Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005129
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67812/2023
LP/02925/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 17th of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BAGRAL

Between

SH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr I Ali, Counsel instructed by Rashid Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First‑tier Tribunal Judge Beg (“the judge”), promulgated on 26 June 2025, by which his appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claim was dismissed.
2. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal on 23 October 2025. On renewal, permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Neville on 10 March 2026. Judge Neville granted permission to appeal on all grounds, but the observation that he made in granting permission plainly relates to Ground 1. Judge Neville considered it was arguable that the judge failed adequately to engage with explanations advanced by the Appellant in respect of aspects of the credibility assessment.
3. The appeal now comes before me to determine whether the judge made a material error of law.
Background
4. The Appellant is a citizen of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity. His claim for international protection was based upon an alleged incident with Iranian border guards on 12 June 2021; and sur place political activities in the United Kingdom.
5. The judge rejected the Appellant’s account in Iran and also rejected his sur place claim, finding that he was not a credible witness and was not of adverse interest to the Iranian authorities.
The Grounds of Appeal
6. The Appellant advances four grounds, which may be summarised as follows:
Ground 1: failure to engage with explanations for inconsistencies and omissions.
Ground 2: failure properly to assess sur place activities.
Ground 3: failure properly to assess Facebook evidence; and
Ground 4: failure properly to assess risk on return.
The Hearing
7. I had before me a composite bundle which included the documents relevant to the appeal, and the Appellant’s and Respondent’s bundles before the First- tier Tribunal. I also had the Appellant’s second asylum interview record dated 28 November 2023, the Respondent’s Rule 24 Response and the Appellant’s skeleton argument drafted by Mr Ali for this hearing.
8. Having heard helpful submissions from Mr Ali and Mr Nappey, I indicated that I would reserve my decision and provide that in writing which I now turn to do.
Consideration
9. I observe that the Appellant was legally represented before the judge, but those representatives came off the record following the dismissal of the appeal. No further representatives were instructed until after permission to appeal had been granted and Mr. Ali notified me that the Appellant personally prepared the grounds of appeal.
10. Mr Ali, who did not appear before the judge, sought to advance two additional matters in his skeleton argument, which do not appear in the grounds of appeal.
11. The first concerns an alleged error of fact at [23], where the judge recorded that the Appellant claimed to have hidden in the mountains until approximately 1 a.m., whereas in interview he had stated 11 p.m.
12. The second is an assertion that the judge imposed a requirement of corroboration at [25] and [49] by taking into account the absence of supporting evidence from the Appellant’s parents and uncle.
13. Mr Ali made submitted that the first matter was implicit in the grounds as pleaded. He properly accepted that the second was not raised within them, but invited me to take into account that the Appellant was unrepresented at the stage when the grounds were drafted.
14. No application was made to amend or vary the grounds so as to include these additional matters.
15. I was not persuaded by Mr Ali’s submissions in this respect.
16. The Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules apply equally to all parties, whether represented or not. The grounds, as drafted, are detailed and make reference to relevant authorities. They do not suggest that the Appellant is an unsophisticated litigant. On any fair reading, the additional matters now relied upon are neither expressly raised nor capable of being reasonably inferred from the grounds.
17. In those circumstances, I indicated to Mr Ali that I would not permit these additional matters to be pursued. He did not seek to press them further.
18. I turn to address the grounds as pleaded.
Ground 1: Failure to engage with the Appellant’s explanations
19. Ground 1 challenges the judge’s treatment of the Appellant’s evidence concerning his ability to describe the border guards.
20. At [21] of the decision, the judge concluded that:
“The appellant was unable to give any detailed description of the guards in the asylum interview despite sighting that they regularly came to the land to verbally abuse and humiliate shepherds. In cross-examination he said that he saw that they were wearing khaki clothing and remembers seeing the green colour. I find that the appellant could not give description in the asylum interview even of the guard who allegedly shot his dog” (sic).
21. At [22], the judge also relied upon inconsistencies in the dates provided by the Appellant for the incident in question – 20 June 2021, 12 June 2021 and 10 July 2021 - and stated that he “gave no explanation” for those discrepancies.
22. The Appellant submits that this amounted to a failure to engage with the explanations advanced in his witness statement, including that he was stressed during interview, not prompted to expand his answers, and that translation issues affected his description of the guards uniforms.
23. It is correct that the Appellant subsequently offered such explanations. It is also correct that the judge might have articulated more fully that those explanations had been considered. However, as Mr Ali rightly accepted, it is not incumbent on a judge to refer to each and every strand of the evidence, but nonetheless he submitted that the judge was required to engage with the Appellant’s evidence. Although I accept that as a general proposition, even assuming, in the Appellant’s favour, that the judge should have expressly acknowledged the later explanations advanced, I am satisfied that any such omission does not amount to a material error of law.
24. The asylum interview record demonstrates that, when questioned about the guards, the Appellant’s responses were notably limited and lacking in substantive descriptive detail, notwithstanding his claim of regular encounters. In that context, the judge’s finding that the Appellant was “unable” to describe the guards is properly understood as an evaluative assessment of the interview evidence, rather than a literal assertion that no description whatsoever was provided.
25. This was not a case in which the credibility assessment turned upon a single adverse finding. The judge conducted a cumulative assessment of credibility, supported by multiple independent findings, namely:
(i) materially inconsistent dates for the alleged incident, as relied upon at paragraph [22];
(ii) findings of implausibility concerning the appellant’s actions following the incident, including his account of concealment and the absence of a coherent explanation as to how the authorities would locate him ([23]–[24]);
(iii) the absence of evidence from family members or from the uncle said to have assisted his departure ([25]); and
(iv) an adverse finding under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, based on the Appellant’s failure to claim asylum in Italy and France ([28]).
26. None of those findings depends upon, or is materially reinforced by, the Appellant’s ability to describe the guards and nor did the judge treat the inadequacy of the description as determinative. It was relied upon as one factor among several. Read fairly and as a whole, the decision contains no indication that the judge would have accepted the Appellant’s account had this single feature been resolved differently. Taking these matters together, I am satisfied that the judge would inevitably have reached the same conclusion.
27. For those reasons, Ground 1 does not disclose a material error of law.
Grounds 2 and 3: Sur Place Activities and Facebook evidence
28. Grounds 2 and 3 assert that the judge failed properly to assess the Appellant’s sur place political activities in the United Kingdom.
29. The judge addressed the sur place claim in detail at paragraphs [29] to [51]. At [29]-[33], the judge correctly identified the applicable legal framework, and then considered the Appellant’s claims.
30. The Appellant contends that the judge failed properly to engage with evidence that he was prominent at demonstrations and active on Facebook. I do not accept that submission. The judge addressed the Facebook evidence at [35]–[37]; the demonstration evidence at [38]–[50] and found that the Facebook posts were largely copied or not attributable to the Appellant and that the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations was limited - he was “part of the crowd” and held no leadership role.
31. At [51], the judge concluded:
“The appellant has no profile whatsoever in Iran… I do not find it credible that the authorities even know his name.”
32. Those findings directly address the substance of the Appellant’s case that he would be identifiable to the authorities. The fact that the judge did not specifically refer to the Appellant wearing a high‑visibility jacket does not demonstrate a failure to consider the evidence. The judge plainly assessed the photographic evidence and was entitled to conclude that he did not stand out. These were clear findings of fact, open to the judge on the evidence, and adequately reasoned.
33. Grounds 2 and 3 are not made out.
Ground 4: Risk on Return
34. Ground 4 asserts that the judge failed to apply the correct test in assessing risk on return, including in relation to illegal exit and status as a failed asylum seeker.
35. The judge expressly directed herself to the relevant country guidance, including SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 308, at [48].
36. At paragraph [47], the judge correctly noted that while illegal exit may give rise to questioning on return, the country guidance establishes that where a person is not otherwise of interest to the authorities, this does not give rise to a real risk of serious harm.
37. Having lawfully rejected both the Appellant’s claimed political activity in Iran and any adverse political profile arising from sur place activity, the judge was entitled to conclude at [51] and [52] that the Appellant was not of adverse interest to the Iranian authorities and that his removal would not breach Articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR.
38. Ground 4 is not made out.
Conclusion
39. I find that even by taking Ground 1 at its highest, it does not disclose a material error of law. Grounds 2, 3 and 4 are not made out.
40. I find that the decision of the First‑tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

R. Bagral

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
8 June 2026