Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005151
UI-2025-005150

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02632/2024
PA/58795/2024
PA/55980/2025
LP/04411/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CANAVAN

Between

C R P
First Appellant
E R
Second Appellant
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A. Smith, instructed by Luqmani Thompson LLP
For the Respondent: Ms S. Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 07 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity because the case involves protection claims. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Summary

1. This is a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the Upper Tribunal’). The Upper Tribunal is an independent decision-making body with powers granted by an Act of Parliament. This decision is made in the context of the Upper Tribunal’s role considering statutory appeals from decisions made by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the First-tier Tribunal’).

2. The appellants (CRP & ER) appealed decisions made by the respondent (SSHD) to refuse their protection and human rights claims. The appellants lodged an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘NIAA 2002’). The appeal could be brought on the ground that removal from the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention or would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA 1998’).

3. The losing party in an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal can apply for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. If permission is granted, the Upper Tribunal will consider the legal arguments put forward by both sides in the appeal. The Upper Tribunal only has power to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal if it concludes that the arguments put forward by the party that applied to appeal show that the decision involved the making of an error of law: see section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (‘TCEA 2007’).

4. If the Upper Tribunal finds that a decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, the First-tier Tribunal decision will stand. If a decision of the First-tier Tribunal is found to involve the making of an error of law the Upper Tribunal has power to set aside the decision. The Upper Tribunal will then decide whether it will remake the decision or whether the appeal might need to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal.

5. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appellants’ appeal on protection and human rights grounds. The judge was not satisfied that the appellants produced sufficiently reliable evidence to establish the credibility of their account that they would be targeted by a local politician on behalf of someone with whom they had a protracted property dispute. The First-tier Tribunal also concluded that there was insufficient reliable medical evidence to show that removal would breach the appellants’ human rights on health grounds.

6. The Upper Tribunal has concluded that the arguments put forward on behalf of the appellants fail to show that the First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law. The First-tier Tribunal’s findings were within a range of reasonable responses to the evidence.

Decision and reasons

7. The appellants are a married couple from Sri Lanka. They appealed decisions made by the respondent on 26 March 2024 and 22 January 2025 to refuse their protection and human rights claims.

First-tier Tribunal decision

8. First-tier Tribunal Judge Ripley (‘the judge’) dismissed the appeal in a decision sent on 12 October 2025. The judge summarised the factual basis of their claims for international protection and the respondent’s reasons for refusing the applications [3]-[4]. The appellants said that they bought a house in 2008 but the previous owner (‘C’) would not give up the property. It took around 10 years to evict her. The previous owner continued to verbally abuse and threaten the appellants. The appellants sold the house in 2019. The appellants said that on 22 January 2022 they were threatened by three masked men, who were said to have connections to a corrupt local politician, on behalf of C. After reporting the matter to the local police, on the evening of the same day, two men attacked them at their home. The appellants eventually made arrangements to leave Sri Lanka. The judge identified the issues to be determined in the appeal before turning to make findings on the evidence [13].

9. The judge made clear that she had considered the diagnosis of depression and PTSD when considering the appellants’ ability to give a consistent and chronological account [15]. She turned to the first of the issues in the Schedule of Issues. The judge concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show that threats said to be made in 2022 were made ‘for reasons of’ any imputed political opinion. If the politician did use his influence to threaten them it was on behalf of the person who used to own the house and was not for one of the reasons contained in the Refugee Convention [16].

10. The judge went on to consider the credibility of the appellants’ account with reference to the evidence and taking into account the factors outlined in section of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (‘AITCA 2004’). The judge took into account the fact that the first appellant admitted to lying about her reasons for leaving Sri Lanka in the screening interview [17]. She also considered the second appellant’s delay in claiming asylum [18]. The judge reminded herself that the statute required her to take into account the fact that these matters may have a bearing on their credibility. Nevertheless, she considered ‘all of the evidence together … and that the extent of the damage done to an appellant’s credibility by the factors mentioned in Section 8 is a question of degree in each case.’ [19].

11. The judge then reviewed the evidence relating to each of the main aspects of the appellants’ accounts, noting a number of inconsistencies between the accounts given by the appellants and the documents produced in support of the claim [20]-[40]. Having conducted a review of the evidence, and taking into account the evidence relating to their mental health, the judge did not accept the overall account of the reasons why they left Sri Lanka [41]. The judge accepted that they might have been subjected to verbal abuse from C, which had a negative impact on them. However, the judge did not accept that the evidence showed that it was reasonably likely that the appellants continued to be threatened [42]. Nor did she accept that the appellants were likely to have been attacked in their home in 2022 [46].

12. The judge concluded that there was insufficient reliable evidence to show that the appellants would be at real risk of treatment amounting to serious harm from the politician that they thought was threatening them on C’s behalf if they returned to Sri Lanka [48]. The evidence showed that they were able to seek the assistance of a lawyer, the police, and the courts during the course of what was admittedly a protracted process relating to the property dispute. The appellants could seek protection from the authorities from C [49]. In the alternative, it would not be unduly harsh to expect the appellants to relocate to another area of Sri Lanka [51]-[58].

13. The judge went on to consider the medical evidence in further detail to assess whether removal would amount to a breach of Article 3 on health grounds [59]-[69]. She concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show a real risk that the appellants would suffer a serious rapid and irreversible decline in their health or a significant reduction in life expectancy if returned to Sri Lanka to meet the high threshold required to a show a breach of human rights in health cases. She did so with reference to the relevant tests set out in AM (Art.3; health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 00131 and J v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 629.

Upper Tribunal proceedings

14. The appellants applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the following grounds:

(i) The First-tier Tribunal unlawfully ‘put the cart before the horse’ in assessing the credibility of the appellants’ account before considering the medical evidence: Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367 referred.

(ii) The First-tier Tribunal failed to consider the second appellant’s lack of knowledge about the full details of the attack on his wife adequately.

(iii) The First-tier Tribunal failed to consider the impact of the appellants’ subjective fear of return in assessing the Article 3 and Article 8 claims based on their health.

15. A judge of the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal in an order sent on 05 November 2025.

16. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing, before coming to a decision in this appeal. It is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions because they are a matter of record, but I will refer to any relevant arguments in the decision.

17. I bear in mind that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of a specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings: see HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19.

Ground 1 – error of approach in the assessment of credibility

18. The first ground argued that the judge failed to give adequate consideration to the medical evidence when making her findings relating to the credibility of the appellants’ account. Beyond submissions relating to the structure of the decision nothing in the pleaded grounds nor the oral submissions clearly identified what aspects of the medical evidence might have made any material difference to the outcome.

19. At the outset of her findings, the judge made clear that she had ‘taken into account the effect of their poor mental health on their ability to give a consistent and chronological account.’ She went on to say that before arriving at her conclusions she had considered all the evidence in the round [15]. The judge then went on to make structured findings in relation to each of the main aspects of the evidence. The main reasons given for rejecting the credibility of the appellants’ account to have been attacked at home on 22 January 2022 were the inconsistencies between the appellants’ own evidence and the documents that they produced in support of that account.

20. The judge found that relevant matters contained in section 8 AITCA 2004 were factors that undermined the appellants’ overall credibility. She accepted that there was some evidence to indicate that the appellants had a lengthy property dispute with C. They were assisted by a lawyer, obtained a court order, and the police then helped them to evict C in 2018.

21. I note that the evidence was inconsistent as to when the appellants then sold the property. They variously claimed that it was sold in 2019 but in her witness statement the first appellant said that it was in late 2021 i.e. suggesting that it was not long before the attack in January 2022. This contradicted the evidence produced by the appellants from their lawyer (pg.138 UT bundle), which stated that the property was sold on 14 March 2019. The seemingly untranslated copy of the document that is said to be the deed for the sale of the property gives the same date in the Gregorian calendar (pg.139).

22. Even if there had been unpleasant verbal abuse from C during the course of the property dispute, it seems that little explanation was offered as to why C would continue to threaten the appellants some four years after she was evicted and three years after the property had been sold. The country expert, Mr Smith, observed that it was unclear how or why the local politician might assist C to threaten the appellants. Ms Smith suggested that the appellants did not know why the politician helped C. Even if the local politician was willing to help a supporter, it is difficult to identify any obvious motive as to why he might continue to have any interest in the appellants so many years after a property dispute with a third party had come to an end.

23. It was open to the judge to find that there were inconsistencies on the face of the document that was said to be a police report. The report was said to relate to threats made to the appellants in a public car park on 22 January 2022 (pg.455-456). The date on the translation of 21 January 2020 did not accord with the copy of the original. The date on the original had clearly been amended by hand to accord with their claim that this incident happened on 22 January 2022, suggesting that it was translated before it was amended. It was also open to the judge to observe that the content of the police report was also more consistent with it being a record from 2020 because it referred to the appellants winning ‘a legal case about two years ago’. It is clear that the judge took into account the evidence given by Mr Smith as to why the police might not mention the politician by name in the report at this stage of her findings [24].

24. The credibility of the appellants’ account of the incident in the car park formed the foundation of the next event. The appellant said that it was because they reported the matter to the police that men came to their house and attacked them later the same day. The judge found that there were inconsistencies in their respective accounts of the attack that the appellants said took place in the evening of 22 January 2022. The judge took into account the second appellant’s explanation that the lack of detail in interview was due to poor memory [25]. At [26] she considered whether the medical evidence might support this explanation. Nevertheless, it was open to her to find that the interview record indicated that the primary difficulty he had was in recollecting the date of events rather than the detail of the events themselves.

25. It was open to the judge to go on to observe that, despite the significance of the attack on their home, it was not mentioned to the psychiatrist who had written almost identical letters in relation to each appellant shortly before they left Sri Lanka (07 July 2022 for the first appellant and 19 January 2023 for the second appellant) [28]. The judge went on to note that no physical attack was mentioned in other medical evidence relating to the second appellant [29]. The judge then went on to consider Dr Chisholm’s psychological report relating to the second appellant at [30]-[31]. The judge outlined other inconsistencies in the evidence relating to the appellants’ accounts of the threats that they received [35]-[38].

26. It is clear from the outset of the decision that the judge had considered the evidence as a whole, including the evidence relating to the appellants’ mental health, before coming to any conclusions relating to the credibility of their account. It was open to the judge to make findings relating to the reliability of various aspects of the evidence as she considered each aspect of the claim in turn. It is also clear that the judge considered the medical and expert evidence during the course of those findings and gave adequate reasons to explain why it did not provide an adequate explanation for some of the inconsistencies.

27. Having made findings about the reliability of various aspects of the evidence, the judge drew her findings together under the heading ‘Conclusions’ [41]-[47]. I can see nothing in the findings made before this section to suggest that the judge had come to any concluded views without adequate reference to the medical or other expert evidence. It was open to the judge to conclude that, although there was evidence from Dr Chisholm to indicate that the first appellant might have suffered a traumatic experience in the past, she did not accept that it was in the context or for the reasons that the appellants’ claimed i.e. during an attack on the house by the politician’s men on C’s behalf. Those findings were within a range of reasonable responses to the evidence. As an expert tribunal it is reasonable to take judicial notice of the fact that Sri Lanka was in the depths of an economic and political crisis during the course of 2022, which might have provided an alternative motivation to leave Sri Lanka.

28. For these reasons, I find that the first ground does not disclose any errors of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s credibility findings.

Ground 2 – failure to give adequate consideration to evidence

29. The second ground also fails to disclose a material error of law. The fact that the second appellant might not be aware of the full extent of the attack on the first appellant would not have made any material difference to the credibility findings. Even if this argument is taken at its highest, it was still open to the judge to find that the second appellant’s failure to mention any physical injuries to his wife in interview undermined the credibility of this aspect of his account when the first appellant said that she was bruised, cut and burned during the incident [25]. Nothing in the judge’s findings suggest that she placed any weight on the fact that the second appellant may not have been aware of the full extent of the attack as disclosed to Dr Chisholm. This was only one of many factors identified by the judge that undermined the credibility of the appellants’ overall claim to have been attacked at their home on 22 January 2022.

Ground 3 – failure to give adequate consideration to subjective fear of return

30. The third ground argues that the judge failed to give adequate consideration to the appellants’ subjective fear of return when coming to her conclusions relating to the availability of internal relocation with reference to the Refugee Convention and the human right claim on health grounds.

31. First, the judge gave sustainable reasons for concluding that there was insufficient evidence to show that the appellants would be at real risk of serious harm from C or the politician who is said to have helped her. Those findings were open to the judge on the evidence. Having found that they would not be at risk in their home area, the issue of internal relocation did not arise.

32. Second, there were no clear findings as to whether the medical evidence showed that both appellants were suffering from serious illnesses of sufficient severity to engage the operation of Article 3. The evidence showed that the appellants were recorded to suffer from depression and PTSD. There was also some mention of fleeting thoughts of suicide in relation to the second appellant. The judge did not deal with this issue expressly.

33. Third, it is clear that Dr Chisholm’s report was at the forefront of the judge’s consideration of this issue because she quoted it in the first paragraph of her findings [59]. Even if that evidence was taken at its highest Dr Chisholm’s opinion was that the first appellant would have a subjective fear of return that might be quite acute on arrival but was likely to subside in time if there were no further threats or attacks. In fact, the judge did consider the first appellant’s subjective fear at [60] and [62]. It was within a range of reasonable responses to the evidence for the judge to conclude that the first appellant’s fear was not likely to be any greater now than it might have been before. It was also open to the judge to find that the appellants produced evidence to show that they were able to receive support and treatment for their mental health when they were in Sri Lanka.

34. Fourth, the judge expressly considered what weight could be placed on the risk of suicide [63]-[69]. Having considered the evidence myself, it was within a range of reasonable responses to the limited evidence on this issue for the judge to conclude that there was insufficient evidence of a risk of suicide beyond the second appellant’s fleeting mentions of a suicide pact, which might have been an indicator of distress rather than meaningful intent. There was no indication of a history of self-harm or previous suicide attempts. Even though the evidence indicated that the first appellant might have suffered a traumatic experience of some kind in the past, Dr Chisholm’s report indicated that she had no plans to end her life although she might be more vulnerable to her husband’s suggestions. However, there was no clear evidence to show that there was likely to be any significant risk of self-harm or suicide by either appellant if returned to Sri Lanka.

35. Fifth, having found that removal would not breach Article 3 on health grounds it was open to the judge to find that there would be no breach of Article 8. The appellant’s fell far short of the private life requirements of the immigration rules. It was not arguable that they would face ‘very significant obstacles’ to integration on any other grounds other than their health. The judge had already found that treatment was likely to be available in Sri Lanka. Their daughter still lives in Sri Lanka. In at least one piece of evidence it was suggested that they had lived with her in the past. Their son lives in Japan but his in-laws were currently living in the appellants’ house. This also suggested that they might have access to some support from their son. The appellants mentioned other friends and relatives in Sri Lanka in the course of their evidence.

36. For these reasons, I find that the third ground does not particularise any error of law that would have made any material difference to the outcome of the appeal.

37. I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The decision shall stand.

Notice of Decision

The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law

M. Canavan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
08 January 2026