Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005156, UI-2025-005157
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62485/2024 PA/62487/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5 May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SOLANKI

Between

BH
AH (A Child)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Gayle, Counsel instructed by Elder Rahimi
For the Respondent: Mr Puh, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and his family). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellants are nationals of Iran. They are of Kurdish ethnicity. They were born in 1983 and 2011.
2. The issue to decide is whether the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) Judge (‘the Judge’) Graves erred in law, in a decision dated 25 September 2025, when dismissing their appeal against the decision of the Respondent, dated 22 April 2024, to refuse their protection and human rights claims made on 16 July 2022.
Background
3. The Appellants entered the UK on 16 July 2022. The First Appellant (A1) is the father of the Second Appellant (A2). The rest of their family remain in Iran (A1’s wife and twin youngers sons).
4. A1’s case is that he was with his brother in a car in 2020 to 2021 when they were involved in an accident with security personnel driving another car, who were chasing a suspect. His brother was shot and killed and he was detained, and accused of assisting the suspect to escape, and accused of being a spy for Mossad. He was tortured and released to hospital after twenty seven days, having been forced to sign a false confession. A1 then says in 2022, a friend borrowed a car from him, and he received a call from their family to say the friend and the people he was travelling with, had been arrested and detained and accused of anti-government activity. A1’s home was then raided, because the car was registered to him. His friends were then executed for political offences. He fled Iran and came to the UK, via Turkey, Italy and France, where he claimed asylum. A1 converted to Christianity once in the UK. He relies on a fear of persecution for all of these reasons. The Respondent accepted he was born a Muslim and his nationality.
5. The Appellants claimed asylum on 16 July 2022. Their claims were refused on 22 April 2024. They appealed these decisions. Their appeals were dismissed by the FtT in a decision dated 25 September 2025.
Grounds of Appeal and Grant of Permission
6. The Appellants appealed the decision of the FtT on 8 October 2025. The grounds are drafted by Elder Rahimi Solicitors. I summarise the grounds of appeal advanced as follows:
i. Ground One: The Judge erred by misrepresenting A1’s evidence at paras. 38-39. The Judge states there was a fundamental shift in the account between his Screening Interview Record (SCR), his Asylum Claim Questionnaire (ACQ) and his second Asylum Interview (AIR2). The assessment of credibility is as such on a materially flawed basis.
ii. Ground Two: The Judge fundamentally misunderstood A1’s account at paras. 35-37, 41-43. A1 explained he made a coerced, false confession about being a Mossad spy. It was known to those he confessed to he was not a spy but this was extracted to absolve those responsible for killing his brother. The Judge finds it not credible that he was released with conditions given his confession but ignores the basis on which the confession was made and the levels of corruption in the security and intelligence services. The Judge also erred at para. 48 in making a perverse finding in respect of his family and the failure to consider that not all of them faced the same risk.
iii. Ground Three: The Judge makes incorrect findings in respect of A1’s evidence on his practice of Islam. The Judge failed to consider this evidence in the context of the background evidence on Iran. The Judge unreasonably at para.56 took into her analysis that A1 referred to Psalm 18:2 as opposed to Psalm 2:18, knowing he had mental health issues. The Judge erred in considering Pastor Rouin’s evidence and the evidence from Christ Church Gypsy Hill when considering the genuineness of A1’s conversion.
7. Permission to appeal was granted by FtT Judge Adio. His decision reads as follows:
3. The grounds in the application for permission to appeal argue that the judge based an adverse credibility finding on a misrepresentation of the Applicant’s evidence. Ground 2 states that the decision is wrong because it is materially flawed and contains a materially flawed analysis of the Applicant’s evidence and ground 3 states that there is failure to give adequate reasons for rejection of apostacy.
4. In respect of ground 3 concerning the failure to give adequate reasons for rejection of apostacy, the grounds state that the adverse finding on the Applicants’ motivations or consideration of the possibility he is feigning to bolster his claim, betrays the judge’s failure to engage with the evidence from Christ Church, Gypsy Hill and that in their joint letter dated 31 August 2025 Reverend Emma Lowth and lay leader Richard Winborn set out their reasons for supporting the Applicant’s claim to be a genuine convert to Christianity.
5. At paragraph 62 of her decision the Judge notes as follows: “62. I have attached some weight to the letter and oral evidence from Mr Winborn and the church letters, to the extent that I accept the appellant was attending church as asserted in those letters, that he participated in a baptism, engaged with Bible study, and that Rev’d Lowth and Mr Winborn believe him to be a true Christian. However, I find that taking all of the evidence in the round, while they will have had contact with him, and have interacted with him over a period of time, they are not entirely disinterested and independent witnesses, as their evidence about his faith may well be influenced by their own, and there is nothing to suggest there has been a process of testing his motivations or consideration of the possibility he is feigning to bolster his claim. Credibility is ultimately a matter for the Tribunal, and I have found the appellant’s claim to have been fabricated for the purpose of founding his asylum claim. That finding does feed into the overall assessment of the credibility of his motivations in becoming a Christian, although it is by no means determinative. However, I also have concerns about the detail and consistency of the appellant’s faith.”
6. I find that there is an inherent contradiction in the judge’s finding, particularly as the judge attached some weight to the letter and oral evidence from Mr Winborn and Reverend Lowth, believing the Applicant to be a true Christian. It is arguable that any influence on the witnesses and author of the letter can be separated from the Applicant’s independent practice of his faith referred to below in the relevant letter referred to by the representatives.
7. The letter dated 31st August 2025 set out by the representatives in the grounds of application include points such as the Applicant being trained as a Bible study leader, giving presentations about his faith during church services to English speakers and provided testimony of his faith journey that was used by a racial justice focus group attended by the Bishop of Kingston and others included at paragraph 32 of the grounds of application for permission to appeal. It is arguable that the judge erred in her reasons for rejecting the apostacy of the Applicant and not finding that he has now become a genuine Christian, particularly in view of her lending weight to the letter and oral evidence from Mr Winborn. The judge does not analyse the contents of the letter referred to above and state how much weight is attached to the individual activities carried out by the Applicant before concluding that he is not a genuine Christian. The positive findings arguably undermine the adverse credibility findings made against the Applicant. Both set of findings of fact cannot satisfactorily stand together.
9. Grounds 1 to 2 are also arguable with regards to the reasons provided in the application for permission to appeal concerning the Applicant’s evidence on his claim based on political opinion.
10. Permission to appeal is granted.
Submissions
8. The matter came before me in an error of law hearing on 8 January 2026.
9. I had before me a composite bundle (CB) running to 664 pages and a Rule 24 reply dated 29 December 2025.
10. The Rule 24 Reply in summary states that Ground 1 and 2 are disagreements with the findings. The Judge explained why A1 was not credible in detail at paras. 25-52 of the decision. The Judge did address the inconsistencies raised in Ground 1 at paras.31-34 of the decision. There was no misrepresentation of evidence relating to inconsistencies. As to Ground 2, the Judge explained why it was considered completely incredible that A1 would be released after making a confession. If the Judge had erred in considering it was a false confession, the issue is whether there was any risk relating to the car incident and clear findings were made in this regard which means the error is immaterial. A1 gave a different account, and this was considered by the Judge; see paras. 37-47 of the decision. The threshold for perversity is extremely high and the Judge has considered relevant matters in making her findings. There is no material error in respect of apostacy. The Judge accepted at para. 62 that A1 was attending church, that he participated in a baptism, engaged with Bible study and that Rev’d Lowth and Mr Winborn believe him to be a true Christian but credibility is ultimately a matter for the Tribunal. A1 was not considered to be a genuine Christian based on concerns about the detail and consistency of his faith.
11. I heard detailed submissions from both representatives. At points, Mr Gayle’s oral arguments deviated from the grounds of appeal. Mr Gayle also at one stage referred to his hearing notes when making submissions. I raised this in the hearing with the representatives. No application was made at any stage to amend the grounds of appeal or to adduce any evidence under Rule 15(2A).
Findings and Reasons
12. I consider the grounds of appeal advanced below in turn.
Ground One
13. It is argued that the Judge erred by misrepresenting A1’s evidence at paras. 38-39 of the FtT decision. The Appellants argued that the Judge states there was a fundamental shift in the account between his Screening Interview Record (SCR), his Asylum Claim Questionnaire (ACQ) and his second Asylum Interview (AIR2) but this was not correct as in his screening interview he did state that his friends belonged to PJAK and they were arrested them in his car which created the interest in him. It is said that he said the same thing in his ACQ which was that his friends were detained for working with counter revolutionary forces and the car they were in was in his name. It is also said that in his answer in his AIR2 he was responding to a question about what he knew about PJAK as a political party, but the Judge has incorrectly stated that he was being asked about his suspected link to PJAK. The assessment of credibility is as such said to be on a materially flawed basis.
14. I note the following findings were made by the Judge at paragraphs 38 and 39 of the decision:
“38. It is also of note that on arrival, when first asked why he could not return to Iran, when asked for ‘ALL of the reasons’ (SCR4.1), the appellant made no mention of being a suspected spy for Mossad. Instead he said a group of people borrowed a car from him, and in the car were ‘three people belonging to a political party called Pijhak’, and only ‘because the car belonged to me the police also came after me’. The basis of the appellant’s account then changes fundamentally between the SCR and the ACQ, in that instead of him being entirely unrelated to what happened, apart from loaning a car, these people were stopped because the car linked them to him, and it is really the appellant the authorities are suspicious of, because of his suspected links to Mossad. The ACQ also makes no mention of a Kurdish political party. This is a significant shift in the basis of the claim, the reasons for adverse interest and the appellant’s role. By the second interview, when asked about the Kurdish party (AIR2-60) the appellant just said he did not know anything about it.
39. I find it difficult to understand why the appellant would not have said, when asked, that the Iranian authorities suspect he is a spy and arrested his friends because they were connected to him through the car, rather than a different account. The aspect of the account where there was his friend and three (or two) people who were involved in a Kurdish political party also appeared to have fallen away by hearing, since the appellant has not explained where this comes from, or why he believes these people were part of a Kurdish party. Instead, his account is that they were arrested because of him, on suspicion of spying, but they had simply borrowed the car to go to a wedding and although in the SCR, he said the wedding was in Sardasht, some hours from Urumieh, in the main interview, he said they were going to Alinejab, forty five minutes away (AIR2-58). There are peripheral inconsistencies as well as more major ones.
15. I have considered the grounds advanced, together with the evidence and detailed submissions made by the parties.
16. In his screening interview his evidence is recorded as follows:
“4.1 - My friend used my car to transported three people belonging to a political part party called Pizhak. They were travelling to Sardasht from Urmieh. The police stopped them and arrested all of them Because the car belonged to me the police also came after me. I was scared for life as the Pizhak party is an anti-Iranian government party. This happened on the 25-03-2022. If I returned to Iran I will be arrested or even killed by the Iranian government.”
17. In his ACQ he said as follows:
“I believe that based on what happened to me before, the accusations made against me, the false confessions extracted from me, the conditions of my release and the incident which led to the raid on my home, I will be executed….
They obtained a forced false confession from me stating that I was cooperating with the Israeli forces, and I had assisted my comrades to escape from the IRGC and I was getting paid by MOSSAD. I had write on the paper than I had read the entire written confession and signed the fact that I had cooperate with Israel and cooperated with MOSSAD. I was released on condition that I was at their disposal and any wrong action on my part, I would be executed. I was under medical and psychological care. Around a year later, one of my friends contacted me and asked to borrow my car. I took the car to him, he said they were going to a wedding. Next morning, I got call at home. It was my friend’s wife. She was distressed. She said that night, her husband and his friends had been detained and accused of working with counter revolutionary forces. I had a panic attack because the car was in my name. I fled the house by taxi with my family. I left them at my mother in law’s house. I fled the city and went into hiding in my ancestral village. During this time, my wife contacted me and said our neighbours’ had told her that security forces had raided our home.”
18. I note that the Judge’s first point in respect of inconsistencies at para.38 of the decision is that the Appellant failed to mention in his screening interview his history of being accused of being a spy for Mossad. The grounds of appeal do not challenge this part of the findings.
19. At para.38 of the decision the Judge also takes issue with the Appellant having raised for the first time in his ACQ, that it is history of being accused of Mossad links that created the problems for him. Having read the ACQ in full it is clear that he is at that stage quite heavily relying on that incident and the conditions of his release, together with his friends (who belonged to counter revolutionary forces) using his car and that being traced back to him. I note that the Judge states when considering the ACQ that “This is a significant shift in the basis of the claim, the reasons for adverse interest and the appellant’s role.” I also note that at para.40 of the decision the Judge again refers to the Appellant failing to mention his detention and the accusations surrounding Mossad at other aspects of his screening interview and this being a “fundamental inconsistency” which would be unexplained by his mental health or by a long journey. Again, the grounds of appeal do not challenge this aspect of the findings and the inconsistency raised in this regard.
20. What is really challenged in the grounds is the fact that the Judge states that in his ACQ he makes no mention of a Kurdish political party and that in his AIR2 Q60 when he was asked about the Kurdish party he said he did not know anything about them. I have had regard to the fact that he does refer to counter revolutionary forces in his ACQ. I have also had regard to the fact that at AIR2 Q60 he is asked, “What can you tell me about the Pizhak party?”, and he replies “That isn’t the spelling, it is Pahjak. I do not have any information about this party as I want to politically active. (sic)”. Mr Puh in his submissions before me at the hearing, said that A1 had never said he was politically active and as such he would not have knowledge of PJAK. I have come to the conclusion that whilst the Judge has made errors in this regard in recording the evidence on these issues, these are not material errors of law. The significant shift that she is referring to is the one which I have explained at paras. 18-19 of my decision above and the grounds of appeal do not challenge these findings.
21. I also note that at para.39 the Judge states that the account of there being interest in him owing to his friends’ involvement in a Kurdish political party had fallen away by the hearing, that he has not explained where this came from or why he thought these people were part of a Kurdish political party. She further notes an inconsistency between his screening interview and asylum interview as to where A1 says these individuals were travelling to. The grounds of appeal do not challenge these findings either.
22. Having considered all of the above, I find that there is nothing in Ground 1 that makes out a material error of law.
Ground Two
23. The Appellants argued that the Judge fundamentally misunderstood A1’s account at paras. 35-37, 41-43. A1 explained he made a coerced, false confession about being a Mossad spy. It was known to those he confessed to he was not a spy but this was extracted to absolve those responsible for killing his brother. It is said that the Appellant repeatedly explained that this was in effect a ruse and it was known he was not a spy. The Judge finds it not credible that he was released with conditions given his confession, but ignores the basis on which the confession was made and is unaware of the levels of corruption in the security and intelligence services. The Judge also erred at para. 48 in making a perverse finding in respect of his family and the failure to consider that not all of them faced the same risk. The Appellant was at risk as the owner of the car, none of his family were directly linked to the same.
24. I have considered at length the paragraphs referred to by the Appellants in the FtT decision. I set these out in full here:
“35. I find it simply implausible and incredible that if the authorities arrested him on suspicion of spying for a foreign intelligence service like Mossad, that he would have been released twenty seven days later, with no restriction on travel, no charges, and no consequences. The appellant said the reason was because they did not have any evidence that he was spying for Mossad, or they knew he was innocent, but that does not fit with the confession, or with the hair trigger approach the country information and guidance say the authorities take in Iran. Nor does it fit with his claim that for just driving in a car that was registered to him, his friends were all arrested, detained and executed, which suggests an extremely low threshold of suspicion and a heightened response.’
36. The appellant’s case is that he was released despite confessing to espionage for Israel, which would create a far higher risk profile than perceived opposition due to the fact of being a returning Kurdish failed asylum seeker.
37. The appellant told me at hearing that they released him because they knew he was innocent, but could not explain how he could know this, nor does this explanation fit with what he said in his ACQ, which was that he provided a signed confession to say he was a spy for Mossad. I find it completely incredible that having confessed to being a spy for the Israeli security forces, in writing, that the appellant would have been allowed to go home, with no further contact from security forces, regardless of whether he had injuries or not.
41. There were other issues relevant to plausibility and credibility in relation to the appellant’s arrest and detention in February 2021. As raised by the respondent, it was unclear why they thought the appellant and his brother were spies for Mossad, the people they were looking for, if they had been chasing a different car and simply crashed into the appellant and his brother. Nor do I find it credible that the appellant’s own relative would have coerced a false confession from him, to the extent that he was a spy for Mossad, as it is difficult to see either how this would have enabled his release, nor how it would have assisted any family member who was associated with him. The respondent asked why a high up security officer within the family would not have learned of the appellant’s detention for a month. Nor do I understand why the appellant and his family would have thought that confessing to spying for Israel would help to trigger his release, rather than his execution (AIR2-68).
42. The appellant was additionally inconsistent about his account of the confession he says he was forced to sign. At hearing he said it was blank, or he was never allowed to see it, so did not know what he was agreeing to or what it said. Yet in his ACQ, the appellant lists exactly what was in the confession, and said he signed to say he had read the entire confession. Again, this is something I would expect him to be able to remember reliably.
43. The appellant was inconsistent yet again about the conditions for his release and his account in oral evidence lacked plausible detail. When asked about conditions, since he mentioned them in his ACQ, he said he did not know what they were. Yet in his ACQ, he specifically says he was released on condition that ‘I was at their disposal’ and ‘any wrong action on my part, I would be executed’. This implies some sort of condition that he act as an informer, or comply with some sort of ongoing contact and good behaviour bond, yet at hearing he said he never had any contact with the security forces again, despite having confessed to being a spy for the Israeli intelligence forces. I find that incredible. I also do not believe that the appellant would be unable to consistently remember what the conditions for his release were, given he would live in a constant state of fear that breaching them would mean his immediate arrest and execution. Nor that the Iranian authorities would either not tell him what his conditions were, which was what he suggested at hearing, in which case he would be unable to comply with them, or that they would release him with no conditions at all, even to assist with surveillance, such as reporting, no international travel or surrendering of his passport, etc, if he signed the confession as claimed. I note too that in his interview (AIR2-75) he said he was told there were conditions of his release, yet at hearing, did not know what they were.”
25. As was submitted by Mr Puh, at para.41 of the decision the FtT Judge does actually consider the A1’s evidence that this was a false and coerced confession. She does not accept that as credible and she explains why in detail. The grounds of appeal do not engage specifically with these findings or suggest that the reasoning in that paragraph is flawed. The suggestion made in the grounds that the Judge fundamentally misunderstood this part of the account is not correct when one reads para.41 of the decision.
26. I also note that it is asserted in the grounds of appeal that A1 repeatedly explained that this was a coerced and false confession, extracted to absolve those responsible for killing his brother from any future investigations. I have considered the evidence of the Appellant and note the following:
• As set out by the FtT and above in my decision, in his screening interview he did not disclose the Mossad issues.
• In his ACQ, he said the following: “They said if I did not cooperate, I would meet the same fate as my brother. They asked me which branch of the Israeli state we were working with. They kept asking about links to Mossad, how much we were being paid. I was confused and in shock. They claimed that we had deliberately let the first car that they were chasing go past us and then blocked their path, allowing the others to escape. Slowly it dawned on me of what they were accusing us of. They were asking about the occupants of the other car. They were checking my phone…. I was tortured each time, physically and verbally abused. Eventually, one of the officers said that if I did not confess and cooperate with them, they would bring my children and hang them by their testicles in front of me and they would strip my wife naked in front of me…. I later learnt that my father had been trying to get me released with the help of one of our relatives who was a senior ranking official in the intelligence services. In the room, when my blindfold was taken off. Our relative was there. He spoke in Kurdish. He asked me why we had not tell them the truth. He said my poor old father had confessed everything to him (this was false), I started to cry. I had no more words. I pleaded my innocence again. He said the next day, I would sign and paper. They obtained a forced false confession from me stating that I was cooperating with the Israeli forces, and I had assisted my comrades to escape from the IRGC and I was getting paid by MOSSAD. I had write on the paper than I had read the entire written confession and signed the fact that I had cooperate with Israel and cooperated with MOSSAD. I was released on condition that I was at their disposal and any wrong action on my part, I would be executed. I was under medical and psychological care.”
• In his first asylum interview (AIR1) at q62 he was asked “what alleged crimes were you specifically arrested for?” and he said “I was arrested for accusations for being in a car for blocking the road in our car and working for Mossad, I didn't know who was Mossad.” At q63 he was asked “Have you submitted any evidence of your arrest and detention for 27 days by the authorities?” and he said, “they didn't give me any documents and forced me to sign a letter – statement.”
• In his second asylum interview (AIR2) I note the following questions and answers:
• Q50. He explains he was asked about Mossad and working for him, how many spies were in the group and where they were hiding. He was tortured severely and threats were made to his family.
• Q63. He explains the police came after him as the car was in his name, they accused them of falsely working with Mossad, they thought they were collaborating with the individuals in the car in front of them who may have been with Mossad
• Q64. He explained that he told them that he had no affiliation to Mossad but that the Sepah did not believe him
• Q65. A1 stated that the authorities would be after him now as he confessed under torture to working with Mossad and the four people that were in his car were arrested and executed on 31 December 2023.
• Q69. He states he confessed to the charge as he wanted to be released, they were going to kill him, he wanted to confess and leave.
• In his appeal statement he says at paras.22 and 23 – “With regard to paragraph 7(c), I have never stated that my ‘uncle’ was a senior member of Iranian intelligence. In my ACQ, I state that this was a ‘relative’. As I explained, my father had been desperate to get me out of detention and asked extended family members for help. The Iranian intelligence officer who assisted was not a close relative. He made it clear that the only way I would be released was if I signed a confession. I have no doubt that the Sepah were trying to cover themselves for the killing of my brother. My confession provided justification for that murder….With regard to paragraph 7(e), I was released because the authorities knew that my confession was false. As I have said, they just wanted to cover themselves.”
27. It follows from the above that A1’s case in his ACQ was that his relative had arranged for him to sign a false confession for his release, with the relative suggesting to the authorities that the truth was that he was working for Mossad. In AIR2 he explained the authorities believed he was working with Mossad and they did not believe him when he said was not doing so. In his statement he explains a relative assisted with his release and made clear he would only be released by signing a forced confession, that he believes that that Sepah knew his confession was false and that they obtained this to cover themselves. It as such seems (contrary to what is asserted in the grounds) that the first time he mentions that the confession was a ruse was in the appeal statement. In both the ACQ and AIR2 he gives different explanations.
28. I note that the grounds of appeal refer to the Judge being unaware of the levels of corruption in the Iranian intelligence and security services. I was not taken to any objective evidence and it was not asserted before me or in the grounds of appeal that the FtT were taken to any particular evidence that was missed by the Judge in considering this aspect of account. I have considered the appeal skeleton argument that was before the FtT and this does not refer to any country evidence. I note that the country evidence which was before the FtT in fact in many respects supports that judge’s findings, as it shows that individuals who have given forced confessions in Iran have been detained, convicted or sentenced to death (see for example CB 115, 120, 121, 122, 143, 156, 337). In any event, this would not address the reasons given by the Judge at para.41 of the decision for not accepting this account as credible.
29. In respect of para.48 of the FtT decision, I note that the Judge states:
“I also find it difficult to understand why, if it was too dangerous for the appellant and his son to remain in Iran, it was safe for his wife and other children, and parents and other siblings, who have all apparently been able to continue their lives, despite extremely serious allegations of international espionage against a close family member. It was put to me that the children could not attend school due to fear for their safety, and they had to move around for the same reason, but the appellant had also mentioned that the younger children were being educated online even before he left Iran, and made mention of economic issues, or a lack of schooling in their area, and problems with the availability of their house. It is difficult to understand how, if the family were at such risk, they were able to live in their family’s properties when the authorities were actively seeking the appellant. My concern is there were other reasons emerging, than those stated, for issues with access to schooling and moving house.”
30. The challenge to the Judge’s approach to the family is a perversity challenge. As was said in R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at §11 “It is well known that "perversity" represents a very high hurdle. In Miftari v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 481, the whole court agreed that the word meant what it said: it was a demanding concept. The majority of the court (Keene and Maurice Kay LJJ) said that it embraced decisions that were irrational or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense (even if there was no wilful or conscious departure from the rational), but it also included a finding of fact that was wholly unsupported by the evidence, provided always that this was a finding as to a material matter.”
31. The grounds of appeal assert that the Judge’s findings are perverse for failure to consider that the family did not face the same level of risk. It is said that A1 was at risk as he was the owner of the car and none of his family members were directly linked to the car. I note that in his ACQ A1 did state that his eldest son was taken with him as he was at risk of detention by the regime in retaliation. His evidence is the same at AIR1 77 and at AIR1 76 he said that his wife and sons in Iran were ”very anxious of being arrested and kidnapped so they are living in a small village near the town of Uromieh.” I do not consider that this ground reaches the high threshold for perversity when considering the account advanced by A1 and the whole of para.48.
32. I also note that the Judge made several reasoned adverse findings in respect of this part of the Appellants’ account which have not been challenged on appeal.
33. For the reasons set out above, I find that there is no material error of law made out on Ground Two.
Ground Three
34. It is argued that the Judge makes incorrect findings in respect of A1’s evidence on his practice of Islam at paras. 54-55. A1 was never asked when he stopped practising Islam, but contrary to what the Judge states it was long before he left Iran (and the Judge does refer to him questioning Islam from his time in school in AIR2). The Judge failed to consider this evidence in the context of increasing antipathy towards Islam in Iran; the Judge was required to consider this in the context of the background evidence. The Judge unreasonably at para.56 took into her analysis that A1 referred to Psalm 18:2 as opposed to Psalm 2:18, knowing he had mental health issues. The Judge is said to have erred at para.59 in considering Pastor Rouin’s evidence when considering the genuineness of A1’s conversion. He has completed the Alpha course before being baptised, no information was sought on the course by the Judge, and the evidence from Pastor Rouin confirmed A1 had worshipped at her church since January 2023. It is said that the Judge’s finding at para.62 that there was no evidence of the current church testing his motivations or considering the possibility of him feigning to bolster his claim showed a lack of engagement with the evidence from Christ Church Gypsy Hill.
35. I start by considering the grounds raised in respect of paras.59 and 62. The relevant parts of the Judge’s decision at paras.59 and 62 reads as follows:
“59. …It is unclear to me too how much preparation he took before taking the decision to become baptised, and what the ‘Alpha course’ comprised, or the degree to which the Iranian church leaders assess whether a person’s motivations are genuine. I do question whether the appellant was genuinely motivated to become a Christian, or was doing so to bolster his asylum claim.
62. I have attached some weight to the letter and oral evidence from Mr Winborn and the church letters, to the extent that I accept the appellant was attending church as asserted in those letters, that he participated in a baptism, engaged with Bible study, and that Rev’d Lowth and Mr Winborn believe him to be a true Christian. However, I find that taking all of the evidence in the round, while they will have had contact with him, and have interacted with him over a period of time, they are not entirely disinterested and independent witnesses, as their evidence about his faith may well be influenced by their own, and there is nothing to suggest there has been a process of testing his motivations or consideration of the possibility he is feigning to bolster his claim. Credibility is ultimately a matter for the Tribunal, and I have found the appellant’s claim to have been fabricated for the purpose of founding his asylum claim. That finding does feed into the overall assessment of the credibility of his motivations in becoming a Christian, although it is by no means determinative. However, I also have concerns about the detail and consistency of the appellant’s faith.”
36. The grounds argue that these findings fail to engage with the evidence from Pastor Rouin, Mr Winborn and Rev’d Lowth.
37. The Judge says that she accepts that A1 was attending church as asserted in those letters, that he participated in a baptism, engaged with Bible study and that Rev’d Lowth and Mr Winborn believe him to be a true Christian. The Judge’s statement that there is nothing to suggest there has been a process of testing his motivations or consideration of the possibility he is feigning to bolster his claim in my view fails to consider the evidence from these individuals adequately.
38. As is highlighted in the grounds, the evidence from Mr Winborn and Rev’d Lowth, was detailed. It said the following:
• Mr Winborn had been a lay leader in the Christ Church’s Ministry to Farsi speakers since it began in 2022 and a member of the church since 1975.
• Rev’d Lowth had been the Church of England Minister at that Church since June 2019.
• The Appellant has been regularly attending the church since December 2023, having moved to the area then.
• Rev’d Lowth was unable to attend the hearing owing to a prior engagement but Mr Winborn who was a trusted church leader with equally close experience of A1 would be able to bear witness to their shared understanding of his faith.
• A1 has been part of the church community, practising his faith, regularly attending Sunday service, midweek Bible study, monthly Farsi Holy Communion services.
• A1 has been a great asset to midweek Bible studies. He participates well in discussions about his faith and the Bible. He often helps guide others to a deeper and more accurate understanding of faith in midweek Bible study, reflecting on how his own faith impacts his life.
• A1 has been trained as a Bible study leader.
• A1 is seen as having future potential in Christian ministry.
• A1 has given presentations about his faith during church services to English speakers. He has explained how his experience of Persian New Year celebrations has changed and been impacted by his faith. He has shared a moving account of his journey to faith and used it as a reflection to guide the Racial Justice focus group attended by the Bishop of Kingston in June 2025. This testimony has encouraged congregants in their own Christian faith and they have been moved by hearing it.
• At Easter 2025, A1 gave a powerful presentation to the Farsi speakers about the resurrection. He explained the Biblical story in a way listeners found profound and impactful. In July 2025, the Appellant wrote an ‘excellent’ reflection on a passage in the Book of Revelation, which he delivered during the sermon. They have seen a maturity of Christian faith in him on these occasions which was expressed from the heart and lived out in his actions.
39. I note that earlier letters from Rev’d Lowth dated 4 August 2024 and 2 May 2024 state he attends Sunday services regularly, he participates in the church community by helping to set up events, he has been part of the church community since Christmas 2023.
40. It is clear from the above evidence that these witnesses held great experience in leading the church and Mr Winborn had experience of engaging with Farsi speakers at the church. It is also clear that their experience of A1, his church attendance and faith had at the date of hearing spanned over 21 months. The evidence showed he had shown depth and understanding of his faith in their view, his own journey to faith had been significant for other members of the congregation to hear and been used by a focus group, they were giving him positions of responsibility and leadership in the church, he was seen by them as having a future in ministry, they considered he had shown maturity in his faith and that he had expressed the same from his heart and in actions. This detail was clearly relevant to the issue of consideration of feigning and how or whether they has tested his motivations. The decision of the FtT does not demonstrate this has been considered adequately or at all.
41. I note that the Judge also says that these individuals are not entirely disinterested and independent witnesses, as their evidence about his faith may well be influenced by their own. It is not clear to me from reading the decision whether this was in fact put to Mr Winborn by anyone. He attended Court, he gave oral evidence and was an experienced church leader (see para.62 of the decision).
42. I also have concerns about para.59 of the decision, namely the fact the Judge says that it is unclear how much preparation he took before the decision to become baptised and where she questions the degree to which Iranian church leaders assess whether a person’s motivations are genuine.
43. I note the letter from Pastor Rouin at East London Iranian Church dated 18 December 2023 confirms that A1 joined with his son in January 2023, he finished the Alpha course successfully and was baptised in December 2023, he is growing in his faith and God’s Word as he attends weekly Bible Study, he is part of the evangelical team too. A letter from The Meeting Point dated 5 December 2023 confirms he participates and helps with great enthusiasm in Christian meetings at the community centre including Al Massira on teachings of the Bible (five 90 minutes sessions each since the start of November 2023) and that he has been in attendance at church. This evidence suggests there was a range of preparation before his baptism in December 2023, not just the Alpha course but also Bible Study weekly, attending an Al Massira course and attending church regularly (with his minor son). Furthermore, The Meeting Point letter provided a link to the Al Massira course and when one clicks on the same it explains what the course entails. It is not clear from the decision of the FtT that this evidence has been considered adequately or at all. I am also concerned about the statement regarding Iranian church leaders. The suggestion that Iranian church leaders may take any different position to other church leaders in assessing whether motivations in conversion are genuine is not supported by any evidence.
44. I find that the above errors are material; see R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at 9 (ii), (iii) (iv), SA (Iran), R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 2575 (Admin) and Dorodian (01/TH/1537).
45. In his submissions Mr Puh referred me to para.58 of the decision and the timing of A1 disclosing his conversion. It is said here by the Judge he said nothing about it in his ACQ. In reply, Mr Gayle highlighted that this is not correct as in his ACQ, dated 31 December 2025, he disclosed his religion as Christian (see CB 595). This is as such a mistake of fact.
46. Whilst I note that there are a number of other grounds advanced under Ground three and that Mr Puh did defend the decision on these grounds, having regard to the nature of the errors I have found above and the issue that they go to in this appeal, I cannot say that the decision of the FtT would have inevitably been the same on the issue of conversion had the above errors not occurred. I am mindful that credibility is a holistic assessment. Further, the claim is an asylum claim and deserves “the most anxious scrutiny”; see Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514, at 531 and MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at §66. I therefore find the errors I have set out and addressed above on the issue of conversion to be material.

Notice of Decision
47. For the aforementioned reasons, I find that there are no material errors of law in the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal in respect of events that occurred in Iran/the political aspect of his claim.
48. The errors relating to the genuineness of A1’s conversion are material. I set aside the decision on this basis. The findings of the FtT at paras.24-52 of the decision are preserved. The findings at para.64-65 are also preserved, bar the last sentence of para.65 which relates to the risk to the Appellants on the basis of religion.
49. Considering 7.2 of the Practice Statement of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal and the nature of the errors identified, I remit this matter to the FtT, to be heard on the basis set out above before any Judge aside from Judge Graves.

P. Solanki

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 April 2026