Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005065
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55384/2023
LP/06989/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 4th of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOSHI

Between

TD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hussain, legal representative
For the Respondent: Mr Simpson, senior presenting officer

Heard at Field House on 10 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal shall continue in force. No-one shall publish or reveal any information that is likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant, including his name or address. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. By a decision dated 29 November 2024, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s 4 August 2023 decision to refuse his 2 April 2019 protection and human rights claim.
2. Thereafter, the Appellant applied in-time for permission to appeal. By a decision dated 29 October 2025, the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal. The appeal came before me for an error of law hearing on 10 February 2026, via Cloud Video Platform.
Background
3. The Appellant is a national of Ethiopia now aged 33 years. He entered the UK unlawfully on 1 April 2019 and claim asylum on the following day. There were two limbs to his claim, based on risks he would face: (1) because of his father’s Ethiopian Popular Peoples’ Front (‘EPPF’) involvement; and (2) because his father was considered to be a witchdoctor (a ‘Buda’). The Appellant also raised an Article 8 ECHR claim based on his relationship with his partner and their two children.
4. By a decision dated 4 August 2023, the Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim on all grounds. Notably, she: (1) accepted that the Refugee Convention was engaged in respect of both limbs of the Appellant’s claim – respectively, imputed political opinion and membership of a particular social group (family members of a Buda); (2) accepted the Appellant’s claimed nationality and identity; (3) accepted that the local people in Gondar considered the Appellant’s father to be a Buda and the Appellant’s to be the son of a Buda; (4) accepted that the Appellant’s father’s involvement in EPPF and the mistreatment that the Appellant’s family had suffered as a result (i.e. his father’s arrest and detention, his mother’s murder, and the Appellant and his siblings being forced out of their homes in Gondar and Armachow); (5) considered the Appellant’s credibility to be damaged because he failed to claim asylum in Italy and France (pursuant to section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004), but not sufficiently to undermine the credibility of the core of his claim; (6) considered that the Appellant would not be at risk of persecution because he would have a sufficiency of protection and/or could internally relocate (in particular because there had been a change of government and attitude towards the EPPF, and the Buda risk was from non-state actors and localised); and (7) considered that the Immigration Rules were not met on private and family life grounds and that the Appellant’s removal would not otherwise breach Article 8 ECHR.
5. In due course, the Appellant appealed by way of these proceedings. By the time his appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal, on 19 and 28 November 2024, the basis of his claim had developed: (1) he had now added sur place political activism against the Ethiopian government as a further limb of his claim (the Respondent accepted that this activism had taken place but disputed that it put the Appellant at risk on return); and (2) his relationship with his partner had broken down – however, he maintained his Article 8 ECHR claim on the basis of his relationship with his two children.
6. By the First-tier Tribunal’s 29 November 2024 decision, the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds. Materially, the Judge found that: (1) the Appellant’s limited sur place political activism was not credibly based on genuinely-held political opinions; (2) the Appellant’s very late claims (made for the first time at the First-tier Tribunal hearing) himself to have engaged in political activism in Ethiopia were not credible; (3) the Appellant would not be at risk on return as a result of his father’s EPPF involvement or his own sur place political activism (and it would not be unreasonable to expect him to lie about that political activism if questioned about it, because it was not based on genuinely-held political opinions); (4) the Appellant would be at risk on return as a result of his father being considered to be a Buda and he would not have a sufficiency of protection against that risk; (5) however, he could safely and reasonably internally relocate to avoid that risk; (6) the Appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration on return for the purposes of the private life provisions of the Immigration Rules; (7) the Appellant was credible in respect of being the biological father of only one of his two claimed children; (8) nevertheless, Article 8 ECHR was engaged on family life grounds in respect of both children; (9) however, there was nothing to suggest that the children’s best interests would be harmed by the Appellant departing the UK and it was not disproportionate in breach of Article 8 ECHR to expect him to do so.
7. In due course, the Appellant applied for permission to appeal on two grounds:
a. Ground 1. The Judge’s decision in respect of the political opinion limb of the Appellant’s claim was inadequately reasoned because:
i. Ground 1(a). In finding that the Appellant’s father’s EPPF involvement would not put the Appellant at risk, the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for failing to follow the unreported Upper Tribunal case AT (Ethiopia) v SSHD (PA/09724/2019).
ii. Ground 1(b). As a failed asylum-seeker, the Appellant was likely to face a ‘pinch point’ on return to Ethiopia and, in light of the accepted elements of his factual case (in particular, his father’s accepted EPPF involvement), the finding that it would be reasonable to expect him to lie if questioned was inadequately reasoned.
iii. Ground 1(c). The finding that the Appellant’s political opinions were not credibly genuinely-held was inadequately reasoned.
b. Ground 2. The Judge’s finding that the Appellant’s removal would not breach Article 8 ECRH was inadequately reasoned.
8. On 29 October 2025, the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal on Ground 1 only. There was no renewed application for permission to appeal in respect of Ground 2.
Hearing
9. Before me, the documentation was contained in a consolidated bundle of 491 pages and a rule 24 response from the Respondent in which she defended the appeal.
10. Mr Hussain applied for the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal to remain in force. Mr Simpson no objection to this on behalf of the Respondent. I acknowledge the importance of the principle of open justice. However, I grant the application because the Appellant is a protection claimant, and I consider that disclosing his identity could potentially cause him harm in the event that he is returned to Ethiopia.
11. Mr Hussain adopted the grounds of appeal (which he had not drafted) and made further oral submissions which may be summarised as follows:
a. Ground 1(a). The Judge had noted the Appellant’s reliance on §26 of the unreported case of AT at §43. That provided support for the Appellant’s contention that he would be at risk due to his father’s EPPF involvement. If the Judge did not agree, it was incumbent upon them to give reasons and they failed to do so. Mr Hussain accepted that he did not know whether the Appellant had applied for permission to cite this unreported case or whether the Judge had given permission. He also accepted that §26 of AT did not expressly state that family members of political activists would be at heightened risk; rather, his submission was that it demonstrated that the authorities had a low threshold for suspicion, from which it could be inferred that family members of political activists would be at risk.
b. Ground 1(b). This Grounds was closely related to Ground 1(a). If there was a ‘pinch point’ then Appellant’s father’s accepted EPPF involvement could put the Appellant at risk. Mr Hussain could not confirm whether this argument was raised before the First-tier Tribunal and accepted that there was nothing before me to suggest that it was. He also accepted that there was no country evidence or caselaw before me (of the First-tier Tribunal) to suggest that there is a ‘pinch point’ for failed asylum-seekers on return to Ethiopia.
c. Ground 1(c). Mr Hussain said he had nothing to add to the grounds in respect of Ground 1(c). I note that the grounds said only this: “At [59] – [67] of the [decision] the [Judge] has provided inadequate reasons for finding that the Appellant does not hold a genuine political opinion.”
12. In response, Mr Simpson adopted the rule 24 response (which he had not drafted) and made further oral submissions which may be summarised as follows:
a. Ground 1(a). The Respondent was prepared to infer that permission to rely on the unreported case of AT had been granted. However, AT is not a country guidance case, it is a case that was decided on its own facts. In any event, §26 of AT did not expressly state that family members of political activists would be at heightened risk. Essentially, all it said was that people themselves suspected of EPPF involvement may be at risk. Accordingly, the Judge considered whether the Appellant would himself be associated with EPPF and found that he would not be (§41 onwards). The Judge’s approach to the unreported case was correct, and their conclusions were adequately reasoned.
b. Ground 1(b). The Respondent did not accept that the ‘pinch point’ argument was raised before the First-tier Tribunal, and there was nothing before me to suggest that there would be a ‘pinch point’ in any event.
c. Ground 1(c). The Judge set out their reasoning for the conclusion that the Appellant’s political opinions were not credibly genuinely-held over 16 paragraphs from §§45-61. The Appellant had made no specific criticism of any of that reasoning.
13. Mr Hussain made no submissions in reply.
14. In terms of disposal, Mr Hussain submitted that if I were to find an error of law in respect of Grounds 1(a) and/or 1(b) but not Ground 1(c) then the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal, but if I were to find an error of law in respect of Ground 1(c) then the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Simpson submitted that if I were to find an error of law in respect of any / all of the Grounds, then the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal.
15. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Decision and reasons
Ground 1(a)
16. I am prepared to infer that the Judge granted permission to rely on the unreported case of AT, in particular based on the Respondent’s concession in this regard.
17. §26 of AT provides as follows:
“Professor Schaefer states at paras. 57 and 58 of his January 2021 report:
‘57. ... A number of news agencies, in addition to Amnesty International, have documented the ongoing arrests of members of the opposition in Ethiopia. Members and supporters of the CUD/UDJ/Semawayi/Ginbot 7 continue to be focus of the Ethiopian government's activities to control the opposition and maintain its own power. Arrests, detention and alleged torture are still being reported, including for people who are only suspected of being associated with opposition parties.
58. Even though Ginbot 7 has formally been disbanded, its former rural supporters remain in the crosshairs of government authorities. ... While Ginbot 7 is formally disbanded an inflammatory element of the ideology of Amhara ethnonationalists lives on and that is all about Amhara land for Amharas. Rural supporters of old Ginbot 7 are not going to be given amnesty. Their grievances live on. These grievances may be incorporated into a new political party, like NaMa, but the individuals will not be exonerated, they will always be targeted by non-Amhara political forces, currently an Oromo dominated Prosperity Party/EPRDF. World renown leaders of Ginbot 7 will be tolerated, rank and file supporters, especially farmers whose claims to land transcend party, will always be persecuted. Persecution comes in many forms: the Oromo led government, other ethnic militias and even competing ethnic farmers. The Tigrean farmers turning on Amhara that Alex de Waal reported on, illustrates how ethnic control over land has become the most combustible political issue in Ethiopia today.’”
18. It is important to note that, at §30, the Tribunal recorded that the Respondent’s representative said that “…the respondent had no evidence capable of countering Professor Schaefer’s expert opinion…”.
19. The error of law alleged in this Ground is not made out, for the following reasons.
a. AT is not a reported case of the Tribunal, still less a country guidance case. It is an unreported case that was decided on its particular facts, based on the particular evidence that was before the Tribunal at the date of the hearing. Therefore, the Judge was not bound to follow AT in the Appellant’s case.
b. Nevertheless, the Judge did expressly refer to §26 of AT at §43, in the context of having noted at §42 that “Nothing presented by either party shows relatives of EPPF supporters would be in danger through the behaviour of family members.” That finding was correct: as Mr Hussain accepted, §26 of AT does not expressly state that family members of political activists are at heightened risk; at its highest, it demonstrates that the authorities have a low threshold for suspicion (or, as the Judge put it at §43, “the authorities have a low trigger for those suspected of association with opposition groups.”)
c. Thus, the Judge correctly asked themselves at §44 “whether the Appellant would be identified as someone associated with the EPPF”. In that context, the Judge considered whether the Appellant’s own activities would put him at risk at §§45-61 and found that they would not (and, as explained below in respect of Ground 1(c), these finding are unimpeachable).
d. Also at §61, the Judge found “I do not accept he had any EPPF links there, beyond being related to his father. Nothing presented shows that would be enough to place a person at risk.” (emphasis supplied). Again, that conclusion was correct – there was nothing before the Judge to support the contention the Tribunal that family members of political activists are at heightened risk.
e. Therefore, the Judge took the correct approach based on what §26 of AT actually says and the evidence before them.
Ground 1(b)
20. The Judge did consider what would happen if the Appellant were to be questioned on return and found that he could be expected to lie about his political activities because they were not based on genuinely-held political opinions (see §§45-61 – and, as explained below in respect of Ground 1(c), these finding are unimpeachable).
21. In so far as this Ground turns on the Judge’s failure to consider what would happen if the Appellant were to be questioned about his father’s EPPF involvement specifically, the error of law alleged is not made out. That is for the following reasons.
a. I do not accept that the ‘pinch point’ argument was raised before the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Hussain was not able to confirm that it was; Mr Simpson did not accept that it was; and there is nothing in the papers to suggest that it was.
b. In Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC), it was held at headnote §7 that: “Unless a point was one which was Robinson obvious, a judge’s decision cannot be alleged to contain an error of law on the basis that a judge failed to take account of a point that was never raised for their consideration as an issue in an appeal. Such an approach would undermine the principles clearly laid out in the Procedure Rules.”
c. I do not consider this to be a Robinson obvious point. Quite the contrary, as Mr Hussain accepted, there was no country evidence or caselaw before me (or the First-tier Tribunal) to suggest that there is a ‘pinch point’ for failed asylum-seekers on return to Ethiopia. Further, there was nothing before me (or the First-tier Tribunal) to suggest that family members of political activists are at heightened risk.
Ground 1(c)
22. The error of law alleged in this Ground is not made out, for the following reasons.
a. The Appellant has never particularised in any way the contention the finding that his political opinions were not credibly genuinely-held was inadequately reasoned. He did not do so in his grounds and Mr Hussain added nothing in his oral submissions.
b. Therefore, I consider this Ground to be nothing more than a bare disagreement with the Judge’s careful reasoning and conclusion on this issue.
c. For the avoidance of doubt, I consider that this element of the Judge’s reasoning was clearly intelligible and adequate, and enabled the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was (see South Bucks District Council v Porter (No. 2) [2004] UKHL 33, 2004 1 WLR 1953, per Lord Brown at §37). In very short summary, the Judge had various concerns about the Appellant’s evidence which were diligently explained over 16 detailed paragraphs. As I have said, there has been no challenge to any specific element of that reasoning.
Conclusion
23. For the reasons set out above, I dismiss the Appellant’s appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain any material errors of law and so it stands.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain any material errors of law and so it stands.

B. Hoshi

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 February 2026