Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005176
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00031/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 30th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

Between

Umaya Gurung
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Ogunbusola, Counsel instructed by Privatus Law
For the Respondent: Mr Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Nepal born in 1986. Her father (“the sponsor”) is a former Gurkha soldier who served in the British army between 1989 and 1985.
2. In 2016 the sponsor settled in the UK along with his wife (the appellant’s mother).
3. The appellant applied to join her parents in the UK. In October 2024 her application was refused.
4. The appellant appealed against this decision to the First-tier Tribunal and her appeal came before Judge of the First-tier Tribunal C. Fern (“the judge”). In a decision promulgated on 9 September 2025 the judge dismissed the appeal. The appellant is now appealing against this decision.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. The judge identified as the key issue in the appeal whether family life, for the purposes of article 8(1) ECHR, existed between the appellant and sponsor.
6. The judge identified the relevant test as being whether there was real, effective or committed support. I pause to note that the decision was made prior to the Court of Appeal judgment in IA v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 where it was clarified that, whilst whether there is “real, effective or committed support” is relevant, it is not the test. In IA at [113] it is explained that:
“family life for the purpose of Article 8 … is normally limited to the core family and that there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties””
7. The judge did not believe the appellant’s claim about being dependent on the sponsor, describing it in para. 27 as “not credible”. The judge stated in paragraph 27 that the appellant’s evidence was:
“contradicted directly by the sponsor, who makes clear that [the] appellant has lived an independent life for many years, both whilst married and since she has been divorced. Her relationship with the sponsor has been long distance for many years, punctuated by his visits to Nepal”
8. The judge found that the appellant has two children with a man she divorced in 2023, having previously been married to him for 18 years. The judge found that, for the last three years, the appellant had lived in rented accommodation that was not the family home and was not a home in which the sponsor had ever lived.
9. The judge accepted that the sponsor provided some financial support to the appellant since at least 2023 but did not accept that this amounted to a “substantial part of her support”. The judge stated in para 28:
“We do not know who else supports the appellant, or indeed whether she is working like her siblings and uncle. It is not clear why she does not live in the family house in Malagiri but instead rents her own home some distance away”.
10. The judge accepted that the sponsor has travelled regularly to Nepal (once every two years on average) and communicates with the appellant regularly.
11. The judge found that it was more likely than not that the appellant lived an independent life with her husband and children; and then continued to live an independent life after separating from her husband.
12. The judge concluded (in para. 35) that there was not credible evidence presented to establish that the relationship between the appellant and sponsor was more than a normal relationship between a parent and adult child and that there was not “committed, effective financial and emotional support (reciprocal or otherwise) or dependency”.
Preliminary issues at the hearing
13. The appellant’s representatives were required to file and serve an electronic bundle by 4 September 2026. They did not do so. On 9 September 2026 they were informed that a bundle had not been received and given until 4 PM on 10 September 2026. They failed to comply and as of the morning of the hearing no bundle had been filed and served.
14. Mr Ogunbusola was unable to explain the reason for this serious breach of directions. He stated that he would email the Upper Tribunal and respondent a copy of the bundle along with his skeleton argument, which had also not been filed and served prior to the day of hearing. He emailed his skeleton argument along with a bundle. Although in his email he stated he was attaching the appellant’s bundle, he did not provide a composite bundle as required in the standard directions but instead just sent the First-tier Tribunal bundle.
15. I decided to hear this appeal last in my list, in order to give Mr Ogunbusola time to obtain the bundle. I asked him to inform his instructing solicitors that they should send an email explaining why no bundle had been received. To date, I have not received the requested email.
16. The lengthy skeleton argument sets out seven grounds. However, the grounds of appeal contain only five grounds. No application was made to rely on additional grounds. Further, the first five grounds in the skeleton do not directly correspond to the five grounds of appeal. I asked Mr Ogunbusola how I should reconcile the grounds with the skeleton. In the absence of being informed of a way to do this, I stated that I would rely only on the grounds rather than the skeleton argument. Mr Ogunbusola did not object.
Grounds of Appeal
17. There are five grounds of appeal.
18. Ground 1 argues that the judge erred in respect of financial dependency. It is argued that the judge failed to make a clear finding on whether there is dependency, did not apply the correct legal test, disregarded oral evidence and submissions, and did not explain why access to the sponsor’s pension did not constitute financial support.
19. Ground 2 submits that the judge erred by not making finding on emotional dependency.
20. Ground 3 submits that the judge erred by not considering whether there had been an historic injustice.
21. Ground 4 submits that the judge misdirected himself in law because on the undisputed evidence family life was re-established following the short period where the appellant lived independently.
22. Ground 5 submits that that it was an error of law to not recognise that family life exists from birth and persists despite voluntary separation.
Submissions
23. Mr Ogunbusola submitted that it was clear from the evidence that the appellant is dependent on the sponsor. He noted that the sponsor has travelled to see the appellant frequently and asserted that he supports her financially and emotionally. He also asserted that the only income the appellant receives is from the sponsor, who provides a substantial amount. He submitted that the evidence shows that the relationship goes beyond the normal between an adult daughter and parent and that there is real dependence.
24. Mr Sheikh carefully took me through each of the grounds and made cogent submissions as to why they were not established. I have not set out his submissions as they are reflected in my analysis below.
Analysis
25. Before considering the five grounds, I will address Mr Ogunbusola’s oral argument, which I understand to be that the judge reached the wrong conclusion because the evidence plainly establishes that the appellant is dependent, both financially and emotionally, on the sponsor.
26. There are two fundamental difficulties with this argument. The first, as argued by Mr Sheikh, is that the starting point in considering the judge’s consideration of the evidence is that the judge did not believe the appellant, as her evidence was not consistent with that of the sponsor: see para. 7 above setting out para. 27 from the decision. An argument that the evidence demonstrates dependency would need to address the adverse credibility findings. However, there is no challenge to the credibility finding in the grounds, and it was not addressed by Mr Ogunbusola in his oral argument.
27. The second difficulty is that, on at least one reasonable view, the evidence plainly supports the conclusion that there is not any degree of dependency. This is because the judge found that the appellant formed her own family unit independent of the sponsor (with a husband and children) many years ago; since divorcing has lived in her own rented home (as opposed to the family home); only sees her parents at most yearly when they visit; and has not established (on the balance of probabilities) that she does not work or receive financial support from people other than the sponsor. On these findings of fact, it is not the case that the only conclusion open to the judge was that there is dependency and a relationship between the sponsor and appellant that goes beyond the normal between an adult daughter and parent. Indeed, on the contrary, based on the findings of fact made by the judge, it is difficult to see how any conclusion on dependency and support other than the one reached by the judge could, on any legitimate view, have been reached.
28. I now turn to the five grounds.
29. Ground 1: financial dependency. It is not the case that, as argued in this ground, the judge failed to make a clear finding on whether the appellant was dependent on the sponsor. On a fair reading of the decision it is apparent that the judge did make a clear finding, which is that the appellant is not financially dependent on the sponsor: see para. 28 where the judge did not accept that money sent to the appellant by the sponsor was “a substantial part of her support”. Moreover, the reasons given by the judge are also clear: they are, amongst other things, that the appellant’s evidence was not found to be credible (as it was inconsistent with the sponsor) and it was not accepted that her only source of funds was from the sponsor. It is also not arguable that the judge applied the incorrect legal test as although the judge framed his assessment in terms of support rather than dependency, it is plain that the judge was of the view that the level of financial support was insufficient to indicate that the appellant is financially dependent on the sponsor. The approach was therefore consistent with IA.
30. Ground 2: emotional dependency. The argument in the grounds that the judge failed to make a finding on whether there was emotional support has no merit as it is clear that the judge made a finding; which is that it was not established that the appellant is emotionally dependent on the sponsor. This finding is unsurprising given the absence of evidence to indicate emotional dependence. When this was put to Mr Ogunbusala his response was that there is evidence of regular contact and frequent visits. However, regular contact and frequent visits indicate emotional closeness, not dependency. There is therefore no merit to this ground.
31. Ground 3: historic injustice. The historic injustice experienced by former Ghurka soldiers such as the sponsor is relevant to the proportionality assessment under Article 8(2) ECHR. It is not relevant to the assessment of whether there is family life engaging Article 8(1). If family life engaging Article 8(1) is not found to exist there is no need to consider proportionality under Article 8(2). Accordingly, as the judge found there was not family life engaging Article 8(1), proportionality – and therefore historic injustice - did not need to be considered.
32. Ground 4: misdirection in law because on the undisputed evidence family life was re-established following the short period where the appellant lived independently. This ground is misconceived because (a) the evidence relating to whether family life existed was not undisputed; (b) the judge found that the appellant lived independently for over two decades, not a short period; and (c) disagreeing with the judge’s findings, which in substance is what this ground entails, is not a “misdirection in law”.
33. Ground 5: family life exists from birth and persists despite voluntary separation. Mr Ogunbusola did not explain, or even refer to, this ground in his submissions, and I have struggled to make sense of it. On its face, this ground makes no sense. Plainly, family life can exist from birth, and it can persist despite a family not living together; but equally a family life that previously existed can cease when a family that had previous lived together starts living separately. Whether, in any particular case, family life between a parent and adult child exists will be fact specific and will depend on whether there are, as explained in IA, “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties.” As drafted, this ground does not identify a point that is relevant to the question of whether the judge erred in law.
Notice of Decision
34. The grounds fail to identify an error of law and the decision stands.

D Sheridan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 September 2026