Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004894
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/04166/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILLIAMS

Between

SS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The Appellant in person
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 24 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a national of Iran, appeals with permission against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) to dismiss his appeal on protection grounds. The decision of the Judge was sent to the parties on 22 August 2025.

Background
2. The appellant’s protection claim made on 17 November 2022, was advanced on the basis of his political opinion. Specifically, the appellant claimed to have attended a protest on 26 September 2022 against the death of Mahsa Amini. The appellant claims his brief attendance at this protest was noticed by the authorities who subsequently raided his home, precipitating his exit from Iran. Following his arrival in the United Kingdom, the appellant also attended demonstrations against the Iranian regime and posted anti-regime material on Facebook.
3. The respondent refused the appellant’s claim by a decision dated 18 October 2024. Whilst it was accepted the appellant was an Iranian national of Kurdish ethnicity, and that he had been engaged in sur place activity, it was not accepted he had attended a demonstration in Iran, nor that he was wanted by the Iranian authorities. The appellant exercised his right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The appeal came before the Judge sitting at Manchester on 11 August 2025. Both parties were represented. The Judge heard evidence from the appellant, heard submissions from both representatives and reserved his decision. The Judge’s decision was sent to the parties on 22 August 2025. The decision, spanning fifteen pages, is a carefully written one. The Judge’s salient findings can be conveniently summarised.
5. The Judge considered the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in France at [22] to [25], finding this, and the different explanations given for that failure, damaged his credibility. At [30] to [49], the Judge gives detailed consideration to the appellant’s claim to have attended the protest. The Judge found that the appellant was among a crowd of a thousand people, and that he was ‘pulled to the back’ when shooting began, and that it was ‘very difficult to imagine anyone being identified in the circumstances’.
6. The Judge then proceeded to determine the risk which might emanate from the appellant’s sur place activity. At [52], the Judge found the authorities would not know of the appellant’s past as a kolbar, and that illegal exit and Kurdish ethnicity alone would not ‘place the appellant in enough peril whereby the appeal might succeed’.
7. Having assessed the appellant’s Facebook evidence and his attendance at demonstrations in the United Kingdom, the Judge concluded by finding the appellant’s political beliefs were not genuine [67], that he could delete his Facebook profile [70], and that even with his ethnicity, illegal exit and being a returnee from the West, the authorities would not know or become aware of his sur place activity. The Judge then considered the appellant’s private life claim, and his Article 3 medical claim. The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. The appellant’s application for permission to appeal was initially refused by the First-tier Tribunal. His renewed application was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins. Whilst the grounds are drafted in the first person, the appellant confirmed before us that he was assisted with their drafting by Mr Mehr who appeared below.
9. Considering the grounds were prepared with the assistance of a legal representative, it is disappointing that they do not comply with the guidance given in Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150. Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins described the grounds as ‘very taxing’, which we find is a fair characterisation.
10. In granting permission, Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins identifies as arguable the assertion the Judge misunderstood the appellant’s evidence as it related to his position in the crowd at the demonstration which the appellant claimed evoked the attention of the authorities. The grant of permission however, was not restricted.
11. As well as the ground specifically referred to in the grant of permission, the appellant also sought permission to challenge the Judge’s finding that the appellant’s evidence as to how he had been identified by the authorities was speculative, and that the Judge had failed to adequately consider the risk emanating from his sur place activity, and in finding that activity was not genuinely motivated.
The Hearing
12. This appeal originally came before Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 21st April 2026. Unfortunately, that hearing had to be adjourned due to there being no facilities in the allocated courtroom to enable remote attendance by the interpreter. The hearing was adjourned and came before us sitting together as a panel.
13. Whilst the appellant can speak English, he participated in the hearing with the assistance of a Farsi interpreter, Mr Sarwarzada. At no time during the hearing did we observe any difficulties in communication between the appellant and the interpreter, and we were satisfied the appellant could participate effectively. We explained to the appellant we had considered the grounds seeking permission, and he confirmed he had nothing to add. We heard from Mr Tan who resisted the appeal, and the appellant responded briefly. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision which we now give with reasons.
Discussion
14. The point specifically identified as arguable in the grant of permission pertains to the Judge’s finding that the appellant had been ‘pulled’ from the front to the back of the crowd [48]. This was a factor which the Judge considered reduced the risk to the appellant, stating ‘it is very difficult to imagine anyone being identified in those circumstances’. We consider first the Judge’s consistent recording of the appellant’s evidence as to where he was within the crowd.
15. At [31], the Judge records the appellant’s evidence from the first substantive interview (with references to the answers given in that interview), that the appellant had arrived ten minutes before the demonstration started (AIR 38), that around a thousand people were present. The appellant was at the front, chanting and holding a placard someone gave him (AIR 91). A friend was shot and injured, at which another friend called the appellant to the back of the crowd (AIR 72).
16. The Judge reiterated the appellant’s claim to have been at the front of the crowd at [35], stating ‘I recognise claims the appellant was at the front of the protest. That may have made it more likely he was captured on film, though the description of being called to the back after the shooting started would reduce that’. The appellant’s position was considered again at [37], with the Judge saying ‘…even if the appellant was at the front of the protest’. At [40] the Judge considers the issue of identification saying ‘even if someone was at the front of a group, that being a thousand strong would make identification more difficult.
17. In considering this ground, we remind ourselves of the Court of Appeal’s caution against ‘concentrating on particular verbal expressions that the judge used rather than engaging with the substance of his findings’, Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [65]. We are satisfied the Judge was aware of the appellant’s claimed position at the front of the ground. His reference to the appellant being ‘pulled’ instead of being ‘called’ is likely to be a typographical error.
18. Even if it were the case that the Judge had made a mistake of fact as to the appellant’s position within the crowd, the finding at [46] was that the appellant did not attend the demonstration. The impugned reference to the appellant being ‘pulled to the back’ is an assessment of risk if the appellant had attended the demonstration. We do not find there is any material error of law in this respect.
19. The second area of challenge focuses on the Judge’s finding that the appellant’s evidence was, in some ways, speculative. The appellant specifically complains that the Judge’s finding at [37], that ‘any claim friends may have passed along the appellant’s details only arose in the very recent witness statement. I do not simply dismiss the suggesting but must have regard to the fact it only came after the refusal expressed doubts. That has not robbed the point of all weight but does reduce it somewhat’. At [47] the Judge also states ‘whilst it may be as Mr Mehr says some logic exists, so too does an element of speculation’.
20. In our view, this ground is no more than a disagreement with a finding properly open to the Judge on the evidence before him. Looking at the appellant’s evidence, he did not disclose his belief that his friend had informed on him during his interviews with the respondent. The appellant was asked in his first substantive interview (AIR 78) how the authorities were able to identify him after the protest if he was not arrested. The appellant’s response, ‘we were being filmed and photographed at the demo, some of my friends were arrested I didn’t return home I phoned and I was told the authorities were looking for me’ makes no suggestion the appellant had been informed on by the friend who was shot.
21. In his second substantive interview, the appellant was asked several questions about the authorities’ ability to identify him (AIR 58 to 61). Again, there was no suggestion in the answers given that the appellant’s friend had given his name to the authorities. In light of this evidence, it was open to the Judge to find that this was speculative, and to place little weight on the assertion that this was how the appellant became known to the authorities.
22. Finally, the appellant submits that the Judge erred in his consideration of the sur place activity, specifically in finding that it was not the expression of genuinely held political belief. We do not find the Judge erred in this respect. At [54] to [65] undertakes a detailed assessment to the appellant’s Facebook activity, his attendance at demonstrations, and the evidence that the appellant appeared in stills from reports by Iran International and BBC Farsi. The Judge characterised this activity as ‘low-level’ [65], accepting that even that could place the appellant at risk.
23. At [66] to [70], the Judge considers the question of whether the political activity was genuinely motivated. The Judge referred to a ‘combination of factors’ in concluding that it was not. The limited Facebook evidence which ended some time before the hearing, as the attendance at demonstrations did, were factors the Judge was entitled to consider. The Judge also reminded himself of his finding the appellant had not attended a demonstration in Iran and found the sur place activity was simply to support the claim. We do not find any error in the Judge’s reasoning or findings on this point.

Notice of Decision
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal, dismissing the appeal on all grounds, shall stand.

CJ Williams

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 May 2026