Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004999

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/6527/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COTTON

Between

KHK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Vokes, counsel instructed by AB Legal Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a national of Iraq, who arrived in the UK on 16 December 2021, travelling via Turkey Italy and France. On 19 December 2021 he applied for asylum. On 13 December 2023 the appellant’s application was rejected by the respondent, leading to an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) which was dismissed in a decision dated 21 July 2025.

2. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal and permission to appeal was granted on 16 October 2025, restricted to the basis that it was arguable that the article 8 assessment in the FtT determination was inadequate.

In the Upper Tribunal

3. I had available to me written submissions in the form of the grounds of appeal, which were written by the appellant when they were unrepresented, and a rule 24 response from the respondent. I had the benefit of submissions by representatives on behalf of both parties which were succinct and helpful.

4. The permission to appeal decision concluded it was arguable that, notwithstanding the adverse credibility findings, the simple passing reference to the reasons given by the respondent as to why the appellant claim was refused was inadequate.

5. It seems that the permission to appeal determination was referencing [18] of the FtT determination:

Turning to article 8 of the ECHR: I agree with all the points mentioned in the refusal letter and I dismiss the appeal on human rights grounds in relation to this article 8 claim. For the sake of clarity, I also adopt as part of my reasoning all the points made for and on behalf of the respondent as they appear in paragraph 6 above.

6. On behalf of the appellant, it was submitted it could be argued that there is an impingement on the appellant’s art 8 rights inherent in the judge finding that the appellant could get ID documents on return to Iraq when the appellant’s case throughout was that he was unable to obtain a relevant estate ID card.

7. Further, it was submitted, the appellant had developed a private life in the UK and the impact on return of that private life was not properly considered by the FtT.

8. It was submitted that there was a NRM claim, on the basis of modern slavery in relation to his smugglers en route to the UK, which remains outstanding. The appellant submitted that, while the Judge did say that it was not for them to judge whether the NRM is made out, and they observed that no steps were made to pursue it, nevertheless the judge should have found whether that outstanding application impacted on the article 8 assessment. As the judgement stands, this is considered at [17] only in relation to the risk on return for the appellant.

9. It was submitted that the appellant has been in the UK since 2021 and, if he gets a conclusive grounds decision in due course, he might be permitted to stay.

10. On behalf of the Home Office, it was noted that the appellant has not been in the UK for a particularly long time and has no recorded family members in the UK. It would be improper for a judge to anticipate the NRM application outcome.

11. The Home Office submission was that the only conceivable way the appellant could have succeeded on an article 8 point is on the documentation and, submitted the respondent, the appellant did not challenge the fact that he had access to his passport via relatives in Iraq and therefore it should not be difficult for him to come into possession of a relevant ID document.

12. I remind myself of the need to respect the finding of the FTT, where this case was heard by a judge with skills and experience in this specialist jurisdiction. My function is to consider any errors of law, not preferences of style or approach.

13. The Judge makes reference to the appellant’s NRM claim in the FTT determination. I agree with the appellant’s submission that the Judge considers the NRM in relation to the risk on return. I note that in relation to that the Judge comes to the conclusion that, even if the NRM investigation does uncover any more evidence, there was not enough for the judge to make any findings about it. This conclusion was, given the structure of the determination, relevant to the analysis of the protection claim.

14. On the basis that the judge did not take the existence of an NRM claim or investigation into account in assessing the appellant’s article 8 case, I do not conclude that it was an error not to do so. This is because to do anything other than assess the case on the evidence before the Judge, would require the judge to speculate as to the NRM investigation or outcome. The Judge is required to determine the case on the evidence before them, and not speculate on what evidence might be available in the future. I am not persuaded that the NRM investigation or outcome was deserving of any more comment than it received in the determination. The Judge would not have been justified in finding that the mere making of an application to the NRM weighed in the appellant’s favour when assessing article 8.

15. Turning to the sufficiency of [18] in the FTT judgement, I agree with the appellant that this is a short treatment of the article 8 analysis. In my judgement, this paragraph of the FTT determination makes clear to the reader (importantly including the appellant) that the Judge has taken into account the matters in the reasons for refusal letter, as well as submissions made by the respondent in the FTT hearing. Because the reasons for refusal letter considers the amount of time that the appellant had been in the UK and therefore might be said to have been developing his article late rights, it is clear that the judge had also taken this into account. The judge directs themselves [8] that they are considering the appeal at the date of hearing, so I am satisfied that the judge will have taken into account the passage of time between the reasons for refusal letter and the hearing before the FtT.

16. It is clear that there was little evidence in relation to the appellant’s article 8 rights in this case, and I conclude that the FTT explanation of the analysis of article 8 rights is both sufficiently thorough in the circumstances of this case, and sufficiently clear to those the judgement affects.

17. I find the FTT did not err in law.

Notice of Decision

The determination of the First-tier Tribunal contains no error of law.

I do not allow the appeal.

The determination of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

D Cotton

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 January 2026