Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-004887
UI-2025-004910
UI-2025-004912
UI-2025-004914
UI-2025-004918
UI-2025-004931
UI-2025-004937
UI-2025-004938
UI-2025-004940
UI-2025-004942

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/54523/2024
HU/54521/2024
HU/54530/2024
HU/54519/2024
HU/54520/2024
HU/54522/2024
HU/54529/2024
HU/54528/2024
HU/54525/2024
HU/54524/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 10 February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between

MAS (FIRST APPELLANT)
KSD (SECOND APPELLANT)
AWS (THIRD APPELLANT)
ASS (FOURTH APPELLANT)
MS (FIFTH APPELLANT)
ARS (SIXTH APPELLANT)
MS (SEVENTH APPELLANT)
ASS (EIGHTH APPELLANT)
FS (NINTH APPELLANT)
NS (10TH APPELLANT)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr Osmani, Legal Representative from Times PBS
For the respondent: Mr Pugh, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellants are Afghan nationals residing in Pakistan. The first and second appellants are husband and wife. The remaining appellants consist of their children, their children’s spouses, and their children’s children. I acknowledge that a more precise explanation of the various relationships would be preferable, but I have not been provided with what I consider to be a clear and usable schedule containing this information.

2. The United Kingdom-based sponsors are the first and second appellant’s daughter, R, and her husband, H. H is a naturalised British citizen, having originally been recognised as a refugee in this country. R is also now a British citizen. She married H in Afghanistan in 2019 before coming to live in the United Kingdom.

3. The appellants appeal with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Wright (“the judge”), promulgated on 14 July 2025 (I shall refer only to a single “appeal”). By that decision, the judge dismissed the appellants’ appeal against the respondent’s refusal of their combined human rights claim. That claim was based on Article 8 and the assertion that there was family life between the appellants and the sponsors and that a refusal of entry clearance would constitute a disproportionate interference with protected rights.

The judge’s decision in summary
4. On a general note, it is abundantly clear from a reading of his decision as a whole that the judge was not impressed by the preparatory work undertaken (or more accurately the work that was not, but should have been, undertaken) by the appellants’ representatives. They should reflect on the judge’s comments.

5. The judge found as follows:

(a) The appellants accepted that they could not meet any of the Immigration Rules: [9];

(b) The critical issue to be determined was whether there was family life for the purposes of Article 8(1) because the judge confirmed that if family life did exist, he would have gone on to find that the respondent’s decision was disproportionate: [18];

(c) Prior to 2019, R and the appellants had resided together as a family unit in Afghanistan and at that point there was family life: [20];

(d) There had been no direct contact between R and the appellants since the former left Afghanistan in 2019: [22];

(e) In 2021/2022, the appellants left Afghanistan and went to Pakistan, seemingly on the basis of the second appellant’s medical visa for that country;

(f) R and H had been sending money to the appellants on a regular basis: [26];

(g) There was very little, if any evidence concerning the appellant’s overall financial circumstances and needs: [27];

(h) The second appellant had been receiving treatment for her condition whilst in Pakistan, the treatment was adequate, and it had been accessible with or without money from the sponsors: [28] and [29];

(i) The evidence about communications between the sponsors and the appellant’s was unsatisfactory: [29]-[31];

(j) Post-hearing evidence (which had been admitted) suffered from significant shortcomings and no weight was placed on it: [33]-[36];

(k) The appellants were living in difficult circumstances as result of having no current legal status in Pakistan: [37];

(l) The family life that had existed up to 2019 came to an end when R left and Afghanistan for the United Kingdom: [40];

(m) The appellants had “failed to show, on balance, that any relationship between them and the sponsors is more than the usual ties of affection one would expect to see between adult family members who have moved out of the family unit to form a new family unit.”: [41]-[43].

6. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

The grounds of appeal
7. Seven grounds of appeal were put forward. These can be summarised as follows:

Ground 1: The judge failed to factor in protection-related issues into the Article 8(1) assessment.

Ground 2: The judge failed to adopt a holistic approach to dependency and family life.

Ground 3: There was procedural unfairness because the judge failed to raise concerns he had with the post-hearing evidence before placing no weight on it.

Ground 4: The judge adopted an “excessively strict approach” to the evidence on financial dependency.

Ground 5: There was an inadequate assessment of “medical dependency”.

Ground 6: The judge inconsistently applied country evidence relating to the appellants’ circumstances in Pakistan.

Ground 7: The judge failed to “properly weigh” oral evidence.

8. On 21 November 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan granted permission on all grounds, albeit that he regarded grounds 2 and 4-7 as being weaker than grounds 1 and 3.

Rule 24
9. The respondent provided a detailed rule 24 response, dated 5 December 2025.

The hearing
10. Mr Osmani relied on the grounds of appeal and a skeleton argument. He expanded on these in his oral submissions. Certain aspects of his submissions came very close to straying into evidence and/or points that might have been made to the judge but which rather overlooked the fact that the judge had actually made findings and these had to be the focus of my attention at the error of law stage. I will deal with relevant aspects of Mr Osmani’s submissions when setting out my conclusions, below.

11. Mr Pugh relied on the rule 24 response and made submissions on grounds 1-3. He was content to oppose the remainder of the grounds based on the rule 24 response. I was referred to IA and Others v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, particularly [116]-[128]. Again, I will deal with any relevant matters arising from the oral submissions when setting out my conclusions, below.

12. Mr Osmani made a brief reply.

13. At the end of the hearing I informed the parties that I would reserve my decision.

Conclusions
14. In this case as in all cases I exercise appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The judge read and heard evidence for himself and undertook an assessment of this within the appropriate legal framework. I remind myself that a judge need not set out every item of evidence relied on, nor state every step of the reasoning process. The judge was not required to give reasons for reasons. Finally, and importantly, his decision must be read holistically and sensibly.

15. Before moving onto the particular grounds of appeal, it is important to record here my general conclusion that the judge’s approach to Article 8(1) and whether there was family life between adults was in all material respects consistent with what is said at [116]-[128] of the judgment in IA and Others. As a matter of substance, he undoubtedly applied the “additional elements of dependency” test approved by the Court, whilst at the same time having proper regard to the particular circumstances of the case. The appellants have not suggested otherwise.

Ground 1
16. I accept that the country conditions pertaining to individuals residing abroad who seek entry clearance to enter United Kingdom can in principle be a relevant consideration when considering Article 8(1), as well as in respect of proportionality under Article 8(2). That is because those circumstances can potentially inform, to a greater or lesser extent, additional elements of dependency between a sponsor residing in this country and family members abroad.

17. Contrary to what is said in ground 1, it is sufficiently clear that the judge did in fact take the appellants’ circumstances in Pakistan into account as part of the contextual background to the appeal. At [16] and [43], he confirmed that he had taken a holistic approach to Article 8(1). At [25], he took judicial notice of the “hard line approach” taken by the Pakistani authorities to Afghan nationals. He again acknowledged the appellants’ precarious position at [37]. He also acknowledged the claim that one reason for the appellants’ departure from Afghanistan was because two of them had worked for the government before the Taliban took control of the country: [23 ]. Having said that, the judge was entitled in the present case to conclude that protection-related matters did not play a material (in other words, a sufficiently significant) role in the overall assessment of whether there was family life and he was entitled to exercise real caution to avoid a “backdoor” protection claim being run via Article 8. In truth, the underlying substance to ground 1 relates more to what might have been considered under Article 8(2) if proportionality had come into play.

Ground 2
18. The second ground of appeal is not made out. The judge stated appropriate self-directions at the beginning and end of his assessment of the evidence on family life: [16] and [43]. Mr Pugh adopted the pithy description of the judge having “topped and tailed” the analysis of the evidence with confirmation that all matters were being looked at holistically. I would require cogent indications on the face of the decision before concluding that the judge had not in fact done what he said he would do on two separate occasions.

19. In the event, there are no such indications. Decisions always require some form of structure and this will differ according to the particular style of the judge concerned. Substance is more important than form. In this case, the judge was fully entitled to work through the various elements of claimed dependency relied on by the appellants to demonstrate the existence of family life. The fact that financial support, the second appellant’s medical condition, and emotional support were considered within separate passages of the decision does not of itself suggest that they were erroneously compartmentalised. The judge expressly stated that he had considered whether any of the elements were of themselves sufficient to demonstrate family life and that was unobjectionable as far as it went. However, having previously stated that he would take a holistic approach to the central issue under Article 8(1), the judge then went on to reach a conclusion on all of the elements on a limited basis. That approach was not only open to the judge, but was in my judgment the correct approach. There is no error of law here.

Ground 3
20. An assertion of procedural unfairness is not uncommon in this jurisdiction. It is often said that a judge has failed to put a party a notice before making an adverse finding. What is important to recognise, however, is that the requirements of procedural fairness are highly context-specific. The question in this case is whether fairness required the judge to give the appellants a (further) opportunity to provide evidence after the hearing?

21. For the following reasons, I answer that question in the negative.

22. First, it is to be noted that, as a result (at least in part) of what the judge described as “woeful” preparation by their legal representatives, the appellants had clearly failed to adduce relevant evidence prior to and at the hearing. In other words, they had already had two opportunities to adduce evidence on the issue of communications between them and R.

23. Secondly, even at the hearing, the judge did not direct further evidence to be provided. He made the entirely justified observation that, “… it is not for me to run [the appellants’] case…” The post-hearing application to adduce further evidence was in effectively unsolicited and represented a third opportunity for the appellants two make out an element of their case. Once received, the new evidence was (my view somewhat generously) admitted by a legal officer of the First-tier Tribunal.

24. Thirdly, one only has to look at the new evidence at pages 35-67 of the error of law bundle to see why the judge had considerable concerns with it. It is nothing more than a lengthy printout of data containing dates, times, whether a call was missed or part of a video or voice call. As a matter of fact, the judge was undoubtedly correct to state that: there were no screenshots to show how the data list related to communications in their original form; there was no witness statement from either the appellants or the sponsors in relation to the context and content of the data list; and there was no explanation as to why the evidence (in any form) had not been provided sooner: [35].

25. Fourthly, the issue of whether there was family life was very much a contentious issue at the appeal and there is no question of the appellants having been ambushed by a new point.

26. Fifthly, put bluntly, it was, or at the very least should reasonably have been, known to the appellants and their legal representatives that the new evidence would have been considered by the judge in the context of its late timing and the format in which it was provided. Those two matters were, or would reasonably have been, obvious. Beyond that, it would have, or should have, been obvious to competent legal representatives that the provision of nothing more than a data list without evidence of context, provenance, or any surrounding circumstances, would be highly likely to raise concerns on the judge’s part. Frankly, in the particular circumstances of this case it would have been remarkable if the judge had not had any evidential concerns.

27. Sixthly, what I regard as the obvious nature of the concerns relied on by the judge when he placed no weight on the new evidence is highly relevant to the question of whether procedural fairness required him to take any further steps prior to reaching that conclusion. I was referred by Mr Pugh to Hima v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 680, at [51]. The relevant point made therein is that:

“Where a party might reasonably expect the FTT to reach a view on a particular point, there generally will be no unfairness in the FTT not drawing attention to that issue.”

28. Placing what I have said in my reasons so far in the context of the authorities, fairness did not require the judge to revert back to the appellants in order to give them yet another opportunity to adduce further evidence and/or rectify evidential problems with the existing evidence.

29. Seventhly, and in the alternative to the above, I note that there been no rule 15(2A) application to adduce any further evidence in relation to the concerns raised by the judge at [35] of his decision. All Mr Osmani could say is that the data list was generated by some form of software, with reference to text at the bottom of each page. That takes the applicants’ case no further. Neither the judge nor I can be expected to have particular knowledge about how data is created, and in any event that says nothing about the concerns raised by the judge and on which he based his finding that no weight should be placed on the new evidence. Therefore, even if the judge should have given the appellants another chance to adduce yet more evidence to explain the deficiencies in the existing evidence, it is inevitable that no such evidence would have been adduced, or that any such evidence would have had no material bearing on the probative value of the data list, or indeed any of the other evidence on communications.

30. Having regard to the particular context of this case, there was no material procedural unfairness.

Ground 4
31. I reject the appellants’ contention that the judge imposed “too strict a threshold” for financial dependency. On what was before him, the judge was entitled to find that there was a distinct lack of evidence surrounding the appellants’ financial circumstances. It was open to the judge to view the absence of any breakdown of expenditure as a relevant consideration, as was the lack of any detail provided by the sponsors. Insofar as Mr Osmani sought to rely on the sponsor’s oral evidence at the hearing, there has been no note of that evidence provided at this stage, there a witness statement from either of the sponsors, and nor have I been asked to listen to a recording of the hearing. The grounds do not refer to any aspect of the oral evidence said to have been overlooked by the judge in respect of financial dependency.

32. As mentioned already when discussing ground 2, the judge was right not to have treated financial dependency as a determinative factor for whether family life existed. Nor is there an indication that the judge was requiring exclusive or exceptional dependency on the part of the appellants.

33. For the sake of completeness, IA and Others makes it clear enough that financial dependency will not often be sufficient of itself to demonstrate family life between adults.

34. There is no error of law in respect of the financial element of the appellants’ case.

Ground 5
35. It is not altogether easy to understand what ground 5 is saying. At the hearing, Mr Osmani submitted that the judge had expected too much evidence from the appellants and that his reasoning had been “too dismissive”. I disagree. The judge accepted that the second appellant had a medical condition for which she had been granted a visa to enter Pakistan for treatment. The judge accepted aspects of the evidence before him (specifically that provided by R) and found that the second appellant had been receiving appropriate treatment in Pakistan. Contrary to the assertion that the judge was expecting too much, he in fact accepted aspects of the evidence. As to the cost of the medical treatment, the judge was entitled to conclude that no reliable evidence been presented on this issue: [29]. It is difficult to see what else the judge was supposed to have done. He was entitled to conclude that the medical element of the appellants’ case did not, by itself or on a cumulative basis, demonstrate the necessary additional elements of dependency going beyond normal emotional ties.

36. Ground 5 discloses no error of law.

Ground 6
37. I conclude that ground 6 is particularly weak. In essence, much of what I have said in respect of ground 1 applies here as well. Beyond that, and as Mr Pugh pointed out, the decision relied on by the appellants in support of ground 6, Al-Hassan and Others (Article 8; entry clearance; KF(Syria) [2024] UKUT 00234 (IAC), applies to the scenario where family life under Article 8(1) has already been found to exist and the question of proportionality comes into play. That is not the scenario with which I am now concerned.

38. There is no error of law.

Ground 7
39. The final ground is unevidenced and has no substance. As I have said earlier, there is nothing before me as to what was and was not said in oral evidence at the hearing. Nothing in the grounds begins to identify what particular aspects of the “unchallenged oral evidence from the sponsors” was even capable of demonstrating the existence of family life. In any event, the judge clearly took the oral evidence into account as part of his holistic assessment. For perfectly adequate reasons, he found that aspects of the evidence (including the oral evidence) were less than reliable, whilst other aspects that itself represented a balanced assessment of the evidence as a whole.

40. No error of law has been identified here.

Summary
41. The numerous grounds of appeal have failed to identify any material errors of law in the judge’s decision.

42. It is appropriate to step back from the detail of the case to look at the bigger picture, as it were. This appeal concerned an adult child of the two lead appellants who had not had direct contact with any of the family members since 2019. The judge found that family life had ceased in 2019 and that particular finding is unchallenged. This was always going to make it more difficult to demonstrate that family life had been re-established as at the hearing before the judge. Further, the sponsors’ familial relationship with the great majority of the appellants was beyond what has been described as a “core” family unit.

43. Whilst I certainly do not regard IA and Others as representing a factual precedent, I simply note the underlying similarities between that case and the present.

44. I, like the judge, express sympathy for the difficult circumstances in which the appellants have found themselves in.

Anonymity
45. The judge made an anonymity direction on the basis that whilst the case before him did not involve a claim for international protection, a number of the issues had protection-related elements which, when combined with the apparent fact two of the appellants had worked for the previous government, justified anonymity.

46. I have not been asked to discharge the direction made by the judge and, notwithstanding the importance of open justice, I am satisfied that it should be maintained for the reasons he gave.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.

The appeals to the Upper Tribunal are all dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 30 January 2026