Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005035
UI-2025-005036

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65506/2024
HU/67244/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RODGER

Between

BT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Lams, Counsel instructed by
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant was granted anonymity. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to continue to anonymise these proceedings.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First Tier Tribunal dated 01 September 2025 dismissing his appeals against the respondent’s decisions of 10 May 2024 to refuse his asylum & human rights claim and 10 December 2024 to refuse his further human rights claim.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Albania. He left Albania by boat in January 2015 and arrived in the UK illegally in March 2015. He met his partner in 2016. On 14 November 2021 the appellant was detained as an illegal entrant. He was released on bail and he claimed asylum on 05 March 2022. This was refused on 07 September 2023 and his claim for asylum was certified as clearly unfounded. The appellant was referred to the National Referral Mechanism on 26 September 2023. A negative reasonable grounds decision was made on 02 October 2023. On 07 February 2024 the appellant made further submissions that were refused on 10 May 2024. His claim was that he had borrowed money from a man called Shaqir in 2014 and that he had been forced to work in a cannabis farm until he repaid the money but that he escaped in January 2015 and fled to the UK. He claimed to be at risk of being killed, persecuted or re-trafficked by Shaqir on return to Albania.
The Respondent’s decision
3. In decision dated 10 May 2024 the respondent refused the appellant’s further submissions.
4. Within the refusal letter, the respondent noted that the appellant had provided little evidence in support of his further submissions to demonstrate that he had experienced past persecution in Albania due to owing money. The respondent considered the country expert report of Dr Korovilas and considered that the report was produced on the basis of the account that the appellant had provided and that opinions had been formed on that basis. The respondent did not accept the account relied upon and found that the even if he did previously suffer ill-treatment, that the Albanian authorities provide support for male victims of trafficking and that it was not accepted, on the balance of probabilities, that he had a well-founded fear of ill-treatment or persecution upon return to Albania.
5. As regards Article 8, the respondent refused his claim and further refused on 10 December 2024 as the respondent was satisfied that the decision to refuse leave was proportionate under Article 8(2) of the ECHR.
6. In a review document dated 29 January 2025, the respondent clarified that the respondent had considered the appellant’s claim at its highest, that is as if the events that the appellant has described occurred as claimed but that credibility had not been conceded. The grounds of refusal were maintained.
The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal
7. The appellant appealed to the First Tier Tribunal. The appeal came before the First Tier Tribunal Judge for full hearing on 25 July 2025. The appellant was represented by Mr Lams of Counsel and the respondent was represented by a Ms Olukoya, a Home Office Presenting Officer. The appellant gave oral evidence and was cross-examined. The Judge heard submissions from both representatives.
8. The Judge refused the appellant’s appeal for the reasons set out in a decision dated 30 August 2025.
9. At paragraph 32 of the decision the Judge notes that she had raised the issue of credibility and the locations that the respondent considered the appellant could relocate to and on taking instructions, the HOPO confirmed that the respondent was conceding the issue of credibility and relocation took take place in Tirana, Kukes or Durres.
10. The Judge decided that there was no refugee convention reason as the objective evidence was that male victims of trafficking did not have a distinct identity in Albanian society. The Judge considered the protection claim under Article 3. The Judge noted that there was no dispute that the appellant did borrow money from Shaqir and noted that he probably had not worked enough to cover the debt. At paragraph 43, the Judge states that she was prepared to accept that there may be a criminal gang that Shaqir is part of but found that the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to show that he would be at risk of persecution after the passage of time and found that the appellant had not established a risk now. For the sake of completeness the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation were considered and the Judge found that the appellant would have sufficient protection and that he could reasonably internally relocate to Tirana. The Judge considered the Article 8 claim and did not consider that there were any unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or his partner and dismissed the appeal against both the protection and the human rights refusal.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The appellant sought permission to appeal on four grounds as set out in the grounds of appeal dated 27 October 2025 [p37]. The first ground can be summarised as an irrationality challenge, namely that the central finding that the criminal gang from whom the appellant had borrowed money would have forgotten about the debt was irrational and/or that the Judge did not engage with the country expert evidence of Dr Korovilas. The other grounds are effectively contingent on Ground 1 and claim that the Judge failed to take into account the expert evidence relating to sufficiency of protection and/or internal relocation. Ground 4 asserts that the Judge’s consideration of Article 8 and exceptional circumstances/significant obstacles was flawed given that the Judge accepted that the appellant owed a debt.
12. On 13 October 2025 the First Tier refused the appellant permission to appeal on grounds that there was no merit in the grounds which are simply disagreements with the assessment of the expert’s report, the evidence based findings and the application of established legal principles.
13. On 01 December 2025 the Upper Tribunal the appellant permission to appeal on all four grounds. UTJ Hirst stated that irrationality is a high threshold but that it was just arguable that in finding that the gang would no longer have interest in the appellant the judge did not engage sufficiently with, or give sufficient reasons for rejecting the evidence of the expert (whose evidence was not challenged). The other grounds appeared contingent on Ground 1 and there was no limit on the grant of permission to appeal.
14. The respondent opposed the appeal for the reasons set out in her response made pursuant to rule 24 of the Procedure Rules dated 05 December 2025.
15. The hearing on 02 February 2026 was conducted at Field House and the appellant was accompanied by his partner and represented by Mr Lams. At the outset I confirmed that we all had the benefit of a composite appeal bundle made up of 693 pages, the UT grant of permission to appeal (which was missing from the composite bundle) and Mr Lams skeleton argument dated 26 January 2026.
16. Mr Lams made an application to admit the 2024 Asylos report which he says was indirectly before the First Tier judge as the Asylos report is repeatedly referred to within the July 2024 Trafficking CPIN, which the judge was referred to during submissions. On hearing submissions from the representatives I was not satisfied that the report was relevant to the error of law issue and given that the First Tier Judge had not been directly referred to it, I was not satisfied that permission should be granted for it to be relied upon for the purposes of the error of law hearing.
17. I am grateful for the helpful submissions from both representatives. I have not set these out but I have reflected on them and they are incorporated into my analysis.
Discussion
Ground 1: Irrational findings on risk on return given the expert report and failure to engage with the country expert report of Dr Korovilas
18. I am not satisfied that the appellant’s first ground has been made out. As said by Lord Justice Brooke in R (and others) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at [11],
“it is well known that "perversity" represents a very high hurdle for an appeal. In Miftari v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 481, the whole court agreed that the word meant what it said: it was a demanding concept. The majority of the court (Keene and Maurice Kay LJJ) said that it embraced decisions that were irrational or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense (even if there was no wilful or conscious departure from the rational), but it also included a finding of fact that was wholly unsupported by the evidence, provided always that this was a finding as to a material matter.”
19. I do not accept that the conclusions reached at paragraph 43 of the decision are irrational or ones that were not open to the Judge to make on the assessment of all of the evidence before the Judge. At paragraph 40, the Judge has considered the country expert report of Dr Korovilas and specifically notes that there is no challenge to the expert’s credentials and accepts him as an expert. That, I find, does not lead to the Judge being required to accept the expert’s conclusions within the report. At paragraphs 40-42 the Judge specifically notes detailed sections of Dr Korovilas’ report regarding how gangs operate in Albania, that there is no debt forgiveness and that debts do not expire over time, as well as the expert’s assessment of the risk [para 41] on return. Given the contents of paragraphs 40-42, I find that it cannot be said that the Judge has failed to take into account the country expert evidence. At paragraph 43, the Judge carried out an assessment of all of the evidence and made the following findings; (1) that the passage of time would have an impact on whether there was a continued risk to the appellant if he returned to Albania, (2) that a lot can happen in ten years and that the appellant had not given any real evidence that the people that he fears still operate or exist in Albania and (3) that this is despite his family living in the same area and the appellant having contact with them.
20. At paragraph 43, the Judge carried out an assessment of Dr Korovilas’s evidence as to assessment of risk, and on reading the whole of the expert report and in particular page 10 of the report wherein the expert states “It is very difficult to definitively assess the actual level of risk faced by [BT] since there are several unknown variables which are impossible to assess. For example, the value of [BT] to this criminal gang and the ruthlessness of this criminal gang are hard to determine.” I do not accept that the findings within paragraph 43 do not take account of the country expert report or are irrational findings based on all of the evidence. The description of the expert having given a very general opinion on the issue of assessing risk is not one that can be described as irrational or in any way unreasonable in light of the wording of the expert report. That, coupled with the finding of the appellant not providing any real evidence that the people he fears still operate or exist in Albania, provides a sufficient basis upon which the Judge was entitled to find that the appellant had not established a risk on return.
21. It is for the Judge to assess the risk on return and that does not require the Judge to accept the expert’s conclusions but to assess the expert’s conclusions with the appellant’s evidence and any other evidence on the issue of risk on return. The Judge specifically notes within the decision that the factual matrix of the claim has been accepted. The issue for the judge to determine was that of risk on return after a proper assessment of all of the evidence. I am satisfied that this is exactly what the Judge has done within paragraph 43, having fully considered the expert report at paragraphs 40-42, together with an assessment of the appellant’s evidence regarding risk on return. The decision is clear as to why the expert’s conclusions are not accepted, his opinion having been assessed as providing a general view, and the decision provides clear detailed reasons as to the finding on the appellant not having proved risk on return to Albania.
22. I find that there is no irrationality or error of law in the Judge’s decision as claimed within Ground 1.
Grounds 2 and 3
23. Grounds 2 and 3 are based on a failure to accept the expert evidence regarding a lack of sufficiency of protection or internal relocation. Given that Ground 1 has not been accepted, there is no error of law in the Judge’s assessment of risk on return and in those circumstances the findings relating to sufficiency of protection and internal relocation are academic as the Judge did not accept that there was any proved risk on return arising from the unpaid debt. However, for the sake of completeness I will deal with grounds 2 and 3.
24. At paragraph 44, the Judge specifically notes the country expert’s conclusions regarding sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. At paragraph 44 the Judge accepts that some gangs would have protection from the police, which I find, is not a rejection of the expert report. The Judge goes on to note that the appellant had provided little details of any connections of the gang with the police and notes that the appellant relied upon the expert report but had not provided details and did not give details when asked in cross examination. The Judge has given detailed reasons for finding that there would be sufficiency of protection as the Judge was not satisfied that the appellant had shown that the gangs had connections to the police. This is a finding open to the Judge on the evidence before her.
25. In relation to internal relocation, the Judge did not accept that the appellant was at risk in his home area but made alternative findings that if the appellant moved to Tirana that he would not be at risk from Shaqir. Paragraph 46 clearly states that the Judge found that there was nothing to show that Shaqir has any interest or motivation in locating the appellant and that there was nothing to say that he would be aware the appellant as in Tirana after such a long period. The judge also considered vulnerability due to having been previously trafficked but found that the appellant could relocate to Tirana if he needed to.
26. I find that Grounds 2 and 3 are mere disagreements with the findings made by the Judge as these were findings that were open to the Judge to make on the evidence before her and there is no arguable error of law.
Ground 4
27. I find that the remaining ground of appeal has not been made out. At paragraphs 48-51, the Judge set out clear well-reasoned findings and conclusions in relation to the appellant’s Article 8 claim. The Judge had already rejected and provided full detailed reasons as to why it was not accepted that he would be at risk on return to Albania. Therefore, the finding that the appellant has not discharged the burden on him to show there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in Albania was one that was open to the Judge to make on the evidence before her. This Ground is a mere disagreement with the conclusions reached and there is no proved error of law in relation to the human rights assessment.
28. Accordingly, for these reasons, I consider that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it.

DUTJ Rodger

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated 09 February 2026