The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005109
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/54369/2022
IA/06532/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19th June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LAWRENCE

Between

AS (NIGERIA)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: self-representing
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals against a decision by Judge Cohen of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”), dated 22 July 2025, to dismiss an appeal by the Appellant against a decision by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”), dated 7 July 2022, to refuse a human rights claim.
Anonymity
2. I maintain or make an order for anonymity because the Appellant’s case concerns a child, whose identity should be protected.
Background
3. The Appellant is a national of Nigeria who was born in 1987. The human rights claim that was refused by the 7 July 2022 decision was made in an application dated 8 July 2021 for leave to remain in the UK on the basis of a parental relationship with a child living in the UK. The SSHD recorded in the 7 July 2022 decision that that application followed the Appellant’s claimed entry to the UK on 17 November 2019 on a family visit visa that was valid until 24 April 2021.
4. In the 7 July 2022 decision, the SSHD asserted, with reasons, that the Appellant did not meet the requirements for a grant of leave to remain as a parent in Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules and that the Appellant’s removal from the UK would not breach Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”). Those same issues were essentially identified by the parties in written submissions as being for the FtT to decide in the Appellant’s appeal to the FtT.
5. The Appellant’s appeal against the 7 July 2022 decision was heard on 25 April 2025 by Judge Cohen. In their 22 July 2025 decision, Judge Cohen materially found that the Appellant did not meet the requirements for a grant of leave to remain as a parent in Appendix FM, because he did not have a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with his child and because he had overstayed his visa. Judge Cohen noted that the Appellant’s relationship with the mother of his child was said to have broken down and that the Appellant continued to pursue Family Court proceedings in order to attempt to gain direct access to the child, who is a British citizen. Judge Cohen found however that such access had not been granted at the date of the appeal and there was no reasonable likelihood of that being granted or of the Appellant being put in a position whereby he would take an active role in the child’s upbringing. Judge Cohen also found that the Appellant did not have a family life in the UK, and that his removal would not cause interference with his right to a family life. The judge accepted that the Appellant had a private life in the UK and that his removal would cause interference with his right to a private life, but the judge found that such interference would be a disproportionate response to the requirements to maintain an effective immigration control policy. The appeal was consequently dismissed.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. Permission to appeal to the UT was refused by FtT Judge Dainty in a decision dated 20 October 2025.
7. The Appellant then applied to the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) for permission to appeal, on grounds that can be summarised as follows: perversity or irrationality in finding there was no reasonable likelihood of access being granted to the child by the Family Court or of the Appellant being put in a position whereby he would take an active role in the child’s upbringing in the light of findings made by the Family Court; procedural unfairness in the judge’s decision to refuse an application to adjourn the hearing for the outcome of the Family Court proceedings; failure to have regard to relevant evidence of a close relationship with the child prior to breakdown of the marriage, which was dismissed by the judge as being irrelevant.
8. Permission was granted by UT Judge McWilliam in a decision dated 26 November 2025. Judge McWilliam’s reasons for granting permission were as follows:
“It is arguable that the decision of the FTT in respect of the relationship between the appellant and his daughter is inadequately reasoned. I am also concerned that there may have been a procedural irregularity arising from the assertion that the judge did not determine the application to adjourn.”
9. The SSHD has made no reply under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
The hearing
10. I heard oral submissions by Ms Khan and by the Appellant, which I refer to in the sections below.
11. I declared that the appeal would be allowed, with written reasons to follow.
12. After doing so, the Appellant informed the tribunal that the Family Court proceedings had concluded since the FtT’s decision with an order for direct contact between him and the child. I suggested that he might consider providing evidence of that claimed fact to the Respondent.
Error of law
13. Ms Khan accepted during the hearing that, if the Appellant had made an application to adjourn the hearing to Judge Cohen, the FtT’s decision would necessarily be vitiated by material error of law because the FtT had given no reasons for refusing the application. Ms Khan however explained that, while the Respondent accepted the factual assertions made at paragraph 4 of the witness statement by the Appellant dated 5 August 2025, that the Appellant had when asked to make his submissions asked the FtT not to make a decision until the end of his family law case, that request had not been an application to adjourn the hearing.
14. I was not persuaded by Ms Khan’s submission and I was persuaded that the Appellant’s request that the FtT not make a decision until the end of his family law case plainly was an application to adjourn that the FtT had given no reasons for refusing. Consequently, given Ms Khan’s concession as to disposal, the appeal must succeed.
15. I also heard argument regarding the adequacy of reasons in the FtT’s decision and I find that the reasons given for finding there was no reasonable likelihood of direct contact being granted or of the Appellant being put in a position whereby he would take an active role in the child’s upbringing are wholly inadequate or irrational, given the situation pertaining at the time of the hearing when it was not disputed that the Appellant was actively pursuing an application to the Family Court for an order allowing him direct contact with his child and he was permitted and was having indirect contact with the child in the interim. The FtT did not adequately explain why there was no reasonable likelihood of direct contact being granted by the Family Court.
Disposal
16. The error of law in the FtT’s decision is such that none of the findings made by the FtT can be preserved, and therefore I consider it is appropriate that the appeal to the FtT be remitted to the FtT for hearing afresh I am satisfied that the nature and extent of judicial fact finding that is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective, it is appropriate to remit the case to the FtT.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the FtT involved the making of a material error on a point of law.
The decision of the FtT is set aside with no findings preserved.
The remaking of the decision in the appeal is remitted to the FtT, to be remade afresh by any judge other than Judge Maurice Cohen.


T Lawrence
Judge Lawrence
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
DATED: 11 June 2026