Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005037
FtT Appeal No: PA/65147/2023
LP/08787/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 13th of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SWANEY

Between

AJG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Aziz, solicitor, of Lei Dat & Baig Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A Mullen, senior presenting officer

Heard at Field House on 10 March 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity order
1. I have considered whether to make an anonymity order and have decided that one is necessary because the need for the United Kingdom to discharge its obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the public interest in open justice.
Background
2. The appellant appeals the decision of the First-tier Tribunal judge (the judge) promulgated on 24 November 2024, dismissing the appeal against the refusal of his international protection and human rights claims.
3. The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution and/or serious harm in Iraq from the family of a woman with whom he had a relationship. The judge dismissed his appeal, finding his claim incredible.
4. The appellant sought permission to appeal, which was refused by the First-tier Tribunal. He renewed the application to the Upper Tribunal, relying on the same grounds of appeal which can be summarised as follows:
(i) The judge erred in making generalised findings about the credibility of the appellant’s claim based on perceived similarities with other claims and failed to give the appellant’s individual claim the required anxious scrutiny.
(ii) The judge wrongly required corroborating evidence from the appellant and failed to engage adequately or at all with the appellant’s witness statement or oral evidence.
(iii) The judge failed to consider the appellant’s explanations for matters that he considered to be implausible.
5. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis that it is at least arguable that the judge erred at paragraph 30 of his decision when he referred to the appellant’s claim being similar to those of other claimants, indicating a lack of scrutiny and potential bias. Although permission was granted in relation to ground one, the grant of permission was not limited and all grounds are arguable.
6. The appeal came before me for a determination of whether the judge’s decision contains a material error of law.
The hearing
7. I considered a composite bundle, a skeleton argument from the appellant, a rule 24 response from the respondent and a reply from the appellant. I heard oral submissions from Mr Aziz and Mr Mullen.
8. The hearing was conducted by video and neither party objected to that as a suitable method of hearing.
Consideration
9. Mr Aziz submitted that the judge’s characterisation of the appellant’s claim as being similar to many others infected the judge’s whole approach to the appeal because it indicates a lack of anxious scrutiny. Mr Aziz relied on KS (benefit of the doubt) [2014] UKUT 552 (IAC) for his submission that the judge’s comment about a lack of evidence of the appellant’s relationship at paragraph 31 amounted to a requirement for such evidence, which was an error of law. In respect of the judge’s findings about the lack of credibility or plausibility of the appellant’s account of having a relationship in secret but nevertheless meeting in public places, Mr Aziz submitted that the he failed to take the appellant’s explanation into account.
10. Mr Mullen submitted that no weight should attach to the judge’s comment that the appellant’s claim was similar to a number of others, as it was simply that and did not colour the judge’s assessment of it. Mr Mullen relied on TK (Burundi) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 40 for his submission that if evidence would ordinarily be available and there is no credible explanation for the failure to produce that supporting evidence, it was appropriate for the judge to have regard to that lack of evidence in his assessment of credibility. Mr Mullen submitted that the judge made findings open to him on the evidence, and that he can’t be said to have omitted anything from his consideration.
11. It is difficult to know why the judge commented on the similarity of the appellant’s claim to those of others if it did not play a part in his consideration of the appeal. Although the judge does acknowledge that any similarly of itself did not make the appellant’s claim incredible, it did form the starting point of his consideration of the appellant’s claim, and I find it is indicative of the judge’s view of the substance of the claim.
12. The judge’s findings at paragraph 31 are unclear. The judge records the appellant’s evidence that he was unable to reset his Facebook account because he had lost his number and could not remember his password for either his Facebook or his email account. The judge then says that ‘If he had been able to access either of them he would have been able to provide supporting evidence about his claimed relationship.’ It is unclear whether this last sentence is a finding or the judge simply recording what the appellant’s evidence was. If it is the latter, then the judge fails to make a finding at all about the appellant’s evidence as to why he was unable to access his Facebook account. If it is the former, then the judge fails to give reasons as to why he does not accept the appellant’s explanation about his inability to access the account. The judge ought to have made a clear findings about whether such evidence could reasonably have been obtained before giving weight to its absence.
13. The judges goes on at paragraph 32 to consider the absence of evidence from any of the appellant’s neighbours who helped him make the original marriage proposal or who intervened when he and his brother were attacked. The appellant’s evidence was that he was not in contact with anyone in Iraq and that his only family member in Iraq was his brother, although he did not know whether his brother was even still there. The judge notes that the appellant told him that he knew how to search for people on Facebook, but states that aside from his girlfriend, he ‘apparently had not looked for anyone else from his home area’. It is not made clear by the judge whether the appellant was specifically asked whether he had looked for anyone else or whether this is an assumption made by the judge.
14. The appellant’s consistent evidence was that he was educated only to grade 5 of primary school and that he began working when he was 10 years old. This evidence was not challenged. In MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 the Court of Appeal considered the issue of corroborative evidence. At paragraph 86 the Court of Appeal said: ‘the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value: if for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the tribunal can give appropriate weight.’
15. There is no indication that the judge considered anything other than the fact that the appellant knew how to search for people on Facebook. He did not consider the appellant’s level of education or his understanding as to the potential significance of evidence from his neighbours; he did not consider the appellant’s consistent evidence about the lack of contact with anyone from Iraq; and given the lapse of time since events happened, he did not consider whether if the appellant was able to make contact with anyone, evidence could reasonably be obtained.
16. I find that the judge’s approach to the lack of corroborative evidence, given the weight attached to that factor in his assessment of credibility, amounts to a material error of law. I also find that the judge’s comment that the appellant’s claim is similar to other claims demonstrates a lack of anxious scrutiny, although I do not accept that it demonstrates bias on the part of the judge.
17. Both Mr Aziz and Mr Mullen agreed that in the event I were to find a material error of law, the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for hearing de novo.
18. Having had regard to paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Directions and what was said by the Court of Appeal in AEB v SSHD [2022], Civ 1512, I find that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing. I consider that the errors in the credibility assessment are such that none of the findings on credibility should be preserved.

Notice of Decision
19. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 24 November 2024 involved the making of a material error of law.
20. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal at Manchester for a de novo hearing before any judge other than judge Alis.

J K Swaney

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
10 March 2026