Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005132
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/63479/2023
LP/03103/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PERKINS

Between

KM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Chohan, Legal Representative from Kings Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq who appeals against a decision of the respondent on 4 December 2023 refusing him international protection. Permission to appeal was granted by the Upper Tribunal (in fact by me) because it was arguable that the judge had not explained adequately why a citizen of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity who claimed to have left Iran without permission and who claimed to have been politically active in the United Kingdom did not need protection from the possibility of persecution in the event of his return to Iran.
2. As I indicated when I granted permission the First-tier Tribunal’s decision is certainly not careless and I begin by considering precisely what the judge decided.
3. The Decision and Reasons contains entirely appropriate and correct standard self-directions. The judge then went to pose the question:
“Is the Appellant credible in his claim to be at risk upon return to Iran?”
4. The judge said that, in summary, the appellant said that when he was in Iran he was working with the Komala Party particularly by providing petrol for party activities and then by distributing political leaflets. It was his case that he had been trained and he operated as part of a cell. He said that in November 2021 he was detained by the Iranian authorities and asked to give an account of himself. He had in fact just been delivering political material to people’s homes. It was the appellant’s case that he was released. He and a person who had been working with him had a practised cover story which appeared to have satisfied the authorities but his home was subsequently raided by the Iranian authorities and his father was arrested. According to the appellant the authorities told his father that they were aware of the appellant’s activities with the Komala Party. The appellant said he had also been engaged in sur place activities in the United Kingdom which was a continuation of the support he had given in Iran but it was his case those activities alone would put him at risk in the event of his return.
5. The judge said with great clarity:
“I do not find the Appellant is credible in his claim to be at risk as a result of political activity in Iran.”
6. The judge noted that the respondent had identified a number of inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence and the judge took account of the letter identifying the inconsistencies and the appellant’s explanations, and having reminded himself of the lower standard of proof, said: “I do not find his account is a credible one”.
7. The judge gave reasons for his decision. He found the appellant had been inconsistent about his involvement with the Komala Party. He initially described himself as a supporter in contrast to a person who worked for the party, then said he had done one job for them. He did not indicate there, as he did later, that he had worked at Komala headquarters and was a cell member. The judge found the lack of detail indicative of dishonesty. The judge found the account of the appellant being suspected of involvement to be vague and that it did not make sense. He said how he was stopped and questioned in the area but he was allowed to continue on his way when his story seemed to satisfy them. It was not clear to the judge why the appellant, having been “released”, possibly better described as not detained, at that point felt the need to hide and leave the country. The judge also noted a shift in the appellant’s evidence. The appellant had been asked at his second substantive interview how the authorities knew about his activities and he said that he did not know if a named person had reported him or not but his fingerprints would be on documents that he distributed. However, in oral evidence the appellant said that the authorities knew for certain about him because the person he identified earlier had reported him. He said his father had been told by the Iranian authorities that that was what had happened although the appellant claims to have had no contact with his father since he had been in the United Kingdom. The judge makes the obvious point that, if the appellant’s father been told in the way described, the appellant would have been in a position to say that at the time of the interview. The judge described the account as something that had “evolved” and saw this as a further challenge to credibility.
8. The judge found that the appellant’s account of his father being arrested to be consistent and plausible. The judge could not accept at face value the story of the appellant’s father going and seeing the appellant immediately after he had been detained. It is well-known that the Iranian state monitors individuals and the judge thought the risk on the father giving away his son’s whereabouts by finding him in that way made the account hard to believe.
9. The judge was assisted by a letter from the Komala Party Committee in the United Kingdom. The letter gave no indication that the writer in the United Kingdom had had any contact with the party in Iran to check on the involvement of the appellant and although the appellant had expressed the view that contact “certainly had” been made he did not know when or by whom. The judge found it significant that the author of the letter did not attend to be cross-examined and that the letter itself was very generic. It gave no indication of what the appellant was supposed to have actually done for the Komala Party, merely that he had helped the party in Iran. Neither did it indicate when the appellant had attended a demonstration against the Iranian regime in the United Kingdom, yet it was the appellant’s case that he had attended up to seventeen demonstrations in the United Kingdom and had been involved in organising demonstrations since December 2023.
10. The judge did not accept that the appellant worked for the Komala Party or that he was wanted by the Iranian authorities.
11. The judge then turned his mind to whether the sur place activity in the United Kingdom put him at risk. The judge accepted that the appellant had attended demonstrations protesting against the Iranian regime and had a Facebook profile that was critical of the Iranian regime. The judge saw a number of photographs intending to show that he was at demonstrations and the judge accepted that he attended demonstrations as claimed.
12. I have looked at the photographs in the bundle that appear to show the appellant protesting outside the Iranian Embassy on different occasions. In some of the pictures he is wearing a hi-visibility jacket and on one occasion he is standing behind a banner. Whatever the appellant’s motives for doing this there can be no doubt that he has drawn attention to himself at more than one protest outside the embassy. The judge was clearly aware of the difficulties that might arise from this and addressed them under the heading: “Would the Appellant’s sur place activity place him at risk upon return to Iran?” The judge reminded himself of BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) and the judge took the view that the hi-visibility vest that the appellant wore in some photographs had been “donned simply for photographs”. There was no evidence that the demonstrations had been reported in Iran or indeed at all in the media. The First-tier Tribunal Judge also explained with reference to XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 which confirms that Facebook entries of this kind would not be problematic. They could be deleted and not discovered. The judge did not accept that the appellant had exited illegally.
13. It is quite clear that the judge did not believe the appellant’s account of his reasons for leaving Iran.
14. The respondent’s reply refers to OM (Iran) [2025] EWCA Civ 1585. This had not been determined when the First-tier Tribunal decided the appeal. It asserts that the “central issues for the judge were whether his contrived sur place activities were likely to have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities or whether they were likely to do so” on return. Obviously I must look with particular care at this part of the judge’s decision. The grounds of appeal supporting the application also refer me to BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return). It is plain that there is no more certainty now that the authorities were any more able than they were in 2011 to film people demonstrating and identify them later but it was also accepted in BA that the authorities would be interested and it was a reasonable assumption that they would have had some interest in the appellant.
15. I have reflected very carefully on this. I find that the real point of interest in this appeal is whether the judge was entitled to find that the appellant would not have been noticed by the authorities in the United Kingdom. In my judgment the Judge was so entitled. There is certainly no direct evidence to the contrary. Any conclusion that he had been identified, or at least that there was a real risk of his being identified, would be based on speculation which is not supported by evidence. The only activity that really drew attention to the appellant was wearing a yellow jacket and that we know was only on for the brief fractions of a second it takes to take a photograph and get ready for it. I am satisfied the judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant had not been identified. After that, the appellant is still at risk of increased scrutiny on return as an Iraqi Kurd, but without more, the judge was entitled to conclude that the risk had not been established. I will go as far as to say that I am not sure that every judge would have decided the case this way but I cannot find an error of law in this judge’s decision.
16. I am grateful to both parties. I have not said much about the submissions made but both Mr Chohan and Ms Keerthy made pithy, apt submissions which showed they understood the case and the material before me and I am grateful to them. Nevertheless for all the reasons given I am forced to conclude that the First-tier Tribunal did not err in law and I uphold the decision.
Notice of Decision
17. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

Jonathan Perkins

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 March 2026