Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No:
UI-2025-004978

First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/02164/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

26th June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA

Between

Rusty Jay Lara Tayhopon
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Ó Ceallaigh KC, counsel instructed by Lexwin Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 16 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his deportation appeal following a hearing which took place on 27 May 2025.
Anonymity
2. The First-tier Tribunal did not issue an anonymity order. I consider the principle of open justice and see no reason to make an order, so none is made.
Factual Background
3. The appellant is a national of the Philippines now aged thirty-one. He entered the United Kingdom during 2007 with indefinite leave to enter to join a parent.
4. On 7 July 2023, the appellant was convicted of three specimen counts of offences involving the making of and possession of prohibited images of children and animals. He was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment. The quantity of images involved is set out in the sentencing judge’s remarks
…possession of 879 category A indecent images of children, 407 category B indecent images of children and 840 category C indecent images of children, one prohibited image of a child, and one extreme pornographic image.
5. The appellant was also sentenced to 10 years Sex Offenders Notice requirements and a Sexual Harm Prevention Order of the same duration.
6. In response to the respondent’s decision to deport the applicant being reached, the appellant made representations based on his rights under Article 8 ECHR. That claim was refused by way of a letter dated 30 October 2023. This is the decision under appeal.
7. In refusing the appellant’s human rights claim, the respondent took into consideration the appellant’s submissions which mainly relied upon his relationship with a partner, who is also a Filipino national. The respondent did not accept that the relationship was genuine and subsisting, at the same time noting that she held only limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom and concluding that the appellant’s removal would not have an unduly harsh effect upon her.
8. As for Exception 1, the respondent accepted that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom but had concerns whether he was rehabilitated given his failure, in a letter dated 18 September 2023, to accept that his offending had caused any harm to the victims shown in the images.
9. The Secretary of State did not accept that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration because the appellant had spent his formative years in the Philippines, he was aware of the culture, language and traditions, had a Filipino partner and could use his educational and work skills to gain employment there. The respondent took note of the fact that the appellant had visited the Philippines in 2008 and 2010 without reporting any difficulty. It was considered that the appellant could receive support from his father and that he had three siblings and other extended family members living in the Philippines.
10. In considering whether there were very compelling circumstances, the respondent concluded that the appellant’s circumstances did not outweigh the public interest in seeing him deported.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
11. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the identified issues for resolution were whether the appellant met Exception 1 or whether there were Very Compelling Circumstances over and above the Exceptions. Before the judge, it was accepted by the Secretary of State that the appellant and his wife were in a genuine and subsisting relationship, however the appellant did not seek to rely upon Exception 2 because his partner was neither British nor settled in the United Kingdom.
12. The appellant’s evidence was that he was a victim of abuse and childhood trauma. This matter was raised for the first time at the hearing and was supported by a report from a clinical psychologist. The judge took no issue with the appellant’s account of his life experiences and the circumstances of his offending. Nonetheless, the appeal was dismissed under Exception 1 and Very Compelling Circumstances, with the judge prepared to attach only limited weight to the psychologist’s report..
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
13. The grounds of appeal are helpfully summarised in the application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, as follows:
Ground 1: In dismissing the evidence of the Appellant’s expert on the basis that she had not had access to his GP records, without having given any indication that this was an issue, the FTTJ acted procedurally unfairly;
Ground 2: In failing to give weight to the expert’s diagnosis of the Appellant’s condition on the basis that he had not been treated for any symptoms before his arrest, the FTTJ reached a conclusion that was Wednesbury unreasonable and/or failed to take account of a material factor;
Ground 3: In holding that a psychologist must examine GP records in the manner of a psychiatrist the FTT misapplied HA (Expert Evidence, Mental Health) [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC) and erred in law.
14. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis sought, with the judge granting permission making the following remarks.
I have hesitated before giving permission because the offences are repugnant and the First-tier Tribunal’s Decision and Reasons is clearly neither careless nor conspicuously unfair. Paragraph 31 of the Decision and Reasons may get to core of the case. However, unlike the First-tier Tribunal, I have the benefit of grounds settled by Leading Counsel and they do make out an arguable case that the Judge erred when considering the evidence of a clinical psychologist. I found them less persuasive in their efforts to show that the alleged errors were material but the appellant has lived in the United Kingdom since 2007 and so has about 18 years lawful residence and has a strong and supportive family whose own article 8 rights are important. Further it may be that the best chance of avoiding further offending is for the appellant to remain in the United Kingdom and to benefit from support there and that not repeating the offences is strongly in the public interest. I give permission on all grounds.
15. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 5 January 2026, in which the appeal was opposed, with the following comments being made.
In relation to ground one, the attribution of weight to Dr Tino's report was a matter for the judge. The First tier Tribunal had adjourned an earlier hearing to enable the appellant to obtain the medical report. A's representatives were aware that the judge would have considered the report following the guidance set out in HA, the appellant's representatives ought to have ensure A's GP records were available to Dr Tino. IT was not for the judge to adjourn the hearing further to enable the appellant to correct any perceived deficiencies in the medical report. It was implicit in the judge's finding that Dr Tine did not have the full picture of the appellant's medical history. The judge was entitled to find the weight he could give to Dr Tino's conclusions was diminished.
The second ground of appeal conflates the alleged error in attribution of weight to Dr Tino’s report with the judge’s consideration of the impact of A’s medical condition as a factor in the Article 8 balancing exercise. The FtT reached its conclusion after careful reasoning and examination of all relevant factors. No error of law has been demonstrated.
Ground three appears to be little more than a disagreement with the judge’s evaluation of the evidence.
The error of law hearing
16. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. A 694-page bundle as well as an authorities’ bundle was submitted by the appellant containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
17. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Mr G Ó Ceallaigh referred to an application having been made pursuant to Rule 15(2A) for the appellant to rely on further medical evidence described as relevant both to the application for permission to appeal and any remaking. While no such application appears on the electronic records, Ms Arif raised no objection to the documents being relied upon and I have, accordingly, considered them.
18. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
19. At the end of the hearing, the decision on error of law was reserved.
Discussion
20. In the light of the guidance given by the Court of Appeal, including at paragraph [77] of KM [2021] EWCA Civ 693, judicial restraint should be exercised when examining the reasons given by a First-tier Tribunal Judge for their decision and that it should not be assumed too readily that the Judge misdirected themselves. In this case [77(2)] is pertinent in that a court or tribunal should be slow to characterise as an error of law what is no more than a disagreement with the assessment of the facts.
Ground one
21. The first ground raises an issue of procedural unfairness in that it is argued that the judge dismissed the medical evidence because the psychologist had not had access to the appellant’s GP records. The grounds rightly state that the appellant’s mental health was the critical element of the appellant’s case. The evidence disclosed at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal was that the clinical psychologist, Dr Anna Maria Tino, had diagnosed the appellant with Complex PTSD, Major Depressive Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder. There appears to have been no challenge to that evidence on behalf of the respondent, and it is said that the judge raised no concerns about the report at the hearing.
22. The post-hearing material now relied upon relates to the evidence that it is said could have been produced had the judge ventilated his concerns at the hearing. That evidence consists of the appellant’s medical records which have now been submitted to Dr Tino as well as an addendum report dated 9 March 2026. The medical records include references to the appellant experiencing mental health issues, from January 2025 onwards, as well as records of what he told the GP about his early life which accords with what he said at his hearing.
23. At [31], the judge records that the ‘key argument’ on the appellant’s behalf in relation to his mental health, was that the ‘care and treatment’ which he is receiving in the United Kingdom to help him recover and the ‘vital support provided by his wife and father’ were key to his full recovery. It was accepted that the appellant may be able to access healthcare services in the Philippines [31].
24. At [47] the judge found that if the appellant required the support of his wife and father, that his wife would return with him and therefore the support currently provided can continue. Also, at [47], the judge further noted that the appellant did not live with his father in the United Kingdom and used modern means of communication to keep in contact, which could continue if the appellant was returned to the Philippines. These findings put into perspective what is contended in the first ground. The short answer is that if the judge was wrong to raise criticisms of the report post-hearing, any error is far from material.
25. The judge made no error in noting what was an obvious omission from the documents considered by Dr Tino. Any competent representative would have realised that Dr Tino had not seen the GP records. Indeed at 1.05 of her report, she clearly states that she has only considered the parties’ respective bundles and the Tribunal’s Practice Direction.
26. The instructions sent by Lexwin Solicitors request a ‘psychiatric and psychological’ evaluation to confirm whether he suffered from any mental health conditions. Had this case been competently prepared, the Solicitors would have been aware that the appellant reported anxiety and depression to his GP in January 2025, that he had been referred for therapy and treated with sertraline.
27. Both counsel at the hearing and Lexwin Solicitors would have been aware of the importance of providing Dr Tino with GP records owing to this Tribunal’s decision in HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC), as set out below.
(5) Accordingly, as a general matter, GP records are likely to be regarded by the Tribunal as directly relevant to the assessment of the individual’s mental health and should be engaged with by the expert in their report.
28. It was open to counsel for the appellant to make submissions to the First-tier Tribunal in relation to the absence of the GP records and HA. Contrary to what is suggested in these grounds, this is precisely what counsel did.
29. The following extract from [40] establishes that counsel was cognisant of the point and put forward detailed argument.
In his closing submissions, Mr Halim sought to make the argument that whilst the appellant’s mental health issues were severe and long term because they arose from significant childhood trauma, he had first revealed this abuse to his solicitor in late 2024. Prior to his solicitor finding out he had not disclosed this trauma to anyone. He therefore made the argument that this meant that there would not be any prior record of that trauma and any related symptoms in his medical records until he was recently examined by Dr Tino and she made a formal mental health diagnosis and linked it to his underlying trauma following her assessment. Having possession of the medical records would not have assisted Dr Tino as the appellant was very clear in his evidence that he only recently opened up about his childhood sexual abuse.
30. The claims made in the first ground are, therefore, wholly misconceived. There was no procedural unfairness given that the point relating to the absence of medical records had been discussed at the hearing and submissions were made directly addressing the matter.
Ground two
31. This ground is parasitic on the first, in that it is argued that the judge’s failure to place weight on Dr Tino’s report was Wednesbury unreasonable and that there had been a failure to consider material evidence. It is necessary to emphasise at this point that the judge did not accord no weight to Dr Tino’s report but ‘reduced’ weight [45].
32. At this juncture, it is helpful to set out more of the judge’s observations at [45].
At the hearing, the evidence of the appellant and his witnesses presented the appellant as someone who is mentally and emotionally fragile, that this mental and emotional fragility is because of the childhood trauma that has severely impacted him into his adulthood, that in order to help him in his recovery he needs the assistance of his wife (who lives with him) and to a lesser degree his father. However, when one takes a step back, this particular strand of the appellant’s case resting on required support from a wife to assist him in his mental fragility arising out of long-term and severe trauma he suffered as a child does not sit neatly with other aspects of his evidence. The appellant came to this country and was able to succeed in his studies, obtain a degree and find employment. He did all this without the support of his wife and without any active support from his father (who was completely ignorant about his childhood trauma). At the time of his arrest he was a single man, working long and difficult hours as a nurse during the Covid-19 pandemic. To put it another way, up until this late disclosure of childhood trauma which led to an adjournment for Dr Tino’s report to be prepared, there is nothing on the evidence before me to suggest that he ever needed the type of family support or assistance that he gets from his wife and which it is now being claimed is so vital to his everyday functioning and recovery. Dr Tino’s recommendations about the vital support he needs from his UK-based family does not rest neatly with all of the evidence that is before me. That evidence paints a picture of someone who, despite having suffered from childhood sexual abuse, was able to function without the specific support of his father (who was unaware of what his child had gone through) and his wife, who was not even present in his life until after his arrest. So at odds is the picture painted by Dr Tino of the fragility in the appellant’s mental health with the rest of the evidence that is before me, that it was for this reason that I sought to clarify with Mr Halim whether the appellant was arguing that there had been some recent material deterioration in his mental health (he answered in the negative).
33. The extract from [45] amply demonstrates that it was not just the absence of GP records which led to the judge reducing the weight to be accorded to Dr Tino’s conclusions.
34. In view of my findings, in relation to ground one, that the judge made no material error in reducing the weight placed on Dr Tino’s conclusions, this ground lacks all substance. The late production of the GP records post-hearing as well as an addendum report does not change the position given that the judge cannot be criticised for not considering evidence which was never adduced. Any failure here is solely down to Lexwin Solicitors.
35. Contrary to what is suggested in the grounds, the judge did take account of earlier indications that the appellant may have suffered mental ill-health. At [43] the judge engages with the presentence report which he acknowledges does mention the existence of mental health problems. In the same passage, the judge notes the appellant’s evidence that he had spoken to his GP and received counselling from the CMHT. At [44], the judge makes a similar observation in relation to the OASys report.
36. It cannot be said that there was any failure by the judge to engage with any aspect of the evidence adduced on the appellant’s behalf. The comments made in the grounds amount to little more than disagreement with the judge’s assessment of the medical evidence.

Ground three
37. It is argued that the judge was wrong to find that a psychologist should be required to examine GP records. This ground is also based on the misapprehension that there had been procedural unfairness in the judge not raising concerns as to the absence of GP records. As indicated above, counsel dealt ably with the point in his closing submissions. In doing so, counsel did not seek to make the point being made now. It is not helpful to raise an argument which was never made at the hearing in the grounds of appeal. I find that this point does not take the appellant’s case any further.
Conclusion
38. The First-tier Tribunal Judge produced a lengthy (21 pages) detailed determination in this case. In his careful assessment, there was no error of approach, and his findings were supported by sustainable reasons. No errors of law have been identified.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 June 2026

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS

1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:

2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.

6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email