Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004977
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53660/2024
LP/11196/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 20th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY

Between

M.R.
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation
For the Appellant: Ms A. Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr S. Karim, Counsel instructed by Kalam Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 27 January 2026

Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the respondent is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the respondent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. This is an appeal brought by the appellant against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) Judge (“the Judge”) promulgated on 15 September 2025, in which he dismissed the appellant’s appeal on protection grounds.
2. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh. He entered the UK on 3 October 2022 on a student visa and claimed asylum in the United Kingdom on 19 December 2022 on the basis that he was at risk on return due to his support for the BNP. The respondent refused his asylum claim on 29 January 2024.
3. In summary the appellant’s account is that his cousins support the Awami League and have been threatening him and his family since 2019 because of his support for the BNP. He claims that his cousins and the police created false criminal charges against him.
4. In the refusal decision the respondent accepted that the appellant had been a low-level member of the BNP student wing, Chhatra Dal. The respondent did not accept, however, that the appellant had provided a credible account of his experiences in Bangladesh or that he had open criminal cases against him. In relation to the appellant’s claim that his cousins had forced him out of his home and made homeless, the respondent refers to the appellant’s visa application which provides his home address and states that he had lived there for 10 years. His claim that his cousin is the president of the Upazila Jubo League was not supported by external evidence. His claim to have had false charges for petrol bombing, kidnapping, robbery, and GBH brought against him since 2019 was not considered plausible in light of the appellant being granted a visa and leaving Bangladesh on his own passport in October 2022. The respondent considered the appellant’s credibility was damaged pursuant to section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 (credibility) due to his delay in claiming asylum after his arrival in the UK.
5. The refusal decision maintains that the appellant can in any event return to Bangladesh as a low-ranking BNP member because the people he claims to fear are non-state actors who do not have any influence or power over the state or authorities in Bangladesh. In addition, the respondent concluded that the appellant could reasonably relocate within Bangladesh.
6. The refusal decision cites sections from the CPIN current at the time: Country Policy and Information Note Bangladesh: Political parties and affiliation September 2020. However, in July and early August 2024 widespread protests resulted in the resignation of Awami League Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the establishment of an interim government on 8 August 2024 under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, who is not from any political party. The respondent updated her CPIN in December 2024 (Country Policy and Information Note: Bangladesh: Political situation, Version1.0) and relied on the updated CPIN at the hearing in September 2025.
7. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed by the FtT for the reasons set out in a decision promulgated on 15 September 2025.
The Decision of the FtT Judge
8. From [19] of the decision the Judge sets out the basis of the appellant’s account. He records the documents on which the appellant relies to support his claim of politically motivated criminal charges having been brought against him. These documents refer to matters dating from 5 April 2018 to 14 August 2022.
9. At [22] the Judge sets out a summary of relevant matters from the 2024 CPIN including (inter alia) [3.1.1] which states that “Leaders, members, and supporters of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) party and their auxiliary (student and youth) organisations are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from the state” and [3.2.2] which states “Leaders, members, and supporters of political groups are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from non-state and/or rogue state actors. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.”
10. The Judge also refers to [13.3.5] of the CPIN which states “the interim government has replaced several senior and mid-level members of key institutions, particularly in the judiciary, bureaucracy and police… Unjust cases filed against protest leaders in July and August are being dropped; earlier charges against opposition figures are also expected to be withdrawn gradually.”
11. At [23], the Judge noted the recent Court of Appeal decision in MU v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 812 where it was held in the case of a low level member and activist of the BNP that “The truth is that the change of government has wholly changed the picture in such a way that there is no reason whatever to suppose that the respondent will be at risk of serious harm if returned”.
12. At [24] the Judge appears to wholly reject the appellant’s account other than accepting he was a member and supporter of the BNP. The decision states that the appellant had failed to show to a reasonable degree of likelihood that in Bangladesh he was actively involved in the BNP as an opposition party activist with a raised profile, nor that his cousins are members of the Awami League and have any power, authority or influence in Bangladesh.
13. However, at [25] the Judge assessed the risk to the appellant taking his claim its highest and found, in reliance on the 2024 CPIN, that the appellant is unlikely to be of ongoing interest to the authorities. The Judge refers to the fact that there are no representatives from the former ruling Awami League party in the interim government; that many public representatives loyal to the Awami League have been replaced with interim administrators; and that unjust cases are being dropped.
14. The Judge addresses sufficiency of protection and internal relocation at [27] to [29] and concludes that the state would be willing and able to offer sufficient protection to a person who fears a “rogue” state actor or non-state actor, and that, if required, the appellant would be able to reasonably relocate within Bangladesh.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
15. The appellant claims the decision of the FtT is vitiated by material errors of law. Three grounds of appeal are relied upon:
1) The FtT did not make clear findings as to whether there are cases against the appellant and therefore whether the appellant may be arrested and face trial on return.
2) The FtT did not make findings on whether the appellant’s house had been taken over by his cousins/the Awami League and that he had been attacked. The appellant claims that the FtT has erred in (i) failing to engage with these aspects of the appellant’s case, (ii) concluding that there is no adverse interest, and (iii) not applying paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules:
3) The FtT did not adequately engage with matters arising from the 2024 CPIN. Essentially, the appellant asserts that the CPIN suggests there has not been durable or lasting change in respect of the police force in Bangladesh
16. Permission to appeal was granted by the FtT on 23 October 2025. The decision states:
3. Ground one is arguable. The decision records in several places, including at [21] and at [25], that the Appellant’s case included a claim that there are open cases against him. It is arguable that the judge has then failed to make specific findings about this, as well as the impact (if any) that this has on the risk on return until such a time as these cases are resolved.
4. The Appellant will need to establish that this was an actual omission, and that a finding adverse to the Appellant cannot instead be properly inferred from the overall findings, particularly the references to unjust cases being dropped at [25]. It will also need to be established that any omission that is found is material, in light of MU. It is, however, at least arguable that the decision fails to make findings on key matters and that this amounts to an error of law.
5. I am less persuaded by grounds two and three but as these are closely linked to ground one I do not restrict the grant of permission.
Analysis and Decision
17. At the error of law hearing Mr Karim adopted the grounds of appeal. I shall address his submissions in my analysis of the grounds below. Ms Nolan responded to Mr Karim’s submissions. I indicated that I would reserve my decision which I now give. For the reasons set out below, I find that the grounds have no merit and do not demonstrate any material error of law in the making of the FtT decision.
18. I have in mind throughout the need to exercise judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the FtT. It is now well established that the Upper Tribunal is not entitled to find an error of law simply because it does not agree with the decision, or because the Tribunal thinks the decision could be more clearly expressed or another judge could come to a different decision. I remind myself that where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the FtT, the UT should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010 UKSC 49, at [45]; and that the issues that the FtT is deciding and the basis on which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [27].
Ground 1
19. In Mr Karim’s submission the Judge failed to conduct an individualised assessment in relation to the appellant’s claim that he faced extant criminal charges and feared the police in Bangladesh. He submits that although the Judge notes generalised passages in the CPIN relating to criminal cases being dropped, he fails to refer to any specific evidence indicating that the cases against this appellant will be dropped. If the Judge had truly taken the appellant’s case at its highest, as he indicated at [25], he would have accepted that there were extant politically motivated charges against the appellant and that he feared the police as well as the Awami League and his cousins.
20. Although the Judge appears to reject the appellant's account at [24], he provides no express reasons for this finding and there is no engagement with the various credibility issues raised in the refusal decision. At [25], the Judge then states that he takes the appellant’s case at its highest. Given this statement, I must infer that the Judge proceeded to assess the risk to the appellant on the basis that the appellant had criminal charges against him and that his account about his cousins and the police is true.
21. Having stated at [25] that he assesses the risk to the appellant taking the appellant’s case at its highest, the Judge refers to the 2024 CPIN and the fact that unjust cases are being dropped in Bangladesh. The Judge was clearly aware that an aspect of the appellant’s case was that false charges had been brought against him – [21] and [25]. By stating that he was taking the appellant’s case at its highest, he must therefore have been assessing risk to the appellant on the basis that his account was true. There was no requirement for the Judge to make specific findings as to whether there are cases against the appellant in these circumstances.
22. The Judge references [13.3.5] of the CPIN at [22] of the decision and refers at the end of [25] to unjust cases being dropped. Given that the country evidence before the Judge indicated that cases have been dropped and are expected to be withdrawn against “protest leaders” and “opposition figures”, it was undoubtedly open to the Judge to consider that any charges against the appellant, found to be a low level member and supporter of the BNP, would follow the same course. I find that I can readily infer from [25] that this was the Judge’s conclusion on this aspect of the appellant’s claim.
23. The CPIN published in December 2024 is publicly available. It was open to the appellant to adduce evidence to demonstrate that any charges brought against him previously were indeed extant. He did not. The appellant was aware from the refusal decision that the respondent disputed this aspect of his claim, and he and his representatives would have been aware of the change of regime in Bangladesh since August 2024 and the publicly accessible updated CPIN.
24. It was open to the appellant to adduce expert evidence to attempt to counter matters in the updated CPIN and to seek to demonstrate that charges were still being pursued against BNP supporters despite the change in regime, and that he would be prosecuted on return and would face arrest and mistreatment from the police. The only objective evidence adduced by the appellant comprised some newspaper articles dating from August and September 2024, around the time and in the immediate aftermath of the removal of Sheikh Hasina, which pre-date the publication of the CPIN.
25. Although the CPIN indicated that the process of dropping charges would be gradual (where they hadn’t already been dropped), it would be reasonable to expect the appellant to obtain evidence that any charges against him were maintained - despite the change in regime and his claim that these charges were politically motivated and brought when the Awami League were in power. The burden of proof is on the appellant, and he had ample time to obtain any evidence to address this and other matters in the CPIN.
26. I find that the Judge was not required to make a finding about whether the charges against the appellant are genuine and extant because he went on to assess the appellant’s case at its highest from [25] et seq. In doing so, the Judge found that the appellant would not be at risk on return and stated that he made this finding specifically in reliance on the new CPIN, salient parts of which the Judge had set out at [22], and in relation to which the appellant had not adduced any evidence to call into question those parts of the CPIN referenced by the Judge (or indeed any part).
27. If the charges were extant, as claimed, the appellant also failed to adduce any evidence that indicates he would not enjoy a fair process in any prosecution that was maintained after the change in regime.
Ground 2
28. Mr Karim submitted that the appellant’s case had been mischaracterised by the Judge. The appellant’s case was not just that he had been threatened by his cousins but that he had been attacked by them and they had taken possession of his home together with the police. In Mr Karim’s submission the Judge did not take the appellant’s case at its highest and failed to consider paragraph 339K of the Rules in this regard.
29. Although the Judge found at [24] that the appellant had failed to establish to the required standard that his cousins are members of the Awami League, having taken the appellant’s case at its highest from [25] of the decision, one can infer that the Judge had in mind the appellant’s account in this regard when assessing whether he would face risk on return.
30. Further, in the event that the appellant’s cousins would still, as rogue non-state agents, present any sort of risk to the appellant, this scenario would be addressed by the Judge’s (unchallenged) findings at [29] that he could relocate to another part of Bangladesh without being at risk from those he says he fears.
31. In circumstances where there has been a wholesale regime change which is central to the appellant's claim to be at risk, consideration of Rule 339K could not have assisted the appellant in achieving a different outcome in his appeal.
Ground 3
32. The appellant asserts that there has not been durable change in respect of the police force in Bangladesh and that he fears the police who brought charges against him. Mr Karim referred to [4.1.3], [11.2.6], [13.3.3], [13.3.5] and [13.3.6] of the 2024 CPIN in support of his submissions. At [4.1.3] the CPIN refers to law enforcement agencies having been historically aligned with the Awami League as the ruling party, and arrests made of opposition protestors during July and August 2024. Other sections which Mr Karim relies upon refer to the police under the Awami League being politicised; some officials close to the Awami League remaining in place; that senior officers implicated in abuses under Hasina’s regime had been replaced but that “[t]rust in the police remains low and moral is poor, with officers worried about being attacked or charged for their role in the crackdown on protesters under Hasina’s regime”.
33. There is no indication that the Judge was referred to these sections of the CPIN at the hearing. Regardless, I do not find that they undermine the Judge’s conclusion on the appellant’s risk on return to Bangladesh.
34. In relation to Mr Karim’s submissions, with respect, it is difficult to see how the sections of the CPIN assist the appellant. They suggest that changes have been made to the police force since Hasina was removed, and that although trust in the police remains low, there is no indication that police who were in position under the Awami League are acting as they did previously; in fact, the indication is that it is the police officers themselves who are now in fear.
35. Although there is evidence that the police and other law enforcement agencies were previously politicised in favour of the then ruling Awami League, there is no evidence that over a year after the change of regime, that this state of affairs endured and that the police are still acting as “attack dogs” for Sheikh Hasina. The appellant did not adduce any evidence of this despite the claim that his fear of the police is an important aspect of his protection claim. At [4.1.4] of the CPIN it refers to “major reshuffles in the police force, and a removal of those loyal to the AL including forced retirement, reinstating, or transferring of police officials, replacement of those implicated in abuses and the arrest of senior officers”.
36. Even taking the appellant’s case at its highest, it is difficult to see how on the basis of the evidence before the FtT the Judge could have come to any other conclusion. The appellant’s representative at the FtT hearing confirmed that the appellant had no freestanding Article 8 claim. The Judge’s findings on the appellant's asylum claim therefore also address Mr Karim’s submissions regarding very significant obstacles to integration.
37. It follows from what I have said that the decision of the FtT is not vitiated by any material error of law and must consequently stand.
Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law and therefore stands

S. Grey
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 February 2026