Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005137

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50418/2022
IA/01441/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 20th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEILSON

Between

ARF
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Brooks, Counsel, instructed by AB Legal Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House, London by CVP on 11 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the respondent is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the respondent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction & Background

1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The appellant appeals with permission granted on 3 December 2025 against the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) given on 22 October 2024 (“the FtT Decision”) to dismiss the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his international protection claim.

2. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on 12 June 2018 and claimed asylum. That application was refused, which the appellant appealed. The appeal hearing took place before Judge Broe in the FtT on 22 October 2019. The appeal was dismissed. In June 2021, the appellant made further representations, which were rejected by the respondent with a right of appeal. A further appeal before Judge Hena in the FtT was dismissed. The appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal and they upheld the appeal and Judge Hena’s decision was set aside but the findings on sur place activities were preserved. The appeal was remitted to Judge Chohan in the FtT who in a decision dated 13 February 2024 dismissed the appeal. The appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal and in a decision dated 24 July 2024 Judge Malik set aside the decision of Judge Chohan in its entirety but preserved the earlier findings of Judge Hena regarding the sur place activities. The case was then remitted for a fresh hearing in the FtT before Judge Dixon. Judge Dixon by a decision of 22 October 2024 (“the FtT Decision) dismissed the appeal. The appellant now appeals against that decision.

3. The appeal came before the Upper Tribunal at an error of law hearing on 11 February 2026 by CVP. At the hearing I heard submissions from the parties and reserved my decision. For the reasons set out below, I find that there was no material error of law sufficient to allow the appeal and I dismiss the appeal.

4. The FtT made an anonymity order in this appeal, and I have considered whether it is appropriate for that order to continue pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (as amended). Having taken into account Guidance Note 2022 No.2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make such an order because the appellant has made an application for international protection and I consider that the UK’s obligations towards applicants for international protection and the need to protect the confidentiality of the asylum process outweigh the public interest in open justice at this stage in the proceedings.

Grounds of Appeal, Discussion and Conclusions

5. In the FtT Decision Judge Dixon at paragraph 4 set out that “It was agreed that the sole issue is whether the appellant faces a real risk of persecution on the basis of his sur place activity in the United Kingdom”. There were preserved findings from the decision of Judge Hena. Firstly, Judge Hena found the appellant to be honest as to how he became interested in Kurdish politics. Secondly, that the appellant’s political activities in the United Kingdom are not high-profile or very significant. With reference to the Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) Version 3.0 July 2023 (“the CPIN”) Judge Dixon determined that the appellant would not be at risk of persecution on the basis of his political activities.

6. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I have reminded myself of the principles that appeal courts should bear in mind, set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, where the Court of Appeal set out guidance at [26] “(i) the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently; (ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the First Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account; (iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the First Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the First Tier Tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out; and (iv) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law.”

7. There were two grounds of appeal put forward by the appellant.

8. Firstly, that Judge Dixon erred in finding that there would be no risk of persecution on return as his sur place activity was low level and would be low level on return. Specifically, that Judge Dixon either failed to address the issue of the risk arising from the appellant’s continuing activity once in Iraq and/or he failed to engage with the appellants evidence which established that there was a risk even with low level political activity.

9. Secondly that Judge Dixon erred in failing to deal with a material issue in the case, namely the issue of honour killing.

10. I heard submissions from both Mr Brooks for the appellant and Ms Clewley for the respondent.

Appeal Ground Two

11. I will deal with the second ground of appeal first. Mr Brooks accepted that he did not dispute that a concession was made before Judge Dixon that the only issue to be determined was the sur place activity and that accordingly the issue of the honour killing was not being pursued. Mr Brooks was also of the view that there was a preserved finding of fact from the hearing before Judge Hena that effectively dealt with the honour killing issue in any event. In the circumstances I did ask Mr Brooks if he wanted to withdraw the appeal on ground two, but he explained that he did not have instructions to do that but conceded that the appeal could not succeed on that ground. In the circumstances there clearly is no error in law by Judge Dixon in failing to determine an issue that it was expressly agreed by all parties (legally represented) he was not to determine. I accordingly dismiss the appeal on ground two.

Appeal Ground One

12. This was the more substantive issue. Mr Brooks submitted that there was an error of law in that either Judge Dixon failed to address the issue of risk on return to Iraq arising out of the appellant continuing to carry out his low level activities whilst in Iraq or there was a failure to engage with the evidence that was put forward by the appellant that, in the submission of Mr Brooks, clearly showed that there was a risk on return.

13. Mr Brooks submitted that the CPIN had been relied upon by both parties before Judge Dixon. In coming to his decision on risk in respect of the sur place activities Judge Dixon had relied exclusively upon the CPIN to support his conclusion that there was no risk. In particular Judge Dixon had relied upon paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 of the CPIN [see paragraph 8 of the FtT Decision]. In the submission of Mr Brooks, the CPIN was not evidence as such and should be treated as no more than a submission by the respondent. For that proposition he relied upon LP (LTTE area - Tamils - Colombo - risk?) Sri Lanka CG [2007] UKAIT 00076. In any event he submitted that there was no evidence underpinning the CPIN and whilst there was a reference in the CPIN to a body “CPIT” having a view it was not clear to him who CPIT were. He submitted there was then a body of evidence that had been before Judge Dixon which clearly established that there was a risk on return for the appellant if he continued his low- level activities in Iraq. Judge Dixon had not engaged with that evidence. Further he submitted that that other evidence was more contemporaneous.

14. For the respondent Ms Clewley submitted that Judge Dixon had specifically addressed the issue of risk on return arising out of the appellant continuing his low-level activities in Iraq. She referred me to the last sentence of paragraph 10 of the FtT Decision. In relation to the CPIN she rejected the submission that it was not evidence. In her submission it was capable of being relied upon as evidence. In her submission the reference to CPIT is a reference to the Country Policy & Information Team. This is the body within the respondent that is the author of the CPIN. She submitted that the CPIN itself drew upon the country evidence that the appellant was now seeking to rely upon and that insofar as there was other evidence put forward by the appellant this was not reliable. She further submitted that both parties had relied upon the CPIN before Judge Dixon and in her submission there was no error of law in the decision by Judge Dixon.

15. I asked both parties if they were in a position to clarify if Judge Dixon had been specifically taken to the country evidence (other than the CPIN) that the appellant was now founding upon. Neither Mr Brooks or Ms Clewley had appeared in the case before Judge Dixon, and neither were in a position to say whether the additional country evidence was something that Judge Dixon was specifically taken to. It was not disputed that the additional country evidence that Mr Brooks referenced at this hearing was in the appellant bundle that was before the FtT. However, it is not clear if any of that evidence was specifically drawn to the attention of Judge Dixon. Judge Dixon does not expressly reference the other country evidence in his decision.

16. There were essentially two points under this ground of appeal. Firstly, did Judge Dixon fail to deal at all with the question of whether there was a risk on return arising out of the appellant continuing his low-level activities once he is in Iraq. Mr Brooks submitted that he did fail to address it. The whole case before Judge Dixon was focussed on quite a narrow issue – whether there would be a risk on return in light of the political activities undertaken by the appellant. It would appear that the main thrust of the argument by the appellant’s counsel before Judge Dixon was that that risk arose because of the sur place activities that occurred in the UK and that this would give rise to persecution upon his return to Iraq – particularly at the “pinch point” of return – see paragraphs 9 and 10 of the FtT Decision. It is not clear to me to what extent counsel for the appellant before Judge Dixon focussed an argument on risk arising from the appellant continuing his low-level activities once back in Iraq. However, I agree with Ms Clewley that the issue was, in any event, addressed by Judge Dixon in paragraph 10 where it is specifically stated “I accept that he will want to carry on his low-level in activity in Iraq but that does not create a real risk of persecution”. Further at paragraph 11 “The appellant remains a person engaging in relatively low-level and not very significant activity such that even scrutiny at the ‘pinch point’ of return (or beyond) is not reasonably likely to give rise to a real risk of persecution.” It is clear to me that Judge Dixon has in his decision taken into consideration the risk arising from the appellant continuing his low-level activity once in Iraq.

17. That deals with the first point. The second point is, I think, the more material one to this appeal. That second point is whether there was an error of law in the Judge relying upon the CPIN to the exclusion (as submitted by Mr Brooks) of the other country evidence.

18. To address that issue, it is necessary to examine both the CPIN and the additional country evidence that Mr Brooks referred me to. I also bear in mind that we are looking here at essentially an issue of whether someone, like the appellant, involved in low level political activity both in the UK and potentially on return, will be at risk on return to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (“KRI”). In the FtT Decision this low level of activity was defined as essentially someone who attends demonstrations (8 to 10 in the UK over a 4 year period) and posts on Facebook.

19. Firstly, I will deal with the issue that Mr Brooks raised regarding the evidential value of the CPIN. His position was that it was no more than a submission by the respondent. His authority for that was LP. Ms Clewley did not accept that. I do not agree that LP supports the argument that the CPIN is no more than a submission. Headnote (7) of LP states “The weight to be given to expert evidence (individual or country) and country background evidence is dependent upon the quality of the raw data from which it is drawn and the quality of the filtering process to which that data has been subjected. Sources should be given whenever possible.” In the body of the decision in LP there is lengthy discussion at paragraphs 18 to 45 of that decision over the evidential value to be attached to expert country reports. In my view it is clear from that discussion and the headnote referred to that country reports are evidential but that the weight that can be attached to the report will depend upon the standing and reputation of the “expert” along with the underlying sources from which any evidence or opinion is based. In LP there was no reference to country policy and information notes (I understand these only came into existence in 2016) but there was reference to Country of Origin Information Services – the precursor to CPIN’s. Accordingly, I consider that Judge Dixon was entitled to rely upon the CPIN as potential evidence – the true issue is the weight he could attach to that evidence – particularly if there was counter evidence – and whether he was required to expressly engage with that other evidence.

20. Mr Brooks also took issue with the reference to CPIT as a source for opinions within the CPIN when it was not clearly identified who or what that body was. Ms Clewley explained that CPIT was a reference to the Country Policy and Information Team – the team who author the CPIN. I note from paragraph 16 of the CPIN that there is a clear reference to the Country Policy and Information Team at the Home Office. I consider that it is clear from the CPIN, read as a whole, that the body that is responsible for the creation of the CPIN is the Country Policy and Information Team or CPIT for short.

21. Mr Brooks took me specifically to evidence in the appellant bundle that he submitted clearly demonstrated that there was a risk of persecution of the appellant even if his political activities were low level. In particular he directed me to a series of copies of what I believe to be Facebook entries from the appellant that highlight cases of persecution of individuals in Iraq. Specifically, I was referred to pages 75, 80, 83, 99, 101, 106, 113, 123 128, 129, 135, 140, 157, 179 and 201 of the consolidated appeal bundle. Mr Brookes also directed me to two reports, the US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq 20 March 2023 (“USDS 2022 Report”) [at page 249 of the consolidated appeal bundle] and the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), EUAA COI Report- Iraq: Targeting of Individuals [3. Political opposition activists and protesters; 5. Journalists, media workers and human rights activists], 31 January 2022 (“EUAA 2022 Report”) [at page 293 of the consolidated appeal bundle]. In Mr Brooks submission this was all material evidence establishing that there was a risk even for low level activity and should have been directly engaged with by Judge Dixon particularly as the CPIN was not evidential.

22. As I referenced earlier it was not clear whether counsel for the appellant before Judge Dixon specifically referenced the materials that Mr Brooks took me to. I also take into consideration that it is not an error of law just because a Judge does not expressly deal in his judgment with every document that an appellant puts forward in a bundle. I do however accept that it would be an error of law for a Judge in their decision to fail to deal directly with material evidence relied upon by the appellant that is contrary to the evidence put forward by the respondent, particularly if the evidence relied upon by the respondent was evidence to which little or no weight could be attached.

23. I am not satisfied that there has been any such failure here. There is no doubt that Judge Dixon relies upon the CPIN in coming to the view that there is no risk of persecution. Specifically, he references paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. of the CPIN [paragraph 8 of the FtT Decision]. He clearly draws a distinction between those who play a low-level part in protests (as referenced at 3.1.2) and other categories who will be at risk such as those with higher profiles or journalists (as referenced at 3.1.3). He has clearly attached significant weight to the CPIN. It also appears that the appellant placed some reliance upon the CPIN before Judge Dixon as the appellant’s counsel relied upon paragraph 3.1.9 of the CPIN [see paragraph 10 of the FtT Decision]. It was also not suggested, and there is nothing in the FtT Decision to suggest, that the appellant took issue with the validity of the CPIN in the hearing before Judge Dixon.

24. I do not agree with Mr Brookes that the CPIN fails to set out its sources. The structure of the CPIN is that the commentary by CPIT is at the front end – paragraphs 1 to 6 under Assessment. There then follows under Country Information in paragraphs 7 to 15 detail of the sources to support the Assessment. In particular, paragraph 14 deals with Treatment of opponents to the KRI authorities. Under paragraph 14 there are numerous sources cited including both the USDS 2022 Report and the EUAA 2022 Report. It is clear that the CPIN has considered both the USDS 2022 Report and the EUAA 2022 Report. Whilst both the USDS 2022 Report and the EUAA 2022 Report do highlight risks and abuse within Iraq both reports are dealing with all of Iraq – not just the KRI and I could not see (nor was Mr Brook able to take me to) anything specific which stated that there was a specific risk for those engaged in low level activity – although I appreciate the need to consider these matters in the round.

25. In terms of the Facebook entries that Mr Brooks referred me to it is not apparent that these contradict the evidence that is referenced in the CPIN. I note that at 3.1.2 of the CPIN there is specific reference to “Despite evidence that opponents of the KRG have been arrested, detained, assaulted and even killed by the Kurdistan authorities, there is no evidence to suggest that such mistreatment is systematic.” The Facebook posts are not inconsistent with that.

26. It is not clear to me that the evidential value of the CPIN was actually challenged before Judge Dixon. The CPIN itself appears to draw on considerable source material – including both the USDS 2022 Report and the EUAA 2022 Report and there is nothing in either of these reports that contradicts the conclusions in paragraphs 3.1.1 to 3.1.3 of the CPIN. In terms of the contemporaneous nature of the reports I do not consider that there is any material that I have been taken to that makes a material difference. Both the USDS 2022 Report and the EUAA 2022 Report that Mr Brooks suggested should have been considered pre-date the CPIN. Accordingly, I do not consider that there has been any error of law simply because the FtT Decision does not specifically engage with the USDS 2022 Report or the EUAA 2022 Report or the various Facebook posts. The Judge was entitled to consider the evidence before him and attach weight to the CPIN in arriving at his conclusion. The CPIN was a report that it was open to Judge Dixon to attach weight to. In arriving at his conclusion it was not necessary for him to address all the other evidence in the appellants bundle where that did not directly contradict the CPIN.

Conclusion

27. For the reasons set out above I find that there is no material error of law and the appeal is refused.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the FtT did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

S NEILSON
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
12.02.26