Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005058

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53907/2024
LP/03914/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COLE

Between

ST
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Panagiotopoulou, Counsel instructed Montague Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Turkey. He arrived in the UK on 22 September 2020 on a student visa. He claimed asylum on 30 January 2023. His protection claim was refused, and he appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was dismissed in a decision promulgated 19 September 2025. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
Background
2. The appellant is a Turkish citizen of Kurdish ethnicity and Alevi faith. He claimed that he was an active supporter of the HDP and that he had been detained and ill-treated on two occasions due to his political activity. During his detentions, he claims he was accused of supporting the PKK. The appellant claimed that, whilst in the UK, his family home in Turkey had been raided by the authorities. Finally, the appellant claimed that he had attended political events in the UK.
3. The respondent accepted that the appellant was a Kurdish Alevi but did not accept the rest of his claim. The respondent stated that the appellant’s evidence was vague. It was stated that the appellant was not at real risk on return to Turkey.
4. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was heard by Judge Taylor on 15 September 2025.
5. The Judge did not find the appellant’s account to be credible. The Judge did not find the appellant to be at risk on return.
6. Judge Taylor dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
7. The appellant submitted grounds of challenge. By decision dated 29 October 2025 First-tier Tribunal Judge Elliot granted permission on the following terms
3. At paragraph 21 of the decision the Judge stated that the appellant may be a low-level supporter of the HDP. Whether he was or not was at the core of the appellant's case. It is arguable that the Judge did not make a clear finding on the issue of whether the appellant was a supporter of the HDP.
4. Further, it is arguable that in failing to make a clear finding on that issue and in failing to then consider the cumulative effect of the various risk factors set out in IA and others (Risk – Guidelines – Separatist) CG (2003) UKITA 00034, the Judge fell into error.
8. Thus, the matter came before me to determine whether Judge Taylor’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.
The Hearing
9. Ms Panagiotopoulou relied on her grounds of appeal and expanded on them.
10. There were six grounds. Ms Panagiotopoulou stated that grounds 1 to 4 related to the appellant’s credibility and ground 5 related to the assessment of risk on return. She acknowledged that, if the appellant’s account of being detained for HDP activities were not accepted, then the risk factors of being a Kurdish Alevi HDP supporter who had attended political demonstrations in the UK were insufficient to place the appellant at real risk on return as per IA and others (Risk – Guidelines – Separatist) CG (2003) UKIAT 00034. Thus, the credibility challenges were the key issues to resolve.
11. In relation to ground 6, Ms Panagiotopoulou stated that she had nothing to add to the written grounds, and she acknowledged that this ground was not the strongest.
12. She submitted that the Judge had failed to engage with the evidence of the appellant’s political activities in Turkey and had made findings contrary to the evidence regarding the appellant’s sur place activities. Ms Panagiotopoulou also submitted that the Judge had placed an unrealistic evidential burden on the appellant. Finally, she submitted that the Judge was wrong to find that the late provision of his parents’ statements undermined his credibility.
13. Ms Keerthy relied upon the Rule 24 prepared by the respondent.
14. She submitted that there was no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. She submitted that the Judge had given substantial reasons for rejecting the appellant's credibility of the claimed detentions. There was limited sur place activity, and the appellant did not have a sufficient profile to place him at risk. Ms Keerthy submitted that there were adequate reasons provided for rejecting the appellant’s evidence of ongoing interest.
15. Ms Panagiotopoulou briefly responded. She submitted that the appellant had provided a detailed and reasonable explanation of his immigration history.
16. After hearing the submissions, I reserved my decision.
Discussion and Analysis
17. When considering whether the judge made a material error in law in dismissing the appellant’s appeal, I have remined myself of the following principles.
18. It is not permissible for the Upper Tribunal to simply disagree with the result or the way in which it was reached (see paragraph 36 of South Bucks County Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33).
19. I take note of the narrow circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the fact-finding Tribunal. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the Court of Appeal confirmed that unless the First-tier Judge's decision is “rationally insupportable”, the Upper Tribunal should not interfere with findings of fact by the First-tier Judge who had seen and heard the oral evidence.
20. I also remind myself that the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of the First-tier Tribunal's reasoning, as detailed by the Court of Appeal in paragraph 26 of Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201.
21. The Judge’s reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account of being detained in Turkey due to his HDP activities were the primary focus. It was accepted that the appellant’s other potential risk factors of being a Kurdish Alevi HDP supporter who had attended political demonstrations in the UK were insufficient to place the appellant at real risk on return as per IA and others (Risk – Guidelines – Separatist) CG (2003) UKIAT 00034.
22. Much was made of the Judge’s statement in paragraph 21 that the appellant “may be a low level supporter of HDP…” It was stated in the grant of permission that the appellant’s support of the HDP “was at the core of the appellant's case.” I accept that it would have been preferable if the Judge had made a clearer finding on this issue. However, even if the Judge’s statement is read as a finding that the appellant was a low-level supporter of the HDP, then this is immaterial to overall decision.
23. Ms Panagiotopoulou accepted that merely being a low-level supporter of the HDP would be insufficient to place the appellant at real risk on return. However, she submitted that the appellant’s support and activities for the HDP were the foundation of the claim which led to the appellant being detained and ill-treated by the authorities.
24. This may well be so, but the Judge has given more than sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant’s claim to have been detained in Turkey, which in turn rejected the appellant's claim to have been a high-profile activist for the HDP.
25. There is no direct challenge to the Judge’s findings that the appellant was not credible in his claim to have been detained in Turkey due to his HDP activities. Grounds 1 to 4 (and ground 6 which was effectively abandoned at the hearing) are mere peripheral challenges to aspects of the Judge’s credibility findings, and they do not address head-on the Judge’s clear rejection of the appellant’s account of being detained in Turkey. Overall, the grounds are a mere disagreement with the Judge’s conclusions and an attempt to reargue matters. In my judgment there are no errors in the Judge’s rejection of the appellant’s credibility.
26. The Judge has given sound and sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant's account of being detained in Turkey. The Judge is entitled to place significant weight on the appellant's immigration history as undermining his credibility. The appellant came to the UK after his first claimed detention and ill-treatment, but then willingly returned to Turkey. Even after he claimed he was detained and ill-treated again, the appellant did not claim asylum on arrival in the UK. He came as a student and then made an Ankara Agreement application. It was only after the refusal of that application that the appellant chose to claim asylum.
27. The Judge was entitled to hold these matters against the appellant. The Judge considered the appellant’s explanations for his behaviour and rejected those explanations. The decision is clearly reasoned and discloses no error.
28. The way the Judge dealt with the statements from the appellant’s parents was more than sufficient. The late submission of the statements was clearly a relevant factor, and the Judge considered the limited information contained in them. The weight to be given to the statements was a matter for the Judge and there was nothing wrong with the Judge’s conclusions in relation to this aspect of the evidence.
29. Overall, the Judge has considered all relevant matters and reached a detailed and well-reasoned conclusion for finding that the appellant was not a credible witness. Comprehensive reasons were provided for rejecting the appellant’s account of being detained in Turkey due to his HDP activities. There is no error of law in the Judge’s rejection of the appellant’s account.
30. This makes the other issues immaterial as it is accepted that the appellant would not be at real risk if his account of being detained were rejected.
31. The Judge’s findings regarding the appellant’s sur place activities are in accordance with the appellant's evidence of his limited sur place activities. Even if the events he attended in the UK would be viewed as political by the Turkish authorities, the appellant was not an organiser of these events, and the country information does not support a finding that the appellant’s activities would be sufficient to place him at risk on return.
32. Ground 5 falls away once the appellant’s claimed detentions are rejected. Without the detentions, the appellant is not at real risk on return as per IA and others (Risk – Guidelines – Separatist) CG (2003) UKIAT 00034. Even if the appellant is taken to be an Alevi Kurd who is a low-level supporter of the HDP who has attended political events in the UK, then he would not have a sufficient profile to be at real risk on return to Turkey. Thus, the Judge’s findings on risk on return are perfectly sound and in accordance with the findings made.
33. Therefore, in conclusion, for the reasons above, I find the Judge has not made material errors of law in his decision and reasons.
Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have made an error of law material to the decision to dismiss the appeal. The determination shall stand.

C R Cole
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 February 2026