Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005192

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01766/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29 January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

Shaquille Brown
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms C Robinson, Counsel instructed by Coram Children’s Legal Centre
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
1. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order, though I am not told why. As “Upper Tribunal (IAC) Presidential Guidance Note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private” makes clear, open justice is a general rule which maintains public confidence by ensuring that judicial hearings are subject to public scrutiny and ensures Judges are accountable. Exceptions to that rule must be justified by some more important principle. Such an important principle may include protecting the rights of people who would be harmed by disclosure of personal details, but the common law principle of open justice remains in vigour even where Convention rights also apply. The general principle is therefore that an anonymity order will only be made to the extent that the law requires it or it is found necessary to do so.
2. Ms Robinson argued that the anonymity order should be maintained in this case to protect the Convention rights of the appellant’s wife and children. I am satisfied however that that aim can be achieved by a less restrictive order than one anonymising the appellant. In reaching that conclusion I have regard to the fact there was no anonymity order made in respect of the appellant’s criminal proceedings. I also have regard to the fact there are no protection issues in this appeal. I therefore lift the anonymity order made in respect of the appellant though I have anonymised the details of the appellant’s family in this decision.
Background
3. The appellant is thirty years old and a citizen of Jamaica. He arrived in the United Kingdom aged 6, in 2001 and since then has been living in the United Kingdom. It is accepted by the respondent that he has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for more than half his life. During that time he married Z, a British citizen and they had two children together, A who is ten years old and B who is nine years old. His most recent application to extend his leave to remain in the United Kingdom was made on 9 August 2021.
4. While that application was outstanding, on 1 October 2021, the appellant committed criminal offences of conspiring to supply heroin, conspiring to supply cocaine, possessing a firearm and possessing ammunition. He eventually pleaded guilty to each of those offences and on 12 October 2022 he was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment totalling thirteen years.
5. In the light of his criminality, on 23 February 2024 the appellant was served with notice of the respondent’s intention to deport him. In reply to that notice the appellant raised a human rights claim to remain in the United Kingdom arguing that deportation would be a disproportionate interference with the private and family life he has established in the United Kingdom. The respondent refused that human rights claim on 12 September 2024. On the same day the respondent refused the appellant’s application for further leave to remain having issued a deportation order. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal against the refusal of his human rights claim. He had no right of appeal against the issuing of a deportation order.
6. The appellant’s appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge O’Keefe (the Judge) on 22 April 2025. Documentary evidence was adduced for the hearing including psychological reports about the appellant, Z and B, a social worker’s report about the appellant’s family and a country report about conditions in Jamaica. The appellant, Z, his mother, mother-in-law, half-sister, aunt, and two friends all gave oral evidence.
7. On behalf of the appellant, it was argued that his deportation would be incompatible with his Article 3 Convention right not to face inhuman or degrading treatment as a result of the impact on his mental health and the risk of destitution. It was also argued that his deportation would involve a disproportionate interference with his Article 8 Convention right to respect for his private and family life in view of the effect it would have on his wife who has been diagnosed as suffering from PTSD and Major Depressive Disorder and his children, the younger of whom has been diagnosed with autism. The respondent resisted the appellant’s appeal arguing that the high threshold for finding a breach of the appellant’s Article 3 rights had not been reached and that interference with the appellant’s Article 8 rights was proportionate given the strong public interest in his deportation as a result of the serious offences he committed.
The Judge’s Decision
8. The Judge’s decision was promulgated on 7 May 2025. The Judge found (at [17]) that the appellant is not a seriously ill person and found that on return to Jamaica the appellant would not suffer a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in his life expectancy (at [21] and [22]). The Judge also found at [23] that the appellant would not face destitution in Jamaica.
9. Turning to the appellant’s private and family life, the Judge applied the statutory code set out in Part 5A of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) to determine the public interest question of whether interference with his article 8 Convention right to respect for private and family life was proportionate. Although the length of the appellant’s sentence meant that he could not benefit from them, the Judge first considered the two Exceptions to the public interest in deportation that are identified in section 117C(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act. The Judge found that the appellant met the requirements of Exception 1 because he had been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life, was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom and would face very significant obstacles to integration in Jamaica. The Judge further found that the appellant met the requirements of Exception 2 to deportation because the effect of his deportation would be unduly harsh on Z, A and B.
10. The Judge then addressed section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act and considered whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above the two Exceptions which meant the appellant’s private and family life outweighed the public interest in his deportation. Noting the particular seriousness of the offences of which the appellant had been committed and the weighty public interest in his deportation as a result, the Judge concluded that notwithstanding the effect of deportation particularly on the appellant’s family, the private and family life considerations taken cumulatively do not demonstrate that there are very compelling circumstances that outweighed the public interest. The Judge therefore dismissed the appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The Judge granted the appellant permission to appeal against her decision on two grounds. In the first ground it is argued that the Judge erred in her assessment of the appellant’s Article 3 Convention rights and in the second ground it is argued that the Judge erred in her assessment of the appellant’s article 8 Convention rights. In her very helpful oral and written submissions, Ms Robinson confirmed that the grounds amounted to complaints of:
i. A procedural unfairness arising from the Judge’s finding that the appellant would be able to rely on financial and practical support from his family without the witnesses being questioned about whether they can provide the appellant with such support;
ii. An irrational conclusion that the threshold for interference with the appellant’s article 3 rights was not passed
iii. An irrational conclusion that there were no very compelling circumstances which outweighed the public interest in the appellant’s deportation.
12. The respondent did not serve a written response to the appeal to this Tribunal in accordance with the Tribunal’s Procedure Rules, but Ms McKenzie confirmed that the appeal was opposed and made helpful oral submissions seeking to uphold the Judge’s decision I intend no disrespect to either advocate by not setting out the submissions made in detail here but will refer to them to explain my decision.
The Legal Framework
13. The appeal was a human rights appeal brought by virtue of s82(1)(b) and s84(1)(c) of the 2002 Act on the grounds that the respondent’s decision was unlawful because it was incompatible with his rights under the Human Rights Convention. Article 3 of that Convention provides that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” This is an absolute and fundamental right and its guarantees apply irrespective of the reprehensible conduct of the person in question (see AM (Art 3; health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 00131).
14. Article 8 of the Convention provides a qualified right to respect for a person’s private and family life his home and his correspondence which must not be interfered with by a public authority “except as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
15. In the appellant’s case the existence of a private and family life was agreed. It was also agreed that the respondent’s decision to interfere with that private and family life was lawful because sections 3(5) and 5(1) of the Immigration Act provide the respondent with the power to make a deportation order and section 32 of the United Kingdom Borders Act 2007 provides for automatic deportation where a foreign criminal is sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months. The disputed issue in the appellant’s case was whether the interference is proportionate when the public interest in deportation is balanced against the strength of his private and family life in the United Kingdom (“the public interest question”).
16. Part 5A of the 2002 Act provides the Tribunal with a complete code for answering the public interest question. Within Part 5A of the 2002 Act section 117C(1) states that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest and section 117C(2) says that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in the deportation of the foreign criminal. Section 117C(4) and (5) provide two Exceptions to the public interest in deportation where a foreign criminal has been sentenced to less than four years imprisonment. Exception 1, set out in s117C(4) (the private life exception) applies where an appellant (i) has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life; (ii) is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom; and (iii) would face very significant obstacles to integration in his home country. Exception 2 in s117C(5) (the family life exception) applies where a person is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner or a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying child and the effect of the person’s deportation on that partner or child would be “unduly harsh”.
17. Section 117C(6) provides that in the case of a foreign criminal who like the appellant has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years:
“the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.”
18. When considering whether there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2, all the relevant circumstances of the case will be considered and weighed against the very strong public interest in deportation see [51] of the Supreme Court decision in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22.
Analysis
The Procedural Fairness complaint
19. At three different points in her decision the Judge records a finding of fact that the appellant’s family in the United Kingdom would provide him with support, including financial support if he were to be removed to Jamaica:
[23] ….For the reasons set out below, I do not accept that he would be unable to look to his family in the United Kingdom for financial and practical support to ensure that he does not become destitute……”
[29] He does however, have a large supportive family in the UK. I consider it highly unlikely that his family members would not support him in any way they could if he had to return to Jamaica. The appellant has a history of working in the UK.”
[38]….Whilst the appellant does not have access to family support in Jamaica, he has substantial family support in the UK and I am sure his family would support him in Jamaica as best they could….
20. This finding of fact was relevant both to the Judge’s conclusion that removal to Jamaica would not be incompatible with his Article 3 Convention rights and the Judge’s assessment of whether interference with the appellant’s Article 8 Convention rights was proportionate.
21. Ms Robinson argued that the finding was made unfairly because while the appellant’s witnesses were asked questions about communication and contact with the appellant if he were to be removed to Jamaica, they were not asked about whether they would support the appellant financially in Jamaica. Ms Robinson’s submission was that procedural fairness required the witnesses to be given the opportunity to respond to this question and it was unfair for the Judge to make the finding she did without the question being put to the witnesses.
22. Ms McKenzie submitted that the respondent had made clear in advance of the hearing that her case was that the appellant would be supported by his family in the United Kingdom if he were removed to Jamaica. It was referenced in the Respondent’s Review issued prior to the hearing in accordance with the First-tier Tribunal’s Practice Direction, at [10] “The appellant has family members in the United Kingdom who may have a more recent or developed recollection of life in Jamaica should he need any particular assistance” and more directly at [14] “Further, were they to choose to do so, the Appellant may receive remittances from his family in the United Kingdom which could assist him upon return”. Ms McKenzie further submitted that the witnesses were asked questions and gave evidence about the financial support they currently provide to the appellant and his family and about future contact if the appellant were returned to Jamaica. Finally Ms McKenzie submitted that the Presenting Officer again made clear the respondent’s case that the appellant would receive financial support in Jamaica, when making submissions at the end of the hearing. In these circumstances Ms McKenzie argued that the Judge’s finding was made fairly.
23. When granting the appellant permission to appeal to this Tribunal, the Judge very helpfully provided a copy of her notes of the evidence that was given by the witnesses in the hearing before her. It is apparent from those notes (and Ms McKenzie accepted) that the witnesses were asked about financial support they provide the appellant and his family currently and in the past but that although they were asked about contact with the appellant in Jamaica, none of the appellant’s friends or family who gave evidence were directly asked whether they would financially support him if he were to be removed to Jamaica. The issue for me to resolve is whether that meant the appellant was deprived of a fair hearing given the finding of fact that the Judge made?
24. In Abdi v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455, the Court of Appeal reviewed a wealth of authorities about the circumstances in which a failure to raise a point at a hearing amounts to a procedural unfairness. The Court noted at [29] what fairness requires is essentially an intuitive judgment which is dependant on the context of the decision and an overall judgment must be made in the light of all the circumstances of a particular case on the particular facts. In the same paragraph the Court noted that there is no general obligation on the tribunal to give notice to the parties during the hearing, of all the matters on which it may rely in reaching its decision. At [30] referring to an earlier decision in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Maheshwaran [2002] EWCA Civ 173, the Court stated that:
A failure to put to a party a point which is decided against him can be grossly unfair and lead to injustice because he must have a proper opportunity to deal with the point (at [4]). Where much depends on the credibility of a party which has made several inconsistent statements, that party has a forensic problem as to whether to confront them or focus attention elsewhere. Fairness may in some such circumstances require the inconsistencies to be put to the witness but that will not usually be the case. Usually the tribunal can remain silent, especially if the party is represented, and see how the case unfolds (at [5]).
25. In my judgment, notwithstanding the fact none of the witnesses were posed the direct question “will you financially support the appellant in Jamaica?” the procedure adopted by the Judge was a fair one and the finding of fact made that the appellant’s family would support him financially in Jamaica was fairly reached.
26. This was not a case where the Judge was identifying an issue that had not been raised by the parties. As the phrasing of the Judge’s finding recognises, it was the appellant’s case that he would be destitute in Jamaica. This was an assertion that was for the appellant to establish by means of evidence. If it were the case that the appellant would not receive any support from his family in the United Kingdom it would have been reasonable to expect that evidence to that effect to have been positively provided by the appellant and his witnesses. It is inconceivable that the appellant and his witnesses would be unaware when making that assertion that the possibility of him receiving financial support from his family in the United Kingdom would be something considered by the Judge. If there were any doubt about that fact it was removed by the passages of the respondent’s review identified above in which the respondent directly argued that there would be such support, an assertion that was repeated in submissions at the end of the hearing. The appellant and his representatives could have been in no doubt that the question of whether he would receive financial support in Jamaica was a live issue and one that the Judge would be considering. In those circumstances, in an adversarial process, the Judge was entitled to see how the case unfolded and fairness did not require her to directly ask the witnesses about financial support in Jamaica.
27. The evidence presented to the Judge was that the appellant has a hugely supportive, large family in the United Kingdom. The witnesses described supporting the appellant and his family currently, including financial support while the appellant has been in prison. Z told the Judge that as well as helping her with the children, her mum provides financial support. Likewise the appellant’s mother said that she and Z’s parents support the appellant’s family financially. The evidence was that the family members would maintain contact with the appellant in Jamaica, although all said that such contact would not be sufficient for them. There was therefore ample evidence before the Judge that the appellant and his family are financially supported by his wider family and friends in the United Kingdom and there was evidence that those wider friends and family were committed to continue support of him at least by way of contact in Jamaica. This evidence provided sufficient foundation for the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant could look to his friends and family for support on return to Jamaica. The fact the witnesses were not asked the direct question about such support did not in all the circumstances and on these particular facts mean that an unfairness arose.

Irrational conclusion about Article 3
28. Ms Robinson points to the following evidence from clinical psychologist Dr Kitchenham:
8.8.1 in the event of deportation, I consider it likely there would be a serious and rapid decline in [the appellant’s] mental health, such that he becomes acutely depressed and suicidal.
8.8.2 In such a scenario, his risk of engaging in suicidal behaviour would inevitably increase. I consider it likely he would seek to engage in some form of self-harmful behaviour when in crisis; though the outcome of this would depend on whether [the appellant] engaged in a genuine suicide attempt, with intent to end his life (e.g.as he has suggested he would, in line with the plan he communicated during the assessment) or seek to cause himself limited physical harm in other ways that present in his history (e.g. cutting or other behaviour functioning to help him cope and communicate his distress, but without a firm intention to die.).
8.8.3 Either way, it is likely some degree of suffering in his mental health would result from deportation, with any genuine suicide attempt inevitably posing a risk to life expectancy.
29. Ms Robinson recognises that the Judge engaged with this evidence but argues that in light of that evidence it was irrational for the Judge to conclude at [21] of her decision that the evidence does not show that the decline in the appellant’s health would be serious, rapid and irreversible and as result in intense suffering or that the absence of access to treatment will lead to a significant reduction in life expectancy. Ms Mckenzie submitted that the Judge considered the relevant evidence, applied the appropriate test as identified in AM (Art 3 health cases) Zimbabwe and reached a rational conclusion that the test for incompatibility with the appellant’s Article 3 rights was not established.
30. In AM (Art 3 health cases) Zimbabwe this Tribunal gave the following guidance on the approach to be taken by a tribunal considering an Article 3 “health case” such as this one:
In Article 3 health cases two questions in relation to the initial threshold test emerge from the recent authorities of AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 and Savran v Denmark (application no. 57467/15):
(1) Has the person (P) discharged the burden of establishing that he or she is “a seriously ill person”?
(2) Has P adduced evidence “capable of demonstrating” that“ substantial grounds have been shown for believing” that as “a seriously ill person”, he or she “would face a real risk”:
[i] “on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment,
[ii] of being exposed
[a] to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering, or
[b] to a significant reduction in life expectancy”?
31. The Judge recognised this guidance and sought to apply it at [15] – [23] of her decision. In answer to the first question she had to resolve, of whether the appellant is a seriously ill person, the Judge identified the evidence of Dr Kitchenham that the appellant does not have a severe and enduring mental illness. In these circumstances the Judge’s finding that the appellant is not a seriously ill person was uncontroversial. Applying that finding to the guidance in AM (Art 3 health cases) Zimbabwe the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s appeal could not succeed on Article 3 health grounds was inevitable – the appellant did not get past the first stage as the appellant had not established that he is seriously ill.
32. Ms Robinson argued however that the later evidence of Dr Kitchenham that deportation of the appellant would result in an increased risk of suicide means that it was irrational for the Judge to conclude that the test was not met. This argument does not however recognise the Juge’s careful consideration of the support that would be available to the appellant in the event of and during the process of his deportation. That included evidence of steps that would be taken to reduce the risk during the deportation process and the likely availability of support for him in Jamaica. As the Judge’s findings make clear, this is not a case where the appellant has a serious illness which will decline as a result of his deportation. Instead, Dr Kitchenham identifies that the deportation process will involve a heightened risk to the appellant, however the Judge was unquestionably entitled to conclude on the evidence that such a risk would be mitigated by the processes that would be followed.
33. As the Supreme Court made clear in its consideration of AM’s case in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17, the threshold for establishing a breach of Article 3 is “not undemanding” and the question of whether the minimum level of severity is met is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case. Here, contrary to the arguments made on behalf of the appellant, the Judge’s assessment that the demanding threshold for establishing a breach of Article 3 was not met was a rational one which a reasonable Judge could properly reach.
Irrational conclusion about Article 8
34. The Judge’s assessment of whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above the two Exceptions that outweighed the public interest in the appellant’s deportation is set out at [65] – [83] of her decision. The Judge brought into that assessment her earlier conclusions that the appellant met the requirements of both Exception 1 and Exception 2 to deportation. She concluded however at [83] that: “the public interest in this case is weighty. Considering the evidence as a whole, I find that notwithstanding the effects of deportation in this case taken cumulatively, do not demonstrate that it would be disproportionate to remove the appellant. Considering the evidence before me as a whole, I find that it has not been demonstrated that there are very compelling circumstances in this case that outweigh the public interest in deportation of this appellant.”
35. Ms Robinson submits that this was an irrational conclusion. Ms Robinson points to the fact that the Judge found that the requirements of both Exception 1 and 2 were met. She identifies that the Judge found Exception 2 was met both in respect of Z and also in respect of A and B. Ms Robinson argues therefore that the impact of deportation on Z A and B went well beyond what would be necessary to make out a bare case of the kind described in Exception 2. As such she submits that there were very compelling circumstances over and above the Exceptions which outweighed the public interest and it was irrational for the Judge to find otherwise. I agree however with Ms McKenzie’s submission that in reality Ms Robinson’s argument amounts to a disagreement with the Judge’s decision rather than identifying an error of law.
36. The balancing exercise of weighing the strength of the appellant’s private and family life, including the fact he met the requirements of the two Exceptions, one side of the scales against the weight of the public interest in his deportation on the other side of the scales, was an evaluative exercise for the discretion of the Judge. In her detailed evaluation, the Judge gave a careful and comprehensive summary of the factors that she took into account as part of that evaluative exercise. There is no suggestion that the Judge took into account when conducting that exercise irrelevant factors, neither could there be as the Judge was fastidious in ensuring that she had regard to those factors identified as relevant by the European Court of Human Rights (see [71] and following paragraphs).
37. Those factors included on one side of the scales the nature and seriousness of the offences which the appellant committed. The offences were, as the Judge observed, especially serious, involving the appellant playing a significant role in the illegal trade of drugs worth in the region of £1M. The offences also involved the appellant’s DNA being found on a pistol and his being in possession of ammunition compatible with that pistol meaning it could easily have been made operational. The Judge recognised the damage that this type of offending does to the community and that crimes of violence and drug related offences are at the most serious end of the criminal spectrum. On the other side of the scales the Judge recognised the fact the appellant met the requirements of the two Exceptions, she identified that the best interests of A and B would be for the appellant to remain in the United Kingdom and play an active role in their upbringing. The Judge noted the negative effect that deportation would have on Z’s mental health. The Judge also recognised that the appellant’s mental health is likely to deteriorate if he were to leave the United Kingdom.
38. The weight she gave to these various factors was properly a matter for the Judge. It is clear that this was a case where both sides of the scales bore substantial weight. Ultimately however the Judge’s conclusion that the weight of the public interest in deportation outweighed the weight of the appellant’s private and family life rights was entirely rational and far from a conclusion which no reasonable Judge could reach. As s117C(2) identifies the more serious the offence the greater the public interest in deportation and the offences the appellant committed were very serious indeed. The appellant may be disappointed with the outcome, but it was far from being irrational.
Conclusion
39. For all the reasons discussed above I am satisfied that the decision of the Judge did not involve an error of law and should stand.
Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge O’Keefe did not involve an error of law and shall stand.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 January 2026