Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004903

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52387/2023
LP/00222/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RAE-REEVES

Between

AI (Iraq)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Cleghorn, Counsel instructed by North East Law Centre
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hillis, (‘the Judge’), promulgated on 17 July 2025, dismissing his appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of his protection claim. The Appellant is a national of Iraq, of Kurdish ethnicity, who claims to fear honour-based violence at the hands of his father following a false allegation made by his stepmother.‑tier Tribunal (Judge Hillis), promulgated on 17 July 2025, dismissing his appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of his protection claim. The Appellant is a national of Iraq, of Kurdish ethnicity, who claims to fear honour‑based violence at the hands of his father following a false allegation made by his stepmother.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Hamilton on 19 October 2025. The grant of permission noted it was arguable that the First-tier Tribunal (“the FTT”) erred in law by relying on speculation, cultural conjecture, and assumptions about Kurdish family dynamics contrary to the guidance in HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, Awala v SSHD (2005) CSOH 73 and Esen v SSHD (2006) CSIH 23, and by failing to give adequate weight to the Appellant having been a minor at all material times.‑tier Tribunal Judge Hamilton on 19 October 2025. The grant of permission noted it was ‑tier Tribunal (“the FTT”) erred in law by relying on speculation, cultural conjecture, and assumptions about Kurdish family dynamics contrary to the guidance in HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA
3. For the reasons that follow, I find the FTT’s decision involved the making of a material error of law. I set that decision aside. No findings are preserved. The appeal is remitted for a complete rehearing.
Background
4. The Appellant was born on 3 September 2005. He entered the UK clandestinely in February 2021 and claimed asylum shortly thereafter. It is accepted that he was a minor when the events occurred and at the time of interview.
5. His case is that while living with his father, stepmother (an Arab woman from Syria), mother and siblings in Ranya, his stepmother made unwanted sexual advances towards him when they were alone. When he refused, she falsely accused him of sexual assault. The Appellant states that his father—a man he describes as powerful, influential, and armed—threatened to kill him to restore the family’s honour. His uncle assisted him to flee.
6. The Respondent accepted:
(i) his nationality and Kurdish ethnicity;
(ii) that false accusations of honour related misconduct may put a person at risk;
(iii) that the Appellant is capable of falling within a Particular Social Group: “individuals accused of immorality and at risk of honour-based violence”‑related misconduct may put a person at risk;‑based violence”.
7. The Respondent rejected the credibility of the events and considered the risk on return to be unfounded.
Anonymity Direction
8. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity direction, and I have no reason to dispense with that direction.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
9. Whilst the Judge found the Appellant’s historic account to be consistent, he rejected the Appellant’s oral account as unreliable [11] relying heavily on what he considered the norms of Kurdish culture, family hierarchy, and expected obedience.
10. At paragraphs [14]–[19], the Judge gave multiple reasons based on assumed norms: expectations of father–son obedience, what a “high ranking” Peshmerga officer would “likely” do, whether family dispute resolution would or would not occur, whether a stepmother unfamiliar with Kurdish culture would behave in such a way, and whether a father would permit is son to re-enter the home if he distrusted him.‑ranking” Peshmerga officer would “likely” do, whether family dispute resolution would or would not occur, whether a stepmother unfamiliar with Kurdish culture would behave in such a way, and whether a father would permit is son to re‑enter the home if he distrusted him.
11. The judge also rejected various supporting elements of evidence (including the letter from RE Organisation and details of the Appellant’s family dynamics).
Grounds of Appeal
12. Ms Cleghorn relies on the written Grounds and took me through them;
a) The FTT engaged in cultural speculation rather than assessment based on the evidence, contrary to HK.
b) The judge imposed his own conception of reasonableness within a Kurdish or Kurdish/Arab household without evidential basis.‑Arab household without evidential basis.
c) The reasoning between [14] and [19] was based on inherent improbability rather than evidence. The Judge steps into the role of expert, exhibiting higher knowledge of concepts that are very fluid.
13. Ms Isherwood confirmed that there is not Rule 24 letter. She submits that the judge demonstrates that he has considered the background information and that whilst she accepts that he has made inferences, some of these are mere terminology and some he is entitled to make. He makes finding open to him. She suggests that the rejection of the letter and preceding paragraph need to be read together.
Discussion
14. I remind myself that the task of the Upper Tribunal is not to remake findings of fact, but to determine whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law which was material to the outcome. Indeed, as set out in HK [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 the appeal “court is normally precluded from interfering with such conclusions”, namely “findings of primary fact or the drawing of inferences from such findings” [24]
15. In HK, the Court of Appeal warned tribunals against rejecting accounts because they do not “fit” the decisionmaker’s expectation of how individuals from another culture would behave. Cultural practices are not monolithic; irrational or unpredictable behaviour does not equate to untruthfulness. As Lord Justice Neuberger stated;‑maker’s expectation of how individuals from another culture would behave. Cultural practices are not monolithic; irrational or unpredictable behaviour does not equate to untruthfulness.
Inherent probability, which may be helpful in many domestic cases, can be a dangerous, even a wholly inappropriate, factor to rely on in some asylum cases. Much of the evidence will be referable to societies with customs and circumstances which are very different from those of which the members of the fact-finding tribunal have any (even second-hand) experience. Indeed, it is likely that the country which an asylum-seeker has left will be suffering from the sort of problems and dislocations with which the overwhelming majority of residents of this country will be wholly unfamiliar. The point is well made in Hathaway on Law of Refugee Status (1991) at page 81:
"In assessing the general human rights information, decision-makers must constantly be on guard to avoid implicitly recharacterizing the nature of the risk based on their own perceptions of reasonability." [29]
16. As highlighted by Neuberger LJ, Lord Brodie in Awala –v- Secretary of State [2005] CSOH 73 said that rejection of a story on grounds of implausibility must be done "on reasonably drawn inferences and not simply on conjecture or speculation"[30]
17. The FTT decision repeatedly applies an “inherent likelihood” test rooted in assumed norms rather than in evidence. Examples include:
a) “If F was a high-ranking Peshmerga with influence and power as claimed I infer that he would have been aware that W2 may wish to cause the Appellant problems” [14]
b) “F must have known the nature of his son and been aware of the cultural obedience his son would be required to give to him. “[14]
c) “I conclude he would not have permitted him to return to the family home where W2 was alone.......to be alone at home with W2 is likely to have been culturally unacceptable “[15]
d) “It is not reasonably likely given the Kurdish culture that he would not show the same deference” [16]
e) “I, therefore, conclude that it is not reasonably likely that F would have taken so different a view to his whole family particularly as in the Muslim faith and law a female’s word does not carry the same evidential weight as that of a male” [18]
18. None of these conclusions are grounded in expert evidence or country guidance. They are precisely the type of “commonsense but culturally uninformed” assumptions HK warns against. Ms Isherwood submits that because the Judge has made reference to the Country Policy and Information Notes Iraq: Blood feuds, Honour crimes and Tribal violence Version 1.0 dated July 2024 [7, 11] he has based his inferences on the wider evidence. I reject this for two reasons. Firstly, because this is not clear as the Judge has not made cited any such evidence. To reach a series of conclusions based on cultural assumptions it is not enough simply to have made reference earlier in a decision to a CPIN. To do so risks falling into the very trap outlined in HK. This is borne out by the fact that as submitted by Ms Cleghorn, the CPIN does not appear to support the conclusions, apart from references to patriarchy.‑sense but culturally uninformed” assumptions HK warns against
19. Secondly the inferences drawn by the Judge and set out above do not appear to be based on findings of fact but on speculation.
20. Ms Cleghorn raises the fact that the Appellant’s historic account was found to be consistent but not his oral account. Whilst reference was made at paragraph 2 of the Grounds this point was not developed before me or in the Permission to appeal. Whilst I make the following observation this is not central to my decision as not fully argued before me. The Appellant was between 15 and 16 at the time of events, and 16 at the time of interview. The FTT noted the Appellant’s youth at [9]–[10] and correctly places no significance on the fact that he was unable to specify dates or provide the same detail as an adult [9].
21. The Judge found that “having carefully compared and contrasted” the Appellant’s evidence “his account was essentially consistent in the core aspects of his claim”. Somewhat oddly he goes on to state that such consistency is not determinative and goes on to reject the credibility of his oral account. The basis of rejecting the Appellant’s credibility is therefore the inferences and speculation outlined above which I have found to be in error. Furthermore, whilst placing no significance on the omissions in the Appellants previous evidence he does not explain why he does not apply the same approach to his oral evidence which risks the appearance of not applying any meaningful adjustment in his credibility reasoning based on the appellant’s age.
22. I turn specifically to the issue of plausibility raised at paragraph 7 and highlighted in the Permission. The FTT’s reasoning appears to substitute a test of what the judge personally considered “likely”, rather than whether the Appellant’s account met the lower standard of a reasonable degree of likelihood, as reiterated in MAH (EGYPT) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216.
Conclusion on Error of Law
23. The FTT’s findings were reached through a process infected by:
• speculation;
• cultural assumptions not founded on cited evidence;
• failure to apply the child sensitive credibility framework;
• improper reliance on inherent improbability.
24. These errors were material. The credibility findings cannot stand.
25. Given the scale of factfinding required, and in line with Begum (remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 00046, I conclude that the appropriate course is remittal.‑finding required, and in line with
26. None of the FTT’s findings are preserved.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law. It is set aside in its entirety.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing de novo, to be conducted by a judge other than Judge Hillis.

V S Rae-Reeves

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

04/02/2026