered to be of loose morals. She stated that this was the case:
“because it is not the notion of female consent that matters (and informs our terminological differentiations)” but the fact that all these events share the fact that the women had sexual intercourse outside the protection/control of men: their fathers and brothers before, and their husband after marriage. In other words a “whore” is a woman categorically falling outside the Albanian cultural norms of the family and accepted gender roles. According to the Kanun, “kurvinja” (sexual contact outside accepted norms) which normally is translated as “adultery” requires the killing of both parties involved, men and women, or – at best – the expulsion of the woman. Only death or exile can avert her ‘shame’ from the family”.
40. The approach in AM & BM as to the particular problems faced by women labelled as kurva was endorsed in TD and AD.
“110. At paragraphs 147-151 of AM & BM, the Tribunal considered the evidence of Dr Agnew-Davies in respect of the psychological effects of trafficking. We adopt and underline the view expressed in that case that in all claims it is important to consider the circumstances of the individual, including her strength, age, and psychological make-up. For VOTs who have been through extreme traumatic experiences it is not difficult to see how they are likely to suffer psychological consequences such as complex PTSD. The VoT may suffer lasting physical damage as a result of her experiences. These are important factors which must be considered when assessing whether internal flight is reasonable for any individual VOT. Whilst the evidence relating to psychological support services for VOTs once they have left the shelters suggests some availability, that it is undoubtedly patchy and in many cases wholly inadequate as we have observed above. An individual, because of her condition, may have difficulty in accessing or engaging with such services that do exist. She may be required to pay for mental health care, increasing her financial burden. These are all matters relevant to the consideration of whether internal flight is reasonably available.
111. As to the social consequences of a past trafficking experience we note the findings in AM & BM about social exclusion of women labelled as kurva, in the context of the tenacity of Northern Albanian traditions. It might be thought that the increased migration from the countryside to the cities might lead to a weakening in such belief systems, as extended families leave the land and break down into smaller, more independent units. Surprisingly we were shown no evidence to that effect, and in fact it was suggested by Professor Haxhiymeri that such migration – primarily from North to South – has had the opposite effect, of transporting conservative Geg social mores into the more liberal south. The importance of the family unit as a social and economic construct was emphasised in all the evidence before us. We accept her evidence that women living on their own are immediately identifiable as being on the 'outside'; even if the details of their history are not known, work colleagues and neighbours may view them with some suspicion. In some cases that suspicion will escalate to open prejudice and hostility. We therefore find no reason to depart from the general conclusions on this matter drawn by the Tribunal in AM & BM. Women living on their own are likely to be socially distinct. Whilst discrimination and stigma certainly exist they will not generally constitute persecutory "serious harm" or breach Article 3, but this it nevertheless a factor to be considered cumulatively when assessing whether internal flight is reasonable for any given appellant.”
41. I am not satisfied that the FTJ adequately had regard to the potential for EL to be considered as “kurva” by her family, and how EL would be perceived by wider society in her home area and elsewhere. It was also something which ought to have been considered in the round when assessing the reliability of the Appellant’s claim to have become estranged from her family. As a Victim of Trafficking, specifically forced prostitution, the FTJ ought to have self-directed in accordance with the relevant country guidance authorities that wider society, would consider EL as ‘kurva’ as especially so given the presence of three illegitimate children. I find that this should have been factored into the assessment of both sufficiency of protection and internal relocation as well as credibility and risk on return, and Article 8 ECHR, and the FTJ’s failure to do so was a material error.
Ground 6:
42. Given the above deficiencies in the decision, it follows that Ground 6 is made out in relation to the FTJ’s assessment of very significant obstacles to reintegration, and in particular whether or not the Appellant’s subjective fear would or might impede reintegration.
Disposal
43. At the hearing I canvassed the views of the parties as to the nature and venue of any remaking. The parties agreed that this was partially dependent on the extent to which any fact-finding should be preserved, and whether there was a need for more detailed fact-finding. In my judgment, this is not a case where I can simply re-make the decision for myself, without hearing evidence, because there must be significant fact finding undertaken regarding the credibility of the Appellant’s account as well as a careful evaluation of risk in accordance with the relevant country guidance authorities and country information evidence. Applying the principles in AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I have carefully considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements. I took into consideration the history of this case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made as well as the fact that the nature of the errors of law in this case meant that the Appellant was deprived of fair consideration of this protection claim appeal. I have decided that, given the nature and extent of the errors of law, the matter must be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal because there remains significant fact finding which must be made. I further consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process.
44. Because of the nature of the errors of law set out above, and mindful of what was said by the then President, Lane J, in AB (preserved FtT findings; Wisniewski principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 268 (IAC), I have concluded that none of the credibility findings can be safely and fairly preserved.
45. In this eventuality, the parties agreed at the hearing that it would be fair to direct the Respondent to file and serve the underlying reasoning behind the conclusive grounds decision of 19 January 2023 (now referred to as the “detailed consideration minute”1), for any remitted hearing, within 14 days, and I do so direct.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
The appeal is remitted, de novo, to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by a different First-tier Tribunal Judge.

R Singer

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
28.1.26