Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005071

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51209/2024
LP/13488/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 14th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRAVES

Between

TK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Sheikh, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Unrepresented

Heard at Field House on 5 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision (“the decision”) of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the judge”), dated 20 September 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent of 14 December 2023, refusing his asylum and human rights claim.
2. The appellant’s case was that he was a former sergeant within the army of Nepal, who retired in 2008 and thereafter did private security work in Nepal and then in the Maldives. He had then been providing security for the Canadian embassy in Kabul, in Afghanistan, between January and August 2021. He arrived in the UK on 18 August 2021, having been evacuated by the British army from Kabul, following the Taliban taking control of Afghanistan. The basis of the appellant’s asylum claim, made on 18 February 2022, was that he feared the Taliban would seek reprisals against him and his family in Nepal, if he returned there. He said he had also borrowed money from someone in his village in Nepal and was being pressured to pay it back. When refusing the protection and human rights claims, the respondent had found the claim not to be credible and said it did not engage the Refugee Convention, there was no risk to the appellant on return, that there was sufficiency of protection and an internal relocation option. By the date of hearing, the appellant maintained he also feared harm from Maoists in Nepal, as a consequence of his former service in the army.
3. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal, on credibility grounds, as well as there being no risk on return from Maoists, the Taliban or the people who lent money to the appellant. The judge also found there was sufficiency of protection and an internal relocation option.
The grant of permission to appeal
4. The appellant appeals against the judge’s decision, with permission from the First-tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) granted on 31 October 2025 on grounds 1 to 4. With the grounds, the appellant’s representatives also provided some recent articles about protests in Nepal in September 2025. The articles said the protestors were largely a youth movement, dubbed the ‘Gen Z revolution’, who were protesting in response to state social media restrictions. The articles also commented on the state and police response to the protests. The grounds are set out below:
“1. Misapplication of Country Information and the Absence of a CPIN:
The FTT's reliance on the 2006 country guidance case KG (Nepal) as determinative was a fundamental error. This is compounded by the fact that the Respondent has withdrawn the relevant Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) for Nepal. The absence of an in-force CPIN demonstrates that the Secretary of State herself accepts there is no reliable, up-to-date official country guidance. The FTT therefore had no sustainable evidential basis for its conclusions that the Maoist threat is a "fantasy" [31] or that state protection is "adequate" [31]. Recent events in Nepal (Sept–Oct 2025) demonstrate renewed Maoist activity, political mobilisation, and violent state responses to protests. The Appellant's past as an ex-army sergeant who fought Maoists is directly relevant in light of this resurgence, making the decision unsafe.
2. Procedural Unfairness and Flawed Credibility Assessment:
The FTT identified the Appellant as a potentially vulnerable witness, suggesting a need for psychiatric expertise [8]. However, it then proceeded to make robust adverse credibility findings without obtaining such evidence. This was procedurally unfair (AM (Afghanistan) [2017] EWCA Civ 1123) and rendered its assessment of the Appellant's testimony unsafe.
3. Misapplication of the Standard of Proof:
The FTT erred by applying an impermissibly high standard of proof. The rejection of the Appellant's account was based on the Tribunal's own speculation (e.g., that he could have become "seriously rich" as a mercenary [16]) rather than applying the correct "reasonable degree of likelihood" test. This flawed approach vitiates the core credibility findings.
4. Material misdirection - Sufficiency of protection and internal relocation:
On protection, the FTT merely asserted state protection was "adequate" [31] without conducting the required Horvath analysis of whether Nepal has a functioning system willing and able to offer practical protection to this Appellant, particularly given his claim of state-persecution and the current political climate. On internal relocation, the FTT's finding that relocation to Kathmandu was a "full answer" [37,45] was based on the 2023 CPIN [26], which has since been withdrawn and therefore does not have effect.”
Permission to Appeal
5. Permission to appeal was granted with the following reasons and observations:
“2. The grounds assert that the Judge erred in placing reliance on the CPIN Nepal from 2023 which has since been withdrawn. There is also repeated reference to the Appellant’s failure to adduce objective evidence in support of his appeal whilst failing to note the evidence included in the Appellant’s appeal bundle. When considering this cumulatively, this is an arguable error of law.
3. It is also noted that the IJ is speculative in relation to the basis of the Appellant’s claimed fear of money lenders (paragraph 16). The IJ comments that the Appellant can become ‘seriously rich’ from working as a mercenary however does not cite any objective evidence to support this conclusion. This may be material to the credibility findings and as such a further arguable error of law.
4. Of concern is the fact that despite the IJs observations noted at paragraph 8 regarding the Appellant’s mental health and an acknowledgement that the Appellant’s ‘functional intelligence may be compromised’, there is no consideration of this point when assessing the Appellant’s credibility. This is a further arguable error of law.
5. The arguments raised at point 4 are also arguable in that the IJ fails to undertake a proper assessment in relation to the adequacy of protection and internal relocation.
6. The Appellant has identified multiple arguable errors of law and permission to appeal is granted.”
The Hearing
6. On 29 November 2025 the hearing was listed for 5 January 2026 before me, and notice of hearing sent to the appellant’s solicitors by email and to the appellant by post with directions to file a bundle of evidence. On 12 December 2025 a reminder was sent to the appellant’s representatives, as no bundle had been received.
7. On 23 December 2025 the appellant’s solicitors notified the court that they were no longer instructed as they were not in funds, and the appellant would now be a litigant in person. On 30 December 2025 the appellant’s solicitors emailed the court to propose the hearing be vacated as they would not be attending. The court treated this as an application to adjourn and refused it, notifying the appellant’s representatives that day that the hearing would proceed, and that ‘the appellant shall attend the hearing’ and come prepared to deal with the issues and that failure to do so ‘may result in the matter being heard in absence’. The appellant was directed to attend and deal with the error of law issue as a litigant in person.
8. There was no attendance by the appellant or his representatives on the day of the hearing and no further application to adjourn the hearing. I am satisfied the appellant and his former solicitors were notified of the hearing, and that it is in the interests of justice to proceed to hear the case, which can be justly and fairly heard in the appellant’s absence. I already have before me the grounds and evidence on which he relies.
9. The court had prepared a bundle running to 320 digital pages containing the documents relevant to the appeal before me, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
10. Following submissions from Mr Sheikh, I indicated that I would reserve my decision and now provide this below with reasons.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Ground 1
11. It is argued the judge erred in their approach to the country evidence and a failure to have regard to recent events in Nepal which demonstrate the Maoists are still active. I have considered the evidence, but it does not appear to me that the recent news articles submitted with the grounds for permission to appeal were before the judge, or included in the appellant’s bundle, despite being dated before the hearing. They were uploaded to the First-tier online system on 3 October 2025, which is after the judge’s decision was promulgated. It cannot therefore be an error of law for the judge to have failed to have regard to evidence not submitted by the appellant before the hearing or the decision. In any event, as raised by Mr Sheikh, the articles do not appear to relate to the issues in the appeal or the appellant’s bases of claim, and make no reference to risk to former soldiers from Maoists, an absence of state protection for people facing risk from Maoists, any uprising or renewed influence by Maoists, or risk in relation to money lenders or the Taliban, and as such do not appear to add anything. If anything, they show a strong state response to protests and attacks on government officials and buildings.
12. It was also asserted that it was an error of law for the judge to have had regard to an old 2006 country guidance case. KG (Review of current situation) Nepal CG [2006] UKAIT 00076 was referred to by the judge, although it was acknowledged this case is now some nineteen years old, but this remains the current and most recent country guideline decision on Nepal, and so there was no error of law in having regard to it. It was directly relevant to the appellant’s assertions of risk from Maoists. Furthermore, I find the assertion the judge treated this authority as ‘determinative’ has not been made out. The appellant’s own ASA relied on both the 2023 CPIN on Nepal and the guidance in KG (paras 9 and 17) being current in relation to the situation in Nepal and the availability of sufficiency of protection. I find it was open to the judge to first direct themselves to consider the most recent country guideline decision from this Tribunal, to have regard to when it was published, whether it is still the most recent guidance from this Tribunal and then to have regard to any country information that is more recent, which the judge did at 19, 24, and 26. The judge was also entitled to have regard to an absence of country information to establish that the situation had deteriorated since KG was decided.
13. It is unclear to me whether the CPIN was withdrawn before or after the hearing at the FtT, and Mr Sheikh was unable to find out the answer to that. However, the CPIN was in the appellant’s bundle and was relied on in the ASA. In any event, I cannot find the judge did rely on an out of date or withdrawn CPIN, as in fact the judge’s decision does not directly reference it, and instead refers to the guidance in KG and what is described as the ‘country evidence’, said to be mainly from 2023, which is also the year given on most of the country background reports and articles provided in the appellant’s bundle. It is therefore not at all clear to me that the judge only had regard to the CPIN, or relied on it without regard to the other reports.
14. As to reliance on the absence of objective evidence, while I have carefully considered the articles and reports provided by the appellant, I have been unable to locate anything in that material that conflicts with the judge’s findings at 19, 20, 23, and 24, that the country information does not establish attacks against former soldiers by the Maoists, Maoist influence within the state or its emanations, or the Taliban having reach into Nepal, or the government of Nepal being unable or unwilling to protect people against attacks by either group.
15. While the judge regrettably did not cite individual reports and articles in the decision, there was reference to the history and country situation mentioned in those articles, at 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32 and to the financial advantages or prevalence of Nepali migrant workers undertaking work generally and private security work in Afghanistan, despite the risk [at 16] which was also mentioned in various articles in the appellant’s bundle before the FtT.
16. While the grounds criticise the judge’s findings about state protection being ‘adequate’, that appears to originate from the appellant’s own ASA, which acknowledges that KG is authority for finding that generally there is sufficiency of protection from Maoists in Kathmandu and the sole reason why internal relocation was argued to be unreasonable was because the appellant asserted fear of the state, which the judge found had not been established.
17. I therefore find the judge’s findings were open to them and it has not been established that they failed to have regard to either the country guidance from this Tribunal, or country information provided. No error of law has therefore been established.
Ground 2
18. It is argued that the judge erred in finding the appellant was potentially a vulnerable witness and psychiatric evidence was needed, but then made robust credibility findings without obtaining such evidence. I have considered with care the judge’s treatment of this issue, mindful of its importance to procedural fairness and the credibility assessment. The appellant asserted post traumatic stress disorder when first making his asylum claim and thereafter, but also said at each interview that he had never seen any medical professional about this and had never received any diagnosis or treatment. No medical evidence was submitted at hearing and it would appear it was the judge who raised the issue of whether he was a vulnerable witness of their own volition. The appellant was represented but his counsel appeared not to have raised it. In the absence of any evidence to establish diagnosed mental health problems, the judge quite appropriately took a cautious view and applied the Presidential Guidance and treated him as a ’possible’ vulnerable witness.
19. I do accept phrases such as the appellant’s ‘functional intelligence might be compromised’ or ‘he may have a type of paranoid anxiety’ or ‘functional psychological issue’ appear to point to the judge having concerns about the appellant’s fitness to give evidence. However, the judge went on to find that this was merely ‘possible’, was ‘far from proven’, ‘I did not find it was definitely affecting him’, and there was no diagnosis or medical evidence to support that and it should be supported or followed up with psychiatric experts. The appellant does not appear to have done that even by the date of hearing before me, nor did his counsel seek more time to do that before the FtT. It has not been asserted that this was argued at all at the hearing on the appellant’s behalf and appears to come entirely from the judge raising this. I note too the context in which these concerns arise, which relate to the appellant’s fear of the Taliban. My reading of the judge’s comments on the relevance of the concerns about his mental health is that the judge appeared to accept the potential of a genuine subjective fear of harm from the Taliban, as a result of his witnessing of the bomb explosion in the Canadian embassy in Kabul and its psychological impact, and therefore made some allowance in his credibility assessment with regard to that, but went on to find that fear was not objectively well founded.
20. As to whether these concerns undermine the credibility assessment made by the judge, this did not turn on, for example, minor inconsistencies or discrepancies about dates, detentions, traumatic experiences or issues where an account might obviously be affected by undiagnosed mental health issues. The judge relied primarily on the account and asserted risk being inconsistent with and not supported by country information, fundamental plausibility issues, and issues such as the delay in the claim. These include, for example, his family continuing to live in the same village as the money lenders, at the same address given on the appellant’s documents left behind in Kabul, where he has always lived, yet experiencing no further problems from the money lenders, Maoists or the Taliban. Or the appellant’s failure to provide any evidence to support the Taliban being able or motivated to pursue former security personnel in Nepal, or the state failing to protect such people. Or the absence of any evidence or explanation to support any risk to the appellant from the state. It is of note that the majority of those core credibility findings have not been disputed or addressed in the grounds. Further that even taken at its highest, and accepting the appellant feared reprisals from those groups, the judge found there was no risk on return and the appellant’s fear was not objectively well founded.
21. I therefore find that the judge made adequate and sustainable credibility findings that were not undermined by the appellant’s assertions about possible mental health problems, and dismissed the appeal on other bases, and so even were this an error, it is not a material one.
Ground 3
22. It is also argued that the judge applied too high a standard of proof. I note the judge did appropriately direct himself [at 13 and 14] as to the appropriate standard of proof.
23. The appellant’s representatives also argue the judge had regard to speculative findings not open to him, such as that the appellant could get ‘seriously rich’ from private security work and so it was not credible he would have entered into loan agreements. I am unable to locate evidence that would support that specific phrase used by the judge, but note the appellant himself at interview said his bank job paid more than the army, and that he chose to pursue security work in Afghanistan, as did many other people, because ‘it was a good salary’ (question 53). He told the respondent he relied on an army pension of 6,000, presumably nepali rupees, and his bank salary was 14,000 a month (question 49), but the private security job paid 1,200 Euro a month, presumably with other benefits, which is a significant increase in salary. The appellant also provided numerous articles in his bundle, which cited thousands of workers from Nepal having chosen to go to Afghanistan for labour, work and private security work, as the pay was ‘much better’ and said the economy of Nepal was significantly boosted by remittances from such people (B185-188). There does, therefore, appear to be support within the appellant’s own evidence, for the judge’s findings that based on the figures provided, he had the potential to significantly increase his income. It was therefore open to the judge to consider the credibility of the appellant’s account of entering into debt in this context, and of him entering into a loan for similar amounts to those he would earn from security work.
24. These findings about credibility and other issues in relation to the loans also did not stand in isolation, as the judge made other findings about internal and other issues with the account, the timing of the claim, the lack of any problems for the family who continued to live in the same village which did not support risk on return, and the availability of sufficient protection and internal relocation [at 34 to 42].
25. Thus, these findings too were open to the judge, on the evidence before them, but even were the reliance on a speculative finding to be an error, I find it would not be a material one, as the judge found the appellant would not be at risk on return and could seek protection from the state or relocate.
Ground 4
26. It is argued that the judge’s findings about internal relocation and sufficiency of protection are flawed, due to a failure to consider the current political climate, but I have not been directed to country evidence or any updated country guideline decision that replaces or warrants a departure from that relied on by the judge. The judge found there was an absence of country information to establish that there was any objectively well founded risk to the appellant from the Taliban, outside of Afghanistan, or from money lenders or Maoists in his home area, and that even if there was a risk, he could relocate or seek state protection. The judge found the claim was not credible and there was no adverse interest from the state for any reason, despite that being asserted in the ASA, and so these findings too were open to them on the evidence.
27. I therefore find that on the evidence before the judge, the findings the judge made about the appellant’s credibility and the weight to attach to his documentary and other evidence, were adequately reasoned findings that were open to the judge to make.
Notice of Decision
28. The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of errors of law. Accordingly, it stands and the appeal is dismissed.

H Graves

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 January 2026