Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005096

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/56887/2024
LH/01510/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 19th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PAUL LEWIS

Between

NATTHAPANEE SUWANTHAVORN
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. Papasotiriou, counsel.
For the Respondent: Mr. Tuffan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 February 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Background

1. The appellant is a citizen of Thailand who appeals with leave against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge [the ‘Judge’] dated 14th July 2025. An issue to be determined before the judge was whether the appellant was able to meet the continuous residence requirements of paragraph 5.1(a) of Appendix Private Life to the Immigration Rules.

2. In support of her claim the appellant relied on letters from persons who claim to have known the appellant from her time in the UK. One of those persons attended the hearing. For convenience herein, references to ‘witnesses’ refer to persons who gave evidence at before the judge and to those who provided a written account.

3. The appellant’s representative applied to adjourn the hearing to enable the other witnesses to attend.

4. The application was resisted by the respondent on grounds including that a witnesses statement or letter ought to convey everything material which they wished to say to support the appellant. Having considered the written material provided by the appellant, the respondent did not wish to cross-examine the witnesses whose attendance was now sought by way of adjournment.

5. The application was refused for reasons given at [18] to [20] of the judge’s decision. Applying the test of fairness set out in Nwaigwe (adjournment; fairness) [2014] UKUT 00418, at [20] the judge found:

‘The appellant had been given a fair opportunity to ensure her witnesses set out everything they want to say in their written evidence. If the respondent did not wish to question them about their written evidence, then there was no justification for adjourning the final hearing. It was not in the interests of justice to allow witnesses to attend to give oral evidence purely in order to augment their written evidence with details that should have been set out in the written evidence. Furthermore, the appellant could be allowed to give additional evidence regarding her relationship with the absent witnesses. Taking all the circumstances into account, I concluded it would not be unfair or contrary to the interests of justice to refuse the adjournment application.’

6. It is proper to note that at [29] the judge permitted the appellant to give additional oral evidence in chief ‘to enable her to give details of her claimed relationship with the absent witnesses and TA (the witness who had attended)’.

7. The judge dismissed the appeal making findings about the reliability and detail contained in the accounts of the evidence of the appellant and witnesses.

This appeal

8. Permission to appeal was granted on two grounds, below:

Ground 1: The refusal of the Appellant’s adjournment application deprived her of a fair hearing.

Ground 2: The First-tier Tribunal drew inferences from the evidence which were not reasonably open to it on the evidence.

9. The respondent opposed the appeal, relying upon a short Rule 24 response and further oral submissions.

Ground 1

10. It his written grounds at [§6], the case for the appellant is advanced on the basis that the attendance of witnesses would have allowed them to augment their evidence in chief (see [5] above). At the error of law hearing before me, Mr. Papasotiriou helpfully refined the appellant’s submissions in respect of ground one. He confirmed that had an adjournment been granted to secure the attendance of witnesses, it was not intended that there would have been an application to supplement the contents of the witnesses’ statements or letters but simply to tender them for cross-examination.

11. Mr. Papasotiriou submits that it was incumbent upon the respondent to challenge the evidence of witnesses by cross examination as to the circumstances in which the witnesses were able to provide an account of the appellant’s continuous residence in the UK. His case is framed in his written grounds at §13, in this way:

‘The forensic disadvantage from the non-attendance of witnesses should, generally, be borne by the party who is relying on their evidence. However, in the circumstances of A’s case, it was unfair of the FtTJ to refuse her adjournment application, made in order to enable the attendance of her witnesses, on the basis that R had indicated that she did not intend to cross-examine them, one (sic.) one hand, but intended to impugn their evidence, on the other hand’.

12. Mr. Papasotiriou refers me to TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48 per Lord Hodge at [70]. The principles in TUI apply to immigration proceedings per Abdi & Ors v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455 see [33]. At TUI [70],

(i) The general rule in civil cases, as stated in Phipson, 20th ed, para 12-12, is that a party is required to challenge by cross-examination the evidence of any witness of the opposing party on a material point which he or she wishes to submit to the court should not be accepted. That rule extends to both witnesses as to fact and expert witnesses.

(ii) In an adversarial system of justice, the purpose of the rule is to make sure that the trial is fair.

(iii) The rationale of the rule, ie preserving the fairness of the trial, includes fairness to the party who has adduced the evidence of the impugned witness.

(iv) Maintaining the fairness of the trial includes fairness to the witness whose evidence is being impugned, whether on the basis of dishonesty, inaccuracy or other inadequacy. An expert witness, in particular, may have a strong professional interest in maintaining his or her reputation from a challenge of inaccuracy or inadequacy as well as from a challenge to the expert’s honesty.

(v) Maintaining such fairness also includes enabling the judge to make a proper assessment of all the evidence to achieve justice in the cause. The rule is directed to the integrity of the court process itself.

(vi) Cross-examination gives the witness the opportunity to explain or clarify his or her evidence. That opportunity is particularly important when the opposing party intends to accuse the witness of dishonesty, but there is no principled basis for confining the rule to cases of dishonesty.

(vii) The rule should not be applied rigidly. It is not an inflexible rule and there is bound to be some relaxation of the rule, as the current edition of Phipson recognises in para 12.12 in sub-paragraphs which follow those which I have quoted in para 42 above. Its application depends upon the circumstances of the case as the criterion is the overall fairness of the trial. Thus, where it would be disproportionate to cross-examine at length or where, as in Chen v Ng, the trial judge has set a limit on the time for cross-examination, those circumstances would be relevant considerations in the court’s decision on the application of the rule.

(viii) There are also circumstances in which the rule may not apply: see paras 61-68 above for examples of such circumstances.

13. In his written submissions [§9], Mr. Papasotiriou relies specifically on [70(iv)] of TUI. He submits that impugning a witness includes findings that the evidence of the witness was ‘inadequate’.

Discussion

14. Lord Browne set out the general rule that a party is required to challenge by cross-examination the evidence of any witness of the opposing party on a material point which he or she wishes to submit to the court should not be accepted. The rule is not to be applied rigidly [70(vii)] to which he gives examples referring to paragraph [61] of his decision in TUI.

15. In this matter the respondent did no more that draw the judge’s attention to vagueness in the witnesses account. The respondent’s submission was in terms, that the witnesses’ evidence taken at its highest was insufficient for the appellant to discharge the burden on her of demonstrating that she met the requirements of the Immigration Rules by continued residence in the UK for more that 20 years.

16. Mr. Papasotiriou submits that the respondent was wrong to make , and the judge erred in accepting, submissions that the evidence of a witness was vague without putting that to a witness or without further testing that account.

17. I asked Mr. Papasotiriou what questions could or should have been put to the witness in cross-examination. He submitted that it was open to the respondent to request further detail from the witness. There may be good reasons why a party to litigation chooses not to do so. They are certainly not obliged to ask a witness called by an opposing party to elaborate in a manner which might assist the other parties case. Mr. Papasotiriou agreed that any proposed question asking to ‘your evidence is vague’ – would properly be noted as a comment, rather than a question.

18. The judge properly considered and applied Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT. The complaint against the judge under this ground is that the failure to adjourn caused unfairness to the appellant. It seems to me that the heart of the complaint raised by the appellant is that the respondent did not explore and potentially improve the evidence of witnesses who’s written accounts were considered insufficient by the judge.

19. No unfairness was caused to the appellant. The witness evidence relied upon by the appellant was considered by the judge. In reaching his determination he was entitled to consider submissions and make findings that the evidence was vague.

Ground 2:

20. The appellant gave evidence before the Judge. In addition to the contents of her witness statement, the judge permitted additional questions from the appellant‘s representative dealing with the appellant’s relationship with her witnesses who she had said that she had known for ten years or more. The judge described the appellant’s account as to where she was living at [30] as ‘confused and evasive’.

21. On behalf of the appellant, it is submitted that the inferences the judge drew from the evidence were unreasonable. It is submitted that the judge made broad adverse credibility findings when it was not reasonably open to him to be able to do so on the evidence. Specific criticism is made of the judge’s findings at [29] to [32], inclusive.

22. In his grounds of appeal [§19] Mr. Papasotiriou concedes that details of the appellant’s living arrangements were not set out exhaustively in her witness statement and that a witness statement ought to be able of standing as the totality of evidence in chief. With that concession he goes on to submit in terms that where a witness goes on to provide further evidence beyond the scope of their witness statement, it would not be reasonable to draw inferences against them.

23. It is within the judge’s function to assess evidence, including the drawing of inferences provided the reasons for doing so are tolerably clear. At [31], the judge set out his reasons in these terms:

‘All this information was provided to (sic.) the first time at the appeal hearing. No explanation was provided from why TA failed to mention in her written evidence that she had been living with the appellant since 2022. This is clearly a significant inconsistency that the appellant’s representative chose not to explore. This inconsistent significantly undermines TA’s credibility’.

24. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ. 464, at [2], the Court of Appeal reiterated the caution with which an appellate tribunal must approach findings of fact:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
….
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.

24. At [30] and [31] the judge gave a detailed analysis of the appellant’s accounts including how they had developed over time including in her oral evidence before the Judge.

25. This ground of appeal is essentially a disagreement with the weight attached to the detail and development of the account the appellant gave orally and in writing. These are matters to which the judge was entitled to have regard and did. There is no error of law.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the Judge does not contain an error of law. The appeal is refused.

Paul Lewis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11th February 2026