Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005124
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/71141/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 27th of May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SOLANKI

Between

OT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Devlin, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Isherwood, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is an asylum seeker who fears persecution on return to Iran. I continue the anonymity order made on 3 November 2025 accordingly.

2. The Appellant is a national of Iran. He was born in 1991.

3. The issue to decide is whether the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) Judge (‘the Judge’) McCLaren erred in law, in a decision dated 12 September 2025, when dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Respondent, dated 19 September 2024, to refuse his protection and human rights claims made on 18 July 2024.

Background

4. The Appellant fears return to Iran on the grounds of his conversion to Christianity. He also advanced an Article 3 ECHR health claim.

5. The Appellant claimed asylum on 18 July 2024. His claim was refused on 19 September 2024. He appealed this decision.

6. His appeal was dismissed by the FtT in a decision dated 12 September 2025.

Grounds of Appeal and Grant of Permission

7. The Appellant appealed the decision of the FtT. I summarise the grounds of appeal advanced as follows:
i. Ground One: At paragraph 18 of the decision, the Judge made findings that no reasonable judge would have made and/or had regard to irrelevant considerations in assessing the credibility of the claim that the Appellant was a genuine Christian convert. The Judge drew an adverse inference from the omission to mention specific stories or Bible verses in the witness statement, but no issues were taken in this regard by the Respondent in the refusal letter or in the review. The Judge took against the Appellant that he had recited the best known of all Bible passages, but the suggestion that these were the best known passages is not ascertainable from sources of information nor does this fall within judicial knowledge of the tribunal. The Appellant’s knowledge of the Bible was further not to be assessed against the general British population of the United Kingdom, as the Appellant is an Iranian national who was born and raised as a Muslim.
ii. Ground Two: The Judge erred a paragraph 21 of the decision by failing to give adequate and comprehensible reasons for finding that the Appellant had been evasive in cross examination.
iii. Ground Three: The Judge erred in law at paragraph 22 of his decision by failing to have regard to all relevant considerations and/ or making a finding that no reasonable judge would have made. The Judge failed to have regard to the Appellant’s witness statement when considering his evidence on his tattoo location. The Judge failed to give any or adequate reasons for rejecting the evidence that the Appellant was careful to ensure that his tattoo would not be visible. The finding made by the judge that the tattoo would be visible if the Appellant wore a top with a loose neckline was unreasonable.
iv. Ground Four: At paragraph 23 of the decision, the judge made findings that no reasonable judge would have made in stating that it was implausible that he would have obtained a marker of Christianity on his body in Iran when he was at pains to maintain the privacy of his conversion. The Judge made findings on the tattoo and the photographs of the same which are inconsistent with other findings made and on issues that were not raised by the Respondent or the Judge.
v. Ground Five: At paragraph 24 of the decision and paragraph 19 of the decision, the Judge made findings on the locations that the church was held in in Iran which were unreasonable. The Judge also made findings on the implausibility of the Appellant’s account to have not been caught up in the raid on the church which no reasonable judge would have made.
vi. Ground Six: The Judge erred at paragraph 29 of the decision by failing to have regard to all relevant considerations and/ or giving inadequate weight to the evidence from church witnesses. The Judge failed to consider the detail in Reverend Graham's evidence.

8. Permission to appeal was granted by FtT Judge Lawrence in a decision dated 3 November 2025. The Judge also granted anonymity. The decision reads as follows:

“1. The application is made in time.
2. All six grounds are arguable for the reasons stated in the grounds.
3. Permission is accordingly granted.”

Submissions

9. The matter came before me in an error of law hearing on 26 February 2026.

10. I had before me a composite bundle (CB) running to 552 pages and a List of Authorities running to 104 pages. Ms Isherwood confirmed that there was no Rule 24 Reply.

11. I heard detailed submissions from both representatives.

Findings and Reasons
12. I consider the grounds of appeal advanced below.

Ground One

13. The Appellant argues that at paragraphs 18-19 of the decision, the Judge made findings that no reasonable judge would have made and/ or had regard to irrelevant considerations in assessing the credibility of the claim that the Appellant was a genuine Christian convert. It is said that the Judge unfairly drew an adverse inference from the Appellant’s omission to mention specific stories or Bible verses in the witness statement, but no issues were taken in this regard by the Respondent in the refusal letter or in the review. The Judge took against the Appellant that he had recited the best known of all Bible passages, but the suggestion that these were the best known passages is not ascertainable from sources of information nor does this fall within judicial knowledge of the tribunal. The Appellant’s knowledge of the Bible was further not to be assessed against the general British population of the United Kingdom, as the Appellant is an Iranian national who was born and raised as a Muslim.

14. I set out paragraphs 18 and 19 of the decision in full here:
“Appellant’s evidence
18. I found the Appellant’s evidence to be unsatisfactory in several respects. By his own account Amir, the friend who had introduced him to Christianity had told him many stories which had struck the Appellant and had helped him to feel calm in Iran (WS, paras 17-21). The Appellant describes in some detail how the stories made him feel: “simple but meaningful [stories]…I began to feel calmer…the stories were peaceful and gave me a strange sense of comfort...there was something special in these stories, they were full of kindness, forgiveness and hope. I had never heard anything like them before...they were opening my heart to something new, something different…Amir’s words stayed in my mind for days after [his] visit. I couldn’t stop thinking about them…I asked [for them] in writing so I could read them myself…That night I stayed up reading
the stories. They were unlike anything I had read before. They were filled with love and hope and they touched my heart deeply…I spent the whole night reading the notes he gave me…I was full of questions…Over the following days and weeks Amir continued to give me more Bible passages and I read them with great interest.”
19. In his witness statement, the Appellant’s expansiveness about how the stories made him feel and his frequent references to how many stories Amir shared with him sits starkly alongside a dearth of information and detail about the stories themselves. There are no references at all to the specific stories or Bible verses which struck him so deeply. In his asylum interview, he cites three passages namely John 3:16, the Lords’s Prayer and the story of the lost boy who is welcome back by his father which I took to be the story of the prodigal son (AIR 107, 112-114). These may indeed be the Appellant’s favourite Bible passages but they are also probably the best known of all bible passages amongst the general population as a whole and therefore citing them does not of itself indicate that the Appellant has more in-depth knowledge of the Bible than an average member of the public who would not profess to be a Christian. The Appellant also sets out in his asylum interview that he researched Christianity online after Amir introduced it to him and says that he found out about the miracles and life of Jesus (AIR 73) which would bring further stories and Bible passages to his attention. When asked in cross-examination about the passages of the Bible which were given to him and made him feel such a sense of peace again the Appellant is only able to cite John 3:16. Given the central part Bible stories and passages have played in the Appellant’s own account of his conversion, I find his lack of detail on these matters to be particularly striking and an indication that he may not be telling the truth.”
(emphasis added)

15. I have considered the refusal letter. There is nothing within this that questioned or would have invited citation of Bible stories or verses in his appeal witness statement. His knowledge of Bible stories and verses was not specifically raised as an issue by the Respondent. I can see from paragraph 9 of the FtT decision that no review was undertaken by the Respondent and as such no issue in this regard was raised in any review. I note that in his asylum interview when asked about his favourite passage/story at Q107, 112-114 he answered and then was not pressed on these matters any further. The criticism by the Judge at paragraph 19 of the decision of the Appellant’s statement (that he did not reference Bible stories or verses within this) appears not to have regard to this and/or to be unfair when considering this.

16. The statement made by the Judge about the Appellant’s favourite Bible passages being “probably the best known of all bible passages amongst the general population as a whole” causes me concern as this statement is not supported or explained by the Judge reference to any evidence. I also have regard to the submissions made that this Appellant is an Iranian national, born in a majority Muslim country. I note that his evidence is that he raised in a strict traditional Muslim family. His knowledge has to be assessed against this background and it is not clear that this is the approach that has been taken.

17. I have considered that the Judge refers to Appellant’s account of his conversion in expecting more knowledge from him on this issue. In this regard, I was referred by Mr Devlin to the case of Rizal v Gonzalez [2006] which is a United States Court of Appeal, Second Circuit decision. This decision makes some common sense and sensible points. For example, it is said that an individuals can identify with a religion notwithstanding a lack of detailed knowledge of doctrinal tenets, that it is one thing to appreciate the teachings and enjoy listening to preachers and another to claim to be an expert or have a deep understanding of Christianity, that many deeply religious people have very little knowledge about the origins, doctrines or even observances of their faith. It seems to me, having read the Appellant’s statement and interview (including as cited by the Judge), he was not professing to have a profound knowledge of Bible passages but to simply enjoy listening to the same and to be interested in the same. It can be seen from the decision (see for example paragraph 20 and paragraph 31) that the Appellant’s “lack of detail on passages” is taken against him significantly.

18. Having regard to all of the above, I do consider that the approach taken here raises a material error of law in that weight has been attached to immaterial matters; see R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at 9 (iv).

Ground Two

19. The Appellant argues that the Judge erred at paragraph 21 of the decision by failing to give adequate and comprehensible reasons for finding that the Appellant had been evasive in cross examination. It is recorded by the Judge here that the Appellant disclosed feeling unwell when answering some questions but that the Judge does not explain whether he accepted that, nor does he set out what impact (if any) this had upon the assessment of the Appellant’s evidence.

20. I set out paragraph 21, and also paragraphs 6 and 12 of the decision given the relevance of these to the issue being raised:
“6. The HB had been prepared to include documents which had been lodged late by the Appellant. The Appellant also sought to rely on additional papers beyond those in the HB, namely a three-page statement from Rev John Graham, a one-page letter from Mr Noel Hutchison, Community Links Practitioner, and 28 pages of photos (IOP2). Mr Buist objected to the late submission of these items and separately argued that the letter from Mr Noel Hutchison was a new matter to which consent was not given. I admitted all the three items to evidence since they appeared related to the issues before me. The issue of a potential new matter could be covered in submissions.
12. I heard evidence from the Appellant and Rev John Graham. The Appellant gave his evidence with the assistance of an interpreter. The language was Farsi. The Appellant became tearful in the course of giving evidence and said he was not feeling well at all. After a short break he was able to continue. Rev Graham gave his evidence in English.
21. I also found the Appellant to be evasive when answering questions in cross-examination. On two separate occasions I had to direct him to answer the question, which followed Mr Buist drawing his attention to the fact that he had not answered the question asked of him. For example, when asked at what point he began researching Christianity after Amir had given him the handwritten notes of Bible stories, he answered that he trusted Amir a lot. When asked the same question again he said that Amir never forced him to go to church at which point he said that he wasn’t feeling well at all and would like a break. Later the Appellant was directed to a photo of a tattoo featuring a cross (IOP2/2) taken against a brick background with a mug of tea on a windowsill. The Appellant was asked where that photo had been taken and he answered that Amir had taken it. He was asked if he was sure that the photo had not been taken in the UK, to which the Appellant asked Mr Buist if he meant that there were no bricks in Iran. Only when I directed him to simply answer the question asked did he confirm that he was sure that the photo had been taken in Iran. He was asked if Amir owned the tattoo parlour and he answered that Amir was the tattoo artist and went on to give detail about the instrument that he had and what type of tattoo he had wanted. Only when I redirected him to the question asked of him did he advise that the photo had been taken in a room of Amir’s house. I find that the Appellant’s repeated evasiveness in answering questions under cross-examination a further indication that he may not be telling the truth.”
(emphasis added)

21. I note from the above that the Judge admitted medical evidence from a Community Links Practitioner Noel Hutchinson dated 14 November 2024 which stated A was referred from the GP for access to mental health support, that he experienced a traumatic journey and was a victim of violence, this has resulted in ongoing anxiety and depression for which he is receiving treatment, he has been referred for counselling, he has a friend in Glasgow who he confides in and who provides a great deal of support, he has support from his church (CB 481). I also note that his skeleton argument referred to his depression and vulnerability (CB 479-480). In his asylum interview he disclosed trauma, abuse, suicidal thoughts and depression (AIV Q2-7).

22. I note that consent was not given for a new matter which flowed from the medical evidence, namely an Article 3 ECHR health claim (see paragraph 35 of the decision), but that the medical evidence was admitted by the Judge.

23. It is correct that at paragraph 6 and 21 of the decision the Judge notes that the Appellant said he was not feeling well at one point in cross examination, that he was tearful and after a short break he continued to give evidence. What is not clear from the decision is whether the Appellant not feeling well and his medical evidence was taken into account when assessing his evidence. It is not clear whether or not it was accepted that he was not feeling well, whether the Judge considered that this impacted upon his evidence or that it did not, if it did not why not, if it did so to what extent, it is also not clear whether his medical evidence was weighed into any decision made in this regard.

24. I do consider this to be a material error of law having regard to the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child Vulnerable and Sensitive Appellant Guidance (‘Joint Presidential Guidance’) and SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana [2019] UKUT 398 (IAC). I note that the Joint Presidential Guidance, requires being aware that the order and manner of evidence may be affected by mental, psychological or emotional trauma (paragraph 10.3).

Grounds Three and Four

25. It is argued that the Judge erred at paragraph 22 of his decision by failing to have regard to all relevant considerations and/ or making a finding that no reasonable judge would have made. The Judge failed to have regard to the Appellant’s witness statement when considering his evidence on his tattoo location. It is also said that at paragraph 23 the Judge made findings on the tattoo and the photographs of the same which are inconsistent with other findings made

26. I set out paragraph 22 of the decision of the FtT here:
“22. Aside from the evasiveness, I also found the Appellant’s evidence about the tattoo itself to be unsatisfactory. He was clear in his asylum interview that the tattoo was on his lower back (AIR77). No amendments to the asylum interview are before me where the Appellant sets out that there are any matters incorrectly recorded. The Appellant’s pictures of tattoos lodged in IOP2 seem to be screenshots from a messaging service as they show the time, battery power and radio signal of the phone at the top of them. A picture on which the Appellant relies at IOP/2 quite clearly shows a tattoo with a Christian theme on an upper back, quite close to the nape of the neck. A tattoo anywhere on the back could be visible at certain times, but I consider that there is a clear difference between a tattoo on the lower back which is a more private area and less likely to be seen rather than a tattoo such as the one shown in the picture which could be more easily viewed if a top with a loose neckline was being worn. The Appellant said in his asylum interview (AIR 81) that after getting the tattoo he was very cautious and tried not to get undressed where someone would see him, but a tattoo such as the one shown in IOP/2 would be much more likely to be seen even when the Appellant was fully dressed. The Appellant says that even though he has a different phone from the one he had in Iran he was able to access this photo from the icloud. There is no explanation before me as to who “Shiraz” is who took the photo or sent it to the Appellant. There is no explanation before me as to why a photo (IOP2/3) supposedly taken in Iran has the comment “No pain No gain” on it when the Appellant does not speak English and by his own account only ended up in the UK to his surprise and at the behest of the agent in whose control he apparently remained throughout his journey. I accept that the last point about the photo comment was not put to the Appellant.”
(emphasis added)

27. Whilst it is accepted by the Appellant that there were no post-interview representations, it is highlighted in the grounds of appeal that the Appellant corrected his evidence on the location of his tattoo in his appeal witness statement which says at para.35 “The tattoo is on my upper back, not on my lower back. It is not visible unless I remove my clothes. So, it is not correct to say it is on my lower back. I got this tattoo in Iran after I became a Christian. I want to explain this clearly to the decision maker. I can also show old photos taken in Iran where my tattoo is visible. These photos will prove that I had the tattoo already in Iran and it is a part of my faith.” It is further submitted that the Judge has not had regard to the possibility of mistakes with use of an interpreter in the interview, especially where the interpreter was remote.

28. It is not clear from the decision whether the Judge has considered and weighed the evidence in the witness statement. It is also not clear whether the Judge considered the possibility that there was an error, misunderstanding, or mistake, made in the asylum interview when looking at the evidence of the tattoo location; see JA (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] WLR 4291 at para. 24, R (Iran) & Ors at 9(ii),(iii).

29. I also note, as set out in ground 4 of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal, that the Judge says that there is no explanation of who took the photo of the Appellant referred to as IOP/2 (namely the photo of the cross tattooed on the back) but that at paragraph 21 of the decision the Judge records that the Appellant said in cross examination that this photo was taken by Amir.

30. Similarly, at paragraph 23 of the decision the Judge states “[the photograph] is not accompanied by any detailed explanation in the Appellant’s witness statement as to where the photos have been taken, by whom and when. The Appellant’s answers in cross-examination and the way he gave them did not clear up any of the questions which arose.” As stated above at paragraph 21 of his decision, the FtT record that the Appellant had said in cross-examination that “Amir had taken [the photograph]” and that it had been taken in “a room of Amir’s house”. It follows that I agree with the submission made in Ground 4 that it is wrong, or at the very least difficult to understand the finding made by the Judge, that the Appellant’s answers in cross-examination did not clear up any of the questions which arose. I am mindful of what I have found in respect of Ground 2 in coming to this conclusion.

31. I also note, as highlighted in Ground 4, that the FtT Judge accepts at the end of paragraph 22 of the decision that one of the issues taken against the Appellant here was not in fact put to him; see Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48 and R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at 9 (i) (ii), (iii), (iv) and (vi).

32. I have not considered all matters raised under Grounds 3 and 4 here, but my reasons for this are further explained below.

Ground Six

33. I now turn to ground six.

34. It is argued that the Judge erred at paragraph 29 of the decision by failing to have regard to all relevant considerations and/ or giving inadequate weight to the evidence from church witnesses. It is said that the Judge failed to consider the evidence from Reverend Elliot.

35. The Judge makes findings on Reverend Graham’s evidence at paragraphs 26-29 of the decision. I set out those findings in full:
“Evidence of Rev John Graham
26. Rev John Graham is the minister of Parkhead Congregational Church and has held the position for over 45 years. He first met the Appellant in early 2025. He gave his evidence simply and without embellishment and there was no doubt in my mind that the statement he gave alongside his oral evidence came from his sincerely held belief that the Appellant was a genuine Christian convert.
27. The Appellant invited me to place weight on his evidence without going into much detail as to why I should do so. I find that Reverend Graham holds a position of responsibility within the church and has been a minister for 45 years. He has seen a growing number of individuals from Iran attending his church, all of whom had recently converted to Christianity as far as he was aware. He wasn’t aware of the reasons why the Home Office had refused the Appellant’s claim. From his own experience of the Appellant he had come to the view that he was a genuine and committed Christian. In cross examination he stated simply and openly that it was difficult to say what had convinced him of that but had come to that view from speaking with him and hearing about the Appellant’s faith that Jesus was his saviour and had died for him. He referred to the Appellant’s approach as refreshing and that the Appellant had spoken naturally and those factors had led him to believe that the conversion was a genuine one. The church has begun offering part of the services with Farsi translation which Reverend Graham translates himself using an online translation service. He is aware of members of the church with ongoing asylum claims and he had agreed to speak in support of one other person. There were those in his church who claimed to be Christians but whom he had had to challenge about their behaviour. At times like these he had reminded himself that it was not for him to judge. He was asked whether his desire to want to believe someone was a genuine convert might cloud his opinion, but he didn’t think so as the church didn’t pressure people into believing. He had baptised the Appellant, a process which was not rushed and which followed him being satisfied that the Appellant knew what baptism meant and was sincere.
28. The factors that draw me to placing weight on Rev Graham’s evidence are that he is an experienced minister of many years and holds a position of responsibility within the church. Importantly he had considered the possibility that the Appellant was not a genuine convert (para 12). It was also clear that he did not support every asylum seeker in his church, citing that he believes God gives discernment (para 12). The Appellant was only one of two people he was prepared to give evidence.
29. Against those factors, I have some reservations about Reverend Graham’s evidence. He has not known the Appellant particularly long, only a matter of months. I accept that the process of baptism as outlined before me would seem to entail some in-depth discussions, but I cannot agree when he says that he has known the Appellant for a considerable period of time (para 1). It was also not clear to me from the evidence before me for how many years of Rev Graham’s ministry Iranian Christian converts had been attending his church, nor how long he had been providing Farsi translations of his main talks. Providing such a service might well attract many more Farsi speakers to his church amongst whom there may be more asylum seekers. His decision to speak up for only two of the asylum seekers could best be understood against a background of how big the group of asylum seekers in his church actually was. I accept that latter point was not put to him in cross-examination for him to comment upon.”

36. I have considered the written evidence from Reverend Graham (CB 35, 510-512). The initial written evidence is dated 29 April 2025 and confirms that the Appellant had been attending their worship services on Sunday mornings for the past two months (this would be from February 2025), having already been involved in a Christian fellowship in London when he first arrived in the UK in July 2024. The evidence says that the Reverend is convinced of his sincerity in making his profession of faith in Jesus Christ and therefore he has pronounced him to be a Christian man. He confirms that he baptised him at the church where he made a firm commitment to follow Jesus. A more recent statement from Revered Graham is dated July 2025 and this provides a lot more detail.

37. I have also considered the letter from The Upper Room Church dated April 2025 (CB 36). This is written by the lead pastor, Reverend Eliott. The letter says that the Appellant began attending there in early August of 2024 and since then he has regularly attended weekly Bible study and the main weekly worship service. This timeline was verified with trusted colleagues. The author personally attests to his responsiveness to opportunities to express a sincere Christian faith in the community. The letter confirms that they have been considering the Appellant for baptism.

38. I can see nothing in the decision of the Tribunal which considers the written evidence of Reverend Elliott from The Upper Room Church. It is not clear whether any weight has been attached to the evidence or whether it has been considered at all. No reasons are given for rejecting that evidence or for taking any particular approach to it.

39. Given this case turns on the genuineness of the Appellant’s conversion and the importance of this type of evidence to the issue in the claim, and given Reverend Graham’s evidence followed on from the evidence of Revered Elliott, I find that the FtT’s failure to consider the evidence of Reverend Elliott is a material error of law. In coming to this conclusion I have regard to TF v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] SC 61 at para.60, SA (Iran), R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 2575 (Admin) and Dorodian (01/TH/1537).

40. I also note that the FtT Judge accepts at paragraph 29 of the decision that some of the matters raised by the Judge in doubting or having reservations in respect of Reverend Graham’s evidence were not in fact put to him; see Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48 and R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at 9 (ii), (iii), (iv) and (vi).

41. Having considered all of the above, I find that this ground establishes a material error of law.

42. Whilst I note that there are a number of other grounds advanced, and that Ms Isherwood argued against those grounds, having regard to the nature of the errors I have found above and the issue that they go to in this appeal, I cannot say that the decision of the FtT would have inevitably been the same on the issue of conversion had the above errors not occurred. I am mindful that credibility is a holistic assessment. Further, the claim is an asylum claim and deserves “the most anxious scrutiny”; see Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514, at 531 and MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at §66. I therefore find the errors I have set out and addressed above on the issue of conversion to be material.

Notice of Decision

43. For the aforementioned reasons, I find that there are material errors of law in the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal. I set aside the decision on this basis.

44. Considering 7.2 of the Practice Statement of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal and the nature of the errors identified, I remit this matter to the FtT (Glasgow/Scotland), to be heard before any Judge aside from Judge McLaren.

P. Solanki

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 May 2026