Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004943
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02650/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

F A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Pullinger, Counsel, Imperium Chambers.
For the Respondent: Mr S Walker, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 30 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant appeals the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT / the Judge’) dated 13th March 2025, in which the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s protection and human rights appeal.

2. I have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. I consider that the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection, are such that an anonymity order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.

Factual background and procedural history

3. The Appellant is a Nigerian citizen, who last entered the UK in May 2021. She claimed asylum in September 2021. The Appellant’s protection and human rights claim was refused by the Respondent on 5th September 2023 and the Appellant appealed that decision to the FtT. Her appeal was heard in her absence, for reasons that I have summarised further below, on 6th March 2025.

4. For the purposes of this appeal, it is not necessary for me to summarise the basis of the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim any further.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal

5. The Judge recorded at [2] of his decision that the Appellant did not attend and was not legally represented at the hearing. He further recorded that no bundle or any other evidence had been submitted for this appeal. At [3], the Judge noted that the Notice of Hearing had been sent to the Appellant's last provided address and “(t)here was therefore no need or point in adjourning this hearing”.

6. The Judge went on to summarise various aspects of the Appellant’s claims and then details of the Respondent’s position in response. The Judge’s findings start at [29], where he noted again that no evidence had been submitted with the claim and that neither the Appellant or anyone on her behalf had attended the hearing. As a consequence of this, the Judge found at [33] that the extensive refusal grounds had simply not been addressed at all and at [35] that the Appellant had not discharged the burden of proof that rested upon her. At [36]-[39], the Judge considered in a bit more detail various aspects of the appeal before him, concluding at [41]-[43] that the Appellant’s protection and human rights claims fell to be dismissed on all grounds.

The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal

7. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal on the basis that there had been procedural unfairness and that the Judge had failed to consider the interests of justice given the nature of the appeal. In particular, in support of her appeal, the Appellant put forward grounds of appeal, settled by her Counsel, and two witness statements, the first from herself and the second from the same Counsel who had settled the grounds. The pleadings and the statements set out the following matters of note:

(a) The Appellant had instructed Counsel to act for her on 10th September 2024;
(b) That whilst a Notice of Hearing had indeed been sent to the Appellant’s e-mail address on 24th November 2024, the Appellant was at the time struggling with the day-to-day care of her children, did not have access to the internet and would only check her emails when she could get an internet connection. As a result of this, she had missed the Notice and only noted this after the date of hearing had passed;
(c) Counsel confirmed that he had also been served with a Notice of Hearing on 24th November 2024 but as a result of an administrative error, this was not linked to the case and allocated to Counsel’s diary;
(d) When realising the error, the representatives made multiple attempts to contact the Tribunal to request that the matter be re-listed and that included correspondence sent on 10th , 13th , 17th, 21st and 27th March 2025, which Counsel pleaded in the grounds of appeal were not acknowledged;
(e) Counsel apologised for the failing on his and his Chambers’ part.

8. In granting permission to appeal, the Upper Tribunal stated as follows (capitals original):

“It is a feature of this case that the appellant did not appear and was not represented before the First-tier Tribunal.
I now have witness statements from the appellant and from counsel who was instructed to appear but who did not appear.
Counsel says at paragraph 6 of that statement: “Due to an administrative error by my Clerk the hearing date was not link to the case and allocated to my diary and was inadvertently missed.”
That is the kind of mistake that should not happen but sometime does.
This case should not go to a hearing without the respondent indicating if she accepts what counsel says or if she wants counsel to give evidence. IF THE RESPONDENT DOES NOT INDICATE WELL BEFORE THE HEARING DATE THAT COUNSEL IS REQUIRED TO GIVE EVIDENCE THE TRIBUNAL MAY ASSUME THAT THE EVIDENCE IS AGREED. If the evidence is agreed it would be helpful to know how the respondent suggests the appeal should be decided.”

9. In response, the Respondent did not file and serve a reply under Rule 24 of the Procedure Rules. Nor did she otherwise indicate, in advance of the hearing, a position in reply to the grant of permission and the express indication made within that decision.

The Appeal hearing

10. At the hearing, Mr Walker was able to inform me at the outset that he had made further enquiries and it appeared to him that there were a number of addresses for the Appellant at the relevant time and that she had asked for assistance with accommodation in early 2025. Mr Walker indicated that this may have also compounded the difficulties that had been relayed by the Appellant herself in her witness statement submitted in support of her appeal to this Tribunal. On my enquiry, Mr Walker also confirmed that the accommodation provided to the Appellant was under the National Asylum Support System (‘NASS’). Mr Walker also confirmed that he had no objections to my admitting the two witness statements submitted in support of the Appellant’s appeal since these went directly to whether or not there had been procedural unfairness as pleaded. I duly admitted these statements pursuant to Rule 15(2A) of the Procedure Rules.

11. Mr Pullinger made brief submissions expanding on the grounds of appeal and apologised again unreservedly for the failings that had taken place in his chambers’ and colleague’s representation of the Appellant at first instance and which had led to the difficulties experienced and this appeal.

12. Mr Pulling did note however that it was usually routine for the FtT to make enquiries of an appellant and/or those on record representing an appellant if there is no attendance on the day of the hearing. This is particularly the case when appeals concern protection claims and when an appellant, or indeed any one party, may be vulnerable. There was no record in the decision, or elsewhere, of any such enquiries being made by the FtT in this matter at first instance. Mr Pulling also submitted that this hearing had been previously adjourned in November 2024 following an application for an adjournment submitted by his Chambers. This meant therefore that the same Chambers would have likely been on record in the FtT as representing the Appellant. In those circumstances, it was unfair of the Judge to have proceeded in the absence of the Appellant and/or unfair of the Judge to have proceeded without making those checks and enquiries.

13. Mr Walker in response reiterated that the Appellant herself had experienced difficulties and he confirmed that he did not contest the matters set out by her and her counsel in their respective statements.

14. Following my consideration of the documents in the appeal and of the parties’ submissions, I was able to indicate at the hearing that I was satisfied that there had been procedural unfairness. I emphasised at the hearing, and do so again, that what led to the Appellant’s absence at the hearing was unsatisfactory but an explanation and an apology were provided as soon as these matters had come to light.

15. Furthermore, I accept that the Appellant was in a vulnerable position, accommodated by the Respondent at the time with little or irregular access to the internet to check her e-mails. With the Appellant seeking international protection and the likely vulnerabilities that this entailed, I do consider that further basic checks should have been made to try and contact her on the day of the hearing following her absence being noted. My view is strengthened by the fact that the Appellant’s representatives would have likely been on record since Mr Pullinger confirmed that an adjournment application, made by them, had been granted prior to the matter proceeding to the hearing in March.

16. Lastly, I also accept Counsel’s information that as soon as his error came to light, he contacted the FtT and at least one of those pieces of correspondence was sent, and would have been received, prior to the decision being issued in the appeal by the FtT and when the Judge was still seized of the matter.

17. From all of the above, I am satisfied that there has been procedurally unfairness. Whilst the non-attendance of both the Appellant and her representatives was not the FtT’s or the Judge’s fault with the FtT having duly served the Notices of Hearing, the lack of enquiries made in particular with those representing the Appellant (likely on the record) led to procedural unfairness.

18. If enquiries were made by the FtT and/or the Judge on the day of the hearing, none of those details are recorded as having been made in the decision. Moreover, there is no assessment in the Judge’s decision of the consideration listed at Rule 28(a) of the FtT Procedure Rules: whether it is in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing. The Judge merely noted that there was “no need or point in adjourning this hearing”. There are no reasons attached to that conclusion other than noting that the Notice of Hearing had been sent.

19. I am also entirely satisfied that the Appellant’s non-attendance at the hearing was not her fault, with her having instructed representatives to act on her behalf and to

20. In light of the above, I am satisfied that as a result of procedural unfairness, the FtT’s decision to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal promulgated on 13th March 2025 shall be set aside, with no findings preserved. For the same reasons arising from the procedural unfairness, it would not be appropriate or just to retain the matter for re-making in the Upper Tribunal and the appeal needs to be remitted to the FtT to be heard afresh, before a different Judge. Both parties in this respect agreed.

Notice of Decision

21. The decision of the FtT dated 13th March 2025 contained material error(s) of law and is set aside.

22. The appeal is remitted to the FtT to be heard afresh, before a different Judge.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19.03.2026