Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004967

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54890/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 14th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAYKIN

Between

D P
[ANONYMITY ORDER MADE]
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Chakmakjian (instructed by JT Solicitors Limited)
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 23 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and his family members are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and his family members. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal brought with permission, by the appellant against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 17 September 2025 in which the appellant’s protection and humanitarian protection appeal was dismissed.

Summary of claim and decision of First-tier Tribunal

2. The appellant is an Albanian national and his claim for protection was on the basis that firstly, he is a gay man and secondly, he has a fear of loan sharks in Albania. The respondent accepted his nationality, sexual identity and his genuine fear of the loan sharks, however the appellant’s claim was rejected on the basis of whether there was a real risk of persecution or serious harm upon return, whether sufficient protection was available and whether the appellant could internally relocate.

3. At the hearing the appellant’s representative conceded there was no freestanding Article 8 ECHR claim (§6 and §29).

4. The First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) found that credibility was “a significant issue” in the case (§13) and proceeded to make negative credibility findings in respect of the appellant’s sexual identity and his fear of loan sharks and ultimately concluded that the appellant was a “wholly uncredible witness” (§14-16). This is of course surprising since the respondent had conceded those matters, and credibility was not an issue the Judge identified as being in contention (§7-8).

5. The Judge then proceeded to conclude by reference to the Country Policy and Information Note: Albania: Sexual orientation and gender identity and expression, dated 7 December 2022 (“the sexuality CPIN”) and BF (Tirana – gay men) Albania [2019] UKUT 93 (IAC) that there was no risk of persecution, as oppose to discrimination, for gay men in Albania (§17-20).

6. In relation to sufficiency of protection, the Judge noted that the appellant had not approached the authorities either in relation to threats from the loans sharks or any issues arising from sexuality (§21). By reference to the sexuality CPIN the Judge noted that whilst there might be some issues with implementation or effectiveness there had been a general improvement for the LGBTI community in Albania (§21-22).

7. The Judge further concluded by reference to the Country Policy and Information Note: Albania: Actors of Protection, dated February 2025 (“the Protection CPIN”), that in relation to the appellant’s fear of harm from loan sharks there would be effective state protection. The Judge found that the appellant had not provided evidence to substantiate that the loan sharks he fears have influence over the state authorities but “even if he had” the Protection CPIN provides strong evidence of practices to combat corruption. Taking the appellant’s claim at its highest the Judge concluded as follows (§23):

“he has only received one threat from the loan sharks and that was in 2022, more than three years have elapsed with no further contact. Accordingly, as the appellant has not raised any issues of persecution, and he accepted that the most he would face be insults and contempt (which does not cross the threshold for persecution), with respect to his sexual orientation and as there is no continuing threat from the alleged criminal actors, in my judgment any consideration of the sufficiency of state protection (which is sufficient on the country evidence) is entirely academic.”

8. In consideration of internal relocation, the Judge concluded that (§25):

“the appellant had not produced any evidence to substantiate the assertion that the loan sharks he fears have influence with the state authorities. Furthermore, notwithstanding the appellants claim that the loan sharks are part of wide ranging and well-connected criminal enterprise, he could not name the organisation to which they allegedly belong. Accordingly, there is no evidence to suggest that the criminal actors who the appellant fears operate on a national level which would therefore make internal relocation a viable option for the appellant.”

9. As for relocation to Tirana, the Judge noted that Tirana is generally considered a safe location for members of the LGBTI community and that the appellant had spent some time with his sister in Tirana before he left Albania. The Judge concluded there were no barriers to the appellant’s internal relocation, and it was not unreasonable for him to do so should he need to (§26-27).

10. The appeal was dismissed on refugee and humanitarian protection grounds.

Grounds of appeal

11. There were two grounds of appeal:
(i) The Judge went behind a credibility concession of the respondent, which tainted the assessment of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation; and
(ii) In considering sufficiency of protection and internal relocation the Judge failed to approach those issues cumulatively on the basis of the appellant’s fears of the loan shark and the vulnerability of being a gay man taken together.

12. I heard submissions from the representatives which are a matter of record.

13. Mr Ojo confirmed that there was no rule 24 response from the respondent but that the appeal was contested. The respondent conceded that Ground 1 identified an error of law in that the Judge should not have gone behind the concession but that it was not material without also being successful on Ground 2, which the respondent contested. The respondent was correct to take that approach in relation to Ground 1. There was a clear concession about the appellant’s sexuality and his subjective genuine fear of loan sharks. It was not open to the Judge in those circumstances to go behind that concession and make adverse credibility findings on his own volition. Therefore, the issue before me was whether Ground 2 identified a material error of law.

14. During his oral submissions, Mr Chakmakjian made an application to amend the grounds of appeal to challenge the Judge’s failure to consider the article 8 ECHR position and whether there were very significant obstacles to integration upon return to Albania. Essentially, the submission was that the Judge was obliged to determine that issue, notwithstanding that the appellant’s representative conceded there was no freestanding human rights claim. He also invited me to consider that it was a Robinson obvious point (as per R v SSHD, Ex parte Robinson [1997] 3 W.L.R. 1162). In answer to my question about the late timing of the application, Mr Chakmakjian explained that he was only instructed a few days ago and that it remained in the interests of justice to allow the application.

15. Having heard from Ojo who opposed the application, I refused the application. There is no good reason for the application being made as late as it was. Indeed, Mr Chakmakjian did not identify the application as being necessary at the outset of his submissions. He only made the application when it was pointed out by the bench that the article 8 claim was conceded in the First-tier Tribunal and was not part of the grounds of appeal upon which permission had been granted. The concession by the appellant’s representatives in the First-tier Tribunal was clear (§6 and §29). In all of those circumstances it is not in the interests of justice to allow the appellant to amend his grounds of appeal because there is no good reason for the timing of the application and the proposed ground is unarguable.

Reasons

16. In my judgment there is no error identified in Ground 2 of the grounds of appeal. Paragraph 23 of the determination is key because the Judge considered the appellant’s case at its highest and so was not impacted by any adverse credibility findings. The grounds proceed on the basis that Tirana might not be safe for the appellant due to his fear of discovery by the loan sharks. Whilst the respondent accepted that the appellant had a genuine a fear of loan sharks, the Judge concluded that fear was not well-founded. Having concluded that the appellant would not be at risk of persecution on account of his sexuality, the judge concluded there was no continuing threat from the loan sharks, taking the appellant’s claim at its highest and so protection was not strictly relevant. Even if protection were required, sufficient protection was available as a gay man and as someone in fear of loan sharks. The Judge plainly did consider both issues together in relation to sufficiency of protection and internal relocation (§24-27).

17. Although Ground 1 was conceded and I agree that it is an error of law for the Judge to have gone behind the respondent’s concession on credibility that is not material to undermining the entire decision. The findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation are sustainable, notwithstanding the errors identified in Ground 1.

Conclusion

18. I find that there are no errors of law identified in Ground 2 of the grounds of appeal.

Notice of Decision

19. The appeal is dismissed.

E Daykin

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 January 2026