Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No.: UI-2025-005127

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55901/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MONSON

Between

UN (PAKISTAN)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Hashmi, Counsel instructed by Mamoon Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House and on CVP on 6 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Davison promulgated on 8 September 2025 (“the Decision”). By the Decision, Judge Davison dismissed on protection and human rights grounds the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent made on 27 February 2024.

Relevant Background

2. The appellant is a national of Pakistan, whose date of birth is 17 May 1993. He arrived in the UK on 30 April 2022, and on 31 January 2023 he made an application for asylum.

3. The appellant claimed that he had been threatened in Cyprus (where he had been living since 2017), and in the UK, by his family for refusing to return to Pakistan to marry his cousin HB, and that if he were to be returned to Pakistan, he would face a real risk of being subjected to an honour killing.

4. The appellant also advanced a family life claim. He said that he had been in a relationship with CM, a British national, whose date of birth was 18 June 2000, since December 2022. He said that after she had lost her home in April 2023 she had moved to live with her father and he had also taken up residence at her father’s home.

The Reasons for Refusal

5. In the reasons for refusal letter (RFRL) dated 27 February 2024, the respondent did not accept that the appellant had a genuine fear of his family or of HB’s family, or that he was at real risk upon return, because the material facts which would have created a real risk of persecution were not accepted. In addition, even if his claim was taken at its highest, he had been unable to demonstrate the power and reach of HB’s family or of his own family in Pakistan.

6. As to his family life claim, he had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he had been living with his partner in a relationship akin to marriage for at least 2 years before the date of application.

The Appellant’s Case on Appeal

7. On 25 September 2024 the appellant married CM in a civil ceremony. In a witness statement dated 10 March 2025 CM said that she was now pregnant with their first child and was due to give birth on 10 April 2025. She could not go to Pakistan to live there, since she had severe ADHD. The appellant’s solicitor subsequently uploaded to the CCD (aka “My HMCTS”) file documentary evidence of the child’s birth on 1 April 2025.

8. In a direction issued by a Legal Officer, the respondent was invited to confirm their position in respect of the additional evidence of the appellant having a child with his partner.

The Supplementary Respondent’s Review

9. In an undated supplementary Respondent’s Review, the respondent submitted that there was no medical evidence to support the claim that the partner could not travel to Pakistan due to her ADHD. The maintenance of the refusal decision would not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or his family. As regards the appellant’s child, the respondent submitted that this child did not meet the 7-year UK residence test, and as such would be able to integrate into Pakistan should the parents wish to take the child there.

The Hearing Before, and the Decision of, the First-Tier Tribunal

10. The appellant’s appeal came before Judge Davison sitting in the Virtual Region (Manchester) on 27 August 2025. The appellant was represented by Ms Hashmi, instructed by Mamoon Solicitors, and the respondent was represented by a Home Office Presenting Officer.

11. As set out in the Decision at para [9], the representatives agreed that there were two issues for consideration in the appeal:

“(i) the credibility of the asylum claim and the risk to the appellant from former family members or the wider community for refusing to marry his cousin; and/or

(ii) the Article 8 claim regarding his partner and child in the United Kingdom (insurmountable obstacles, very significant obstacles, exceptional circumstances, section 55 and 117B). It was agreed that all of these matters would stand and fall together. No distinct arguments were to be raised.”

12. The Judge received oral evidence from the appellant and his partner, who were both cross-examined.

13. In his closing submissions on the issues arising under Article 8 ECHR, the Presenting Officer submitted that the appellant could not meet an immigration rule; the expert report offered little; and in summary there were no insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing in Pakistan. In the alternative the appellant could return and make an application for entry clearance.

14. In her closing submissions on behalf of the appellant, Ms Hashmi invited the Judge to find that the appellant was credible in his protection claim. As to the alternative claim under Article 8 ECHR, she submitted that the appellant’s wife had serious mental health issues. It would not be possible for the appellant to return and seek entry clearance, as his wife did not work. The appellant was looking after his wife and father-in-law and was certainly his wife’ main carer. Without him in the UK, she would be left unattended as would their new son. This was against their son’s section 55 best interests. The appellant wife had no intention of leaving the UK and felt that Pakistan was not safe. In the circumstances, the appeal should be allowed.

15. At paras [17] to [22] of the Decision, Judge Davison gave reasons for dismissing the appellant’s protection appeal. The Judge then turned to consider the alternative claim under Article 8 ECHR. At para [23] he directed himself that the question was whether the appellant, his partner and child could return to live in Pakistan, or whether the appellant should return to make an entry clearance application.

16. At para [24] the Judge held that the appellant’s wife had converted to the Muslim faith. In some of the photographs provided she was seen wearing a head-scarf. She stated in evidence that she often wore this when attending Friday prayers. She had therefore adopted her husband’s religion and some of the cultural mores. For the reasons given above, he did not accept that the appellant’s direct and extended family posed a threat in Pakistan.

17. At para [25] the Judge addressed the expert evidence. He held that the expert report was prepared without sight of the appellant’s wife’s GP notes. The Judge went on to find that the report should be given limited weight. The expert had acted more as an advocate than as an independent expert. The report was unsourced; assertions were made concerning the appellant’s inability to work in Pakistan with no basis; and the conclusions of the report related to the legal framework that needed to be applied by the independent tribunal.

18. The Judge went on in para [26] to reach the following conclusion:

“Even accepting that it could possibly be advisable for her to seek further treatment for these mental health issues, no independent evidence has been placed before me to state that such treatment would be unavailable in Pakistan. Moving to Pakistan with a young child would be difficult. However, that is not the threshold for assessment. With her partner’s support I find that there would be no insurmountable obstacles to the appellant, his wife and child establishing themselves in Pakistan should they wish.”

19. At para [27] the Judge gave reasons for finding that there would not be very significant obstacles to the appellant returning to reside in Pakistan for the purposes of making an application for entry clearance.

20. At para [28] the Judge found that the appellant’s father-in-law worked as a milkman, and no independent evidence was placed before him to evidence that he could not meet his own needs or that he would be unable to cope if the appellant were to leave his household. If anything, the appellant had been reliant upon him to provide a place of accommodation since his wife had lost her own accommodation.

21. At para [29] the Judge went on to address an Article 8 claim outside the Rules. He held that on the appellant’s side of the equation was his relationship; his child; his wife’s mental health issues; and the fact that she is a British citizen with family ties to the UK. On the respondent’s side of equation was the fact that the appellant had come to the UK on a student visa; he had overstayed this visa; and he had made a fraudulent claim for asylum. He had then entered a relationship with his now-wife when he had no permission or expectation to be able to remain in the UK. There was a public interest in the maintenance of a fair and effective system of immigration control. The correct avenue for the appellant would be to return and apply for entry clearance if his wife wished to remain in the UK. This was a matter of choice for them. There were no exceptional circumstances that would merit a grant of leave.

The Reasons for the Grant of Permission to Appeal

22. On 3 November 2025 First-tier Tribunal Judge Lawrence granted the appellant permission to appeal for the following reasons:

“It is arguable that the Judge materially erred by failing to have regard to the best interests of the appellant’s child when considering whether there would be insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the UK or [whether] the decision under appeal is unlawful under Article 8 of the ECHR.”

The Hearing in the Upper Tribunal

23. The hearing before me to determine whether an error of law was made out was a hybrid one, with me being present in the courtroom at Field House, whereas the representatives attended remotely on the Cloud Video Platform.

24. Although the respondent had not filed a Rule 24 response, Mr Tan confirmed that the appeal was opposed. Ms Hashmi submitted that the decision was vitiated by a material error of law for the reasons given in the grant of permission and in the Appeal Skeleton Argument (ASA) dated 5 January 2026. She confirmed that the Judge had correctly set out the agreed issues at para [9] of the Decision, but she submitted that the Judge still had to consider the best interests of the child, and he had failed to do so.

25. Mr Tan submitted that the child was only a few months old at the date of the hearing, and no evidence specific to the child was put forward. The Judge had addressed the three central issues bearing upon the claim that there were insurmountable obstacles to family life being carried on in Pakistan, and the Judge should be taken to have had all the relevant considerations in mind, including the best interests of the child. In reply, Ms Hashmi acknowledged that the only argument specific to the child was that as a British citizen it was not reasonable to expect the child to go to Pakistan. Otherwise, the case on reasonableness rested upon the case put forward in respect of the child’s mother.

Discussion and Conclusions

26. I bear in mind the observations of Lord Brown in South Bucks County Council -v- Porter [2004] UKHL 33; 2004 1 WLR 1953 at para [36]. His guidance is cited with approval by the Presidential Panel in TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC). Lord Brown’s observations were as follows:

“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…”

27. I also take into account the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Volpi and another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at para [2]:

“i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for the judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”

28. The error of law challenge engages EX.1(a) of Appendix FM, and section 117B (6) of the 2002 Act. EX.1(a) applies if the applicant has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a child who is under the age of 18 years; is in the UK; is a British citizen or has lived in the UK continuously for at least the 7 years immediately preceding the date of application; and taking into account their best interests as a primary consideration, it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the UK.

29. Section 117B (6) provides that, in the case of a person who is not liable to deportation, the public interest does not require the person’s removal, where (a) the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and (b) it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the UK.

30. In the appeal skeleton argument (ASA) before Judge Davison dated 9 June 2025, Mark Edwards of Mamoon Solicitors submitted that the appellant was entitled to remain in the UK under Appendix FM as a partner of a British citizen, and that due to the appellant’s wife’s and father-in-law’s mental health issues, and his baby son’s needs and welfare, it would not be reasonable to expect his son to leave the UK (para 8); that there were insurmountable obstacles to family life with his wife and son continuing outside the UK; and taking into account his son’s best interests as a primary consideration, it would not be reasonable to expect him to leave the UK with his father (para 18); and that the refusal of LTR or asylum would lead to a breach of section 55 BCIA 2009 in relation to the appellant’s son (para 23).

31. In an otherwise comprehensive and well-reasoned decision, the Judge left himself open to an error law challenge by not making specific reference to the best interests of a British citizen child in his discussion of EX.1 and of proportionality.

32. However, I am not persuaded that the Judge thereby fell into material error, having regard to the case the way the case was put by the appellant. As stated by the Judge at para [9] of the Decision, there was no distinct argument pursued at the hearing as to why it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the UK, taking into account his best interests as a primary consideration. The appellant’s case was that there were insurmountable obstacles to family life with his partner continuing outside the UK, and on account of those obstacles it was unreasonable to expect the child to leave the UK. Thus, the appellant’s case on EX.1(a) stood or fell with the case advanced under EX.1(b).

33. The appellant’s primary case was that he was a potential victim of honour killing in Pakistan. Alternatively, his case was that there were insurmountable obstacles to family life being carried on in Pakistan because (a) the appellant and his British family could not live in safety and would be destitute in Pakistan; (b) the appellant’s wife and son would still be at risk because the family could not obtain the healthcare required for the appellant’s wife, and (c) the appellant and his family would face very significant obstacles to integrating into life in Pakistan.

34. The Judge gave cogent reasons for finding that none of the above obstacles were made out, and that the relocation of the parents and the child to Pakistan would not have an unjustifiably harsh impact upon the appellant’s father-in-law.

35. In the light of the way that the appellant’s case was advanced and resolved by the Judge, it was implicit that the appellant had not made out a case that - taking into account his best interests as a primary consideration - it would be unreasonable to expect the child to leave the UK. On the contrary, it is implicit from the Judge’s findings that it was entirely reasonable to expect the British citizen child to leave the UK with both his parents.

36. It is clearly in the best interests of the child who has only just been born to remain in the same household as both his parents; and so, if the choice of the parents is to relocate to Pakistan, it is clearly in the best interests of the child, and clearly reasonable, to expect the child to relocate to Pakistan with both his parents.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not contain an error of law, and accordingly the decision stands. This appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Anonymity

The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in favour of the appellant, and I consider that it is appropriate that the appellant continues to be protected by anonymity for the purposes of these proceedings in the Upper Tribunal.

Andrew Monson
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
20 January 2026