Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005121
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61635/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2nd March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIPLEY

Between

AAN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Bhachu, counsel, instructed by Lawrence Kurt Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Walker, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 February 2026

ANONYMITY ORDER

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.

Failure to comply with this Order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The appellant appeals a decision of First-tier Tribunal Codd (“the Judge”) dated 1 September 2025 dismissing the appellant’s international protection and human rights appeal.

Anonymity Order

2. The Judge issued an anonymity order. Neither party requested that the order be set aside. I observe that the appellant seeks international protection and consider that his private life rights protected under Article 8 ECHR presently outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings. The latter right is protected by Article 10 ECHR.

Relevant Facts

3. The appellant is a national of Afghanistan. The appellant’s claim was that he was a second lieutenant in the army and guarded high profile figures in that capacity. He fears the Taliban as a consequence. The respondent refused the application for international protection in a decision dated 4 November 2025.

First-tier Tribunal Decision

4. In the decision the Judge made the following records and findings:
(i) The witness who attended the hearing had provided a statement but was simply a character witness and had no direct evidence to offer and it was thus not necessary to call him [10]
(ii) The appellant had attempted to conceal something from the Tribunal in his editing of the photographs of himself wearing a uniform. Adverse weight were attached to the photographs [20]
(iii) It was not credible that the appellant would only have had limited training considering the seniority of those he was guarding. [23]
(iv) It was not credible that the Taliban letter would contain the appellant’s full rank and employment details.[24]
(v) The appellant’s annual identity clearance documents were not considered reliable due to their identical photographs and similar wet stamp [27]
(vi) The explanation the appellant gave for providing a digital and paper photograph identity document was not credible [28]
(vii) Section 8 applied and adversely affected the appellant’s credibility [30]
(viii) It was not credible that the appellant was a high-ranking military officer or a member of the army [31]
(ix) The appellant had not brought forward any practical reasons which would prevent his return. He had not pleaded any separate Article 3 or Article 8 claim as a barrier to return [34]

Grounds of Appeal

5. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal on the following grounds:
(i) Failure to apply relevant country evidence and country guidance cases and background material on risk to former ANSF members. The Judge had failed to assess whether the appellant would be at risk as someone affiliated with the former regime even if it was not accepted that he was of high rank.
(ii) The assessment of credibility was flawed and irrational. The Judge had been inconsistent in his findings as to the photographic evidence and had inferred deception on inadequate grounds. The Judge ’s expectations for corroboration were unrealistic and unfair. The Judge had disregarded the supporting written evidence from the appellant’s cousin SN.
(iii) In assessing the application of Section 8 of the 2004 act, the Judge had failed to place weight on the appellant ‘s explanation that he was under the control of an agent.
(iv) The Judge had failed to engage with the evidence supporting the appellant’s Article 8 claim and claim concerning return conditions in Afghanistan.

Permission to appeal

6. By a decision dated 2 November 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Boyes granted permission to appeal on ground (iv) above only.

Error of law hearing

7. The error of law hearing was listed on 5 February 2026. As a preliminary matter, the appellant sought permission orally to rely upon grounds of appeal previously refused permission. Mr Walker had no objection to the oral application to argue such grounds and submitted that he agreed with Ms Bhachu that there was a material error of law in the Judge ’s description of the witness evidence and failure to deal with that evidence in the decision.

8. Ms Bhachu was advised that the application to argue such grounds must be made in writing: rule 21(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. The representatives were informed that that application and the oral submissions made by both parties would then be considered.

9. The appellant filed grounds of appeal in accordance with oral directions and sought an extension of time on the ground that counsel had only been instructed shortly before the error of law hearing.

10. An application was made to pursue ground (ii) on the basis that it overlapped with ground (iv) in respect of the evidence of the appellant’s cousin, SN. It was argued that Judge Boyes had not given reasons addressing the failure of the Judge to consider the written evidence of SN.

11. I have considered the reasons provided for the delay in renewing the application for permission to appeal on grounds previously refused by the First-tier Tribunal, and I exercised discretion to extend time in which to file the notice of appeal and granted the appellant permission to appeal on ground (ii).

Analysis

Ground (ii)

12. At paragraph 10 of the Judge ’s decision the following is recorded:

Although the Appellant produced a witness statement from his cousin, who attended the hearing, his evidence was simply as a character witness. He had no direct evidence to offer, and as such it was not necessary to hear evidence from him.

13. The witness, who is understood to be SN, had provided a written statement setting out conversations he had with both the appellant and the appellant’s father (the cousin of the witness) confirming that the appellant was in the army in Afghanistan and what his job entailed. The appellant and the appellant’s father were in Afghanistan at the time and SN was in the UK. There is no other witness statement in the bundle, apart from the appellant’s own statement.

14. Ms Bhachu argued orally that it was an error to describe SN as a character witness and the information in his statement had a direct bearing on the asylum appeal. The Judge therefore needed to make an assessment of SN’s written statement. Mr Walker concurred.

15. In the written application to pursue grand (ii) there is no specific reference to paragraph 10 and the description of SN as a character witness. Instead, the renewed grounds focus on the failure to make any further finding on the written evidence of SN.

16. Mr Walker has conceded that the failure to consider the written evidence of SN was a material error. The Judge has failed to address the relevant evidence in the appellant’s protection appeal, in so far as the statement of SN, sets out information regarding the appellant’s military career and duties.

Ground (iv)
17. Permission to rely on ground (iv) has already been granted. The statement of SN is also relevant to the appellant’s private life claim and Mr Walker has conceded that the failure to consider that statement is a material error of law.

18. In the circumstances, it is accepted that the appellant has established a material error of law in the judicial consideration of his credibility and the only proper course is to set aside the decision in its entirety.

Remitted Hearing

19. I observe the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I consider the nature and extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in this appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.

20. There are no preserved findings of fact.

Notice of Decision

21. The decision of the Judge is considered to contain an error on a point of law and is set aside pursuant to section 12 (2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“the Act”).

22. The anonymity order is to continue.

23. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal at Birmingham to be heard by any Judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Codd

F Ripley
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 February 2026