Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005136
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/56116/2023
LP/11738/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24th of April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

MCR
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: R. Chapman, instructed by Wilson Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: A. Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction and Summary
1. The First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) made an anonymity order in this appeal because the appellant has made a claim for international protection. I consider it appropriate for that order to continue because the public interest in the UK’s compliance with its international obligations and in the confidentiality of the asylum system outweigh the public interest in open justice in this case.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Somalia, born in Somalia in 1995. He is a member of the minority Reer Hamar clan. He says that in late 2019, Al Shabaab demanded that he join them. He refused and in January 2020, after a series of threatening phone calls, Al Shabaab shot him in the street. He survived and was hospitalised, but fearing further reprisals from Al Shabaab, he fled the country. He arrived in the UK in July 2021 and claimed asylum. He was then reunited with his father, who had come to the UK as a refugee in 1999 and is now a British citizen. He lives together with his father, his father’s wife and his four young half-siblings.
3. The respondent interviewed the appellant about his asylum claim in July 2023 and refused the claim on 23 August 2023. The appellant appealed, and in a decision promulgated on 2 April 2025, the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) dismissed his appeal. The FtT did not believe the appellant’s account and found that even if the account were true, Al Shabaab would not know of the appellant’s return and would be unlikely to continue to have any interest in him. He would not be at risk of serious harm because he was a member of the Reer Hamar claim, nor would he be at risk of destitution or a serious deterioration in his mental health. Any interference with his family life with his father and half-siblings would not be disproportionate.
4. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal against the FtT’s decision on six separate grounds. The most important of these grounds is the complaint that when it was considering whether to believe the appellant’s account of events in Somalia, the FtT failed to take into account that he had been diagnosed with PTSD and that this may have affected his memory.
5. For the reasons set out below, I find that that ground is made out and the decision must be set aside.
The FtT’s decision
6. The FtT began by summarising the basis of the appellant’s claim at [2]-[5] and the respondent’s reasons for rejecting it on credibility grounds at [6]-[11]. The respondent’s reasons for rejecting the appellant’s article 8 claim were summarised at [12]-[13].
7. Paragraphs [14]-[44] are entitled “Proceedings at the hearing”. This section begins:
“At the commencement of the hearing, the appellant’s counsel requested that the appellant be treated as a vulnerable witness because he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder. This was agreed by the Home Office presenting officer.”
8. The FtT then recorded that the appellant had adopted his statements of 18 August 2023 and 8 May 2024 and summarised the latter: [15]-[26]. At [27]-[35], the FtT summarised the appellant’s oral evidence. At [36]-[42], it summarised the written and oral evidence of the appellant’s father. At [44], it noted that it had heard submissions from both representatives, which it had taken into account.
9. Paragraph [45] is entitled “The Law”. The summary is brief and significantly out of date, as it refers to the Refugee or Persons in Need of International Protection (Qualification) regulations 2006 (the “Protection Regulations”) and Council Directive 2004/83/EEC of 29 April 2004, but nothing turns on this.
10. A section on the “Burden and Standard of Proof” follows. With regard to the appellant’s asylum claim, the self-direction is:
“In asylum appeals the burden of proof is on the appellant. The standard of proof as regards both the likelihood of persecution and the establishment of past and future events is a reasonable degree of likelihood which can be expressed also by a ‘reasonable chance’ or ‘a serious possibility’. The question of whether a person has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason has to be looked at in the round in the light of all the relevant circumstances and judged against the situation as at the time of the hearing of the appeal. I have also borne in mind that great care must be taken before making adverse findings on credibility in asylum cases.”
11. The FtT set out its factual findings at [48]-[66]. These begin:
“As will be apparent from above, the basis of the appellant’s claim is that if returned to Somalia, he will be persecuted either by Al Shabaab or generally by majority clans because he belongs to the minority Reer Hamar clan. I have looked at the appellant’s evidence in the round, including taking into account a country expert report prepared by one Dr Peter Chonka dated 8 May 2024 and a medical-legal report prepared by Forest Medical Legal Services dated 20 May 2024 and of course the background material as well as the appellant’s evidence and that of his father. The conclusion to which I have come is that I am not satisfied to the requisite standard of proof that the appellant has given a truthful account of his experiences in Somalia. In making this finding I should make it clear at the outset that I am prepared to accept that the appellant has scars on his body consistent with being shot, however that does not necessarily mean that the appellant has been shot in the manner and circumstances he claimed to have been shot.”
12. Paragraphs [50]-[54] contain the FtT’s reasons for disbelieving the appellant’s account of being threatened and shot by Al Shabaab.
13. At [50], the FtT found that the appellant “seems not to be able to agree the date when he received the first contact” from Al Shabaab. In his main interview and his subsequent witness statements, he said it was in October 2019, but in a letter from his solicitors dated 22 October 2021, it was asserted that it was in November 2019. The letter referred to here was written and signed by a legal representative at Wilson Solicitors and contained the answers to the questions posed by the respondent in a Preliminary Information Questionnaire (“the PIQ letter”). The FtT expressed the opinion that
“It seems to me that the appellant is most likely to remember the event closest to its occurrence whereas the farther the time lapse, the likelihood of erosion of memory is greater. Therefore, I do not understand why the appellant maintained that the initial contact was in October 2019.”
14. In the same paragraph, the FtT recorded that “the appellant’s evidence in his statement suggests that there was no direct contact with Al Shabbab until he was shot in January 2021”, and tha neither the appellant nor Wilson’s had given a date for the shooting by prior to the appellant’s substantive interview. “[Y]et in interview he appears to be able to recall the date of 22/23 January 2019.” The implication appears to be that this precise memory was suspect. Finally, the FtT noted a discrepancy between the appellant’s own evidence and the PIQ letter about how often Al Shabaab had contacted the appellant by telephone between their first contact and the shooting.
15. At [51], the FtT found that the “The appellant did not remain consistent in relation to whether the Al Shabaab knew where he lived.” Where the inconsistency lay was not identified. It continued, “The impression one forms from the interview and the statement is that they did.” The FtT then found it implausible that Al Shabaab would have shot the appellant in the street “where they are likely to be seen by members of the public”.
16. At [52], the FtT noted further inconsistencies:
“The appellant claimed that after he was shot, he next woke up in hospital from where he was taken to his maternal uncle’s home where he hid. By contrast, the letter from Wilsons asserts that he was taken to his friend’s home. When this discrepancy was put to the appellant in his interview, he appeared to be slightly unnerved and claimed that he cannot fully remember, but it was his uncle’s friend’s home. Maybe he was mistaken. In his interview, the appellant claimed that whilst he was in hiding he received calls from Al Shabaab, but he did not answer the phone, whereas in his statement, he states that he did not have his phone with him whilst in hiding. In his interview the appellant states that it was his uncle and his friend that collected him from hospital, but the letter from Wilson’s mentioned that it was the appellant’s friend who collected him from there whereas in his statement he only mentions his uncle.”
17. At [53], the FtT noted that the appellant’s account of being approached by Al Shabaab was consistent with the background evidence but concluded nonetheless “that it is more likely than not that the appellant has created a narrative to fit around the background situation then prevailing in Somalia.”
18. At [54], the FtT made its final comments on the appellant’s account. It found the appellant’s description of his uncle’s poverty inconsistent with the claim that the uncle funded the appellant’s journey to the UK. It then found it implausible that the appellant would have telephoned the appellant multiple times before approaching him in person: “If the Al Shabaab was so adamant in recruiting this appellant, then it seems hardly likely that they would simply press their claim on the phone rather than make a personal visit either to persuade the appellant to join them or else to presumably threaten harm, unless he joins.”
19. Thus, the FtT did not set out at [53] why it concluded that the appellant’s claim was a fabrication, but when the decision is read as a whole, it is clear that it is because of the inconsistencies and implausibilities set out immediately before and after that paragraph.
20. At [55]-[58], the FtT considered the appeal in the alternative, as if the appellant’s account were true. It found that it was implausible that Al Shabaab would still be interested in the appellant:
“At first blush, it appears implausible that after a passage of some five years, a loose collection of terrorist militants would still be interested in the appellant. In making this finding, one has to bear in mind that the Al Shabaab are not a government like institution with a centralised computer data base of all of the people in whom they maintain an interest and if it is the case. Even if that was the case, it is highly unlikely that those that pursued him are still around the area where the appellant is likely to return or indeed alive themselves. In other words, it is difficult to imagine how the appellant’s return would be identified by the Al Shabaab high command. With the passage of time, surely, they would have found other recruits and make use of them or else find new members rather than wait to punish this appellant who had disappeared from the scene for many years. “
21. The FtT then went on to place this “first blush” implausibility finding in the context of the country evidence before it. It noted the statement of the appellant’s expert Dr Peter Chonka that “I have seen no compelling evidence to suggest that Al Shabaab’s recruitment, intelligence gathering and operational capabilities have significantly diminished in Mogadishu”: [56] It found, however, that this was inconsistent with the country guidance case of MOJ & ORS (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT00442, which it summarised as:
(i) there has been durable change in the sense that the Al Shabaab withdrawal from Mogadishu is complete and there is no real prospect of a re-established presence within the city;
(ii) The level of civilian casualties falling within Al Shabaab target groups such as politicians, police officers, government officials and those associated with NGO’s and international organisations, cannot be precisely established; and
(iii) there has been a reduction at the level of civilian casualty [sic] since 2011, largely, due to the cessation of confrontational warfare within the city and Al Shabaab’s resort to asymmetrical warfare or carefully selected targets; and
(iv) there is no real risk of forced recruitment to Al Shabaab for civilian citizens of Mogadishu, including for recent returnees from the West.
22. As the appellant was “not a member of the government or an NGO or some other organisation but simply a civilian”, according to the FtT’s reading of MOJ, he would not be targeted by Al Shabaab.
23. The FtT acknowledged that “the appellant’s country expert report is largely favourable” to his claim, but found that it would “not proper [sic] for me simply in reliance on one report, to depart from findings made in a Country Guidance case which would have considered many sources before reaching its conclusions.”: [57]
24. At [59], the FtT found that there was no real risk that the appellant would be persecuted simply because he was a member of the Reer Hamar clan. It relied for this finding on the country guidance case of OA (Somalia) Somalia CG [2022] UKUT00033, and in particular on the guidance that:
“‘The Reer Hamar are a senior minority clan whose ancient heritage in Mogadishu has placed it in a comparatively advantageous position compared to other minority clans. Strategic marriage alliances into dominant clans has strengthened the overall standing and influence of the Reer Hamar. There are no reports of the Reer Hamar living in IDP camps and it would be unusual for a member of the clan to do so.’...
“Somalia culture is such that that family and social links are, in general, retained between the diaspora and those living in Somalia. Somali family networks are very extensive and the social ties between different branches of the family are very tight. A returnee with family and diaspora links in this country will be unlikely to be more than a small number of degrees of separation away from establishing contact with a member of their clan, or extended family, in Mogadishu through friends of friends, if not through direct contact.“
25. At [60], the FtT rejected the appellant’s account that his wife, child and uncle had “vanished” since he left the country. “Given the above”, it was “very surprising indeed that the appellant had not been able to re-establish contact with them.” It was “implausible given the nature of Somali society”. At [61], the FtT found that the appellant would be able to turn to other members of his clan for support on return to Somalia: “The idea of clan network is so that beyond a person’s immediate family, he has a means of support within the wider community.”
26. The next paragraphs begins, “I now turn to the medical report produced by Forest Medical-Legal Services. This makes a diagnosis of the appellant suffering from PTSD.” It notes that the author of the report confirms that they had sight of the appellant’s GP records but does not discuss them. It comments that this is “unsurprising” because the GP records do not mention the appellant seeking help from his GP for psychological symptoms. It rejects the appellant’s explanation that this was due to embarrassment, for the following reasons:
“It is often said that because of the stigma attached to mental health, people do not turn to receiving support. In my view, that stigma is real, but is not confined to countries other than the United Kingdom. In other words, the stigma includes people living in this country as well. It is surprising then, that the appellant who has been residing with his father since 2021 and who appears to be aware of the appellant’s conditions, has made no effort to refer the appellant for medical treatment.”
27. This reasoning is not entirely clear. It seems to be that because there is stigma attached to mental ill health in the UK, it is fundamentally implausible that a person living in the UK with a father who was a long-term resident of the UK would be prevented by stigma from seeking treatment. The FtT further noted that the appellant had still not referred himself for treatment. The paragraph concludes, “The father made no mention that this was because of stigma!” (exclamation point in the original).
28. At [64], the FtT rejected the expert’s opinion that the appellant’s mental health would worsen on return to Somalia on the grounds that it was based “on a single interview” and there was no historical evidence of the appellant suffering from mental ill health.
29. At [65], the FtT accepted that the appellant’s relationship with his father and half-siblings constituted family life for article 8 purposes. It then conducted an assessment of the proportionality of the appellant’s removal, taking into account the factors set out at section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. It found that the appellant received financial support from the Home Office but was accommodated by his father. This appears to have been treated as a neutral factor, because the next sentence begins, “However, in assessing the proportionality of the appellant’s removal from this country, I have to take into account the public interest in the maintenance of immigration control”, which is a factor that weighs against the appellant. The FtT expressly took into account that “the appellant has PTSD” but found he could “turn to extended family and/or clan networks to resettle himself.” His father worked as a bus driver and would be able to spare some money to “assist in his resettlement.” The appellant would also have access to a £3000 resettlement package from the Home Office. At [66], his human rights claim was dismissed for these reasons.
The grounds of appeal and the respondent’s Rule 24 response
30. The appellant was granted permission to appeal on six grounds.
31. Ground One: Vulnerable witness. The appellant submits that the FtT made no actual finding on whether the appellant was a vulnerable witness and then erred in assessing credibility without considering the appellant’s vulnerability.
32. In her Rule 24 response, the respondent submitted that the FtT was not required to state explicitly that it accepted that the appellant was a vulnerable witness, and in any event there was no evidence that “the judge’s conduct of the hearing inhibited the appellant from giving evidence to the best of his abilities”.
33. Ground Two: Failure to make findings on material issues. The appellant submits that the FtT was required to make a finding as to “how the appellant came to be shot”.
34. The respondent does not address this ground in her Rule 24 response, and Ms Chapman did not pursue it before me.
35. Ground Three: Material errors of fact. The appellant says that the FtT made three material errors of fact:
(i) At [50], the FtT records that the appellant said in his statement that he was shot in January 2021 and in his interview that the date was 22/23 January 2019. The appellant gave either of these dates.
(ii) The FtT found at [51] that the appellant was inconsistent about whether Al Shabaab knew where he lived, but there was no such inconsistency.
(iii) There was “no evidential basis” for the finding that it was implausible that Al Shabaab shot the appellant in the street, rather than in his home. As Ms Chapman acknowledged at the error of law hearing, this final complaint does not identify a claimed mistake of fact. It is either a rationality challenge or a submission that the FtT erred by making a finding of implausibility without reference to the country context. In either case, it does not come within the ground pleaded.
36. The respondent submits that this ground “ignored the wider context of the judge’s findings which he set out [in] the following paragraphs of the determination.” Mr Sheikh clarified at the hearing before me that the respondent’s submission here is that when the decision is read as a whole, none of these claimed errors were material.
37. Ground Four: Failure to take account of material evidence. The appellant submits that in finding that Al Shabaab would no longer be interested in him and unable to identify his return, the FtT failed to take into account the respondent’s CPIN at 2.4.25 and the expert report of Dr Chonak at [17].
38. Ground Five: Failure to give reasons. The appellant says that the FtT failed to give reasons for not believing that the appellant’s wife, child and uncle have “vanished” or for the finding that he would be able to rely on other members of his clan for support.
39. The respondent submits that Grounds Four and Five are mere disagreements.
40. Ground Six: Failure to take into account material considerations regarding article 8. The appellant submits that the FtT erred in failing to make a finding on whether the diagnosis of PTSD was accepted, and that the diagnosis was clearly material to the appellant’s article 8 physical and moral integrity claim based on the impact on him of return to Somalia. Moreover, the decision at [64] not to give much weight to the expert’s opinion that the appellant’s mental health would deteriorate on return was insufficiently reasoned. The FtT also failed to take into account the effect of removal on the appellant and his family life with his father and half-siblings, given that his father had been recognised as a refugee from Somalia and has never returned.
41. The respondent submits that the FtT did expressly take into account that the appellant has PTSD and that his condition may worsen on return. However, the FtT gave little weight to the “potential deterioration” on return, because the expert’s opinion was “based on one interview”. Moreover, “the judge had a broader question to answer than the doctor”. He had concluded on the basis of the background evidence that the appellant would be able to access support from his clan, and the fact that the appellant had chosen not to access treatment in the UK “diminished the extent to which the deterioration could be said to result from his removal.” The respondent further submits that the FtT did not have “any information” about the severity of the alleged deterioration.
The hearing
42. At the hearing before me, I had sight of a composite bundle of 461 pages.
43. I heard submissions from Mr Chapman and Mr Sheikh. The recording of the hearing stands as the record of proceedings, and I will not rehearse their submissions here. I confirm that I have taken the submissions into account in making my decision, and I will refer to them where relevant in my discussion below.
Discussion
44. In considering whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I have borne in mind the principles set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4]. I have also consider the FtT’s reasoning as a whole, and avoided “island-hopping”. See: Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114].
45. Even bearing those principles in mind, I conclude that the FtT’s decision contained several material errors of law.
Ground One
46. As is clear from the grounds and confirmed by Ms Chapman at the hearing, the appellant’s complaint is not that he was not treated as a vulnerable witness at the hearing. It is that the FtT failed to take into account his vulnerability when assessing his credibility.
47. The FtT had before it an expert medical report expressing the opinion that the appellant had scars consistent with being shot twice, once in the right shoulder and once in the right leg, and at [48], the FtT accepted this. Regardless of who shot the appellant, being shot twice is obviously reasonably likely to have been a traumatic event. The same report contained a diagnosis of severe PTSD based on the criteria set out in the International Classification of Diseases (10th edition – ICD-10), eight separately identified clinical features and the appellant’s score on the Impact of Events Scale - Revised (IES-R). Although the FtT put less weight on the report with regard to the risk to the appellant’s mental health on return, I agree with the respondent that the FtT expressly accepted the diagnosis of PTSD at [65]. I also agree with the respondent that the FtT implicitly accepted the appellant’s vulnerability at [14] when it recorded without further comment that both parties had agreed he should be treated as a vulnerable witness “because he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder”.
48. I agree with the appellant, however, that the FtT did not take this vulnerability into account when assessing the appellant’s credibility.
49. It is well-established that expert evidence of a witness’ vulnerability must be taken into account in the assessment of credibility. See, e.g.: AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 at [18]; MN v The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rev 3) [2020] EWCA Civ 1746 at [106]-[108]. Where a person has suffered trauma, it is also well-established that this must be taken into account, because trauma can have a significant impact on human memory, including in particular on the ability to remember precise details consistently and to recount traumatic events coherently: MN and IXU at [250].
50. The respondent’s bundle before the FtT also included an article by Jane Herlihy and Stuart W. Turner, published in the British Journal of Psychiatry in 2007, briefly describing the effect of trauma on memory. They set out that PTSD is associated with “overgeneral memory”, and that memories of traumatic events are often incomplete and not recalled voluntarily but in response to triggers.
51. The FtT does not expressly refer to this research, or to the relevant caselaw. The only self-direction as to the assessment of credibility is that it must done with “great care”.
52. I am required by the principles set out in the caselaw cited above at [44] to assume that the FtT took all of the evidence before it into account and was aware of an applied the relevant law, unless it is clear that it did not do so.
53. I consider it clear in this case that the FtT did not take the psychological evidence into account as required. First, there is no express reference to the psychological evidence about the appellant anywhere within the credibility assessment. Secondly, the bulk of the FtT’s adverse credibility findings are based on inconsistencies about the details surrounding clearly traumatic events, including the specific number of threatening phone calls he received, who collected him from hospital and where he was taken. Both the caselaw and the Herlihy and Turner article should have reminded the FtT that PTSD may affect a person’s memory in general, and in particular with regard to the underlying traumatic experiences. Yet there is nothing to indicate that the FtT considered whether that might have been the case here.
54. I do not consider it plausible that the FtT considered the appellant’s PTSD when deciding what weight to put on the inconsistencies it identified but simply failed to mention this explicitly. This is partly because it did direct itself about how to assess credibility, but the self-direction contained no reference to vulnerability or mental health, merely to the need to “take great care”. Moreover, on the one occasion when the judge did explain why he put weight on an inconsistency, he said: “It seems to me that the appellant is most likely to remember the event closest to its occurrence whereas the farther the time lapse, the likelihood of erosion of memory is greater.” The FtT was clearly relying here on its own suppositions about how memory works, and nothing else.
55. Thirdly, many of the FtT’s adverse credibility points are based on inconsistencies not between the accounts that that appellant had given but between the appellant’s account and that given by his solicitors in letter they wrote in October 2021. This letter was written only a few months after the appellant arrived in the UK, and it does not contain a statement confirming that it has been read back to the appellant. Rather, the letter closes by indicating that a statement from the appellant will follow at a later date. Nor did the appellant adopt this statement in his evidence before the Tribunal. Although no doubt the appellant’s solicitor was acting on instructions, given that the appellant was accepted to have suffered trauma and to be vulnerable, it is troubling that the FtT did not consider the possibility of some initial miscommunication between the appellant and his solicitor that he may not have been aware of (as there was no indication that the letter had been read back to him).
56. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the structure and language of the decision contains a clear indication that the FtT did not consider the psychological evidence to be relevant to the assessment of credibility. At [48], the FtT confirms that it has taken all of the evidence into account, including the medico-legal report. It refers to and accepts the findings in that report about the appellant’s physical injuries. It then proceeds, as outlined above, to give reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account of events in Somalia at [49]-[54], followed by reasons for rejecting the appellant’s protection claim even if the account is accepted. It is only after rejecting his protection claim that the FtT announces, “I now turn to the medical report produced by the Forest Medical-Legal Services. This makes a diagnosis of the appellant suffering from PTSD.” [emphasis added]. The conclusion is inescapable that the FtT fell into the error first identified in Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 36 of rejecting the appellant’s credibility first and only turning to the psychological evidence afterwards.
57. For these reasons, Ground One is made out.
58. I also find that Ground Three is made out. I have looked at the appellant’s statements, and he does not say that he was shot in January 2021. In his 8 May 2024 statement, he says it was three months after Al Shabaab first approached him in October 2019. In his August 2023 statement, he said it was “roughly in January 2020.” Nor does he say at his interview that it was in January 2019. At his interview of 12 July 2023, he was asked when Al Shabaab came to him, and he answered that this was in January 2020. He was asked, “What happened in January 2020?” and he replied, “They opened fire on me.” He was then asked “Where did this happen?” and he answered “22d or 23d of January.”
59. I have taken into account that FtT decisions should not be scrutinised as if they were contracts or statutes, and that they may contain simple typographical errors. However, in the context of an adverse credibility assessment that consists almost entirely of identified inconsistencies, I consider that these errors cannot be ignored. At best, they display a casual attitude towards what the appellant’s evidence was.
60. Perhaps more significantly, I was unable to identify any inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence about whether Al Shabaab knew where the appellant lived. Nor was Mr Sheikh able to identify one at the hearing before me.
61. The FtT did, in the alternative, assess the risk to the appellant on return if his account were true. If there were no error in that assessment, the errors in the credibility assessment might not have been material.
62. Under Ground Four, the appellant complains that the FtT failed to take into account two material pieces of evidence relevant to whether there would be an ongoing risk from Al Shabaab. The first is the respondent’s CPIN at 2.4.25. This states:
“Al Shabaab has control of large sections of rural areas, and in many areas members are integrated into the local population. It also has a presence in other areas not under its control, such as Mogadishu and other cities. Al Shabaab defectors are seen as a threat due to their knowledge of the organisation or being perceived as holding sensitive information. Al Shabaab has an active intelligence wing ‘Aminyat’, and it is likely they would be able to locate a person should they so wish.”[emphasis added]
63. The second is [17] of Dr Chonka’s report. This states:
“Recruitment takes place for multiple roles for/within the militant group. These include combat roles and street level intelligence gathering. The aforementioned EUAA report references Al Shabaab’s ‘very strong intelligence network in Mogadishu’, which is staffed and enforced through extensive recruitment. [emphasis added] It is important to also note that [the appellant] was previously living in the Dharkeynley district of Mogadishu. This peripheral area has a high proportion of displaced people’s camps and is outside the core central areas where the Federal Government and African Union forces have greatest presence. Research that I have been involved in highlights the limited presence of state security forces in more peripheral districts of Mogadishu, and increased presence/freedom of movement for Al Shabaab operatives. For these reasons (and considering his age as a young man) it is entirely plausible that [the appellant] was targeted for recruitment.” [footnotes omitted]
64. Both of these sources were cited in the appellant’s skeleton argument below and both directly contradict the FtT’s finding that Al Shabaab would have no way of locating the appellant if he returned to Mogadishu because it was nothing more that a “loose collection of terrorist militants” and did not have a centralised computer data base.
65. It is trite that the FtT does not need to refer to every piece of evidence before it. However, the FtT clearly identified the question of whether Al Shabaab would have the ability to locate the appellant as an important one. It was the starting point for the consideration of risk on return. I answering the question, the FtT first set out its own “first blush” impression as to what was plausible. It then went on, quite properly, to test this first blush impression against the country evidence before it. Given the importance the FtT had given to this issue, it was necessary for it to take into account the relevant country evidence that was before it and was drawn to its attention by the parties.
66. At [56], the FtT did refer to a different section of the expert report, which expressed the opinion that Al Shabaab’s “recruitment, intelligence gathering and operational capabilities” had not “significantly diminished” in Mogadishu. This is taken from the report’s conclusion. At [57], it acknowledged that the expert report was “largely favourable” to the appellant’s claim. Thus, I find that the expert report was taken into account, including on the issue of Al Shabaab’s ability to locate the appellant. Where the FtT erred, however, is in the reason it gave for putting no weight on the report, which was that it was found to be inconsistent with the country guidance case of MOJ. As Ms Chapman correctly submitted, MOJ was not specifically concerned with Al Shabaab’s intelligence gathering capabilities and nothing in the headnote discusses that issue. It was primarily concerned with the risk of forced recruitment and other types of harm to ordinary civilians. The Upper Tribunal heard expert evidence that referred to Al Shabaab’s “intelligence wing” ([74]) but only in the context of considering the risk of forced recruitment into it. Indeed, nothing in the FtT’s summary of the guidance in MOJ refers to Al Shabaab’s intelligence gathering capabilities.
67. Moreover, there is no indication that the FtT took into account the respondent’s position, as expressed in the CPIN at 2.4.25.
68. For these reasons, I consider that Ground Four is made out.
69. Because Grounds One, Three and Four are made out, the FtT’s finding that the appellant’s claimed fear of persecution by Al Shabaab is not well-founded was infected by material errors of law and must be set aside.
70. I do not consider that Ground Five is made out. The reasons that the FtT rejected the appellant’s claim of being unable to turn to his family or clan for support are entirely clear. They are based on what was said in OA about the nature of Somali society. However, it is highly likely that the FtT’s decision on this issue was influenced by its rejection of the appellant’s general credibility, and as I have found that the credibility assessment was flawed, these findings must also be set aside.
71. I consider that I do not need to reach the question of whether Ground Six is made out. This is because the FtT’s article 8 assessment was, quite properly, based on the findings of fact that preceded it, including that the appellant was not at risk from Al Shabaab and that he would be able to locate his wife. The FtT also found for the purposes of the article 8 assessment that the appellant would be able to rely on the support of his clan with regard to his mental health. The FtT could not have made this finding unless it had already rejected the expert’s opinion that if the appellant returned to Somalia, “Without good psychotherapeutic and medical interventions […] his mental health would seriously deteriorate.” At set out above at [26] of this decision, the FtT’s main reason for rejecting the expert’s opinion on this issue was that he did not accept the appellant’s explanation for why he had not previously sought treatment for his mental ill health. Key aspects of the FtT’s article 8 assessment were therefore based on the prior rejection of the appellant’s credibility. As the credibility assessment was materially flawed, the article 8 assessment will need to be conducted afresh, on the basis of new findings.
Disposal
72. The general rule is that when the Upper Tribunal sets aside a decision of the FtT, it will retain the appeal for remaking before it. There are two main exceptions to this rule, identified in the applicable practice directions. These are where the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:
“(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party's case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or
“(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.”
73. The appellant does not say that the proceedings before the FtT were unfair. However, having considered the reasoning in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), I find that this is a case in which remittal is appropriate. This is not a case in which there will be limited future fact-finding on discrete issues. Extensive fact-finding will be required, on the core issues of the appellant’s claim.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 2 April 2025 is set aside with no findings preserved.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before any other judge.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
22 April 2026