Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005162
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03894/2024
PA/55173/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 10 March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DOYLE

Between

AH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Holt, counsel, instructed by HI Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House, on 24 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. I make an anonymity direction because this appeal arises from the appellant’s protection claim.

2. This is an appeal by the Appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Howard, promulgated on 03/09/2025, which dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.

Background
3. (a) The Appellant is a Kurdish citizen of Iraq. The appellant entered the UK on 26 June 2018 and immediately claimed asylum. The respondent refused that application. The appellant appealed unsuccessfully and his appeal rights were exhausted on 3 October 2019.
(b) In November 2020 and January 2021, the appellant made two unsuccessful applications for family reunion. He appealed one of those decisions unsuccessfully, and his appeal rights were exhausted on 18 January 2023.
(c) On 11 July 2023 the appellant made further submissions which the respondent treated as a renewed protection claim. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s renewed protection claim on 20/02/2024.

The Judge’s Decision

4. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. On 03/09/2025 First-tier Tribunal Judge Howard (“the Judge”) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal.

5. The Appellant lodged grounds of appeal, and, on 13/10/2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Elliott granted permission to appeal. He said

2. The admirably succinct grounds assert that the Judge erred in treating the respondent’s CPIN as determinative of the risk faced by the appellant on return to the KRI and in failing to take account of the appellant’s specific evidence and misinterpreting the CPIN.

3. A reading of the Judge’s decision confirms that he took account of the contents of the respondent’s CPIN and, although he stated he considered all the appellant’s evidence, it is not readily apparent from the decision what his findings were about it and it is arguable that he has failed to engage properly with the appellant’s personal profile and specific risk factors.

4. The grounds raise an arguable, material error of law. Permission to appeal on all matters raised in the grounds is granted.

The Hearing
6. For the appellant, Mr Holt moved the grounds of appeal. He told me that the appellant is at risk on return because of his political activities in the UK. Mr Holt took me to [30] of the decision, where (he told me that) the Judge accepted that the appellant has been openly critical of the KRG authorities. Mr Holt told me that at [32] the Judge identifies that he has to assess risk on return, but, Mr Holt argued, the Judge made a material error in law in finding “the answer” in “country guidance”. The “country guidance” the Judge referred to is the respondent’s 2023 CPIN.
7. Mr Holt said that the Judge treated the respondent’s CPIN as a rebuttable presumption that the appellant would not be at risk on return. He said that, in itself, is an error but the error is compounded by the Judge’s failure to properly consider the content of the CPIN. Mr Holt said that the Judge failed to assess all of the evidence against the complete contents of the CPIN, and the Judge had failed to take account of evidence which indicates that the appellant’s political activities in the UK are known to the authorities in KRG.
8. Mr Holt told me that the decision contains material errors of law and asked me to set the decision aside.
9. For the respondent, Ms Clewley resisted the appeal. She relied on the respondent’s rule 24 note and said that the decision does not contain an error of law, material or otherwise. Ms Clewley told me that although the Judge only refers to one paragraph from the assessment section of the CPIN, a complete reading of the Judge’s decision discloses that the Judge took account of the country evidence part of the CPIN. She reminded me that the Judge says that he has considered all of the evidence, and took me through the Judge’s findings at [33] to [40] of the decision.
10. Ms Clewley told me that the Judge carried out a complete assessment of risk on return and his conclusions are supported by the background materials available. She asked me to dismiss the appeal and allow the decision to stand
Analysis
11. The Judge’s finding start at [23] of the decision. The Judge correctly records that the appellant has had two previous appeals before the First-tier Tribunal, and the decision in one of those two previous appeals is the starting point for the appeal before the Judge. The Judge correctly identifies the issue before him is the appellant’s political activity in the UK.
12. At [30] of the decision, the Judge accepts that the appellant has been politically active in the UK, and that the appellant has attended public meetings and demonstrations. At [31] the Judge correctly focuses on risk on return to KRG.
13. At [32] and [33] the Judge refers solely to the respondents 2023 CPIN, which he calls “country guidance”. At [34] the Judge finds that the appellant genuinely holds political opinions contrary to those prevailing in Iraq and KRG. The Judge’s entire reasoning for refusing the appellant’s appeal lies between [31] and [35] of the decision.
14. The respondent says that the Judge records at [34] that he has considered all of the material placed before him. That is an incorrect reading of the first sentence of [34]. where the Judge says
I have carefully considered all the material the appellant has submitted in support of the proposition that he has political opinions that are counter to those prevailing in Iraq and KRI today
15. The opening sentence of [34] simply explains and reinforces the Judge’s findings at [30] of the decision.
16. The appellant relied on several sources of background materials, including material from UNHCR, Amnesty International, United States Department of State, Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, and OCHA. There is no mention of any of that material in the Judge’s decision. The Judge does not explain why he places emphasis on the respondent’s CPIN.
17. The Judge was correct to focus on risk on return, but the mistake the Judge made was to find “the answer” solely by looking at the respondent’s CPIN, and apparently relying only on one paragraph from the assessment section of the respondent’s CPIN.
18. The Judge was required to decide the issues after having regard to each strand of evidence, and the respondent’s CPIN was not the only country evidence before the tribunal. Although the Judge might have had good reasons for preferring the CPIN to the other background evidence relied on by the appellant, the language used might suggest that the Judge looked no further than the CPIN.
19. The Judge is assumed to know the law and to have applied it, so that failure to mention any of the other evidence would not, by itself, be sufficient to establish a material error of law.
20. The real problem is that the Judge based his decision not on the country evidence in the CPIN, but on the assessment section, which is not evidence. He failed to act in accordance with the Upper Tribunal’s guidance about the nature of the respondent’s CPINs. As set out in KK and RS (Sur place activities: risk) Sri Lanka CG [2021] UKUT 00130 (IAC) at [301]:
“[…] we regard the “Assessment” section [of the CPIN] as constituting a statement of the respondent’s guidance to her caseworkers on a number of thematically-arranged issues. The CPIN is simply evidence of the respondent’s position as it was at the date of its publication […]. The guidance to caseworkers may be relevant in any given case where the respondent seeks to put forward an argument that is inconsistent with it. As regards the “Country information” section, we evaluate the source materials set out therein on their own merits in the usual manner and as part of the overall evidence before us.”
21. In Roba (OLF - MB confirmed) Ethiopia CG [2022] UKUT 00001 (IAC) at [83]-[85], the Upper Tribunal drew a distinction between the “country information” section of a CPIN (and other similar government reports, such as DFAT reports) and the section setting out the “policy position of the relevant government”. The panel made it clear that their decision was based on the former.
22. For that reason, the Judge’s decision contains material errors of law requiring it to be set aside.
Remaking the decision
23. Both representatives agreed that there is no challenge to the Judge’s findings that the appellant has been politically active in the UK, and that he is politically opposed to the governments of Iraq and KRG. Both representatives agreed that there is no real need for further fact-finding. This case is about risk on return.

24. The accepted facts are that the appellant has publicly aligned himself with a political opposition group. Whether his reasons are heartfelt or cynical is irrelevant. The appellant has created a political profile which places him in opposition to the governments of Iraq and KRG because of his activities in the UK since 2021.

25. In YB (Eritrea) v SSHD 2008 EWCA Civ 360 the Court of Appeal sounded a note of caution in relation to the argument that, if an appellant was found to have been opportunistic in his sur place activities, his credibility was in consequence low. Credibility about what, said the Court of Appeal. If he had already been believed ex hypothesi about his sur place activity, his motives might be disbelieved, but the consequent risk on return from his activity sur place was essentially an objective question.

26. Section 14 of the respondent’s CPIN (2023) details that arrests and detentions of opposition political activists in KRG. That same material refers to the public unrest in December 2020, and provides several cited references to arbitrary detention and disappearances of lower profile political activists, including bloggers and online activists. There are reports of repression of protests and repression of freedom of assembly. That information is drawn from the background materials relied on by the appellant (including Amnesty International, Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, USSD, and OCHA)

27. It is not suggested that the appellant can relocate elsewhere in Iraq. The appellant is a young Kurdish Sunni Muslim. He only speaks Kurdish Sorani. Mindful of the guidance found in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 110 (IAC) I find that internal relocation would be unduly harsh.

28. The respondent says there is a sufficiency of protection in Iraq, but that is not borne out by the respondent’s own CPIN. The respondent’s CPIN Iraq: Actors of protection, says (at section 2.3.4 to 2.3.10) that the security forces in Iraq are inefficient, corrupt, and not always willing to offer protection. At 2.3.15 the respondent’s CPIN says that the Iraqi state does not provide a sufficiency of protection.

29. The appellant establishes a political profile which is likely to be known to the Kurdish authorities. I have already found that there is no available option of internal relocation. I find that the background materials disclose that that is no sufficiency of protection from nonstate actors that the appellant fears. I find that the appellant also fears state actors, so the question of sufficiency of protection is no longer a relevant consideration.

30. The totality of evidence tells me that the appellant has a history of involvement in Kurdish politics. He has created a political profile which places him at odds with the state. The appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his political opinion.

31. I find that the Appellant has discharged the burden of proof to establish that he is a refugee.

Humanitarian protection

32. The appellant is a refugee. I cannot consider whether he qualifies for humanitarian protection.
Human rights
33. I have found the appellant has established a well-founded fear of persecution, by analogy I find his claim engages articles 2 and 3 of the Human Rights Convention.
34. The appellant does not appeal on article 8 ECHR grounds.

Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 03/09/2025 errs materially in law and is set aside

2. The decision in the appeal is remade.

3. The appeal is allowed on Asylum grounds.

4. The appeal is dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds.

5. The appeal is allowed on articles 2 & 3 Human Rights grounds.

Signed Paul Doyle Date 1 March 2026
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Doyle