The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004968
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59720/2023
LP/07927/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 5th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

A K
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME OFFICE
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Sobowale, Counsel instructed by Schaws Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 11 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

Anonymity
1. I continue the anonymity order made in the First-Tier Tribunal. The appellant is an asylum seeker and disclosure of his identity may put him at risk. I consider that his interests and the public interest in the confidentiality of the asylum process outweigh the public interest in open justice.
Background
2. The appellant appeals, with the permission of the Upper Tribunal, the decision of a judge of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FTTJ”) promulgated on 21 August 2025 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision of 19 October 2023 to refuse his protection claims made on 16 September 2020.
The hearing
3. Ms Simbi told me that the respondent conceded that cumulatively, there were material errors in the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal. The representatives agreed that bearing in mind the errors went to the appellant’s credibility, the appeal should be remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal for rehearing.
Discussion; conclusions
4. I agree with the respondent. Taking the grounds together there were material errors in the FTTJ’s approach to the appellants’ credibility.
5. The FTTJ rejected, on pure plausibility grounds, the appellant’s contention that a case had been filed against him (ground 3). She also found that there was no valid reason the appellant did not claim protection as soon as he arrived in the UK (in 2011) (ground 6). However the FTTJ did not take into consideration that what caused the appellant’s fear was the case brought against him (in 2020) rather than his kidnapping (in 2011). Accordingly the FTTJ did not give adequate reasons for her conclusion that the delay in claiming was very damaging to the appellant’s credibility [38]. The FTTJ also (ground 8) found that it was damaging to the appellant’s claim that his wife did not attend the hearing. However the FTTJ found that the evidence the wife gave about the envelopes did not take the case much further; it is difficult to see what else the appellant’s wife could have added as she and the appellant did not begin their relationship until after the appellant had claimed asylum. The conclusion that the failure of the appellant’s wife to attend damaged his claim is therefore inadequately reasoned.
6. The FTTJ also gave inadequate reasons for placing little weight on the medical evidence (ground 5). It was simply not the appellant’s case that his attackers wanted to end his life. As the grounds aver, the degree of injury was consistent (rather than inconsistent) with the appellant’s case that the attack on him was a message for his peers and a warning not to go to the police.
7. When considering the reliability of the evidence from the appellant’s lawyer in Pakistan, the FTTJ did not address the contention in the appellant’s skeleton argument before her that there was a burden on the respondent to have verified the documents relied upon. It was an issue in the appeal and the FTTJ should have decided it (ground 7).
8. Whilst the FTTJ should have considered the evidence she had that the appellant and the men he claimed were his cousins were related (ground 4) she also made alternative findings. I cannot see how the mistake about hitting with a bat or hitting with a ball (ground 2) is a material difference, and whilst the FTTJ did not make reference to the death of the cousin’s friend, it does not follow that she did not take it into account (ground 1).
9. Nevertheless, taking the errors I have discussed at paragraphs 5 and 6 together they are clearly material, indeed central, to the FTTJ’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility and so even though she made other adverse credibility findings, the decision must be set aside.
10. In addition, the contention that there was a burden on the respondent to verify documents was a material issue which the FTTJ should have decided. I make it quite clear that I am not expressing any view about the underlying merits of the argument as I did not need to hear the representatives on that. I checked with Ms Simbi, and the respondent was not currently proposing to verify the documents, so I note that issue is likely to remain an issue to be dealt with at the new hearing before the First-Tier Tribunal.
11. Given the extent of necessary fact-finding, the appeal will be remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal as the representatives have requested.
Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains material errors of law and is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal (at Birmingham) to be heard by another judge with no findings preserved.
Directions
An Urdu interpreter will be required for the hearing before the First-Tier Tribunal


A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


26 May 2026