Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004974
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/67652/2023
LP/05570/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

MMA
(Anonymity ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mozam of Counsel instructed by Rashid Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties are entitled to apply on notice to vary this direction.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a national of Iraq, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Buckwell (“the Judge”) dated 20 April 2025 dismissing his international protection and human rights claim.
2. The hearing before me is to consider whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If I find that there is a material error of law in the decision, then the decision will have to remade. If I find that there is no material error of law in the Judge’ decision then the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal will stand.
The Grant of Permission to Appeal
3. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal. By way of renewed grounds, Upper Tribunal Judge Khan granted permission to appeal on 4 December 2025. When granting permission the learned Upper Tribunal Judge said:
“Ground 1 asserts that the judge failed to make a finding on the weight attached to Dr Herescu’s report. At [72] the judge states ‘It is my finding that the concerns expressed by the respondent, noting the supplementary review dated 22 July 2025, should be given a degree of weight. Nevertheless, I take account of the medical evidence presented.’ 4. The judge was tasked with resolving whether the medical evidence brought forward met the Article 3 ECHR threshold set out in AM (Zimbabwe) [2018] UKSC 48. The failure of the judge to determine what weight, if any, should have been assigned Dr Herescu’s psychiatric report is arguably a material error of law that undermines the assessment made in respect of the Article 3 ECHR medical issues. Permission is granted. 5. Ground 2 asserts that the judge failed to apply the Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult, and sensitive guidance’ to determine the effects of A’s vulnerability on the evidence. 6. Although the judge agreed to treat the appellant as a ‘Vulnerable Witness’ [10], I consider this ground to be less persuasive as paragraph [15] of the guidance could be interpreted to mean that if the identified vulnerability has not had any effect on assessing the evidence, then nothing needs to be recorded in the decision. That said, vulnerability must be borne in mind as part of a holistic approach to determining credibility. 7. Ground 3 asserts that that the judge erred by failing to give weight to the expert report of Mr Shukur. At [75] the judge stated ‘I have also taken judicial note of the stated country expert report by N Shukur (otherwise Bazyani) dated 15 July 2025. However, the author has not established himself as an expert. He is by profession a journalist. The weight given is accordingly limited.’ 8. It was a matter for the judge to decide whether to treat Mr Shukur as an expert or not. However, rejecting him as an expert on the basis that he is a journalist without more, is arguably an error. However, I consider this ground to be less persuasive because the judge did give limited weight to the report. Therefore, any error is arguably immaterial. 9. Ground 4 asserts that the judge erred by failing to make a finding on the appellant’s attempts to trace his brother. I consider this ground to be less persuasive because there was no requirement for the judge to make such a finding for the purposes of resolving the key issues identified by the parties at [9]. 10. Ground 5 asserts that the judge failed to give reasons explaining how he came to the conclusion that the appellant would have ‘every possibility of locating a relevant relative’ when the CPIN Iraq: Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns, October 202 states that those who return to Iraq without a CSID or INID, cannot obtain one via a family member on arrival. 11. I consider this ground to be less persuasive as the judge does not appear to be saying at [74] that the CNID card can be obtained from a relative, but in a rather more nuanced statement that a relevant relative could assist the appellant with the procedures leading to the issue of a new CNID card.
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
4. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
5. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
The Judge’s Decision
6. The Judge stated in respect of vulnerability as follows at paragraph 10 of his decision:
“10. Ms Atas requested that anonymity should be continued. As is confirmed above and below, that I agreed. In addition, she asked that the appellant should be accepted as a vulnerable witness. Based on my consideration of the evidence in advance of the hearing, I also found that to be appropriate. Ms Shah took due note.
7. The Judge said at the “Findings” section of his decision:
“64. I confirm that every aspect of the evidence submitted has been taken into 10 Appeal No: LP/05570/2024 PA/67652/2023 11 account, including all documentation, whether or not specifically referred to hereafter. It is the task of this specialist and independent Tribunal to determine whether the appellant has an entitlement to succeed on any aspect of his asserted appeal grounds.”
8. The Judge said at paragraph 68 in respect of the expert reports:
“68. I make clear that in my views concerning the overall credibility of the appellant, I have taken careful account of the reports made available to the Tribunal, to which I will return, below. The evidence is considered in the round, taking every aspect into account.”
The Hearing Before Me
9. The Appellant relied on a very large bundle comprising 1289 pages. Mr Mozam went through the grounds of appeal. He submitted that the Judge did not say that the Appellant was not credible. The Judge had said that the Appellant was not at risk but that belief was misplaced. Mr Mozam asked what was the Judge thinking at the final sentences of paragraph 72? I was referred to paragraph 16 at page 1281 of the bundle. Mr Mozam said it would not be assumed that the Reasons for Refusal Letter had been provided. I was referred to paragraph 67 of the Judge’s decision. It was again submitted that the Judge had not made credibility findings against the Appellant. It was submitted that the expert report could be relied upon. Mr Mozam said that one needed to look at the evidence in the round. I was told that the medical records were at page 914 of the bundle. It was submitted that the Judge had “not really” rejected the expert report. It had been given limited weight and not no weight. It was submitted that the Appellant was a vulnerable witness but the Judge had given no weight to the mental health issues and so the Judge had erred.
10. Mr Mozam submitted that Mr Shukur’s expert report was at page 105 of the bundle. Mr Mozam referred me to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re: H (Children) [2026] EWCA Civ 249 and to certain extracts:
“11. An expert witness is a person whose opinion on any relevant matter on which he is qualified to give expert evidence is admissible in civil proceedings: s.3 Civil Evidence Act 1972. The Family Procedure Rules 2010 are no more helpful, providing at 25.2(1) that ‘expert’ means a person who provides expert evidence for use in proceedings. In Hodgkinson and James, Expert Evidence: Law and Practice (5th ed) at 1-025 it is said that the two most important qualities of an expert are the possession of knowledge of the specialism in question, and an ability to use that knowledge by virtue of training and/or experience in that field. The most that has been said judicially by way of definition of expertise is that a witness will be qualified to give expert evidence if they have acquired by study or experience sufficient knowledge of the subject to render their opinion of value in resolving the issues before the court: R. v Bonython (1984) 38 S.A.S.R. 45 (South Australia Supreme Court), which has been followed a number of times in this jurisdiction. By contrast, as was said by Bingham LJ in R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161; [1991] Crim. L.R. 539 a party “cannot fairly be asked to meet evidence of opinion given by a quack, a charlatan or an enthusiastic amateur.” Moving closer to the subject of this appeal, the Guidance from the Family Justice Council and the British Psychological Society (September 2023), entitled ‘Psychologists as Expert Witnesses in the Family Courts in England and Wales: Standards, Competencies and Expectations’ (‘the 2023 FJC/BPS Guidance’) proposes at [2.1] that: “An expert is a person who, through specialist training, study, or experience, is able to provide a court, tribunal, or hearing with relevant scientific, technical, or professional information or opinion, based on skills, expertise, or knowledge, that is likely to be beyond the experience and knowledge of the representing lawyers, judge, jury or panel.” That seems to us to be a satisfactory definition of an expert witness.”
11. Mr Mozam also referred to MOJ and others Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG 2014 UKUT oo442 IAC and to paragraph 23 specifically. He referred me to paragraph 1025 of the bundle and submitted that due to his practical experience, the expert would have an insight into the circumstances to decide whether he was an expert or not. Mr Mozam tole me about the connections to “UK Visa Solutions”.
12. Mr Mozam said that Ground 4 was self explanatory and no made no further submissions in respect of it.
13. In respect of Ground 5, I was referred to the “new guidance of 2026 at paragraph 21(d) which it was said states that the Appellant will not be able to get an identity document if he has had no contact with any of his paternal family members. I was told that the change was that now an application to the Embassy in London, but not previously.
14. Mr Clewley in her submissions said that there was no Rule 24 reply from the Respondent. I shall refer to her submissions as appropriate within my consideration and analysis below.
15. Mr Mozam had said in reply to Ms Clewley’s submissions that page 1014 showed the GP Records dated 26 November 2024. It stated:
“Thoughts of Self-Harm: None. Intent to end life: 0/10 He states that his religion forbids it and he has to look after his brother but his last attempts to end his life were in December 2023 and previous to that January 2023. Protective factors: Brother and religion History (Suicide): He states numerous attempts by taking an over dose of prescribed medication or taking himself to a high building or bridge with the intention to jump off. He also stated that he set his bed on fire inorder to kill himself. He could not give details of when he has done this. He states it has been since living in his flat in Portsmouth. History (Self-Harm): None”
16. Mr Mozam said it was not clear what special measures were sought by the Appellant’s lawyers for the hearing and that the Judge’s findings were tainted by error.
Consideration and Analysis
17. Ground 1 contends that the Judge “failed to make a finding on the weight attached to Dr Hersecu’s report.” The complaint in this ground of appeal is that the Judge failed to carry out an assessment regarding how much weight was to be given to the report and to what the Respondent had said. It is contended that the Judge had not assessed these points when considering the Article 3 matters.
18. In my judgment, as submitted by Ms Clewley, the expressions used by the Judge were perfectly clear. Those expression by the Judge adequately explained why the views reached by the Judge were reached. It was not necessary for the Judge to set out, for example, in percentage terms what weight was given to the evidence. The Judge said that the report was not discounted in its entirety but its weight was limited. That finding was open to the Judge. The Judge had contextualised the evidence but was not dismissing it. The Judge said in clear terms:
“72. The appellant has raised medical issues. The respondent accepted that in principle such issues had been raised at the commencement of the appeal process and therefore no particular consent was required for such issues to be considered. That was an appropriate response, confirmed in the respondent’s supplementary Review. An amount of evidence has been brought forward with respect to medical issues, asserting that returning the appellant to Iraq would constitute a breach of his Article 3 ECHR rights. I take into account the guidance given in AM (Zimbabwe) [2018] UKSC 48. The threshold is high. There is correspondence from Mr S. Nightingale with respect to “Talking Change” and he refers to the appellant having taken overdoses and suffering from depression, anxiety and PTSD. There is the more recent psychiatric report by Dr Herescu, signed on 5 June 2025, which identifies, in terms of suicide, a high risk generally, rising to a very high risk if returned to Iraq. The respondent, with reference to medical evidence, stated that it was unclear if medical representations and reports had been brought forward following circumstances which would have met the guidance, respectively, of the Court of Appeal and of the Upper Tribunal in SS (Sri Lanka) [2012] EWCA Civ 155 and JL China [2013] UKUT 145 (IAC). It is my finding that the concerns expressed by the respondent, noting the supplementary Review dated 22 July 2025, should be given a degree of weight. Nevertheless, I take account of the medical evidence presented.”
19. Therefore, there were adequate reasons for the Judge’s decision in my view. The Judge had considered the evidence in accordance with Mibanga as a tool in assessing the claim. This was the same with the other report which I refer to below.
20. In any event, the threshold for the Appellant to meet in respect of Article 3 had to considered. This has more recently been explained further in the Court of Appeal’s in Secretary of State for the Home Department v OSB [2026] EWCA Civ 647. Bean LJ provided the only reasoned judgment and with which Singh and Baker LJJ said in respect of Article 3 medical cases as follows:
“36. That remained the applicable test until Paposhvili v Belgium [2016] ECHR 1113. At [183] the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR said:-
“The Court considers that the ‘other very exceptional cases’ within the meaning of the judgment in N v The United Kingdom (para 43) which may raise an issue under article 3 should be understood to refer to situations involving the removal of a seriously ill person in which substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he or she, although not at imminent risk of dying, would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy. The Court points out that these situations correspond to a high threshold for the application of article 3 of the Convention in cases concerning the removal of aliens suffering from serious illness.”
37. In AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 [2021] AC 633 (“AM (Zimbabwe)”), the Supreme Court considered what modification needed to be made to the Article 3 test in order to comply with Paposhvili. The court held that, in order for an applicant to succeed on Article 3 ill-health grounds, they must provide evidence demonstrating that:
i) They are seriously ill,
ii) They have provided substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that, if returned to the receiving country,
a) Appropriate treatment would either be absent (i.e., unavailable to anyone) or inaccessible to them in particular; and
b) This absence or lack of access to appropriate treatment would expose them, either,
i) To a serious, rapid, and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering, or
ii) To a significant (i.e., substantial) reduction in life expectancy.
38. AM’s case then returned to the Upper Tribunal, whose decision is reported as AM (Article 3, health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC). The UT reviewed AM (Zimbabwe), Paposhvili, and the Grand Chamber case of Savran and Denmark [2021] ECHR 1025. The UT gave the following guidance at [3]:
“… It is insufficient for P to merely establish that his or her condition will worsen upon removal or that there would be serious and detrimental effects. What is required is “intense suffering”. The nature and extent of the evidence that is necessary will depend on the particular facts of the case …”
21. The Appellant could not meet that test in any event. Even if there was an error of law, which there was not, it was immaterial.
22. Further in any event there was at page 1022 the report which stated that matters were ultimately for the Judge:
“Professional caveat: This report is based solely on one semi-structured clinical interview, review of limited collateral information (principally the verbatim interpreter-assisted transcript supplied to the assessor) and [M]’s own account. It is not a substitute for continuing clinical care. All medical opinions are offered to the best of the assessor’s expertise but should be read in conjunction with the findings of Mohammed’s treating NHS team. Any legal conclusions (e.g. credibility or veracity) ultimately remain for the court or tribunal.
23. Page 937 also said,
“Your Safety You reported that you frequently experience thoughts of ending your life or harming yourself in some way. You told me that your current intent to act on these thoughts are 0/10. You stated that your religion forbids suicide and that you have to look after your brother.
…Risk issues: Client reported struggling with suicidal thoughts but no current intentions or plans to act on these thoughts. No self-harming concerns reported. Client has agreed to follow the safety plan to keep himself safe. No other risk issues reported or identified in session. Next session: 20th June 2023…”
24. Therefore, it is clear to me that the risks were minimal and even as low as “0/10”.
25. Ground 2 relies on the Appellant’s vulnerability. As I have stated above, the Judge had noted the Appellant’s vulnerability. I have set out what the Judge said. The Judge also stated that all evidence had been considered. Mr Mozam was unable to inform me what special measures were sought in any event for the hearing. As the Court of Appeal has made clear, the Senior President’s Guidance is ‘guidance’ and not a rule of law.
26. In the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Khan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ148. Lewis LJ who provided the only reasoned judgment and with whom Yip and May LJJ agreed said:
“37. I am satisfied that the Guidance Note is intended to provide guidance to ensure that parties are able effectively to participate in proceedings and to ensure that their evidence is properly and fairly considered. It is intended to assist the tribunal to deal with a case fairly and justly. The Guidance Note does not impose a set of free-standing legal obligations on a tribunal. The fact that a tribunal has not taken the steps set out in the Guidance Note does not necessarily mean that the tribunal has erred in law, still less that its decision on an appeal is legally flawed. The issue will ultimately be whether the proceedings were procedurally fair so that there was a proper opportunity to give evidence and have that evidence properly and fairly assessed. I reach that conclusion for the following reasons.
…
48. For those reasons, I reject the appellant's submissions that the Guidance Note imposes free-standing legal obligations. A failure to take one of the steps set out in the Guidance Note does not necessarily mean that the First-tier Tribunal has erred in law and does not, of itself, mean that the decision is legally flawed. Rather, the question will be whether the First-tier Tribunal has acted in a way which means that the appeal has not been fairly and justly dealt with or, to put it more simply, whether there has been procedural unfairness which materially affects the decision.
49. There is nothing to suggest on the evidence that there was any procedural unfairness, or any failure to assess the evidence properly. The appellant was represented by leading counsel. He and his wife gave written and oral evidence and he adduced experts' reports. Mr Malik does not suggest that there was any need to make adjustments to the proceedings during the hearing to enable the appellant to participate effectively.”
27. In my judgment, the experienced Judge clearly had the Appellant’s vulnerability in mind and referred to it. There is no basis to conclude that the Judge did not take all of the evidence into account and that the Judge did not take into account the Appellant’s vulnerability when coming to his decisions about the Appellant’s evidence. The caselaw, including OSB shows that there was no material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
28. Ground 3 refers to the journalist’s (Mr Shukur’s) expert report. The Judge did refer to the report at paragraph 75. It was not entirely rejected. The weight to be attached to an expert report is for the Judge. As was stated in AAW (expert evidence weight (Somalia) [2015] UKUT 00673 there was a difference between research and personal experience of journalists. The Judge had given limited weight to the report and he gave reasons why he gave limited weight to the report. I discern no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. The grounds are a mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision. The Judge had to consider the whole of the case and the context. He had done just that.
29. Ground 4 was not vigorously pursued before me which related to the Red Cross, but in any event, it was not listed as one of the issues and there was no need to make findings in respect of Iraq or Turkey. In any event the Judge had adequately engaged with the expert report. This ground is merely an attempt to re argue the case. It made no material difference to the core issues before the Judge.
30. Ground 5 contends that there was a failure to give reasons in respect of the documentation issue. Paragraph 74 of the Judge’s decision has to be read against a background of the Judge not having believed the Appellant’s case. Therefore, it was open to the Judge to conclude that the Appellant could on return to Iraq ask relatives if they could assist him with the procedures on the issue of obtaining relevant documents. The Judge had clearly correctly applied the Country Guidance of “SMO1” (SMO, KSP and IM CG [2019] UKUT 400 (IAC)) and “SMO2”.
31. The Judge had said in adequate terms as follows:
“…Whilst the appellant stated that he had not had contact with any of the large number of relatives resident within the KRG, I find that the appellant, once returned to the KRG, would have every possibility of locating a relevant relative who could assist the appellant in the procedures leading to the issue of a new CNID card.”
32. In my judgment the Judge had thoroughly considered the issues before him and provided adequate and lawful reasons for dismissing the appeal.
Conclusion
33. The Appellant’s appeal is a mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision. The Appellant has sought to reargue his case. That is not permissible. The expertise of the specialist First-tier Tribunal has to be respected.
34. Mr Mozam has said and done all he can on behalf of the Appellant, but I am unable to agree with his submissions.
35. I conclude that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. Accordingly, the Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

NOTICE OF DECISION
There is no material error of law in the decision of the First tier Tribunal.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal stands. The Appellant’s appeal therefore remains dismissed on all grounds.

29 July 2026

Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber