Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005199
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03300/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 19th of March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

JULAND ZOTAJ
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr B Hawkin, Counsel instructed by Lillywhite Williams & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. With permission granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Blum, the appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Buckwell (“the Judge”) on 25 September 2025 to dismiss his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his human rights claim to remain in the United Kingdom. The respondent also issued a deportation order in respect of the appellant. Pursuant to section 12(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the issue for me is whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.

Background

2. The appellant is a citizen of Albania. He is 29 years old. He came to the United Kingdom without leave to do so, in 2014. After his claim for asylum was refused and an appeal against that refusal was dismissed in 2017, he remained in the United Kingdom without leave. In October 2019 he was granted leave to remain in the United Kingdom as the partner of a British national: AB. Together they have three children: CD who is 7 years old, EF who is 4 years old and GH who is 2 years old. The appellant’s leave to remain was subsequently extended so that it was due to expire in November 2024.

3. Between February 2022 and January 2023 the appellant committed the offence of being concerned in the supply of cocaine to others. That offence involved him “managing a drug line”1 which involved the dealing of drugs to users directly on the street. Over that year “the line did well over £100,000 worth of business”. When the appellant was arrested in January 2023 he was in possession of £11,000 and some cannabis. The appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to being concerned in the supply of class A drugs and offences of possessing criminal property and possession of drugs. He was sentenced for those offences on 22 December 2023 to a four year term of imprisonment.

4. In view of that conviction and sentence, on 10 January 2024, the respondent informed the appellant that she intended to deport him. The appellant made representations against his removal from the United Kingdom, which included a claim that removal would be incompatible with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) to respect for his private and family life (the Article 8 claim). The respondent eventually (an initial deportation order was made and then withdrawn for reasons that are not relevant to this matter) considered the applicants Article 8 claim but refused it in a decision dated 14 August 2024. The decision also considered and refused representations made by appellant that his removal would be contrary to the Refugee Convention and certified those representations as not amounting to a fresh protection claim. Those representations are no longer pursued and I need say no more about them. In view of her decision, the respondent issued a deportation order against the appellant.

5. The appellant appealed against the refusal of his Article 8 claim to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was heard by the Judge on 11 September 2025. A bundle of evidence was prepared for the hearing. That bundle included two reports from Chartered Counselling Psychologist Mr Nomir Ahmed, one concerning the appellant and one concerning AB. The Judge heard oral evidence from the appellant and from AB. He also heard submissions from the parties before reserving his decision which was promulgated on 25 September 2025.

The Legal Framework

6. The appeal was a human rights appeal as defined in s.82 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) and by virtue of s.84(2) of that Act, the ground of appeal available to the appellant was that the respondent’s decision was unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 which makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.

7. The appellant’s Article 8 claim was that the respondent’s decision was incompatible with his qualified right to respect for his private and family life, which Article 8(2) of the Convention says must not be interfered with by a public authority “except as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

8. In the appellant’s case the existence of a private and family life was agreed. It was also agreed that the respondent’s decision to interfere with that private and family life was lawful because sections 3(5) and 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 provide the respondent with the power to make a deportation order and section 32 of the United Kingdom Borders Act 2007 provides for automatic deportation where a foreign criminal is sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months. The disputed issue in the appellant’s case was whether the interference with the appellant’s private and family life is proportionate when the public interest in deportation is balanced against the strength of his private and family life in the United Kingdom (“the public interest question”).

9. Part 5A of the 2002 Act provides the Tribunal with a complete code for answering the public interest question (see HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22). Within Part 5A of the 2002 Act s.117C(1) states that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest and s.117C(2) says that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in the deportation of the foreign criminal. Subsections 117C(4) and (5) provide two exceptions to the public interest in deportation where a foreign criminal has been sentenced to less than four years imprisonment. Exception 1, set out in s.117C(4) applies where an appellant (i) has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life; (ii) is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom; and (iii) would face very significant obstacles to integration in his home country. Exception 2 in s.117C(5) applies where a person is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner or a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying child and the effect of the person’s deportation on that partner or child would be “unduly harsh”.

10. Section 117C(6) provides that in the case of a foreign criminal who, like the appellant, has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years:

“the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.”

The Judge’s Decision

11. Having set out the background to the appeal and dealt with preliminary matters, at [13] – [55] of his decision the Judge set out the oral evidence that was given by the appellant and AB. At [56] – [67] the Judge identified the submissions that were made by the advocates and at [69] he explained the legal framework that applied. The Judge then turned to his “findings”.

12. At [71] the Judge noted that the appellant had not been resident in the United Kingdom for more than half his life and accordingly found that the appellant did not meet the requirements of the first limb to Exception 1 in s117C(4) of the 2002 Act. The Judge further found at [79] (repeated below) that the appellant did not meet the requirements of the third limb to Exception 1 because he would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Albania.

13. Turning to consider Exception 2, the Judge found at [73] that the appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with AB, CD, EF and GH. At [75] the Judge noted that for “understandable reasons”, AB would not wish to “transfer to Albania”. Having acknowledged the concerns of the appellant and AB as to how their children “would face their future lives in Albania”, the Judge found that it would be in the best interests of the children that they remained in the United Kingdom with their mother. The Judge then turned to consider whether it would be unduly harsh for the appellant to return to Albania without them (the unduly harsh test).

14. Having identified the case law concerning the correct approach to determining the unduly harsh test at [76], the Judge then stated the following:

77. I have taken into account the reports of Mr Ahmed, in relation both to the appellant and his partner and have subsumed in my overall considerations the views given in those reports. I note that [the presenting officer] was to a degree critical of the author who had not identified any country expertise in relation to Albania. With respect to medication overall, I am satisfied that there would be access to standard medication and therefore that the circumstances in this appeal do not give rise to successful grounds with reference to medical issues. I note that such were not advanced at the appeal hearing.

78 On the facts before me, in relation to the terms of Exception 2, I do not find that there are particular, additional or specific factors which would here heighten the effect of the separation of the appellant from his children and their mother if they remain in this country. I have found that that would be in the best interests of each of the children. Of course that would require that their mother remains with them in the United Kingdom.

15. The Judge returned to the unduly harsh test at [82] of his decision where he stated that:

…. In considering whether the effect on family members may be unduly harsh, I acknowledge that the consequences may be seen as harsh. However, that would not in the circumstances be unduly harsh.

16. The Judge considered the circumstances the appellant would face if he had to return to Albania by himself at [79] in which he said:

…..Although the appellant failed to meet the provisions of Exception 1, based on my finding as to his period of lawful residence in this country, the requirements of that Exception would also be that an applicant establishes the presence of very significant obstacles as to reintegration. Considering the judgment in Kamara I note here that the appellant has family members still in Albania. Although, in general, he compared the circumstances and services available in Albania negatively, in comparison to the United Kingdom, it is found that the appellant would have family assistance available to him on return and although he has been in this country since the age of 17 years, and, to his credit, speaks English to a high standard, I find that the appellant remains fully integrated in terms of Albanian culture, which no doubt he would have shared with those family members who are also present in this country. Applying the terms of Kamara I do not find that the appellant would face very significant obstacles himself as to reintegration in Albania.

17. The Judge then considered the facts of the appellant’s criminal offending at [80]. At [81] the Judge recognised that the appellant’s Article 8 rights were engaged and said that “determining proportionality here must be from the prospective of any potentially very compelling circumstances beyond the Exceptions within section 119C (sic) of the 2002 Act.” The Judge confirmed he had considered “all aspect of the evidence in the round” and on a “cumulative basis”.

18. At [82] and [83] the Judge provided his conclusion applying the facts to the law as follows:

82. Balancing all factors and aspects set out and referred to above, and applying significant weight to the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals, I find that the appellant does not succeed in establishing that his removal to Albania would unlawfully interfere with his engaged human rights with respect either to his private life or his family life. I have considered all factors on a cumulative basis and have considered carefully the circumstances of the wife of the appellant and their children. Overall the circumstances of the appellant do not establish very compelling circumstances above and beyond the terms of the Exceptions in section 119C (sic) of the 2002 Act. Further, the consequences of refusing this appeal are not found to result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant. In considering whether the effect on family members may be unduly harsh, I acknowledge that the consequences may be seen as harsh. However, that would not in the circumstances be unduly harsh.

83. Overall it is found, therefore, that the refusal of the human rights application, and of this appeal, do not breach the terms of section 6 of the 1998 Act. An Exception under section 33 of the 2007 Act has not been established. Consequently removal under the 1971 Act would be lawful.

The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

19. The appellant was granted permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision on two grounds. In the first ground it is asserted that the Judge erred by failing to give proper consideration to the evidence of Mr Ahmed or alternatively failed to give adequate reasons about how the evidence was treated by the Judge. In the second ground it is asserted that the Judge erred by failing to consider evidence about the long-term consequences of the separation of the appellant from AB and the children. The respondent did not serve a written response to the appellant’s grounds of appeal but confirmed that the appeal was opposed.

20. At the hearing before me Mr Hawkin made helpful submissions in support of the two grounds of appeal. In respect of the first ground he submitted that although the Judge’s decision acknowledges the reports of Mr Ahmed, it includes no substantive consideration of those reports, with the reference at [77] of the decision to the views given in the reports being “subsumed” in the Judge’s overall consideration being inadequate to enable the reasonable reader of the decision to understand what the Judge made of that evidence. Mr Hawkin submitted that the reports’ conclusions that the appellant and AB had PSTD and severe depression were of central importance to the appellant’s assertion that the consequences of his deportation would be unduly harsh on AB and the children and to the appellant’s case that he would not be able to reintegrate on return to Albania. Mr Hawkin submitted that the Judge’s decision failed to demonstrate proper consideration of this evidence or its impact on the principal controversial issues in the appeal.

21. In respect of the second ground of appeal Mr Hawkin submitted that the evidence was that AB and the two older children suffered discriminatory treatment when visiting Albania previously and that the appellant and AB were concerned about the children facing such treatment in the future. As the appellant would not be able to visit his family in the United Kingdom while the deportation order is extant, Mr Hawkin submitted that the Judge was required to consider the likelihood of the appellant being permanently separated from his wife and children, when assessing the proportionality of the respondent’s decision.

22. In response Ms Ahmed submitted that the Judge made repeated reference in his decision to the evidence of Mr Ahmed, from which it is apparent that the Judge took the evidence into consideration when assessing the appellant’s case. She reminded me that the Judge’s decision is to be read looking at the substance of its reasoning and that a specialist immigration judge should not be assumed to have erred in law simply because every step in their reasoning has not been fully set out. Ms Ahmed submitted that the Judge considered the medical evidence in context, including the absence of medical records for either the appellant or AB and the fact they would have access to standard medication. Ms Ahmed submitted that the Judge had regard to that evidence when reaching conclusions about whether Exceptions 1 and 2 were met.

23. In respect of the second ground of appeal, Ms Ahmed submitted that the Judge referred to and clearly had regard to the evidence of AB about whether she would visit Albania with the children if the appellant were deported and the Judge considered the impact of separation from the appellant on the AB and the children and concluded that the consequences would not be unduly harsh.

Analysis

24. It is helpful to begin my analysis of the appellant’s grounds of appeal and the Judge’s decision with a reminder that it is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law; where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account; and when it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out – see [72] of HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22.

25. The appellant’s first ground of appeal is made up of two separate but related complaints, first that the Judge failed to adequately consider the evidence of Mr Ahmed and second, if the Judge did consider the evidence, that the Judge failed to adequately explain the impact Mr Ahmed’s evidence had on his decision.

26. Contrary to the first of those complaints, the Judge makes a number of specific references to the evidence of Mr Ahmed in his decision and a number of references in that decision to considering all of the evidence holistically. At [4] the Judge says that he had the opportunity of reading all the documentary evidence in advance of the hearing (from which I consider it safe to assume the Judge means he took the opportunity to read the documents). At [59] the Judge referred to submissions made by the respondent’s representative about the evidence of Mr Ahmed. At [64] the Judge referred to the submissions made by the appellant’s representative about the evidence of Mr Ahmed. Most significantly at [77] the Judge explicitly states that he has taken the reports of Mr Ahmed into account and that he has “subsumed in my overall considerations” the views expressed in those reports by Mr Ahmed. At [81] the Judge says that he has considered all aspects of the evidence in the round and at [82] the Judge states that he has considered all factors on a cumulative basis and considered carefully the circumstances of AB and the children. The clear and overwhelming inference from these references is that the Judge did consider the evidence of Mr Ahmed in his assessment of the evidence as a whole.

27. Mr Hawkin suggested that the Judge was required to set out the content of the Mr Ahmed’s evidence in his decision. I disagree with this submission. As was made clear at [2((iv)] of Volpi v Vopli while the Judge must consider all the material evidence he need not discuss it all in his judgment. In any event the Judge does at [64] when identifying the submissions made by the appellant’s representative detail the diagnosis of PTSD made by Mr Ahmed in respect of both the appellant and AB and at [54] recognises (in the context of the submissions made by the respondent’s representative) Mr Ahmed’s view that the appellant’s mental health would deteriorate if he returns to Albania. In these circumstances, there can be no sensible doubt that the Judge considered the evidence of Mr Ahmed when assessing the appellant's case.

28. Notwithstanding that consideration, the Judge reached unambiguous conclusions that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Albania, that the effect of the appellant’s deportation would not be unduly harsh on AB and their children and that there were not very compelling circumstances which outweighed the significant public interest in the appellants deportation. The second complaint in ground one is that the Judge failed to adequately explain what impact the evidence of Mr Ahmed had on those findings.

29. To consider this complaint it is necessary to consider the Judge’s decision as a whole, reminding oneself that reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed and that an appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis and it should not be picked over as though it was a piece of legislation or contract – see [2(vi)] of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464. I am satisfied that when the decision is read in this way the Judge’s conclusions are adequately reasoned.

30. The Judge noted in his decision some limitations in the evidence of Mr Ahmed. At [40] the Judge recorded the appellant’s evidence that he was not on medication or receiving treatment. At [64] the Judge recorded the submissions about the failure of the appellant and AB to provide their GP records. In the same paragraph the Judge also mentions the evidence of the appellant and AB that they were not aware they were suffering from any mental illness until Mr Ahmed made his diagnosis.

31. At [77] of his decision, the Judge addressed the evidence of Mr Ahmed directly. It is in that paragraph that having referred to the views of Mr Ahmed being “subsumed” in his overall consideration, the Judge makes the finding that: “there would be access to standard medication and therefore that the circumstances in this appeal do not give rise to successful grounds with reference to medical issues.” In my judgment, on a fair reading, this finding explains that the Judge was satisfied that the treatment that the appellant and AB require will be available to them notwithstanding the appellant’s deportation and therefore Mr Ahmed’s evidence does not lead to a successful appeal. It is evident in other words from this passage that the Judge determined that the views of Mr Ahmed did not establish successful grounds to challenge the respondent’s decision.

32. Having addressed Mr Ahmed’s evidence in the previous paragraph, the Judge then found at [78] that there were no factors that would heighten the effect of separation from the appellant on AB and the children. It would be artificial to suggest that the Judge had disregarded the evidence of Mr Ahmed when reaching that conclusion.

33. The Judge’s conclusions and assessment could perhaps have been more clearly expressed but it is tolerably clear from these paragraphs that having had regard to his evidence, the Judge did not consider the reports of Mr Ahmed were sufficient to establish that there were very compelling circumstances over and above the two Exceptions which outweighed the public interest in deportation.

34. That conclusion is further explained by the Judge’s other findings set out in his decision. The Judge found that the appellant would have the support of his family in Albania upon his return. The Judge noted the appellant’s ability to work as the head of a three person “line” supplying drugs. The Judge recognised that these were factors which indicated that the appellant would be able to re-establish himself in Albania notwithstanding the views expressed by Mr Ahmed. The Judge also noted the fact that the appellant’s children would be remaining with their mother in the United Kingdom and referred elsewhere to the appellant’s evidence that in the past his brother had assisted the family while the appellant was in prison. These were factors that help to explain the Judge’s conclusion that the effect of separation from the appellant on Ab and the children would not be “heightened” notwithstanding Mr Ahmed’s evidence.

35. Finally, the Judge recognised that his assessment involved a proportionality assessment balancing the public interest against the impact of deportation on the family of life of the appellant, AB and the children. The Judge recognised that the effect of the appellant’s deportation on AB and the children may be considered harsh, but he concluded that it would not be unduly harsh. That was a reflection of the significant public interest in deportation given the offences committed by the appellant, which the Judge described as “very serious offences” with a considerable negative effect on communities.

36. Overall therefore, when the Judge’s decision is read holistically it provides adequate reasons to enable the appellant to understand why, notwithstanding the evidence of Mr Ahmed, the Judge concluded that the strength of his private and family life was insufficient to outweigh the public interest in his deportation.

37. When granting permission to appeal, Judge Blum stated that the second ground of appeal had less merit than the first. I agree with this assessment. Contrary to the assertion in this ground that the Judge failed to consider the potential for deportation to result in the long-term separation of the appellant from his family, the Judge unquestionably had regard to the evidence on this point. The Judge refers to the previous adverse experience AB had when visiting Albania with CD and EF in 2022 at [49] and [53] of his decision. The Judge also refers to AB’s evidence that she would not visit the appellant in Albania at [51] of his decision. There is no reason to think that having recorded that evidence the Judge then disregarded it when assessing the impact of deportation on AB and the children.

38. Contrary to Mr Hawkin’s able submissions, the Judge was not required as part of his proportionality assessment, to make a finding about whether the effect of deportation would be the permanent severance of the appellant from the rest of the family. Instead, the judge was required to balance the impact of deportation on the appellant, AB and the children against the public interest in deportation. That is what the Judge did and his conclusion was that although the impact would be harsh on AB and the children, it would not be unduly harsh. Again that conclusion is adequately reasoned not least by the Judge’s reference to the very serious offence committed by the appellant.

39. In all the circumstances therefore I find that the Judge’s decision did not involve a material error of law. I find that the Judge had regard to all the evidence before him including the evidence of Mr Ahmed, and made findings on that evidence that were adequately reasoned as they enable the reader to understand why there were no very compelling circumstances over and above the two statutory Exceptions to outweigh the strong public interest in the appellant’s deportation.

Notice of Decision

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Buckwell did not involve an error of law and shall stand.

The appeal to this tribunal is dismissed

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 March 2026