Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004998

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/54315/2024
LH/04186/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SKINNER

Between

IQBAL HOSSAIN
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S. Khondoker, solicitor, instructed by Lawmatic Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E. Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal from the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Buckwell dated 18 September 2025 whereby he dismissed the appellant’s appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds. Permission to appeal was granted on two grounds (of four), in summary that the Judge (i) erred in law in respect of his assessment of the best interests of the appellant’s children and (ii) failed adequately to consider the appellant’s partner’s pending asylum appeal.

2. At the hearing I heard submissions from Mr Khondoker for the appellant and Mr Terrell for the respondent. I also had the benefit of a skeleton argument from Mr Khondoker. I am grateful to both representatives for their helpful submissions.

3. At the end of the hearing I announced that the appeal would be dismissed with reasons to follow in writing. These are those reasons.

4. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He has an appalling immigration history. He came to the UK in 2006 on an SBS work permit valid for 1 year. The FTT found in a finding which is unchallenged that the appellant had no intention to work in the UK pursuant to the visa which he had been granted which he obtained purely for the purpose of entering the country. Since the expiry of his visa in 2007, the appellant has remained here illegally. Despite the length of time that the appellant has been in the UK, the FTT also found (in further unchallenged findings) that he had not developed a knowledge of the English language or any ability to fund himself on a long-term basis.

5. The Judge found that there were no very significant obstacles to the appellant’s re-integration in Bangladesh. There is no challenge to that conclusion.

6. Further, there was no dispute before the Judge that the appellant married, under a religious ceremony, a Bangladeshi national in 2022, who entered the UK as a student in 2023. They have two children, born in 2024 and 2025 respectively.

7. The Judge’s findings in respect of the appellant’s children and the partner’s asylum appeal are contained in paras.57-61 of his decision. At para 57, the Judge found that Article 8 was engaged given the length of time in the country. He then noted that “His parter has an outstanding protection appeal but as at the date of the hearing of this appeal I am satisfied that she does not hold substantive immigration leave.”

8. At para.58, the Judge summarised the law in respect of the approach that must be taken to the best interests of the children. The Judge noted that he had “subsumed the duty within my considerations”.

9. At para.59, the Judge addressed the appellant’s claims in relation to the availability of medical care, the fact that the appellant grew up in Bangladesh and would be able to re-integrate, including by finding work. He noted, “The fact that he would be separated from his partner and two children would not be a basis for finding that there will be very significant obstacles as to re-integration on return.”

10. At para 60, the Judge turned to Article 8 outside the Immigration Rules and concluded that the appellant’s removal would not be disproportionate. He gave “considerable weight to the public interest in ensuring that the provisions of the Immigration Rules are met, in that the maintenance of an effective system of immigration control is itself to be given significant weight.” There is no challenge to the weight given to the public interest. This paragraph concludes, “Any factors favouring the appellant in this assessment are outweighed by the public interest in maintaining immigration control.”

11. Finally, at para.61, the Judge stated that “On departing the United Kingdom the partner of the appellant would remain in this country, at least until her own appeal process is concluded. Consequently it would [be] in the best interests of both children, in such circumstances, if they remain with their mother. However the appellant may be returned to Bangladesh.”

12. The first ground of appeal in respect of which permission has been granted is that the assessment of the best interests of the children was inadequate and fails to comply with the requirement of ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 4. In particular, the appellant submits that (a) the Judge failed to identify with adequate reasons what the children’s best interests actually are on the facts, (b) failed to assess the children’s welfare by reference to the family unit as a whole and (c) failed to grapple with the effect of forced separation from the father. There are two answers to this:

a. First, I do not accept that the Judge erred in this regard. The Judge did state that the children’s best interests were to remain with their mother, in the UK while her appeal is proceeding: see para.61. Further, the Judge’s explanation was, in my judgment, sufficient, in light of the way the case was put before him. In his skeleton argument, the high point of the appellant’s case on his children was that “the appellant has been living in the UK with his partner and child happily for a few years, and his partner could not return to Bangladesh due to her life risk threat. Therefore, it is submitted that the appellant has established private and family life in the UK and forced him to return to Bangladesh, which definitely breaches Article 8 of the ECHR.” There is nothing in the skeleton argument about what the effect of forced separation would be. In those circumstances, it is difficult to understand what “grappling” the Judge could have reasonably been expected to undertake in relation to the effects of forced separation.

b. Second, and even if I am wrong about the lack of error in the Judge’s approach, any such error is not in my judgment material. I asked Mr Khondoker what the high point of the evidence was in relation to the best interests of the children and I was taken to family photographs, which show the sort of family photographs one would expect of a family with young children. They are not rationally capable of showing that there would be any particular effect of enforced separation or indeed any other form of harm. At best they are evidence that there is family life between the appellant and the eldest child (which was not in issue). I was also taken to the appellant’s and his partner’s witness statements. The appellant’s statement addresses his relationship with his first child. It simply states “Since birth, our child have developed very strong emotional bond with me. My wife love and continuous care for the child and me made us inseparable.” Likewise, the partner’s statement states, “Since birth, our child has developed a very strong emotional bond with me. My partner’s love and continuous care for the child and me made us inseparable.” This is little more than bare assertion. For completeness, I also note that, as recorded at para.26 of the Judge’s decision, the appellant’s response when asked in cross-examination whether his relationship with his partner would continue if he had to return to Bangladesh was ask how he could leave the children behind in this country, adding that his wife and children would not go to Bangladesh because she had certain family problems. In my judgment, this evidence of the appellant’s relationship with his young children comes nowhere near being capable on any rational view of outweighing the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration control in light of the appellant’s immigration history and the other unchallenged factors identified by the Judge. No rationally directed tribunal could on the basis of the evidence have concluded that the best interests of the appellant’s children meant that removal was disproportionate.

13. The second ground on which permission was granted was that the Judge failed to consider the appellant’s partner’s pending asylum appeal. The Judge however plainly did do so. It is expressly referred to. Mr Khondoker suggested that there was no engagement by the Judge with what the different outcomes of the partner’s appeal process could be and what effect that would have on the family’s situation. It is however well established that a Judge in a human rights appeal must assess the proportionality of removal as at the date of the hearing of the appeal. At the date of the hearing, the situation was that the appellant’s partner’s appeal was pending. The Judge proceeded on the basis that the children would remain with her in the UK, at least while that process continued. In my judgment that displays no error of law. The Judge was not required to engage in speculation as to what the future might hold. The Judge did not in my judgment err in assessing the proportionality of the interference with the appellant’s family life rights on the basis as they stood before him.

14. In those circumstances, this appeal must be dismissed.

Notice of Decision

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Buckwell dated 18 September 2025 did not involve the making of an error of law. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed and the dismissal of his underlying appeal shall stand.

Paul Skinner

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 January 2026