Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005139
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/56740/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3 March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LINDSLEY

Between

JAVED IQBAL
(ANONYMITY ORDER not MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Nicholson, of Counsel, instructed by JJ Law Chambers
For the Respondent: Mr E Turrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Interpretation: Mr Z Saleem in the Urdu language

Heard at Field House on 25 February 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan born on 15th October 1986. He came to the UK on 12th March 2011 with a student visa valid until 21st July 2012, but then extended this leave until 30th January 2015 in the same capacity. On 28th January 2015 he applied to extend his leave to remain outside of the Immigration rules. This application was refused, and his appeal was dismissed, and on 4th October 2016 he came appeal rights exhausted. The appellant then overstayed in the UK.
2. From October 2015 the appellant says that he has been in a relationship with Ms Mussrat Sultana, a British citizen. The couple were married in a religious ceremony on 31st July 2016. On 1st November 2016 the appellant made an application to remain in the UK on the basis of his relationship with Ms Sultana, this was refused on 21st December 2016, and his appeal was dismissed, and he became appeal rights exhausted in relation to this application/appeal on 6th July 2018. He made further human rights submissions on 17th August 2018, which were refused on 16th November 2018. He made another application on 16th September 2021 which was refused on 15th November 2022.
3. On 16th January 2024 the appellant returned to Pakistan voluntarily. On 5th March 2024 he made an application for entry clearance to return to the UK as the partner of Ms Sultana which was refused on the 7th June 2024 in the decision under appeal. The appellant’s appeal against this decision was dismissed by a First-tier Tribunal Judge in a decision promulgated on 1st September 2025 but for the reasons set out in my decision on error law annexed below I found that this decision erred materially in law and set the decision dismissing the appeal and the factual findings aside.
4. The matter now comes back before me to remake the appeal. As set out at paragraph 13 of the error of law decision it was agreed by both parties that the only issue to be determined in this remaking appeal was whether the relationship between the appellant and sponsor is genuine and subsisting and thus whether the relationship meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules at Appendix FM E-ECP 2.6 that the relationship must be genuine and subsisting. If this requirement is met then the appellant is entitled to succeed in his Article 8 ECHR appeal by reference to the Immigration Rules. Mr Turrell conceded, particularly in light of the new supplementary bundle of evidence, that there was an on-going genuine and subsisting relationship as partners between the appellant and sponsor.
5. Mr Turrell questioned whether part 9 suitability issues ought to have formed part of the remaking process but accepted that they had not been raised in the respondent’s Rule 24 and so whilst he contended that there were errors in the treatment of this issue by the First-tier Tribunal he accepted that it was now too late to raise them.
Evidence & Submissions – Remaking
6. In short summary the evidence the appellant relies upon is as follows. The appellant argues that his marriage, which took place in July 2016, is a proper Islamic marriage, and that he and his partner have now been married for almost ten years. They have supported each other emotionally during this time, and he has attended to his wife’s physical needs. Since he left the UK they have kept in touch via phone calls and messages, and are desperate to be reunited as their separation is causing them emotional and physical distress. He is afraid that his wife is missing medical appointments and struggling with her mobility as a result of his absence.
7. In short summary the evidence of the sponsor, Mrs Mussrat Sultana is as follows. She and the appellant lived together as husband and wife since their marriage until he made his voluntary departure to Pakistan in January 2024. The appellant was the main provider financially to rent, bills, good and the household expenses whilst he lived in the UK. The appellant’s voluntary departure has been very distressing for both of them, and was only done due to the immigration restrictions placed on him. She is a cancer survivor and has a number of other health conditions which mean she needs help with daily tasks such as cooking, cleaning and shopping, and attending health appointments. The appellant has been her carer. She has struggled practically since his departure as she does not have close family nearby who can step up and help her. She has also had problems with feelings of anxiety, depression combined insomnia. She has daily phone and video calls with the appellant but this is not the same as living physically with her husband.
8. There is supporting medical evidence for the appellant’s partner. The phone records also corroborate the appellant and his partner often sending multiple daily messages and having calls for the period 29th June 2024 to 19th February 2026.The Monzo Bank statement from February 2024 to February 2026 shows the sponsor sending money to the appellant on approximately twelve occasions.
Conclusions – Remaking
9. By application of Devaseelan the previous decision of Judge of the First-tier, that of Tribunal Bart-Stewart promulgated on 6th April 2018, is the starting point for my decision. As a result, the starting point is that the relationship between the appellant and sponsor was genuine and subsisting in 2018, as this was accepted by respondent at that time and found to be so by the First-tier Tribunal. It is conceded today, and I find rightly so on the evidence before me, by Mr Turrell that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship as a partner with the sponsor Ms Mussrat Sultana as this is supported not only by the statements of the appellant and sponsor but also by the phone evidence and that of remittances by the sponsor to the appellant. It follows that I find that the couple have a family life relationship under Article 8(1) ECHR.
10. It follows that the appellant has been found to have fulfil all of the requirements of the Immigration Rules at Appendix FM to enter the UK as a partner and so I find that the interference with family life that refusal of entry clearance to the appellant represents is a disproportionate interference with his and his partner’s right to respect for family life and so he is entitled to succeed in his Article 8 ECHR appeal.

Decision:

1. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law.

2. I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal.

3. I remake the appeal by allowing it on Article 8 ECHR human rights grounds.

Fiona Lindsley

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25th February 2026

Annex A: Error of Law Decision

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan born on 15th October 1986. He came to the UK on 12th March 2011 with a student visa valid until 21st July 2012, but then extended this leave until 30th January 2015 in the same capacity. On 28th January 2015 he applied to extend his leave to remain outside of the Immigration rules. This application was refused, and his appeal was dismissed, and on 4th October 2016 he came appeal rights exhausted. The appellant then overstayed in the UK.
2. From October 2015 the appellant says that he has been in a relationship with Ms Mussrat Sultana, a British citizen. The couple were married in a religious ceremony on 31st July 2016. On 1st November 2016 the appellant made an application to remain in the UK on the basis of his relationship with Ms Sultana, this was refused on 21st December 2016, and his appeal was dismissed, and he became appeal rights exhausted in relation to this application/appeal on 6th July 2018. He was encountered working illegally twice in 2017. He made further human rights submissions on 17th August 2018, which were refused on 16th November 2018. He made another application on 16th September 2021 which was refused on 15th November 2022. He was encountered working illegally again in November 2022. On 16th January 2024 the appellant returned to Pakistan voluntarily. On 5th March 2024 he made an application for entry clearance to return to the UK as the partner of Ms Sultana which was refused on the 7th June 2024 in the decision under appeal. The appellant’s appeal against this decision was dismissed by a First-tier Tribunal Judge in a decision promulgated on 1st September 2025.
3. Permission to appeal was granted by a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 3rd November 2025 on the basis that it was arguable that the First-tier judge had erred in law when considering whether there was a genuine and subsisting relationship between the appellant and Ms Sultana when this had been accepted in the 2018 decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and was not apparently disputed by the respondent in her decision letters of 15th November 2022 and the review of 28th April 2025. Permission was granted to argue all grounds.
4. The matter now comes before me to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law, and if so whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
Submissions – Error of Law
5. In the grounds of appeal and in oral submissions from Mr Rajakulendran it is argued, in short summary, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law as follows.
6. Firstly, it is argued, that the First-tier Tribunal erred by failing to properly apply Devaseelan with respect to whether the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with his partner given that this was accepted in the First-tier Tribunal decision of 6th April 2018, and was accepted in the decision of the respondent, including that of 15th November 2022. It is argued that there was no evidence that either party had a relationship with anyone else, or any other good reason to deviate from the previous finding of the First-tier Tribunal on this point.
7. Secondly, it is argued, that there is an error of law in the approach to the evidence of the appellant and the sponsor. It is argued that it was not rational to dismiss the evidence of the appellant and his sponsor that their relationship was genuine and subsisting on the basis that it was self-serving, which is identified in Moyo v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 1104 as not a good reason, as ultimately all evidence put forward by an appellant would generally assists the case otherwise it would be not put forward.
8. Thirdly, it is argued, that there are errors of fact in the decision which amount to errors of law. At paragraph 43 of the decision it states that the appellant knew that the respondent was taking issue with the genuineness of the relationship when this was not the case as the only comment in the decision of the entry clearance officer is that the marriage in 2016 was valid, a position which was only varied in the review to state that the marriage was not valid, but ultimately this was not a relevant point because the appellant and sponsor can be genuine and subsisting partners without being validly married. The First-tier Tribunal then wrongly goes on to require further evidence relating to the relationship, and finds the reference to the appellant in the sponsor’s GP notes is insufficient to show a genuine and subsisting relationship. The First-tier Tribunal then errs in fact by stating there is only one reference to the appellant in the GP notes when there are in fact two references to him. It is argued that this error is one to which the appellant did not contribute, it is a clear factual wrong and is material to the outcome.
9. In a Rule 24 notice and in submission by Mr Dellar it is argued for the respondent as follows.
10. With respect to the first ground it is argued in the Rule 24 that it was open to the First-tier Tribunal Judge to find that the relationship was not genuine or subsisting due to the lapse in time since the past decision applying Devaseelan. The First-tier Tribunal acknowledges the previous determination, and the position of the respondent but on the totality of the evidence does not find the relationship to be genuine and subsisting. Mr Dellar disputed that there was a failure to abide by the principles set out in Devaseelan, the First-tier Tribunal takes the 2018 decision that at that point in time there was a genuine and subsisting relationship as the starting point and builds upon this, looking at the further evidence. This is a correct approach.
11. With respect to the second ground in the Rule 24 it is argued that the First-tier Tribunal considered that the evidence of the appellant and sponsor did not suffice to meet the balance of probabilities test and thus there is no error. Further there was no unfairness as the review does state the appellant had not provided evidence that the relationship met the requirements of E-ECP 2.1-2.10 which includes at E-ECP 2.6 that the relationship must be genuine and subsisting. However, at the hearing Mr Dellar expressed that he had some concerns about the decision of the First-tier Tribunal: he was concerned with the reasoning that leads to the conclusion that the appellant and sponsor were not in a genuine and subsisting relationship. He accepted that the reasons may not be sufficient as the evidence is said to be vague without examples and to be self-serving which is not a term which serves a useful purpose.
12. The third grounds is said not to be arguable in the Rule 24 because there was no mistake of fact.
13. At the conclusion of submissions I informed the parties that I found the First-tier Tribunal had materially erred in law in the reasoning as to why the marriage was not genuine and subsisting. I set out my reasons below in writing. It was agreed that the appeal involved one factual issue, whether the marriage was genuine and subsisting, as all other issues had been resolved in the appellant’s favour. It was therefore agreed that the remaking hearing should take place in the Upper Tribunal at the first available date with an Urdu interpreter, as the sponsor would need an interpreter to give evidence. Both parties agreed that the filing and serving of a bundle of relevant evidence by the appellant, including any new evidence, should take place ten days prior to the remaking hearing date. The appellant’s representatives are reminded that they need not only to upload a new bundle of relevant documents to CE file but also to serve it on the respondent to their UTdirections inbox, as this appears not to have happened for the error of law hearing.
Conclusions – Error of Law
14. The respondent’s refusal is set out at paragraph 14 of the decision and does not include reference to E-ECP 2.6, but only to E-ECP 2.7 that the appellant and sponsor did not have a genuine marriage. However, by the time this appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal it was agreed that all the paragraphs E-ECP 2.1-2.10 had to be found to be satisfied by the First-tier Tribunal, as is set out at paragraph 22 of the decision, and thus the requirement at E-ECP 2.6 that they be in a genuine and subsisting relationship was agreed by both parties to be one in the appeal. None of those who appeared before the First-tier Tribunal were present in the Upper Tribunal hearing but from the decision, for instance at paragraph 37, it is clear that the respondent argued in submissions that there was insufficient evidence to show the appellant and sponsor were in a genuine and subsisting relationship at the time of the hearing. The appellant was represented by counsel: if these submissions were being made and he was surprised by them and wished to have time to collate further evidence on the point he could have made an application to be able to do this. I do not find that the treatment of this issue was procedurally unfair to the appellant.
15. The First-tier Tribunal correctly directs itself as to the application of Devaseelan at paragraph 36 of the decision: the previous decision is a starting point, and so the starting point is that the relationship between the appellant and sponsor was genuine and subsisting in 2018, some seven years prior to the date on which the First-tier Tribunal had to determine the issue. This finding was therefore to be considered in the context of the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal relating to the state of the relationship at the date of the hearing, as set out at paragraph 38 of the decision.
16. However, I find that the First-tier Tribunal falls into error when considering the evidence with respect to whether the relationship is currently genuine and subsisting. At paragraph 42 of the decision, the start point of the First-tier Tribunal’s consideration of this issue, the evidence of the appellant and sponsor is said not to be evidence to which weight can be given because it is self-serving when, applying Moyo, this is not a good reason to discount evidence. As Mr Dellar noted the appellant is said to be vague in his statement at paragraph 43 of the decision without giving any examples of that vagueness. At paragraph 51 of the decision the evidence of payments, messages and phone calls after the appellant left the UK in 2024 is given less weight for no apparent reason, when it might be thought that the most recent contact and most recent evidence going to the relationship would be of most importance. I find that whilst some reasonable reasoning is given relating to inconsistent addresses that the inclusion of erroneous reasoning in the decision as outlined above in the making of the decision on the key question of the genuine and subsisting nature of the relationship between the appellant and sponsor amounts to a material error of law.

Decision:

1. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law.

2. I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal and all of the findings.

3. I adjourn the re-make of the decision.

Directions:

1. The appeal will be remade in the Upper Tribunal at the first available date.
2. The appellant must file electronically with the Upper Tribunal and serve on the respondent a bundle of evidence relevant to the remaking appeal ten days prior to the hearing date for the remaking.
3. Any updating evidence which either party wishes to rely upon must be filed with the Upper Tribunal and served on the other party ten days prior to the date of the remaking hearing (the appellant should include this evidence in the hearing bundle as per direction 2).
4. An Urdu interpreter is required.

Fiona Lindsley

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6th January 2026