UI-2025-004952 & UI-2025-004953
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004952 & UI-2025-004953
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/57491/2024, LH/01620/2025
HU/57492/2024
LH/01621/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 February 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEACH
Between
VINODBHAI MAGANBHAI PATEL AND JYOTSANABEN VINODBHAI PATEL
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellants
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Turnbull, Counsel instructed by Shah Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 6 February 2026
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants appeal, with permission, against the decision of Judge Iqbal of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 2nd June 2025, dismissing the appellants’ appeals against a decision of the Secretary of State made on 21st June 2024, refusing their human rights applications.
Background to the appeal
2. The appellants are Indian nationals who arrived in the UK on 30th January 2023 with leave to enter as visitors valid until 22nd May 2023. On 18th May 2023, the appellants made a human rights claim.
3. The appellants state that they are unable to return to India because of their long term health problems and that they need the care and support of their children in the UK to meet those long term health needs. The 1st appellant is diagnosed as suffering from a major depressive disorder and alcohol use disorder. The 2nd appellant is diagnosed as suffering from diabetes, hypertension and generalised anxiety disorder.
4. The appellants’ children both live in the UK and the appellants have no children living in India. The appellants submitted that they would face very significant obstacles in reintegrating into India and that there would be unjustifiably harsh consequences if they were refused leave to remain in the UK.
The First-tier Tribunal decision
5. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The judge considered the expert reports and set out the health needs of the appellants [17], [18]. She noted that the 1st appellant had been diagnosed with alcohol use disorder and major depressive disorder [19] and his claim that he had no contact with his siblings in India. The judge also noted that the 1st appellant’s alcohol usage was said to have declined in the UK and that the expert opinion was that it would increase if the appellants were returned to India [20]. The judge found that the expert did not consider whether the treatment received in the UK would be available in India. The judge further noted that the 2nd appellant struggled to cope with chores and shopping as a result of generalised anxiety disorder [21]. The judge outlined the experts’ opinion that there was a real risk of deterioration if the appellants left the UK [22]. She also noted that the addendum report referred to a deterioration in the 1st appellant’s heath which was possibly linked to the Home Office refusal. The appellants had also provided an Independent Social Workers’ report. The judge considered this and found that there was no evidence within the report as to how the appellants’ needs might be met in India and what treatment was available in India [27].
6. The judge found that the appellants had health issues before they came to the UK, that there was no evidence of what treatment they had received in India or what efforts had been made to find treatment in India. The judge further found that the statement that the appellants lived in a village with limited services was not supported by the evidence. The judge found that the 1st appellant had stated that he came to the UK for medical assistance. She further found that his decline was exacerbated by the uncertainty in his status and that there was insufficient evidence to show that the 2nd appellant could not cope with the 1st appellant’s needs. The judge further found that the appellants had the family home in India which could be maintained with the assistance of their children. She found that there was evidence that the appellants had accessed NHS services and that there was no evidence to show that the appellants had private medical insurance in the UK [31].
7. The judge accepted that there would be some distress as a result of the separation of the appellants from their children in the UK but that there was insufficient evidence to show that support was not available in India. She further found that the appellants could remain supported by the appellants from the UK. The judge referred to the CPIN and found that the evidence did not show that care and treatment was not available in India. She found that the 1st appellant required long term care but was not satisfied that this could not be provided by the 2nd appellant or via other sources in India. The judge also considered the cultural expectation that adult children would care for their elderly parents.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. On 26th November 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Grey granted permission to appeal on a renewed application for permission to appeal by the appellants.
The grounds of appeal
9. The appellants put forward two grounds of appeal.
Ground 1
10. The appellants submitted that the judge made a mistake of material fact in finding that the appellants had not stated that they were socially isolated in India before they came to the UK. The appellants referred to the 1st appellant’s witness statement and to the report of Dr Latifi. The grounds submitted that the failure to consider past social isolation meant that the Judge’s assessment of very significant obstacles failed to take proper account of this and the impact on the appellants’ ability to build up a normal range of human relationships.
Ground 2
11. The appellants further submitted that the judge erred in her proportionality assessment because the error in ground 1 infected the assessment of proportionality.
The Rule 24 response
12. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 11th December 2025. The respondent accepted that the judge had erred in finding that there was no evidence of social isolation in India but submitted that this was not a material error. The respondent submitted that the judge had given detailed reason for her findings referencing the isolation issue and noting that there would be some distress as a result of the separation from their children. The respondent further submitted that the judge gave cogent reasons for finding that there was no evidence to show that the appellants could not access support and treatment in India.
The hearing
13. I heard submissions from both parties and indicated at the end of the hearing that I reserved my decision. The submissions are fully set out in the recording of the proceedings.
Error of law decision
14. I bear in mind that an appellate Tribunal should be wary of setting aside a decision by a lower Tribunal. In doing so I apply what was held in in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26]. I further bear in mind what was said in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] and what was held in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 at [72].
15. At the beginning of the hearing, Ms Khan stated that the respondent’s position had altered from the position set out in the Rule 24 notice and that whilst the respondent accepted that there had been an error of fact, she did not accept that it was a material error of fact. Ms Turnbull confirmed that she was not prejudiced by that clarification and was able to proceed with the hearing. I noted that, in fact, the respondent’s position in the Rule 24 response had, in any event, been that the mistake of fact was not material to the decision as a whole.
16. Ms Turnbull, in her submissions, made reference to the 1st appellant’s witness statement as well as to the expert reports which were before the judge. She specifically referred to references to feeling isolated and unable to socialise made by the 1st appellant and recorded in the expert reports.
17. Whilst, in paragraph [33], the judge specifically states ‘…it is not said that either were socially isolated before they left India’, there is also reference throughout the decision to the appellants’ feelings of isolation as a result of the appellant’s children leaving India. For example, at [32], the judge states:
‘It is submitted that the children are the only ones able to provide that assistance given the isolation that the first Appellant in particular, has felt from his children having left India…’
18. The judge has given an extremely detailed and careful decision. She has given due consideration to the expert reports which were before her and has set out their conclusions in detail. She accepts the majority of the expert reports’ analysis but raises concerns over the reports’ failures to consider what treatment and assistance may be available in India and the effect of continued connections to the children in the UK [32]. The judge clearly has in mind the isolation stated by the appellants as she makes specific reference to this in the decision. At [19] she refers to the 1st appellant beginning to feel unhappy and lonely when his children left India, to their being frequent occasions when he became unconscious through drink and when he was unable to leave home and to being unable to socialise. At [28], the judge notes the appellants’ daughter’s statement to the ISW that the appellants would be isolated on return without assistance. At [30], the judge states ‘much was made about the ties of kinship and family and friends and network in the United Kingdom as compared to those available in India.’
19. It was in light of that background, which showed a clear understanding that the 1st appellant, in particular, felt isolated that the judge went on to make her findings regarding the effect on the appellants if they returned to India. To take one sentence where the judge appears to misunderstand the appellants’ feelings of isolation when they were living in India fails to take account of the decision as a whole and in particular to the other occasions within the decision where the judge is clearly aware of and takes account of the appellants’ feelings of isolation in the context of her assessment of whether they would face very significant obstacles in return to India.
20. The judge noted that, notwithstanding the appellants’ health problems, Dr Latifi’s opinion was that if the appellants’ continued to follow the recommended treatment, their prognosis would be satisfactory [22]. She noted that there was a lack of evidence from the appellants to suggest that they were unable to access such treatment in India [27]. That was all in the context not only of treatment to alleviate the symptoms of the appellants but also to address the feelings of isolation which the appellants had felt before leaving India.
21. At [32] the judge expressly considers the argument that it was only the children that could provide the assistance required as a result of the isolation the 1st appellant in particular had felt by his children leaving India. The judge finds that she is satisfied that ‘the Appellants could remain connected and supported by the children from the UK and through visits ensuring they do not feel isolated’. The judge also makes reference to appropriate care facilities being put in place to assist with the appellants’ integration to India [32]. A full reading of the judge’s decision as a whole shows that she has, in fact, properly considered the relevant factors when assessing whether the appellants would face very significant obstacles in reintegrating into India including the submissions that the appellants were isolated in India and had a lack of family and other support.
22. The reference to the appellants not stating that they were socially isolated in India is a mistake of fact but is not a material mistake of fact given the reference throughout the decision to the appellants feeling isolated in India and the Judge’s express findings regarding whether that issue could be alleviated on the appellants’ return to India via treatment and continued connection to their children in the UK.
Ground 2
23. Ground 2 was predicated on Ground 1. If Ground 1 failed, then Ground 2 must also fail as the argument was that the proportionality assessment was adversely affected by the mistake in fact that formed the argument in Ground 1. I have found that the judge expressly considered the isolation arguments as part of her assessment of whether the appellants would face very significant obstacles in reintegrating into India and that this was clearly within her mind when writing what is a careful and detailed decision which properly addressed the evidence which was before her. The judge’s assessment of proportionality was also a detailed and careful assessment taking account of the relevant evidence.
24. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error of law.
Notice of decision
The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error of law.
The decision shall stand.
F Beach
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
18th February 2026