Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004988
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/59249/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

KA
(Anonymity ORDER Continued)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The Appellant appeared as a Litigant In Person
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties are entitled to apply on notice to vary this direction.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a national of Bangladesh (his wife and children are dependents on his claim), appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Rothwell (“the Judge”) dated 11 September 2025 dismissing his international protection and human rights claim.
2. The hearing before is to consider whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If I find that there is a material error of law in the decision, then the Judge’s decision will have to remade. If I find that there is no material error of law in the Judge’ decision then the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal will stand.
The Grant of Permission to Appeal
3. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Haria. When granting permission the learned judge said:
“The application asserts the Judge erred in law as set out in the six grounds.
3. There is no merit to ground one, the Judge correctly sets out the standard of proof at [ 17-18]. The Judge refers at [23],[28] [34],[36] and thereafter considers the risk on return on the lower standard.
4. It is arguable, the Judge may have erred as asserted in grounds 3 to 6. While there is less merit in the other grounds, I do not consider it appropriate to limit the grant of permission.”
The Hearing Before Me
4. Because the Appellant is a litigant in person, I heard from Clewley first so that she would outline the Respondent’s reasons for resisting the appeal.
5. Ms Clewley referred to the Rule 24 Response. That is dated 29 October 2025 and states:
“The submissions made under Ground 1 of the appeal are a stretch. There is nothing wrong with the FTTJ’s self-direction to the guidance from JCK at [17], and the submissions refer to nothing in the judgment to establish a misapplication of the required approach.
4. It is also unclear why complaint is raised against the FTTJ making findings in relation to recent country developments. This was inevitably going to happen in a protection appeal made against former state actors in Bangladesh, and both parties made representations on this point during the FtT proceedings.
5. In respect of Ground 2, the FTTJ was aware of points such as the appellant’s BNP profile and the 2018 case, and the respondent does not consider the appellant to Page 1 of 3 7 have properly understood the substance of the FTTJ’s reasoning. It is not said that the circumstances behind the two “post-change killings” of opposition activists align with those of the appellant, nor is it asserted that the appellant was at risk of intra-party violence or disciplinary action from the BNP amounting to persecution. This cannot follow because it is unchallenged from [50] that the appellant is “part of and well connected to the BNP”, and they “are aware of false cases lodged against members of the BNP and its associated organisations”.
6. The appellant seems to be of the misconceived view that the FTTJ has only relied on improvements and aggregate acquittal rates to dispel the question of risk. The 72% acquittal rate from 22,000 cases (at [52]) needs to be taken with other findings, such as the appellant being well-connected to the BNP and a person of standing in Bangladesh, having an advocate acting on his behalf, and his admission at [50] that he is able to “easily prove that he was not involved in the events in 2018 that led to case against him for damage to trees and the Tea Garden, as he has an alibi that he was somewhere else”. Importantly, the FTTJ found at [53] that the issue could be resolved through contact with his advocate during his preparations for return, and this is unchallenged.
7. Ground 3 is problematic because the appellant does not seek to challenge the conclusion at [56] that “there is no evidence that the interim Government are targeting members of the BNP for their sur place activities". Even if the appellant had produced social media evidence through downloaded print outs, it would be of no consequence in the absence of an answer to that question. Furthermore, there is no place for the appellant to accuse the FTTJ to have used XX (PJAK) to mandate a “wholesale rejection”. The FTTJ specifically said at [54] “I place no weight upon this evidence for the reasons set out below”, which would include not only the guidance, but also the findings at [56]. 8. The submissions in paragraph 3 of Ground 3 make no sense because the respondent put the absence of downloaded print outs in issue at paragraphs 11-12 of the review dated 11 January 2015, so there cannot possibly be procedural unfairness.
9. Ground 4 goes too far in suggesting a misdirection with the FTTJ’s Article 8 assessment. The appellant’s complaint seeks a proportionality outcome, but he already has what he seeks, as the FTTJ turned to proportionality at [71] onwards. Those considerations are unchallenged, and the appellant clearly had a tenuous private life claim which was incapable of outweighing the public interest in effective immigration control.
10. Ground 5 is very troubling because even on appeal the appellant is unable to identify what medical evidence is significant towards the best interests of the child. The appellant provided two skeleton arguments dated 3 December 2024 and 21 August Page 2 of 3 8 2025, and the submissions on Article 8 are very thin in both. The first made a blanket assertion at paragraph 9 that the younger child suffers from severe medical conditions without any elaboration, and the appellant abandoned the point completely in the second, as paragraph 23 contains no representations besides a generic submission on very significant obstacles and private life. There is nothing wrong with the assessment at [63]-[68] and the appellant plainly failed to abide with the direction in Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) ]2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC).
11. Finally, in respect of Ground 6, the respondent repeats the submissions made above at paragraph 6 of this response. It is not the case that the conclusion of no risk of serious harm was just due to changed political context and acquittal metrics. This ground effectively reiterates what is said in Ground 2, and the submissions made at paragraph 2 of this ground of appeal could only potentially have force if the FTTJ had found that the appellant would be subjected to pre-trial detention, or dangerous investigative practices or reprisals. There is clear sense to the conclusion that the case would be resolved due to the various factors, and the respondent would again emphasise the FTTJ’s unchallenged conclusion at [53]. 12. The FTTJ’s assessment reflects a very careful and nuanced analysis of the appellant’s circumstances, and the respondent does not consider the grounds to disclose any material errors. 13. The UT is asked to dismiss the appeal.”
6. Ms Clewley submitted at the hearing before me that the Grounds 1 and 2 had no merit, if permission was granted in respect of them. She said that the thrust of Ground 3 was materiality. It was submitted that this Ground had to fail in view of the Judge’s findings at paragraph 56. Nor was there any evidence of the interim government targeting persons. In respect of Ground 4 it was submitted there had been a proportionality assessment. She submitted that the decision was in accordance with the law. Ms Clewely submitted that Ground 5 there was a correct self direction at paragraph 64 and the key issues could be seen at paragraph 65 of the decision. She said that the parents had not referred to medical evidence of the child to the Secretary of State. It was said that the late documents were recorded in the Judge’s decision at paragraph 15 of her decision. Finally, in respect of Ground 6, I was referred to the Rule 24 response and that in any event the Judge’s conclusions at paragraph 53 were unchallenged.
7. The Appellant through a Sylheti interpreter then made oral submissions. He referred to his document folder in which he had documents, including the 6 Grounds of Appeal. He had previously been represented and those documents had been prepared for him by lawyers.
8. The Appellant said that the first mistake by the Judge was that she had mixed up the children’s names. He said his eldest child had autism. He said that the document provided previously in respect of his claim had not been translated correctly. There was an arrest warrant charge sheet but the years 7 penalty was mistakenly mentioned. He said another case was not mentioned. He referred to a court order. He said it was a cyber security case. He said though that this was a mistake and “which was not properly mentioned in this.”. He said he had been instructed to answer in a structure and he could not answer in one line. He said there was a district order against him. He said that the district commissioner “had put me in a condition to answer yes or no”. He said that it was “within limitation of one sentence and why it was not submitted”. He said he had been attacked twice and a cocktail had exploded in his car. He said the one sentence did not explain all of the things.
9. I asked the Appellant what else he wanted to say. He said “because of all of these things”, his family members had become segregated and unable to get financial support. He said he was mentally depressed. He said he was still having medical treatment. He said he was not physically fit like he used to be and was not physically well.
10. I asked the Appellant what else he wanted to say. He said his older child had autism and was waiting for assessment and treatment. He said his wife was 2 months pregnant. He mentioned work of 20 hours per week. He said the position in Bangladesh was not stable and if he was t go back there was no safe haven for him. He said whatever property he had in Bangladesh had been seized by court order with possession and an injunction.
11. I had reserved my decision.
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
12. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:

‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
13. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
Consideration and Analysis
14. The Presidential Panel made clear in Lata (FtT: Principal Controversial Issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC):
“3. The reformed appeal procedures are specifically designed to ensure that the parties identify the issues, and they are comprehensively addressed before the First-tier Tribunal, not that proceedings before the IAC are some form of rolling reconsideration by either party of its position.
4. It is a misconception that it is sufficient for a party to be silent upon, or not make an express consideration as to, an issue for a burden to then be placed upon a judge to consider all potential issues that may favourably arise, even if not expressly relied upon. The reformed appeal procedures that now operate in the First-tier Tribunal have been established to ensure that a judge is not required to trawl though the papers to identify what issues are to be addressed. The task of a judge is to deal with the issues that the parties have identified.”
15. The Tribunal is not obliged to consider potential points which have not been referred to by the parties and which have not previously been identified. That is so even when one or more of the parties is a litigant in person, albeit some account is taken of the party’s unrepresented status. Whilst there are cases in which Robinson obvious points may be considered by the Tribunal, this case comes nowhere near me even coming close to seen any ‘missed’ points being ‘obvious’.
16. Ground 1 contends that the Judge misdirected herself in respect of the standard proof, but it is clear at paragraphs 17 and 18 that the Judge referred to the burden and standard of proof and then applied it correctly throughout her decision. It is not entirely clear if the FTT judge had granted permission on this ground in any event.
17. The Judge had said as follows which is faultless:
“7. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28/06/2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine thelowing matters on the balance of probabilities: a) Taking the appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a convention reason? b) Does the appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?
18. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that: (c) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason. (d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and (e) The appellant could not internally relocate.”
18. Ground 2 contends that that there was a failure to conduct anxious scrutiny and to engage with the matter before her. There is no merit to this ground, even if permission had actually been granted by the FTT judge. The Judge’s findings at paragraphs 50 and 52 make it clear that she had properly considered the acquittal rates and the connections of persons to the BNP. There is no error that I can detect in Judge’s decision The Judge had said,
“50. It is reasonably likely that the appellant could be apprehended on return because of the arrest warrant, but I do not find that he would suffer serious harm. I have found above that he is part of and well connected to the BNP, who are part of the interim Government, who are aware of false cases lodged against members of the BNP and its associated organisations. The appellant states that he could easily prove that he was not involved in the events in 2018 that led to case against him for damage to trees and the Tea Garden, as he has an alibi that he was somewhere else.
51. The appellant said that he completed a law degree in Bangladesh, and he was working as an apprentice lawyer in the Dhaka and Sylhet Judge Court, so he is person of standing in Bangladesh. As stated above he has an advocate acting on his behalf who could act for him, relating to the events of 2018 and the Cyber Act allegations because of the caricatures of the ex-Prime Minister and ex-Transport minister.
52. I have set out above that the police force and Judiciary are no longer connected to the AL. The EUAA report dated August 2025 refers to the thousands of criminal complaints lodged against BNP activists and under the interim Government 22,000 cases had been resolved by September 2024 with a 72% acquittal rate.”
19. Ground 3 contends that there was unlawful treatment of the sur place aspect of the evidence and procedural unfairness. As the Respondent’s Rule 24 response explains, the Appellant has not challenged paragraph 56 of the Judge’s decision that there was no evidence that the interim government was targeting members of the BNP for their sur place activities. This is really the end of this ground. It is a hopeless ground. I am unable to discern any procedural unfairness whatsoever.
20. Ground 4 contends that there was a misdirection in respect of the Article 8 ECHR claim. There is no error because the Judge unarguably correctly dealt with Article 8 ECHR. This included at paragraphs 61 to 75. The Judge said at paragraph 71:
“I have to considered s117B when considering proportionality. I consider the appellants immigration history and although he and his family had leave to enter 15 30 Appeal Number: PA/59249/2024 as students, he stopped studying in July 2022 because he was unable to pay his fees.”
21. Ground 5 contends that there were inadequate reasons/a failure to engage with the children’s best interests the medical evidence. This remains a mystery, even now before me. Whilst I sympathise in respect of the autism diagnosis, this case comes nowhere being able to show a material error of law. In any event, I have referred above to the decision in Lata. It was for the Appellant and his lawyers to set out the issues in the case for the Judge to deal with them.
22. Ground 6 contends that there was inconsistent reasoning in respect of sufficiency of protection. This ground overlaps with Ground 2. The Judge did not consider that there would be any pre-trial detention on the Appellant’s return to Bangladesh. The Ground has not merit. The Judge had said:
“I do not find that the appellant will be at risk on return to Bangladesh. The current interim government includes members of the BNP, and I note that the CPIN: December 2024 confirms that there have been major reshuffles in the police force, and those loyal to the AL have been forcibly removed, and replacement of those implicated in abuses and arrests of senior officers. The Supreme Court chief justice has been replaced, and three hundred lower court judges have been transferred. There is no longer the level of politicisation and pressure within the judiciary that there have been previously. Hundreds of senior officials and AL leaders under the under the former government have been arrested and remanded in custody.”
23. In view of the change of government in Bangladesh the Judge unarguably correctly dealt with the background material and the assessment of the Appellant’s case with that in mind. The Judge had made some favourable findings, some adverse findings and considered the totality of the findings against the background material and case law. The Judge dealt extensively and unarguably lawfully with the Human Rights aspect of the claim, including in respect of the best interests of the children.
24. The fact that the Appellant’s wife is now some 2 months pregnant (more since the hearing), is not a matter that is capable of showing an arguable error of law in the Judge’s decision in any event.
25. The Appellant’s appeal is a mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision. The Appellant has also sought to reargue his case, in some parts impermissibly with new evidence. Nor is it permissible when assessing whether there is an error of law to take into account ‘new’ medical evidence either. The Appellant is said to have some legal qualifications (or at least a law degree). He presented his case well before me, but his case has no merit.
26. I conclude that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. Accordingly, the Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

NOTICE OF DECISION
There is no material error of law in the decision of the First tier Tribunal.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s (and his dependants) appeal stands. The Appellant’s appeal therefore remains dismissed on all grounds.
10 July 2026
Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber