Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005119

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66724/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 4th of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURGHER

Between

IS
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Aslam (Counsel), Lex House Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs A Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 12 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellant, IS, is a national of Albania, born on 7 October 2006.
2. He appeals against the decision of First tier Tribunal Judge C H O’Rourke (the Judge), who heard the appeal on 15 September 2025 and whose decision was promulgated on 17 September 2025, dismissing the appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
3. The Appellant’s account was that, while a minor, he was exploited by a criminal gang in Albania, including being compelled to deliver drugs and surrender earnings. That account was expressly accepted by the Judge at paragraph 15 of the decision.
4. Notwithstanding that finding, the Judge concluded that the Appellant would not face a real risk on return (paragraph 17), that there was sufficiency of protection (paragraph 18), and that internal relocation would be reasonable (paragraph 19).
5. Permission to appeal was granted on 30 October 2025 by First tier Tribunal Judge Swaney, on the basis that it was arguable the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for attaching little weight to the psychological expert evidence and may have proceeded on a mistaken understanding of the materials before the expert.
Anonymity Order
6. The Judge made an anonymity order. There was no request for the anonymity order to be set aside. I conclude that the Appellant’s rights to international protection outweigh the Article 10 rights of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings.
The Grounds of Appeal
7. The grounds are confined to the Judge’s treatment of the psychological expert report and the impact of that treatment on the conclusions that followed. In summary, it is argued that:
a. The Judge summarised the expert evidence at paragraph 13, including diagnoses of extremely severe depression, anxiety and stress, severe PTSD, and moderate suicidal ideation (paragraph 13(iv)).
b. He then attached little weight to the report at paragraph 14(v), relying on JL (medical reports – credibility) China [2013] UKUT 145 (IAC).
c. At paragraph 14(iii), the Judge stated that the expert had not considered the respondent’s refusal decision or prior credibility concerns.
d. At paragraph 19(iii), the Judge concluded that the appellant’s mental health condition is not as serious as stated.
8. It is said that these findings disclose a misapplication of JL, are inadequately reasoned, and were material to the Judge’s assessment of risk, internal relocation and Article 8.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
9. I had before me the composite hearing bundle of 193 pages which included the Respondent’s Rule 24 response dated 10 November 2025. I also benefitted from the helpful oral submissions from both representatives.
Appellant’s submissions
10. Mr Aslam, on behalf of the Appellant, it was submitted that the Judge’s approach to the medical evidence was legally flawed.
11. Although the Judge accurately summarised the report at paragraph 13, he then discounted it without engaging with its objective clinical components, including psychometric testing and diagnosis.
12. It was submitted that the Judge was wrong at paragraph 14(iii) to state that the expert had not considered the refusal decision. The report expressly listed the “Home Office Letter” among the documents reviewed.
13. Reliance was placed on JL, properly understood, as authority that medical reports constitute independent evidence, even where reliant in part on the appellant’s account, and that judges must give clear reasons if departing from such evidence.
14. It was further submitted that the conclusion at paragraph 19(iii) was unsupported by any clinical reasoning and inconsistent with the diagnoses the Judge had recorded at paragraph 13(iv).
15. On materiality, it was argued that the Judge’s findings on risk (paragraph 17), internal relocation (paragraph 19) and Article 8 depended upon his rejection of the severity of the appellant’s mental ill health
Respondent’s submissions
15. Mrs Nolan, on behalf of the Respondent, placed reliance on the Rule 24 response. She submitted that the weight to be given to expert evidence is a matter for the Judge, and that the absence of cross examination did not oblige the Tribunal to accept expert conclusions.
17. The particular inconsistency identified by the Judge at paragraph 14(iii), namely that the expert proceeded on the basis that the Appellant’s family had been threatened, whereas the Judge found at paragraph 9(viii) that the family had not been subjected to threats or violence was relied in support of the Judge’s approach and findings.
18. It was further submitted that any error in this regard was immaterial, given the Judge’s freestanding findings on lack of current risk (paragraph 17), sufficiency of protection (paragraph 18), and the availability of treatment and family support in Albania (paragraph 19(i)–(iii)).
The Legal Framework
16. The Upper Tribunal is confined to considering whether there are errors of law in First Tier Tribunal decisions. In R (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 Brooke LJ summarises what amounts to an error of law at paragraphs 9 and 10
9. When the court gave this guidance in Subesh, it was aware that it would not be of any relevance to an appellate regime in which appeals were restricted to points of law. It may be convenient to give a brief summary of the points of law that will most frequently be encountered in practice:
i) Making perverse or irrational findings on a matter or matters that were material to the outcome ("material matters");
ii) Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters;
iii) Failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters;
iv) Giving weight to immaterial matters;
v) Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter;
vi) Committing or permitting a procedural or other irregularity capable of making a material difference to the outcome or the fairness of the proceedings;
vii) Making a mistake as to a material fact which could be established by objective and uncontentious evidence, where the appellant and/or his advisers were not responsible for the mistake, and where unfairness resulted from the fact that a mistake was made.

10. Each of these grounds for detecting an error of law contain the word "material" (or "immaterial"). Errors of law of which it can be said that they would have made no difference to the outcome do not matter. This need to identify an error of law which would have made a material difference to the outcome…
17. In JL (medical reports – credibility) China [2013] UKUT 145 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal held, in summary, that:
a. Medical reports may constitute independent evidence, even where partly reliant on an appellant’s account.
b. Experts may properly assess the consistency of symptoms with an account; this does not usurp the judicial role.
c. Judges retain the task of assessing weight, but must give adequate reasons when rejecting or discounting expert evidence.
Conclusions
Medical evidence
18. A significant reason given by the Judge for attaching limited weight to the psychological report was the inconsistency between the factual basis on which the expert proceeded and the Judge’s findings of fact.
19. At paragraph 14(iii), the Judge records that the expert understood the Appellant’s family in Albania to have been threatened by the criminal gang, and that this feature informed the expert’s assessment of the Appellant’s ongoing anxiety and fear.
20. However, at paragraph 9(viii), the Judge records as undisputed evidence that the Appellant’s family had not been subjected to threats or violence by the gang following the Appellant’s departure. That finding is relied upon again at paragraph 17(i), where the Judge treats the absence of any approach to the family as an indicator that the gang no longer has any interest in the Appellant.
21. The Judge was therefore entitled to conclude that the expert’s assessment rested, in part, on a factual premise which he rejected. That was a legitimate matter for scrutiny and was properly identified at paragraph 14(iii).
22. The difficulty arises from what followed. Having identified that discrete inconsistency, the Judge proceeded at paragraph 14(v) to attach little weight to the report as a whole, without distinguishing between those aspects of the assessment which depended upon the asserted family threats and those which did not. In particular, the Judge did not explain why the inconsistency identified at paragraph 14(iii) undermined the objective clinical elements of the report, including the diagnoses and psychometric findings which he had summarised at paragraph 13(iv).
23. That difficulty is compounded by the Judge’s conclusion at paragraph 19(iii) that the Appellant’s mental health condition is not as serious as stated. No reasons are given for that conclusion beyond the earlier attribution of limited weight, and no explanation is provided as to how it is reconciled with the diagnoses previously recorded.
24. In those circumstances, while the Judge was entitled to identify and rely upon the inconsistency between the expert’s understanding of family threats and the findings at paragraphs 9(viii) and 17(i), he failed to explain why that inconsistency justified rejecting the severity of the Appellant’s mental health condition itself. That amounts to a misapplication of the principles in JL and discloses an error of law.
Materiality
25. I consider that the error identified was material. The Judge’s conclusion at paragraph 19(iii) that the Appellant’s mental health condition is not as serious as stated formed an important part of the evaluative exercise that followed. That finding fed directly into the assessment of risk at paragraph 17, the reasonableness of internal relocation at paragraph 19, and the rejection of the Article 8 claim. Therefore, the error undermines the findings from paragraph 17 onwards.
26. The assessment at paragraph 19(i)–(iv) proceeds on the footing that the Appellant’s vulnerability is limited and that any residual anxiety would be alleviated by return to family support. Those conclusions cannot safely stand where the underlying assessment of the medical evidence was legally flawed.
27. While the Judge identified factors independent of the medical evidence, such as the passage of time, the absence of threats to the family, and the availability of treatment in Albania, the severity of the Appellant’s mental health condition was a relevant consideration in weighing those factors, particularly in relation to re exploitation risk and the reasonableness of relocation.
28. I am not satisfied that, had the medical evidence been lawfully assessed, the outcome would inevitably have been the same. The error is therefore material.
Remaking
29. In Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal confirmed that remittal will ordinarily be appropriate where the nature or extent of fact finding required makes remaking in the Upper Tribunal inappropriate. Both representatives agreed that the matter should be remitted for a complete rehearing before a judge other than First‑Tier Tribunal Judge C J O’Rourke. The nature and extent of the fact‑finding required is substantial. The interests of justice plainly require that the appeal be reheard entirely afresh. In accordance with paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements, remittal to the First‑tier Tribunal is appropriate.
30. The appeal is therefore remitted to the First tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing, with the preserved finding at paragraph 15 that the Appellant was exploited by a criminal gang in Albania while a minor.
31. I note submissions concerning the pending Upper Tribunal country guidance case relating to Albanian male victims of trafficking, LR (Albania: male victims of trafficking) (UI-2024-002111). It will be a matter for the First tier Tribunal to consider whether it is appropriate to stay the remitted appeal pending the outcome of that case.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First‑tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
I set that decision aside and remit the appeal is remitted to the First‑tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) to be heard afresh by a judge other than First‑Tier Tribunal Judge C H O’Rourke.
The anonymity direction made below is preserved.

Benjimin Burgher

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25 February 2026