The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005191
First-tier Tribunal: PA/00450/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE J F W PHILLIPS

Between

S H
(Anonymity decision made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr K Gayle, Counsel instructed by Elder Rahimi Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr S Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 February 2026


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 1 August 2025 dismissing her appeal against the Respondent’s decision refusing her protection and human rights claim.
Background
2. The Appellant a citizen of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity claimed, in summary, that she was at risk on return to Iran having been forced to marry an older neighbour who was a high ranking member of the Revolutionary Guard and having suffered domestic violence in this relationship. The Appellant took part in an anti-government demonstration and although she was not detained her details may have been given to the authorities and as a result she was sought after by both her husband and the police. Having escaped to the United Kingdom she has taken part in sur place activity having attended demonstrations in this country and has posted anti-regime material on Facebook.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
3. The Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Jepson in an oral hearing on 31 July 2025. The Judge found that the Appellant did not genuinely hold the political views espoused, that she could delete her Facebook posts and was unlikely to have come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities and as such had not established a well-founded fear of persecution or risk of serious harm on a return to Iran or that there were very significant obstacles to his reintegration.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. The Appellant was refused permission to appeal by First-tier Tribunal Judge Horton but on renewal Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan granted permission to appeal on 29 November 2025 in the following terms:
1. The appellant in XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC) was found to be a risk, despite his sur place activities being contrived, because he had “drawn enough attention to himself by the extent of his ‘real world’ activities, to have become the subject of targeted social media surveillance” (para. 118 of XX). In this case, the judge accepted that (i) the appellant has a large number of Facebook “friends” on an open account where anti-regime material is posted and that some posts criticising the authorities have attracted hundreds of comments; and (ii) the appellant has attended demonstrations in the UK where she may have stood out because she is female. It is arguable the judge has erred by failing to explain why there is not a real risk of appellant being the subject of targeted surveillance when she arguably has done as much as the appellant in XX to attract the attention of the Iranian authorities. Ground 5 is therefore arguable.
2. It is also arguable that the accepted aspects of the appellant’s account, as listed in para. 8 of the grounds, mean that she faces a risk on return even if her activity is contrived, because of the “hair trigger” approach of the authorities that is explained in HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430). Ground 1 therefore has arguable merit.
3. I do not restrict the grounds that can be pursued
The hearing
5. Mr Walker confirmed that the Respondent had filed a rule 24 response and did not seek to address me further. Mr Gayle relied on the grounds of appeal and the decision on the application for permission to appeal.
6. I said that I was satisfied that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal displayed a material error of law and reserved my written decision. After some discussion as to whether the matter should be retained in the Upper Tribunal both representatives agreed that whilst the Respondent may wish to reconsider her position in the light of concessions already made in the refusal decision the error of law went to the overall credibility of the Appellant’s account and so that matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with no findings preserved.
Findings – Error of Law
7. Having carefully considered the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and the grounds of appeal I find that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal displays a material error of law. The Respondent conceded and the First-tier Tribunal accepted that the Appellant had taken part in a demonstration in Iran and a number of demonstrations in the United Kingdom and also that the Appellant had been active on Facebook and had a large number of Facebook ‘friends’.
8. In attending demonstrations in the United Kingdom outside the Iranian Embassy the Appellant was photographed and photographs were uploaded to her Facebook account, and the Appellant may have been identified from within the Embassy. The Appellant’s anti-regime Facebook posts are apparent as is the fact that the number of Facebook ‘friends’ runs into the thousands and also have attracted hundreds of comments. The failure of the First-tier Tribunal to reconcile these findings, particularly as the Appellant as a woman is likely to be more easily identifiable, with the guidance in HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC), BA (Demonstrators in Britan – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT and XX (PKAK – sur place activities- Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC) and to find (paragraph 65) that it is not reasonably likely that the Appellant has come to the attention of the Iranian authorities is irrational. Indeed, the finding (also at paragraph 65)
“Even allowing as I do for her potentially being one of few if not the only female present at protests it is not enough”
without any further explanation as to why this would not bring her to attention is not only irrational in the light of the guidance referred to above but also appears to require a much higher standard of proof than is appropriate.
9. I am satisfied that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal must be set aside with no findings preserved and be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing with no findings preserved.






Judge J F W Phillips
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal

5 March 2026