Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005184
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56602/2024
LP/01500/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 29th of April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE I A LEWIS

Between

MZ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Nicholson of Counsel, instructed by JJ Law Chambers
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer (by CVP)

Heard at Field House on 9 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the Appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background
1. This is an appeal against the Decision of First‑tier Tribunal Judge Cohen, promulgated on 28 September 2025, refusing the Appellant’s appeal on protection and human rights grounds against a decision of the Respondent dated 28 February 2024.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Pakistan, born on 16 October 1981. His immigration history is summarised at paragraph 3 of the Decision of the First‑tier Tribunal. His claimed personal history informing his application for protection is summarised at paragraphs 4 to 8 of the Decision.
3. The Appellant claimed protection on the basis that he would be at risk in Pakistan as a gay man. The Respondent did not accept the Appellant’s claim to be gay.
4. On appeal before the First‑tier Tribunal, the Appellant relied on the narrative that had informed his claim. He additionally raised that he “currently had an open relationship with [SH] in the UK, who had been recognised as a refugee because of his sexuality” (Decision at paragraph 16).
5. I pause to note that this updated part of the Appellant’s narrative, and further evidence submitted in the Appellant’s appeal bundle uploaded on 5 July 2024, was addressed in the Respondent’s Review of 8 August 2024 - see paragraphs 6 to 21, and in particular paragraph 12.
6. I also note the following passages from the Review: “The Respondent will seek to test the evidence of the Appellant and any witnesses at a hearing” (paragraph 7); and “R will seek to augment her position through cross-examination of the A and any witness as appropriate at the substantive appeal hearing” (paragraph 21).
7. On 18 September 2025 (i.e. the Thursday before the Monday hearing on 22 September 2025), the Appellant uploaded a Supplementary Bundle.
8. The Supplementary Bundle included a witness statement from his landlord, ‘UA’, signed on 16 September 2025. UA stated he was acquainted with both the Appellant and SH, and offered testimony as to their relationship - which included referring to SH as the Appellant’s “partner” (paragraph 4), and characterising the relationship as “romantic and committed” (paragraph 5); UA also stated that the Appellant “openly identifies as gay” (paragraph 8).
9. On the day of the hearing there was no appearance on behalf of the Respondent.
10. The First‑tier Tribunal proceeded in any event.
11. It is apparent from paragraphs 21 to 29, where the First‑tier Tribunal Judge summarises the proceedings at the hearing, that the Judge asked questions of each of the Appellant and his two witnesses, SH and UA.
12. The appeal was refused.
13. The Judge found:
“The appellant’s claim is riddled with discrepancies going to the very core of the same and I find the appellant to be totally lacking in credibility and find that he has fabricated his asylum claim in its entirety. I find that he is not gay and does not face any threat upon return to Pakistan from his family or any harassment, discrimination or persecution from wider society.” (paragraph 42)
14. In circumstances where no distinct Article 3 claim and no Article 8 claim were pursued (see paragraph 54), this adverse finding was essentially dispositive of the appeal.
15. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. This was granted by First‑tier Tribunal Judge Swaney in a decision dated 6 November 2025.
Challenge and Analysis
Ground 1
16. Ground 1 is summarised in the Grounds of Appeal in these terms:
“…there was no challenge to [the Appellant’s] evidence or to that of his two supporting witnesses before the First‑tier Tribunal. The First‑tier Tribunal therefore erred in law in failing to decide the central issue in the appeal, i.e. whether [the Appellant] is gay, in his favour.”
17. The amplification of this ground places particular emphasis on the absence of cross‑examination of any of the Appellant, SH or UA. The grounds make it clear that it is not being argued that the questions from the Judge amounted to cross‑examination. For example, at paragraphs 7 and 9 of the Grounds, with reference to the Surendran guidelines (helpfully set out as a footnote in the Grounds), it is identified that the Tribunal should not question witnesses other than to seek clarification, and that “the questions asked of the witnesses… did not, as they were required not to, amount to cross examination”. Mr Nicholson confirmed to me, in response to a direct question, that it was no part of the Appellant’s challenge that the Judge had transgressed the Surendran guidelines by cross-examining the Appellant or the witnesses or otherwise ‘descending into the arena’.
18. The Ground makes extensive reference to case law concerning the role of cross‑examination, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, Griffiths v TUI UK Ltd [2023] UKSC 48, Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67, and Elmi v ECO [2023] EWCA Civ 1455.
19. In substance, manifest from its summary, the underlying premise of the ground, is that in circumstances where there was no Presenting Officer to cross‑examine the Appellant and his two witnesses, and where the Judge could not undertake the role of a cross‑examiner, the Tribunal was bound to accept their evidence. This is a startling - and, in my judgment, wholly erroneous - proposition.
20. It is plain that the substance of the Appellant’s testimony was challenged by way of the ‘reasons for refusal’ letter (‘RFRL’) and the Respondent’s Review. It is equally manifest that the evidence of SH was put in issue by the Respondent in the Respondent’s Review.
21. As regards the evidence of UA, it is to be noted that this was filed late - beyond any timetable for the Respondent to make any sort of written response. Even in circumstances where such late evidence was admitted into the proceedings, there is no identifiable legal principle under which the Judge was required to accept it at face value.
22. The case law cited does not go that far. There is no absolute principle of the sort that seemingly underlies the challenge here.
23. The case law emphasising the importance of cross examination, recognises that there will be exceptions to a general rule, and that the rule is not to be applied rigidly.
24. For example, in TUI a passage from ‘Phipson on Evidence’ was cited with approval which began “In general, a party is required to challenge in cross‑examination the evidence of any witness of the opposing party if he wishes to submit to the court that the evidence should not be accepted on that point” (my emphasis).
25. In Ullah the Court of Appeal observed that Lord Hodge in TUI “emphasised that the rule is not to be applied rigidly and that there is bound to be some relaxation depending upon the circumstances”. Lord Hodge set out a non-exhaustive list of examples at paragraphs 61-70 of TUI. Much of the discussion in respect of those examples is in the context of expert witnesses, and it is also observed that the context of the particular case was one where “the opposing party did not require the witness to attend for cross examination” (paragraph 69). However, notwithstanding this distinction, it is to be noted that a passage from a High Court case is cited with approval to the effect that a failure to cross-examine does not inevitably put the trial judge “into a straitjacket, dictating what evidence must be accepted and what must be rejected” (paragraph 69).
26. Similarly, in Elmi v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455, cited in the Grounds at paragraph 4 as an example in this jurisdiction where there was no appearance on behalf of the Respondent, TUI is cited as setting out a general, rather than an absolute, rule: “… fairness generally requires that if the evidence of a witness is to be rejected, it should be challenged at the hearing so as to give them an opportunity to address the challenge” (paragraph 33, my emphasis added).
27. The citation at paragraph 33 of Elmi at paragraph 4 of the Grounds omits the final sentence of that paragraph, which is in these terms - “The rule is subject to certain exceptions and is to be applied flexibly in the circumstances of any individual case in application of the criterion of the overall fairness of the trial”.
28. The preceding paragraph, paragraph 32 of Elmi, refers to WN v SSHD [2004] UKIAT 00213 in which the then President, Mr Justice Ouseley:
“… emphasised that a failure to follow the Surendran Guidelines was not itself conclusive of procedural unfairness. At [34] he said that paragraph 5 needs also to cover the position where no issue of credibility has been raised in the Refusal Letter and yet it may be obvious that further material provided to the adjudicator raises issues of credibility. They should be raised or put to the appellant so that he may answer them, but it does not mean that the hearing is unfair where that does not take place, at least where the appellant is represented. That depends on whether the points are obvious ones going to the appellant's credibility which he could be expected to realise needed addressing in any event, such as inconsistencies with previous statements or a failure to raise a particular matter earlier.”
29. As the cases explain, what underlies this general guidance is the principle of fairness. It would be potentially unfair to rule against a party or witness on the basis of something that had not been raised, or upon which they had not had the opportunity to comment. That, however, is not the case here. The Appellant had every opportunity to address the challenges to his evidence and overall credibility as identified in the RFRL and Review, and both he and his witness SH were on notice that their personal testimonies were not accepted by the Respondent.
30. Paragraph 6 of the Surendran guidelines makes it manifest that the Respondent’s case is to be taken as the case set out in the letter of refusal. In circumstances where such guidelines pre-date the procedure whereby the Respondent also prepares a Review, I see no difficulty in extending this principle to the Review. The Respondent’s case is as set out in the RFRL, as modified or amplified in the Review.
31. Further, paragraph 4 of the Surendran guidelines provides - “Whether or not these matters are addressed by the representative, and whether or not the Special Adjudicator has himself expressed any particular concern, he is entitled to form his own view as to credibility on the basis of the materials before him.”
32. The notion that, irrespective of any direct cross‑examination, the judge must form an independent view of the evidence is reinforced by WN.
33. WN directly concerned a case where there had been no Presenting Officer, and involved express discussion of the Surendran guidelines. For present purposes it is perhaps of most particular interest because of the discussion from paragraph 26 under the heading ‘The necessity to put points’. In particular:
(i) Per Koca, a decision of the Scottish Outer House, it was not for an adjudicator to assume the ‘role of contradictor’; where an appellant has had an opportunity in evidence and submissions to deal with the general issue as to credibility, the adjudicator was not inevitably obliged to raise discrepancies. (Paragraph 26)
(ii) Lord Justice Schiemann in Maheshwaran [2002] EWCA Civ 173 had rejected the submission that where credibility was in issue the adjudicator was bound to accept as fact a point not challenged by the Respondent or raised by the adjudicator. (Paragraph 27)
(iii) “… neither in Scotland nor in England and Wales is it thought in the higher courts that every point which concerns an Adjudicator when dealing with the credibility of Appellant needs to be raised explicitly with the Appellant in order for him to pass comment upon it.” (Paragraph 28)
(iv) The preceding paragraphs were taken forward into a discussion under the heading ‘Surendran guidelines’, which includes the following: “The guidelines now need to be read in the light of the two decisions in Koca and Maheshwaran where, as here, credibility is generally at issue. The obligation is on the Appellant to deal with obvious points which relate to his credibility without necessarily being asked to comment on them by the Adjudicator. The Appellant cannot expect to be able to make tactical decisions as to whether he should deal with an issue or ignore it, later to complain successfully if an Adjudicator has not raised it with him. An Appellant cannot simply say that a question was not put and therefore it was unfair for an inference to be drawn adversely to him on that point, where his credibility has been put at issue and the issue dealt with by the Adjudicator in the determination goes to credibility. Whether it is unfair depends on the circumstances in the case.”
34. In short, it is not necessary to put obvious points on credibility where credibility is already in issue in the RFRL or otherwise as a result of later evidence.
35. Taking all these matters together, I conclude that the premise of Ground 1 is legally flawed.
36. That this is so can be illustrated by paragraph 6 of the Grounds, which states:
“As the First‑tier Tribunal has indicated at paragraph 24, it asked the witness ‘a number of questions of my own’. The questions the Tribunal asked were concerned exclusively with the exchange of gifts between SH and the appellant, where they met and when, and where they went on their first date. The Tribunal did not ask SH or the appellant about their sexual relationship, whether they had had sex. It follows that their evidence that they have an ‘open casual sexual relationship’ was not challenged.”
37. Manifestly, the notion that the Appellant had any sort of homosexual relationship was challenged in the core of the RFRL, and the notion that he had had a sexual relationship specifically with SH had been challenged by way of the Respondent’s Review. The Appellant, as fairness demanded, had had an opportunity to address that challenge, and attempted to do so by submitting evidence in his bundles and by attending the appeal with witnesses.
38. As discussed above, and for the reasons discussed above, the Respondent had not stated any position in respect of the evidence of UA. Even so, I am not remotely persuaded that there is any legal principle under which the Judge was obliged to accept such evidence at face value in the absence of any cross-examination of UA or other direct challenge to it. The evidence was being called by the Appellant in order to support his riposte to the Respondent’s challenge to his credibility; of necessity therefore, the testimony of UA fell to be considered ‘in the round’ with the other evidence in the appeal. This is exactly the approach taken by the First-tier Tribunal Judge.
39. The Judge was not duty‑bound to accept any of the evidence presented, and ultimately did not do so, in my judgment for reasons that were adequately explained. Indeed, in this context it may be seen that the Judge’s clarifying questions—which Mr Nicholson does not suggest strayed into cross‑examination—elicited differing versions of the history of the claimed relationship which, in the Judge’s evaluation, were damaging to credibility. In this context see paragraphs 34-37 and 40-41. The Appellant and his representative will have heard the discrepant statements as they were spoken in response to the Judge’s questions, and as such, given their obvious nature, there was an opportunity to re-examine either witness and to make submissions on such discrepancies.
40. In all such circumstances I reject Ground 1. In its apparent premises it is legally flawed. In any event there was no unfairness.
Ground 2
41. Ground 2 argues that: “the First‑tier Tribunal did not make any finding that [SH], or the other witness [UA] were not credible witnesses, or that their evidence was not credible.”
42. In my judgment, there is no substance to this Ground. It is manifestly clear that the Judge rejected such evidence in rejecting the Appellant’s claim to be gay. It is simply not possible to read the decision and not understand that the Judge did not believe the witnesses.
43. Moreover, the Judge identified—as is acknowledged in Ground 2 itself—that there were discrepancies in the narratives of both witnesses when measured against the Appellant’s own account, and indeed against each other. Paragraphs 34-37 set out in clear terms the findings as to discrepancies, and the reasoning why such discrepancies informed the Judge’s adverse credibility assessment, even making allowance for other areas of the evidence that were consistent. The reasoning is sustainable. There is no identifiable error of law.
44. The attempt in the Grounds to plead that the Judge’s reference at paragraph 37 to a ‘genuine’ relationship – “I find that if the appellant [and HS] had been in a genuine relationship with each other…” - somehow amounted to an error of law because it misrepresents the nature of the claimed relationship, which was said to be an “open, casual, sexual relationship”, is without merit. There is no basis to think that the Judge was drawing a distinction between a ‘genuine’ relationship and a ‘casual’ relationship; it is adequately clear that the Judge meant ‘genuine’ in the sense of ‘real’ or ‘truthful’, and that he was rejecting the notion of any sort of sexual relationship, casual or committed.
45. In this context, and whilst noting that this is not a point referenced by the Judge, I cannot help but observe that there is a plain and obvious difference between the Appellant’s and SH’s characterisation of their relationship as “open” and “casual”, and UA’s characterisation of it as “romantic and committed”. However, of course, I disregard this apparent further discrepancy in analysing the Decision of the First-tier Tribunal and the Appellant’s challenge thereto.
Ground 3
46. Ground 3 argues that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law by relying on evidence being ‘self‑serving’ as a basis for rejecting the evidence of SH, and the written statement purportedly from the Appellant’s wife.
47. The ground makes reference to the case of Moyo [2002] UKIAT 01104, noting that it featured in the submissions made to the Tribunal.
48. For completeness, I have also noted the decision in R (on the application of SS) v SSHD (“self-serving” statements) [2017] UKUT 00164 IAC.
49. The ground goes on to plead that the Tribunal did not take this submission into account when finding that SH had “purely given evidence to support his friend’s asylum claim” (Decision at paragraph 37), and that the Appellant’s wife’s evidence was “entirely self‑serving” (paragraph 44).
50. I see no merit in this ground.
51. In the premises, it is to be noted that criticism in the case law of the term ‘self-serving’ is essentially confined to when such term is offered as the only reason for not placing weight or reliance on a piece of evidence. This is illustrated at the very beginning of the paragraph from Moyo cited in the Grounds: “The only reason given by the Adjudicator for deciding to place no reliance on the letters submitted by the Appellant was that they were “self-serving”. This is not a good reason” (my emphasis).
52. This is further apparent from SS. Paragraph 1 of the headnote is in these terms:
“The expression “self-serving” is, to a large extent, a protean one. The expression itself tells us little or nothing. What is needed is a reason, however brief, for that designation. For example, a letter written by a third party to an applicant for international protection may be “self-serving” because it bears the hallmarks of being written to order, in circumstances where the applicant’s case is that the letter was a spontaneous warning.”
53. Returning to the Grounds, in the first instance I note that the Judge did not attach the epithet ‘self‑serving’ to SH’s evidence. Moreover, and in any event, it is manifestly the case, as already discussed above, that an explanation was given for rejecting the evidence of SH.
54. Whilst it is the case that the epithet was attached to the evidence of the Appellant’s wife, it is again manifestly the case that the Judge offered an explanation for rejecting her evidence over and above merely describing it as self‑serving.
55. At paragraph 44, the Judge states:
“He claims that on the one hand she wants nothing to do with him and advised him of threats against his life and on the other hand was prepared to go to the time and trouble of attending an advocate’s office preparing a witness statement and arranging for the same to be notarised.”
56. Further, the Judge then places this witness statement in the context of the overall evidence, which is entirely in keeping with the required ‘in the round’ assessment, all of which informs the determination not to attach any weight to it and characterise it as self-serving:
“In the light of the significant discrepancies in the appellant’s claim which I find good or the same, I find that the witness statement from the appellant’s wife is entirely self-serving and attach no weight thereto.”
57. I can identify nothing flawed in this exercise, and consider the Judge’s treatment of the evidence to be clear and sustainable. Consistent with SS, the Judge offers reasons beyond merely employing the term ‘self-serving’.
Ground 4
58. There is no merit in Ground 4, which seeks to argue that the First-tier Tribunal did not consider all of the evidence provided by the Appellant to prove that he was gay.
59. The Grounds identify passages in medical records relating to a heart condition, which are pleaded to be consistent with the Appellant being gay: in particular, an entry in his medical records for 9 April 2025, and a letter from his GP dated 17 September 2025.
60. Before me, Mr Nicholson readily accepted that the Grounds ought not to have characterised such evidence as “expert medical evidence”, because the relevant physicians were in no way advanced as being experts in sexuality or in identifying homosexuals. Further and in any event, it is to be noted that there is no apparent basis for the observations in the medical records beyond the Appellant self-reporting to be gay; there is no suggestion of any sort of assessment by the authors of the records.
61. For completeness, I note that this is also the case in respect of two further entries that I identified in my pre-reading, dating from 21 March 2023 and 12 April 2024.
62. As such, the highest the Grounds could go was the pleading that such evidence “comprises previous consistent statements” (Grounds at paragraph 16).
63. The primary difficulty that this submission encounters is that it was not advanced before the First-tier Tribunal.
64. As is acknowledged in the Grounds, the Judge did make reference to the Appellant’s medical condition. However, as was accepted by Mr Nicholson, it was no part of the submissions in support of the Appellant’s credibility that his medical records showed that he had referred to being gay in consultations with his GP. In circumstances where there is an increasing emphasis on the ‘issues-based’ approach to appeals – e.g. see TC (PS compliance – “issues-based” reasoning) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00012 (IAC), and Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC) - it does not behove an unsuccessful Appellant to attempt to raise new submissions in a challenge before the Upper Tribunal.
65. Further and in any event, I note that there is nothing similar in any of the medical records that pre-dates the Respondent’s refusal. The Appellant seemingly first mentioned to his GP that he was gay about three weeks after the Respondent’s decision to refuse his claim for protection. In such circumstances, in my judgement, his utterances recorded by his GP cannot properly be described as previous consistent statements.
Ground 5
66. The Grounds summarise Ground 5 very broadly – “the Tribunal’s determination is inadequately reasoned”. The detail of the ground, thankfully, is considerably narrower.
67. However, the Ground is without merit and amounts to little more than an attempt to reargue an aspect of the case.
68. It is emphasised that the Appellant and SH had been consistent in their evidence in respect of the exchange of birthday gifts. Whilst the Grounds recognise that the Judge acknowledged this, the Grounds submit that it was striking that the Tribunal did not state that it was “not significant” that they would give consistent evidence in this regard, and that the Tribunal did not provide an explanation as to why the witnesses were able to provide consistent evidence if they were not in an intimate relationship.
69. This is to reargue the case and not to identify an error of law. It is not for the Tribunal to provide an explanation as to why evidence was consistent; it is for the Tribunal to weigh that evidence alongside other evidence - which it manifestly did.
70. There is in any event no particular strength to the submission being articulated: the Judge acknowledged that the Appellant and SH were friends; it is not unusual for friends to exchange birthday gifts; the exchange of such gifts is not evidence of an intimate relationship.
Ground 6
71. Ground 6 essentially echoes aspects of Ground 1. In short, it is pleaded that the First-tier Tribunal was in error by reason of unfairness in failing to put to the Appellant concerns about the photographs that he had filed in evidence showing him at gay clubs, before rejecting such evidence as staged to support a weak claim.
72. This is to overlook that the evidence was directly challenged in the Respondent’s Review: see paragraphs 18 and 19
“18. The R has considered the photographs submitted at pages 16-536 of the AB have been considered. The R initially seeks to note that the A has submitted evidence of his claimed attendance at nightclubs and parades only after the outcome of his initial asylum claim. The R also notes that the A stated he met Mike in Club Heaven in London (RB, page 69) and that he would submit photographs from when he went out with Mike, in his second substantive asylum interview (RB, page 62).
19. It is the R’s position that the photographs submitted are not sufficiently persuasive to justify a departure from the R’s findings in the RFRL. ...”
73. Beyond this and in any event, in circumstances where, following the filing of the photographic evidence the Respondent had maintained her position to the effect that the Appellant was not gay, it must have been plain and obvious to the Appellant and the Appellant’s advisers, that it was not accepted that the photographs provided proof of his claimed sexuality.
74. For the reasons already discussed in the context of Ground 1, it was not incumbent upon the First-tier Tribunal Judge either to examine the Appellant, or SH (who appeared in some of the photographs), in respect of such evidence, or to otherwise expressly raise with either the Appellant or his representative, that the photographs were in issue.
75. I am not persuaded that there was any unfairness in the proceedings, either generally, or specifically in relation to the photographic evidence. The Appellant had adequate notice that the Respondent did not accept the photographs to be probative of his sexuality; the matter being in issue - the Appellant being challenged by the Respondent - it was open to the Judge to reach his own evaluation without having to engage in direct questioning of any of the Appellant, his witnesses, or his representative.
Ground 7
76. Ground 7, with particular reference to the Equal Treatment Bench Book, raises a criticism that at paragraph 38 “the Tribunal has indicated that if [the Appellant] were gay he would have been able to provide detailed and compelling evidence concerning what it felt like when he realised he was gay”.
77. Paragraph 38 is in these terms:
“The appellant was asked questions in interview concerning the realisation that he was gay and his answers were basic, simplistic, and lacking in cohesive detail. I find if the appellant genuinely acted upon his gay inclinations for the first time with a young boy in 2018, when he was 37 years old and had a wife and 3 children, that he would be able to provide a detailed and compelling account of what that felt like to him. I find his inability to do so to be damaging to his credibility.”
78. There is no suggestion that the Equal Treatment Bench Book was pleaded in aid in submissions before the First-tier Tribunal.
79. Be that as it may, I note that the passage from the Bench Book cited at paragraph 24 of the Grounds offers a reminder that asylum applicants may have difficulty in proving sexual orientation, and identifies some possible misconceptions which includes the following passage:
“Misconceptions might be that someone cannot be LGB because…
They cannot describe their emotional journey to realising their identity. Ability to identify these milestones is a very Western concept. LGB people from countries which repress expression of different forms of sexual orientation, or which have a collective social orientation, are unlikely to have seen matters that way.”
80. With all due respect to the editors of the Bench Book, I struggle to make sense of the final phrase in that quotation – “are unlikely to have seen matters that way”. However, for the present purposes it does not matter: this passage was not put to the First-tier Tribunal for consideration, and necessarily, the Judge essays no attempt at interpretation.
81. However, irrespective of this specific point not being put, it is to be acknowledged that there is a general understanding in the jurisprudence in this jurisdiction that there should be no expectation of an individual’s discovery and/or exploration and/or experience of their sexuality fitting any sort of template. It is this notion that underlies this particular ground of challenge.
82. I do not accept that there is anything in paragraph 38, or indeed anywhere else in the Decision, that is indicative of the Judge contravening such principle. There is nothing to suggest that the Judge was measuring the Appellant’s account against any expected norms of homosexual experience, psychology, or behaviour. The Appellant had been invited to give his own narrative; he was not then judged on the basis that his narrative did not fit some stereotypical expectation, but that his narrative lacked detail. It was the lack of detail that was considered to be a signifier of a lack of credibility – in other words, that he was not recounting matters of actual experience. That is entirely legitimate reasoning.
83. I conclude that there is no substance to Ground 7.
Conclusion
84. In circumstances where I find that none of the Grounds identify any error of law on the part of the First-tier Tribunal, the Appellant’s challenge fails.
Notice of Decision
85. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained no material error of law, and stands.
86. The appeal remains dismissed.

I.Lewis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 April 2026