Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005204

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67844/2023
LP/13542/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOBBS

Between

JM
ANONYMITY ORDER MADE
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Ms. A. Sepulveda, Fountain Solicitors
For the respondent: Ms. R. Abdul-Karim, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 9 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Freer (the “Judge”), dated 20 September 2025, in which he dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim. The appellant is a national of Iraq who claimed asylum based on his imputed political opinion.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Nightingale in a decision dated 9 November 2025 as follows:
“3. The grounds of appeal argue that the Judge made a mistake of fact with regard to the headquarters of the PKK. Matters were raised which were not raised at the hearing and issues taken against the appellant which has not been put to him. It is also argued that the Judge failed to consider the medical claim made under Article 3 ECHR.
3. It is arguable that the Judge fell into error with regard to the background evidence relating to the headquarters of the PKK; said to be in northern Iraq and, arguably, erred in finding that the PKK operated only in Turkey. It is arguable that this infected other parts of the decision. It is also arguable that the Judge considered matters, such as at paragraph 26, “of my own motion” without putting them to the appellant to give an opportunity to answer. This ground, too, is arguable.
4. The remaining grounds do not add much to this application and whilst it is arguable that the Judge did not consider the medical claim on Article 3 grounds, in view of the nature of the medical evidence this error is unlikely to have been arguably material in view of the high threshold applicable. Nonetheless, for the avoidance of doubt permission is granted on all grounds raised.”
3. There was no Rule 24 response.
The hearing
4. The appellant attended the hearing. I heard submissions from both parties, following which I reserved my decision.
5. Ms. Abdul-Karim conceded at the outset of the hearing that the decision involved the making of errors of law in relation to grounds 1 and 2. However, she submitted that they were not material as the Judge had highlighted two major credibility points and two minor ones, and these were not all infected by the errors of law.
6. Ms. Sepulveda did not make any submissions in relation to ground 3, conceding that the evidence did not show that the appellant would meet the high threshold for Article 3 claims.
Error of law
7. I find that the Judge made a mistake of fact that the PKK were from Turkey, whereas they were from Northern Iraq. This is clear from his findings at [26] to [29] which go to the core of the appellant’s claim of acquiring mobile phones for the PKK.
8. The Judge states from [26] to [29]:
“26. Of my own motion, because it was not raised in the hearing, I find it would make little obvious sense to help the PKK acquire phones and chargers and SIM cards in Iraq, because the alleged fighters were from Turkiye and were fighting in Turkiye at the dates in question, long before the peace settlement reached this year. I take judicial notice that a home country SIM card may not work in any other country. There are various reasons for this:
(a) Compatibility issues with local networks.
(b) Even if it does work, you may incur exorbitant roaming charges for calls, texts, and data usage.
(c) Buying a local SIM card allows you to avoid these charges and enjoy affordable rates for local calls, texts, and internet data.
27. I find that the account makes little sense. They could likely only use these new phones in Iraq.
28. This Appellant never helped the PKK from Turkiye as he claims. They would have acquired their phones in the country where they were most needed. What they possibly needed in Iraq if at all were (i) Iraqi SIM cards to swop over in their existing Turkish phones and (ii) perhaps chargers, if the electricity sockets were incompatible with those in Turkiye. The level of expenditure is not rationally justified. The phones were the most expensive item. They were superfluous. The PKK would surely not equip themselves from scratch in Iraq. They were from Turkiye.
29. It is unclear why the PKK could not individually shop in civilian clothes and buy one at a time what they actually needed. They could have presented separately as foreign tourists seeing the sights. There was absolutely no need for any intermediary and thus the whole account collapses. A Turkish person in civilian clothes would not be assumed to be in the PKK, in my judgment.”
9. The Judge has found that the appellant’s entire account makes little sense on the basis that the PKK would have no grounds for obtaining phones in Iraq. This is on the mistaken assumption that the PKK were based in Turkey. There was evidence before the First-tier Tribunal that this was not the case, and that the PKK headquarters were based in Northern Iraq.
10. I find further find that [26] to [28] involve the making of an error of law in the failure to put matters to the appellant. Had the issue at [26] to [28] been put to the appellant, the mistake of fact would likely not have come about. The Judge is open that this matter was not put to the appellant. I find that he has assessed the appellant’s credibility based on his own incorrect assumptions, without putting them to the appellant.
11. Ms. Abdul-Karim submitted that these errors were not material as the Judge had stated at [25] that there were two major credibility points and some minor ones. She submitted that these errors only went to one of the major credibility points, and that the Judge had weighed these two major points equally in coming to his decision.
12. The second credibility point relates to the documents provided. At [30] the Judge states:
“30. The second major credibility point is the dating of the Court documents. It is beyond argument impossible to have the same date upon a genuine arrest warrant as the search of the house and the judgment in Court. No legal system in the real world proceeds as rapidly as that. The Appellant has produced such documents all dated 2 September 2021, the date when he says his house was raided. This is simply thoughtless bolstering of his case by wholly unreliable documents. I reject them and place no reliance upon them in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed*. The inevitable question follows, should I place trust in anything else that was produced here? The likely answer is probably not.”
13. I find that the documents have been considered against the background of a finding that the appellant’s entire account “makes little sense”. There is one objection taken to the documents, which is the date. It is not clear that the Judge would necessarily have dismissed the claim on the basis of the dates of these documents alone, if he had not dismissed the appellant’s account as making little sense on basis of an error of fact. It is not clear either that equal weight was given to both of the “major” credibility points.
14. I find that the Judge’s error of fact, and his failure to put matters to the appellant on which he then made findings which went to the core of the appellant’s account, are material errors of law.
15. In considering whether this appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal or remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be remade I have taken into account the case of Begum [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC). At headnote (1) and (2) it states:
“(1) The effect of Part 3 of the Practice Direction and paragraph 7 of the Practice Statement is that where, following the grant of permission to appeal, the Upper Tribunal concludes that there has been an error of law then the general principle is that the case will be retained within the Upper Tribunal for the remaking of the decision.
(2) The exceptions to this general principle set out in paragraph 7(2)(a) and (b) requires the careful consideration of the nature of the error of law and in particular whether the party has been deprived of a fair hearing or other opportunity for their case to be put, or whether the nature and extent of any necessary fact finding, requires the matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.”     
16. I have carefully considered the exceptions in 7(2)(a) and 7(2)(b). Given that the Judge erred in his assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s account, and failed to put matters to him, the appellant has effectively been denied a fair hearing. It is therefore appropriate to remit this appeal to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
17. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involves the making of material errors of law and I set the decision aside.  No findings are preserved.
18. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo.
19. The appeal is not to be listed before Judge Freer.
20. The appeal is to be heard at Birmingham.

Kate Hobbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
15 February 2026