Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No.: UI-2025-005118

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61745/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 23rd of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MONSON

Between

NJ (TRINIDAD and TOBAGO)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms T. White, Counsel instructed by Ali Levene Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House and on CVP on 6 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Beg promulgated on 18 September 2025 (“the Decision”). By the Decision, Judge Beg dismissed on protection and human rights grounds the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent made on 12 April 2024.

Relevant Background

2. The appellant is a national of Trinidad and Tobago, whose date of birth is 28 July 1987. She is recorded as claiming asylum on 3 April 2023.

3. In her screening interview she said that she had three children; the youngest of whom had been born on 15 May 2018. She suffered from anxiety, for which she was being prescribed medication by Newham General Hospital. She had been referred to Newham Talking Therapies for past trauma and anxiety. She had also suffered anxiety in Trinidad, but she had not been formally diagnosed at that point.

4. A couple of years ago she was shot at close-range in her abdomen. This was in Trinidad. A bullet passed through her left kidney. Three months afterwards, the bullet passed through to the back and they were able to take it out. She had spent 3 weeks in hospital.

5. She was raped numerous times by her ex-partner, the father of her youngest child. She had reported this to the police once, as well as reporting his physical abuse. They lived together for about 6 months and she had left him when she was 7 months’ pregnant when he had shot at her from behind. She had to run to hide in a neighbour’s house. He had come out of prison last year some time. She had had to leave her youngest child with her sister and flee the country, or she would have been killed by him. He was a member of a gang, and the members of the gang could harm her. She was also stabbed in Trinidad by her ex-partner about 5 years ago.

6. She was asked why she had come to the UK? She had come here in April 2022 to escape being killed in Trinidad. She did not know about asylum then. She would have claimed asylum then if she had known about it. If she had stayed in Trinidad, her ex-partner would have killed her when he was released from prison.

7. When she arrived in the UK, she told the Immigration Officer that she was visiting a friend. She had arrived on 23 April 2022 in the UK, and she had left the UK on 7 October 2022 to go to France for 2 days. She came back to UK on 9 October 2022.

8. She was asked to briefly explain all the reasons why she could not return to her home country? She said that she was shot in the abdomen by members of the gang that her ex-partner was affiliated to. Her ex-partner also shot a gun at her whilst standing behind her. She was raped by him on numerous occasions. She left Trinidad before his release from prison. She had to leave her youngest son there, as he had his ex-partner’s surname and the country would not let her bring him with her, or it would have been classed as kidnap.

9. XM was the name of her ex-partner. The gang was called ‘Rasta City’, and it was one of the biggest gangs in Trinidad and Jamaica.

10. The documents which the appellant provided in support of her claim included a prescription dated 17 April 2023; a citizen report receipt dated 23 January 2018; and a citizen report receipt dated 26 February 2019. The report receipts showed that the appellant had made a complaint to the police on the dates shown in the receipts.

11. The appellant was given a substantive asylum interview on 27 March 2024.

The Reasons for Refusal

12. In the reasons for refusal letter (RFRL) dated 12 April 2024, the respondent did not accept that the appellant was of adverse interest to the Rasta City gang or her ex-partner XM. This was because she had provided inconsistent evidence without reasonable explanation, as well as a lack of detail. There were also some elements of her account which were inconsistent with external information.

13. Among other things, the appellant was lacking in specificity and significant detail regarding her relationship with XM. She did not answer what drew her to him, or what interests he had, and she was also inconsistent in regards to how long she was in a relationship with him. In her substantive interview she said that she was in the relationship for 9 months. In her screening interview she said that she was in the relationship until she was 7 months’ pregnant. In the further alternative, in interview she said that she decided to leave him just before she left Trinidad and Tobago on 22 April 2022. She was also inconsistent as to how long they had lived together. In interview, she claimed that it was only for the first couple of months when she was pregnant. But in her screening interview she said that it was for 6 months.

14. Another inconsistency was over when she claimed to have been shot by the gang for being an informer. In interview, she said that this had happened 10 years ago. But in the screening interview she said that it had happened a couple of years ago.

15. Her credibility was also damaged by her delay in claiming asylum, and by her not claiming asylum in a safe country (France) before re-entering the UK.

The Pre-Review Evidence

16. The appeal bundle uploaded to the CCD (aka “My HMCTS”) file by the appellant’s solicitors in October 2024 contained additional documents from Trinidad in support of the appeal. The one document in which XM was named was an application for an application for a Protection Order made against him by the appellant on 27 February 2019, in respect of two incidents that were said to have occurred on 18 February 2019 and 23 February 2019 respectively, when the respondent (XM) had “called and made threatening, obscene and insulting language towards her”. According to the application for a Protection Order, the appellant and the child’s father were residing in different streets on the Beetham Estate in the city of Port of Spain.

17. In a letter dated 6 October 2024, the appellant’s GP summarised the appellant’s medical history as documented in the surgery’s records. She had sustained an alleged gunshot wound in the abdomen over 10 years ago in Trinidad and Tobago. On examination, she had a 21cm-long mid-line scar, a 15cm transverse scar on the left abdomen, and a 3cm scar on her mid-left flank.

18. An A&E report from a hospital in Port of Spain dated 19 January 2019 stated that the appellant had been stabbed by a glass bottle to her left forearm and left thigh, and diagrams were seen affirming injuries and laceration to her right ear.

19. The appellant had been referred for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) to the Community Mental Health team in May 2024, and had been prescribed medication for sleep. She had had an initial assessment for talking therapies in September 2024 and she had been placed on the waiting list for guided self-help.

20. In a witness statement endorsed with a Statement of Truth dated 4 October 2024, the appellant sought to address the adverse credibility points that had been raised against her in the RFRL. As to her delay in claiming asylum, she wished that she had faced the situation and done something sooner when she first arrived in the UK, but her mind was and remained “very damaged” and she could not cope. She did not want to face anything and just wanted to be safe (para 3). In the refusal, it was mentioned that she was lacking in specificity and significant detail regarding her relationship with XM. It needed to be understood that her mind was all over the place. She was in tears. It was very upsetting going through the trauma. She had listened to the interview again with her legal representative and she was whimpering, if not crying, recollecting a lot of the very bad memories (para 33). XM knew that she had got shot for being an informer. He mocked her for this during her pregnancy. She knew now, looking at the medical report from 2005, that she was shot 19 years ago. She should have been more specific in interview, but she was traumatised about this incident, and still was, and she had blocked it out of her memory. She had just guessed roughly to get the interview over with, as it had triggered flashbacks that she was trying to deal with.

Post-Review Evidence

21. Following a Respondent’s Review in December 2024, the appellant’s solicitors uploaded a supplementary bundle of documents which contained a letter dated 3 February 2025 from a Cognitive Behavioural Therapist, which was addressed to the appellant’s GP.

22. He reported that the appellant had recently attended an initial triage assessment appointment at Ealing NHS Talking Therapies on 13 January 2025. She described experiencing symptoms indicative of PTSD as a result of 2 traumatic incidents which had occurred 20 years ago and 7 years ago, involving assault with a weapon. She reported experiencing symptoms such as flashbacks to both incidents; nightmares; and feeling on the edge/hypervigilant most of the time. She reported avoiding talking about what happened to her, and avoiding any reminders of the incidents. Her responses to a PTSD Questionnaire produced a score of 41 on the PCL-5 scale.

The Hearing Before, and the Decision of, the First-Tier Tribunal

23. The appellant’s appeal came before Judge Beg for a hybrid hearing at Taylor House on 18 September 2025. Both parties were legally represented, with Ms Bexson of Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant. As recorded by the Judge at para [19] of the Decision, Ms Bexson raised as a preliminary issue that the appellant should be treated as a vulnerable witness on the basis of the medical evidence. The Presenting Officer had no objections. The Judge said that she took into account, inter alia, the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No.2 of 2010 in respect of Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Witnesses and she declared as follows:

“The appellant is treated as a vulnerable witness as she has been referred to mental health services.”

24. The Judge’s findings of fact began at para [25]. The Judge found that the appellant’s credibility was damaged under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 as she did not accept that the appellant did not know about the asylum process despite living in the country for a year before claiming asylum: para [28].

25. The Judge found that, given the various discrepancies she had identified, the medical documents from Trinidad did not reliably establish that the appellant had suffered a gunshot injury in 2005. Even if she was shot, there was no credible evidence that it was by a member of the Rasta City gang because she was perceived as being an informer. She found that the appellant could simply have been in the wrong place at the wrong time and caught in a cross-fire where weapons were used. It was common ground that firearms were widely available in Trinidad and Tobago: para [36].

26. The Judge found that if the appellant had been perceived as an informer, it was unlikely that she could have remained living in Trinidad following the shooting.

27. In cross-examination, the appellant denied that she knew XM was a member of the Rasta City gang when she began a relationship with him. She did not find that credible as she gave evidence that he lived close by to her, just a few streets away’ and that the gang was a very large gang which had links to the police. Bearing in mind the appellant’s claim that she had previously been shot by a member of the same gang, it was wholly implausible that she would not have known that XM belonged to the same gang: para [37].

28. If the appellant was concerned about how violent and controlling XM was, she would never have left her son in Trinidad and Tobago before leaving the country. XM could have prevented him from travelling abroad. The Judge did not accept the appellant’s evidence that XM’s sister persuaded XM to send the child abroad. She said that when XM was intoxicated his sister got him to sign the Consent Form. In cross-examination, she claimed that this all happened the day before her son travelled. It was put to her than an airline would need notice in advance for an unaccompanied child traveller. She said that the airline only needed a letter from both parents and the child’s identity document. She said that that was provided on the day of the flight. The Judge did not find it credible that the airline was not informed well in advance that a child would be travelling alone on a long-haul flight. Nor did she find it credible that XM only signed the consent documents whilst intoxicated. The Judge found that XM had agreed for his son to travel to the UK to be raised by the appellant: paras [50]-[51].

29. The Judge concluded at para [58] that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution.

30. The Judge went on to address the medical evidence relating to the appellant’s mental health in the context of a discussion as to whether it would be contrary to the child’s best interests to return with his mother to Trinidad. The Judge observed at para [67] that there was no psychiatric report stating that the appellant had been diagnosed with PTSD. The report from the Cognitive Behavioural Therapist was not a Psychiatric Report, and so she only gave it limited weight. The Judge held that the appellant’s mental health issues did not reach the threshold of AM (Zimbabwe) [2020] UKSC 17: para [76]. The Judge’s overall conclusion was that any interference with the appellant’s Article 8 rights would not be disproportionate.

The Grounds of Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

31. The grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal were settled by Ms White, who had also settled the appeal skeleton argument (ASA) that was before Judge Beg.

32. Ground 1 (set out in para 4 of the grounds) was that, having directed that the appellant was to be treated as a vulnerable witness, the Judge failed thereafter - and at any point in her extensive adverse credibility findings - to direct herself that mental health issues (particular if arising from trauma, such as being shot) might well affect the appellant’s ability accurately to recall and describe past events, or that allowance might have to be made in assessing any perceived discrepancies Therefore, the Judge had misdirected herself and had failed to treat the evidence with anxious scrutiny.

33. Grounds 2 to 7 (set out in paras 5 to 11 of the grounds) related to various adverse credibility findings made by the Judge which were said to lack adequate reasoning and/or to fail to take account of relevant evidence and/or to be based on a misunderstanding of the relevant evidence.

34. Ground 8 (set out in para 12 of the grounds) was that the Judge displayed apparent bias. The Decision gave the clear impression that what the respondent said was far more important to the Judge than what the appellant said. The impression was materially reinforced by the subsequent reiterated and extensive adverse credibility inferences, founded (as noted above) on incorrect and/or inadequate premises - including the rejection of substantial aspects of the appellant’s account because of the absence of corroboration, rather than any perceived and explained difficulties in the evidence itself. This was further reinforced by the speed with which a lengthy and relentlessly adverse determination was promulgated. The cumulative effect was that justice was not manifestly seen to be done in the determination of this appeal.

The Reasons for the Grant of Permission to Appeal on Grounds 1-7

35. On 31 October 2025 First-tier Tribunal Judge Gumsley gave detailed reasons for granting permission to appeal on all grounds save for the ground set out in para 13, which was Ground 8 - the allegation of apparent bias. Judge Gumsley identified the grounds set out in paras 4, 5, 9 and 11 as being arguable. Judge Gumsley did not consider that the grounds put forward at paras 6, 7, 8 and 10 were arguable in themselves, but as they were intrinsically linked to the Judge’s credibility findings as a whole, they might be argued in association with those grounds which were arguable.

The Hearing in the Upper Tribunal

36. At the hearing before me at Field House to determine whether an error of law was made out, Ms White, who attended remotely on the Cloud Video Platform (whereas the appellant was present in the courtroom), developed Grounds 1 to 7 with reference to an appeal skeleton argument that she had settled for the hearing in the Upper Tribunal.

37. Although there was no Rule 24 response, Mr Tan, who also attended remotely on the Cloud Video Platform, confirmed that the appeal was opposed and he mounted a robust defence to the Judge’s decision. He submitted that, on analysis, the error of law challenge made by the appellant was simply a sophisticated disagreement with findings that were reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence that was before her, and for which she had given adequate reasons.

38. After hearing from Ms White in reply, I reserved my decision.

Discussion and Conclusions

39. I bear in mind the observations of Lord Brown in South Bucks County Council -v- Porter [2004] UKHL 33; 2004 1 WLR 1953 at para [36]. His guidance is cited with approval by the Presidential Panel in TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC). Lord Brown’s observations were as follows:

“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…”

40. I also take into account the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Volpi and another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at para [2]:

“i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for the judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”

41. Applying the guidance set out above, I consider that most of the grounds fall away. Although the documentary material from Trinidad supported the core claim to some degree, it was open to the Judge to place adverse weight on the gaps in the documentary record and on the respects in which the appellant’s account was not consistent with the documents. The Judge was also not plainly wrong to disbelieve the claim that XM’s parental consent had been secured while he was intoxicated; or to draw the inference that XM was content for his son to join the appellant in the UK, and hence that XM did not have an ongoing adverse interest in the appellant.

42. However, while I accept that the Judge was not required to refer to every piece of evidence or to set out every step in her line of reasoning, I am nonetheless persuaded that the Judge materially erred in law by not following the mandatory guidance given in the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No.2 of 2010.

43. The guidance provides that the definition of a vulnerable adult includes individuals who are vulnerable because of what has happened to them e.g. they are victims of trafficking or have sustained serious harm or torture or are suffering from PTSD.

44. The guidance stipulates at para 3 as follows: “It is a matter for you to determine the extent of an identified vulnerability, the effect on the quality of the evidence and the weight to be placed on such vulnerability in assessing the evidence before you, taking into account the evidence as a whole.”

45. The guidance goes on to state:

“14. Consider the evidence, allowing for possible different degrees of understanding by witnesses and appellant compared to those who are not vulnerable, in the context of evidence from others associated with the appellant and the background evidence before you. Where there were clear discrepancies in the oral evidence, consider the extent to which the age, vulnerability or sensitivity of the witness was an element of that discrepancy or lack of clarity.

15. The decision should record whether the Tribunal has concluded the appellant (or a witness) is a child, vulnerable or sensitive, the effect the Tribunal considered the identified vulnerability had in assessing the evidence before it and thus whether the Tribunal is satisfied whether the appellant had established his or her case to the relevant standard of proof. In asylum appeals, weight should be given to objective indications of risk rather than necessarily to a state of mind.”

46. The Judge recorded at the outset her conclusion that the appellant was a vulnerable witness. She did not record, or indeed appear to consider, the effect that she considered the appellant’s vulnerability had in assessing the evidence before her; and where she found clear discrepancies in the appellant’s oral evidence, she did not show that she had considered the extent to which the vulnerability of the appellant was an element in that discrepancy or lack of clarity.

47. It was open to the Judge to give limited weight to the medical evidence relating to the diagnosis of PTSD for the reasons which she gave. Nonetheless, having accepted and recorded that the appellant was a vulnerable witness, she could not remain silent on the question whether, and if so, to what extent, the discrepancies she found in the oral evidence were attributable to the identified vulnerability, especially when it was the appellant’s evidence that, for example, her delay in claiming asylum and her inconsistency over when she had been shot in the abdomen were attributable to her traumatised mental state. Also, as was canvassed at the hearing before me, according to the witness statement evidence, the appellant’s child did not travel on his own, but travelled with a responsible adult. So, although it was open to the Judge to disbelieve the account of the child travelling on his own given by the appellant in her oral evidence, she did not ask herself whether the clear discrepancy between the oral evidence and the witness statement evidence on this issue arose from the appellant’s vulnerability.

48. Although the Judge’s failure to consider the effect of the appellant’s identified vulnerability only calls into question the soundness of some of her adverse credibility findings, it cannot be said that, absent the failure to follow the mandatory guidance, the outcome was bound to have to been the same. In any event, not only must justice be done, but it must be seen to be done.

49. For the above reasons, the Decision is unsafe and should be set aside.

50. I have carefully considered the venue of any rehearing, taking into account the submissions of the representatives. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement.

51. I consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process and I therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains an error of law, and accordingly the decision is set aside in its entirety, with none of the findings of fact being preserved.

This appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal at Taylor House for a fresh hearing before any Judge apart from Judge Beg.

Anonymity

The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in favour of the appellant, and I consider that it is appropriate that the appellant continues to be protected by anonymity for the purposes of these proceedings in the Upper Tribunal.

Andrew Monson
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
20 January 2026